HISTORY OF GREECE;

FROM THE

EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE GENERATION

CONTEMPORARY WITH ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

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A NEW EDITION.

IN EIGHT VOLUMES; VOL VIII.

WITH PORTRAIT MAPS, AND PLANS

LONDON:

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

1862.
London: Printed by W. Clowes and Sons, Stamford Street, and Charing Cross.
HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER LXXXVII.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SACRED WAR TO THAT OF THE OLYANTHAN WAR.

It has been recounted in the preceding chapter, how Philip, during the continuance of the Social War, aggrandised himself in Macedonia and Thrace at the expense of Athens, by the acquisition of Amphipolis, Pydna, and Potidaea—the two last actually taken from her, the first captured only under false assurances held out to her while he was besieging it; how he had farther strengthened himself by enlisting Olyntius both as an ally of his own, and as an enemy of the Athenians. He had thus begun the war against Athens, usually spoken of as the war about Amphipolis, which lasted without any formal peace for twelve years. The resistance opposed by Athens to these his first aggressions had been faint and ineffective—partly owing to embarrassments. But the Social War had not yet terminated, when new embarrassments and complications, of a far more formidable nature, sprang up elsewhere—known by the name of the Sacred War, rending the very entrails of the Hellenic world, and profitable only to the indefatigable aggressor in Macedonia.

The Amphiktyonic assembly, which we shall now find exalted into an inauspicious notoriety, was an Hellenic institution ancient and venerable, but rarely invested with practical efficiency. Though political by occasion, it was religious in its main purpose, associated with the worship of Apollo at Delphi and of Demeter at Thermopylae. Its
assemblies were held twice annually—in spring at Delphi, in autumn at Thermopylae; while in every fourth year it presided at the celebration of the great Pythian festival near Delphi, or appointed persons to preside in its name. It consisted of deputies called Hierommenones and Pylagora, sent by the twelve ancient nations or fractions of the Hellenic name, who were recognised as its constituent body: Thessalians, Boeotians, Dorians, Ionians, Perrhaebians, Magnetes, Lokrians, Etaeans or Athenianes, Acheans, Malians, Phokians, Delopose. These were the twelve nations, sole partners in the Amphiktyonic sacred rites and meetings: each nation, small and great alike, having two votes in the decision and no more; and each city, small and great alike, contributing equally to make up the two votes of that nation to which it belonged. Thus Sparta counted only as one of the various communities forming the Dorian nation: Athens, in like manner in the Ionian, not superior in rank to Erythrae or Priene.¹

That during the preceding century, the Amphiktyonic assembly had meddled rarely, and had never meddled to any important purpose, in the political affairs of Greece—is proved by the fact that it is not once mentioned either in the history of Thucydides, or in the Hellenica of Xenophon. But after the humiliation of Sparta at Leuktra, this great religious convocation of the Hellenic world, after long torpor, began to meet for the despatch of business. Unfortunately its manifestations of activity were for the most part abusive and mischievous. Probably not long after the battle of Leuktra, though we do not know the precise year—the Thebans exhibited before the Amphiktyons an accusation against Sparta, for having treacherously seized the Kadmeia (the citadel of Thebes) in a period of profound peace. Sentence of condemnation was pronounced against her,² together with a fine of 500 talents, doubled after a certain interval of non-payment. The act here put in accusation was indisputably a gross political wrong; and a pretence, though a very slight pretence, for bringing political wrong under cognizance of the Amphiktyons, might be found in the tenor of the old oath taken by each included city. Still, every one knew that for generations past, the assembly had taken no actual cognizance of political wrong; so that both trial and sentence were alike glaring departures from understood Grecian

¹ Aeschinês, De Falsa Legat. p. 280, c. 36. For particulars respecting the Amphiktyonic assembly, see the treatise of Tittman, Ueber den Amphiktyonenischen Band, p. 37, 45, 297.  
² Diodor, xvi. 24-28; Justin, viii. 1.  
³ Aeschinês, De Falsa Legat. p. 279, c.
custom—proving only the humiliation of Sparta and the insolence of Thebes. The Spartans of course did not submit to pay, nor were there any means of enforcement against them. No practical effect followed therefore, except (probably) the exclusion of Sparta from the Amphiktyonic assembly—as well as from the Delphian temple and the Pythian games. Indirectly, however, the example was most pernicious, as demonstrating that the authority of a Pan-hellenic convocation, venerable from its religious antiquity, could be abused to satisfy the political antipathies of a single leading state.

In the year 357 B.C., a second attempt was made by Thebes to employ the authority of the Amphiktyonic assembly as a means of crushing her neighbours the Phokians. The latter had been, from old time, border-enemies of the Thebans, Lokrians, and Thessalians. Until the battle of Leuktra, they had fought as allies of Sparta against Thebes, but had submitted to Thebes after that battle, and had continued to be her allies, though less and less cordial, until the battle of Mantinea and the death of Leuctridas.1

Since that time, the old antipathy appears to have been rekindled, especially on the part of Thebes. Irritated against the Phokians probably as having broken off from a sworn alliance, she determined to raise against them an accusation in the Amphiktyonic assembly. As to the substantive ground of accusation, we find different statements. According to one witness, they were accused of having cultivated some portion of the Kirrhean plain, consecrated from of old to Apollo; according to another, they were charged with an aggressive invasion of Boeotia; while according to a third, the war was caused by their having carried off Theano, a married Theban woman. Pausanias confesses that he cannot distinctly make out what was the allegation against them.2

Assisted by the antipathy of the Thessalians and Lokrians, not less vehement than her own, Thebes had no difficulty in obtaining sentence of condemnation against the Phokians. A fine was im-

1 Compare Xenoph. Hellen, vi. 5, 23, and vii. 5, 4. About the feud of the Thessalians and Phokians, see Herodot. vii. 176, viii. 27; Achilleos, De Fals. Leg. p. 230, c. 43; of the Lokrians and Phokians, Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 5, 3; Pausanias, iii. 5, 4.

2 Diodor. xvi. 23; Justin, viii. 1; Pausanias, x. 2; Duris Ap. Athen. xii. p. 564. Justin says, "Causa et origo haud mali, Thebani suere; qui cum rerum potirentur, secundum fortunam imbecillo animo ferentes, victos armis Lacedemoniorum et Phocens, quasi ferae supplicia cadibus et tectis linseant, apud commune Graeco concilium superbe accusaverunt. Lacedemoniorum criminis dtum, quod arcam Thebanam indiciarum tempore occupassent; Phocens, quod Boeotiam depopulati essent; prorsus quasi post arma et bella locum legibus relinquissent."
posed upon them; of what amount, we are not told, but so heavy as to be far beyond their means of payment.

It was thus that the Thebans, who had never been able to attach to themselves a powerful confederacy such as that which formerly held its meetings at Sparta, supplied the deficiency by abusing their ascendency in the Amphiktyonic assembly to procure vengeance upon political enemies. A certain time was allowed for liquidating the fine, which the Phokians had neither means nor inclination to do. Complaint of the fact was then made at the next meeting of the Amphiktyons, when a decisive resolution was adopted, and engraved along with the rest on a column in the Delphian temple, to expropriate the recusant Phokians, and consecrate all their territory to Apollo—as Kirrha with its fertile plain had been treated two centuries before. It became necessary, at the same time, for the maintenance of consistency and equal dealing, to revive the mention of the previous fine still remaining unpaid by the Lacedaemonians; against whom it was accordingly proposed to pass a vote of something like excommunication.

Such impending dangers, likely to be soon realized under the instigation of Thebes, excited a resolute spirit of resistance among the Phokians. A wealthy and leading citizen of the Phokian town Leden, named Philomelus, son of Theotimus, stood forward as the head of this sentiment, setting himself energetically to organize means for the preservation of Phokian liberty as well as property. Among his assembled countrymen, he protested against the gross injustice of the recent sentence, amounting them in an enormous sum exceeding their means; when the strip of land, where they were alleged to have trespassed on the property of the god, was at best narrow and insignificant. Nothing was left now to avert from them utter ruin, except a bold front and an obstinate resistance, which he (Philomelus) would pledge himself to conduct with success, if they would entrust him with full powers. The Phokians (he contended) were the original and legitimate administrators of the Delphian temple—a privilege of which they had been wrongfully dispossessed by the Amphiktyonic assembly and the Delphians. “Let us reply to our enemies (he urged) by re-asserting our lost rights and seizing the temple; we shall obtain support and countenance from many Grecian states, whose interest is the same as our own, to resist the unjust decrees of the Amphiktyons.”

1 Diodor. xvi. 25. 24; Pausanias, x. 2, 1
the Thebans (he added) are plotting the seizure of the temple for themselves, through the corrupt connivance of an _Amphictyonic_ majority: let us anticipate and prevent their injustice.”

Here a new question was raised, respecting the right of presidency over the most venerated sanctuary in Greece; a question fraught with ruin to the peace of the Hellenic world. The claim of the Phokians was not a mere fiction, but founded on an ancient reality, and doubtless believed by themselves to be just. Delphi and its inhabitants were originally a portion of the Phokian name. In the Homeric Catalogue, which Philomelus emphatically cited, it stands enumerated among the Phokians commanded by Schedius and Epistraphs, under the name of the “rocky Pytho”—a name still applied to it by Herodotus. The Delphians had acquired sufficient force to sever themselves from their Phokian brethren—to stand out as a community by themselves—and to assume the lucrative privilege of administering the temple as their own peculiar. Their severance had been first brought about, and their pretensions as administrators espoused, by Sparta, upon whose powerful interest they mainly depended. But the Phokians had never ceased to press their claim, and so far was the dispute from being settled against them, even in 450 B.C., that they then had in their hands the actual administration. The Spartans despatched an army for the express purpose of taking it away from them and transferring it to the Delphians; but very

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3 How far Euboea really promised to the Athenians that which Demosthenes here alleges him to have promised—is a matter to be investigated when we arrive at the transactions of the year 346 B.C. But it seems to me clear that the imputation (true or false) against the Thebans, of having been themselves in conspiracy to seize the temple, must have emanated first from the Phokians, as part of the justification of their own proceedings. If the Thebans ever conceived such an idea, it must have been before the actual occupation of the temple by the Phokians; if they were falsely charged with conceiving it, the false charge would also be preferred at the time. Demosthenes would hardly invent it twelve years after the Phokian occupation.
shortly afterwards, when the Spartan forces had retired, the Athenians marched thither, and dispossessed the Delphians, restoring the temple to the Phokians. This contest went by the name of the Sacred War. At that time the Athenians were masters of most parts of Boeotia, as well as of Megara and Pææ; and had they continued so, the Phokians would probably have been sustained in their administration of the holy place; the rights of the Delphians on one side, against those of the Phokians on the other, being then obviously dependent on the comparative strength of Athens and Sparta. But presently evil days came upon Athens, so that she lost all her inland possessions north of Attica, and could no longer uphold her allies in Phokis. The Phokians now in fact passed into allies of Sparta, and were forced to relinquish their temple management to the Delphians; who were confirmed in it by a formal article of the peace of Nicias in 421 B.C., and retained it without question, under the recognised Hellenic supremacy of Sparta, down to the battle of Leuktra. Even then, too, it continued undisturbed; since Thebes was nowise inclined to favour the claim of her enemies the Phokians, but was on the contrary glad to be assisted in crushing them by their rivals the Delphians; who, as managers of the temple, could materially contribute to a severe sentence of the Amphiktyonic assembly.

We see thus that the claim now advanced by Philomelus was not fictitious, but genuine, and felt by himself as well as by other Phokians to be the recovery of an ancient privilege, lost only through superior force. His views being heartily embraced by his countrymen, he was nominated general with full powers. It was his first measure to go to Sparta, upon whose aid he counted, in consequence of the heavy fine which still stood imposed upon her by the Amphiktyonic sentence. He explained his views privately to King Archidamus, engaging, if the Phokians should become masters of the temple, to erase the sentence and fine from the column of record. Archidamus did not dare to promise him public countenance or support; the rather, as Sparta had always been the chief supporter of the Delphian presidency (as against the Phokian) over the temple. But in secret he warmly encouraged the scheme; furnishing a sum of fifteen talents, besides a few

1 Thucyd. i. 12.
2 Thucyd. v. 18.
3 Justin viii. 1 takes no notice of this first position of the Phokians in regard to the temple of Delphi. He treats them as if they had been despoilers of the temple even at first; "velut diei insecutae."
mercenary soldiers, towards its execution. With this aid Philomelus returned home, provided an equal sum of fifteen talents from his own purse, and collected a body of peltasts, Phokians as well as strangers. He then executed his design against Delphi, attacking suddenly both the town and the temple, and capturing them, as it would appear, with little opposition. To the alarmed Delphians, generally, he promised security and good treatment; but he put to death the members of the Gens (or Clan) called Thrakidaws, and seized their property: these men constituted one among several holy Gentes, leading conductors of the political and religious agency of the place. It is probable, that when thus suddenly assaulted, they had sent to solicit aid from their neighbours the Lokrians of Amphissa; for Philomelus was scarcely in possession of Delphi, when these latter marched up to the rescue. He defeated them however with serious loss, and compelled them to return home.

Thus completely successful in his first attempt, Philomelus lost no time in announcing solemnly and formally his real purpose. He proclaimed that he had come only to resume for the Phokians their ancient rights as administrators; that the treasures of the temple should be safe and respected as before; that no impiety or illegality of any kind should be tolerated; and that the temple and its oracle would be opened, as heretofore, for visitors, sacrificers, and inquirers. At the same time, well aware that his Lokrian enemies at Amphissa were very near, he erected a wall to protect the town and temple, which appears to have been hitherto undefended—especially its western side. He further increased his levies of troops. While the Phokians, inspired with this first advantage, obeyed his call in considerable numbers, he also attracted new mercenaries from abroad by the offer of higher pay. He was presently at the head of 5000 men, strong enough to hold a difficult post like Delphi against all

1 Diodor. xvi. 24. Hesychius (v. Αναπλαστας) mentions another phratry or gens at Delphi, called Laphradae. See Wilhelm Götze, Das Delphinische Orakel, p. 88, Leipzig, 1858.

It is stated by Pausanias, that the Phokians were bent upon dealing with Delphi and its inhabitants in the harshest manner; intending to kill all the men of military age, to sell the remaining population as slaves, and to raise the whole town to the ground. Archidamus king of Sparta (according to Pausanias) induced the Phokians to abandon this resolution (Pausan. iii. 10, 4).

At what moment the Phokians ever determined on this step—or, indeed, whether they ever really determined on it—we cannot feel any certainty. Nor can we decide confidently, whether Pausanias borrowed the statement from Theopompus, whom he quotes a little before.
immediate attack. But being still anxious to appease Grecian sentiment and avert hostility, he despatched envoys to all the principal states—not merely to Sparta and Athens, but also to his enemy Thebes. His envoys were instructed to offer solemn assurances, that the Phokians had taken Delphi simply to reclaim their paternal right of presidency, against past wrongful usurpation; that they were prepared to give any security required by the Hellenic body, for strict preservation of the valuables in the temple, and to exhibit and verify all, by weight and number, before examiners; that conscious of their own rectitude of purpose, they did not hesitate to entreat positive support against their enemies, or at any rate, neutrality.

The answers sent to Philomelus were not all of the same tenor. On this memorable event, the sentiments of the Grecian world were painfully divided. While Athens, Sparta, the Peloponnesian Achaean and some other states in Peloponnesus, recognised the possession of the Phokians, and agreed to assist them in retaining it—the Thebans and Thessalians declared strenuously against them, supported by all the states north of Bocotia, Lokrians, Dorians, Epirotes, Phthiot-Achaean, Magnes, Perrhabians, Atharnians, and Dolopes. Several of these last were dependents of the Thessalians, and followed their example; many of them

1 Diodor. xvi. 27. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τραχεῖόν τις ἐπισημοτάτους κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πόλεως ἀπέστειλεν, ἀπολογισμοῦ ὅτι κατεύθυνα τοῖς Δελφοῖς; ὧν τοὺς ἱερὰς κρήμας ἐπιβουλεύσαν, ἀλλὰ τὰς τοῦ ἱεροῦ πρώτα ἀξιούσια ἐξετάζειν. Ἐκεῖ δὴ χρημάτων τῶν ἱερῶν ἐπί τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ πολιτείας, καὶ τῶν το στρατηγὸς καὶ τῶν ἱεροτομῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἶναι παραδοθέων τοῖς ἑκατοντάδεις Μεταξίων. Ἔλεῳ δὲ, ἂν τις ἐξάγετο καὶ φθείραν πολὺς Φωκικοὺς, μᾶλλον μὲν ἱεραμαίς, εἰ δὲ μὴ γε, τὴν ἰτῆλε θρούν ἔτην.

In reference to the engagement taken by Philomelus, that he would exhibit and verify, before any general Hellenic examiners, all the valuable property in the Delphian temple, by weight and number of articles—the reader will find interesting matter of comparison in the Attic Inscriptions, No. 117-119, vol. i. of Boeckh's Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum, with Boeckh's valuable commentary. These are the records of the numerous gold and silver donations, preserved in the Parthenon, handed over by the trustees of the goddess annually appointed, to their successors at the end of the year, from one Panathenian festival to the next. The weight of each article is formally recorded, and the new articles received each year (ἐπετεία) are specified. Where an article is transferred without being weighed (κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πόλεως ἀπέστειλεν), the fact is noted.—That the previous donations in the Delphian temple also were, carefully weighed, we may judge by the statement of Herodotus, that the golden lion dedicated by Croesus had lost a fraction of its weight, the conflagration of the temple also, when he found it necessary for defence.
moreover, belonging to the Amphiaktyonic constituency, must have taken part in the votes of condemnation just rescinded by the Phokians.

We may clearly see that it was not at first the intention of Philomelus or his Phokian comrades to lay hands on the property of the Delphian temple; and Philomelus, while taking pains to set himself right in the eyes of Greece, tried to keep the prophetic agency of the temple in its ordinary working, so as to meet the exigencies of sacrificers and inquirers as before. He required the Pythian priestess to mount the tripod, submit herself to the prophetic inspiration, and pronounce the word thus put into her mouth, as usual. But the priestess—chosen by the Delphians, and probably herself a member of one among the sacred Delphian Gentes—obstinately refused to obey him; especially as the first question which he addressed concerned his own usurpation, and his chances of success against enemies. On his injunctions, that she should prophesy according to the traditional rites—she replied, that these rites were precisely what he had just overthrown; upon which he laid hold of her, and attempted to place her on the tripod by force. Subdued and frightened for her own personal safety, the priestess exclaimed involuntarily, that he might do what he chose. Philomelus gladly took this as an answer favourable to his purpose. He caused it to be put in writing and proclaimed, as an oracle from the god, sanctioning and countenancing his designs. He convened a special meeting of his partisans and the Delphians generally, wherein appeal was made to this encouraging answer, as warranting full confidence with reference to the impending war. So it was construed by all around, and confirmatory evidence was derived from farther signs and omens occurring at the moment. It is probable however that Philomelus took care for the future to name a new priestess, more favourable to his interest, and disposed to deliver oracular answers under the new administrators in the same manner as under the old.

Though so large a portion of the Grecian name had thus declared war against the Phokians, yet none at first appear to have made hostile movements, except the Lokrians, with whom Philomelus was fully competent to deal. He found himself strong enough to overrun and plunder their territory, engaging in some indecisive skirmishes. At first

1 Diodor. xvi. 25, 26, 27.
the Lokrians would not even give up the bodies of his slain soldiers for burial, alleging that sacrilegious men were condemned by the general custom of Greece to be cast out without sepulture. Nor did they desist from their refusal until he threatened retaliation towards the bodies of their own slain. So bitter was the exasperation arising out of this deplorable war throughout the Hellenic world! Even against the Lokrians alone, however, Philomelus soon found himself in want of money, for the payment of his soldiers—native Phokians as well as mercenary strangers. Accordingly, while he still adhered to his pledge to respect the temple property, he did not think himself precluded from levying a forced contribution on the properties of his enemies, the wealthy Delphian citizens; and his arms were soon crowned with a brilliant success against the Lokrians, in a battle fought near the Rocks called Phadriaides; a craggy and difficult locality so close to Delphi, that the Lokrians must evidently have been the aggressors, marching up with a view to relieve the town. They were defeated with great loss, both in slain and in prisoners; several of them only escaping the spear of the enemy by casting themselves to certain death down the precipitous cliffs.

This victory, while imparting courage to the Phokians, proved the signal for fresh exertions among their numerous enemies. The loud complaints of the defeated Lokrians raised universal sympathy; and the Thebans, now pressed by fear, as well as animated by hatred, of the Phokians, put themselves at the head of the movement. Sending round envoys to the Thessalians and the other Amphiktyonic states, they invoked aid and urged the necessity of mustering a common force—to assist the god,—to vindicate the judicial dignity of the Amphiktyonic assembly,—and to put down the sacrilegious Phokians. It appears that a special meeting of the assembly itself was convened; probably at Thermopylae, since Delphi was in possession of the enemy. Decided resolutions were here taken to form an Amphiktyonic army of execution; accompanied by severe sentences of fine and other punishments, against the Phokian leaders by name—Philomelus and Onomarchus, perhaps brothers, but at least joint commanders, together with others.

1 Diodor. xvi. 25. 2 Diodor. xvi. 28. 3 Diodor. xvi. 28. 4 Diodor. xvi. 22. about Onomarchus.
The peril of the Phokians now became imminent. Their own unaided strength was nowise sufficient to resist the confederacy about to arm in defence of the Amphiktyonic assembly; 1 nor does it appear that either Athens or Sparta had as yet given them anything more than promises and encouragement. Their only chance of effective resistance lay in the levy of a large mercenary force; for which purpose neither their own funds, nor any further aid derivable from private confiscation, could be made adequate. There remained no other resource except to employ the treasures and valuables in the Delphian temple, upon which accordingly Philomelus now laid hands. He did so, however, as his previous conduct evinced, with sincere reluctance, probably with various professions at first of borrowing only a given sum, destined to meet the actual emergency, and intended to be repaid as soon as safety should be provided for. 2 But whatever may have been his intention the official records of the successive Boards of Treasurers of Athens. It is stated in an instructive recent Dissertation, by J. J. Ussing (De Athenaeorum invento et tabulæ Quaestorum Minervæ, in quibus quotannis inscribentur, quorum vasa aurea aliquo rei publicae sunt tabulae, quibusque partes Didymatibus scripta® est . . . . . Nee tamen una tabula templi domus continerat universa, sed separatim quae in Pronæa, quae in Heactampeido, quae in Parthenone (the part of the temple specially so called), servabantur, separatim quae quaque lapidibus consignata erant. Singulari quadam fortuna contingit, ut inde ab anno 434 B.C. ad 407 R.C., tam multa fragmenta tabularum servata sint, ut hos donorum catalogus adfectum reseruare possimus. In quo etiam ad historiæ illæ temporis pertinet, quod florentibus Athenarum rebus oper Deæ paepea super antiquitatem, atque praefatis semper bullo Saturno, inde ab anno 412 R.C., cas partibusdemini viderimus . . . . Urgente pecuniae nupia Atheniensibus ad Deum confugissant, et jam ante annum 406 R.C., pleonasim Pronæa domos ablata esse viderimus. Proximis annis sine dubio nec Heactampeido nec Parthenoni pecunia perecebat; nec mirum est, post bellum Peloponnesiacum ex antiquis ills donis fore nullis comparare;
tions at the outset, all such reserves or limits, or obligations to repay, were speedily forgotten in practice. When the feeling which protected the fund was broken through, it was as easy to take much as little, and the claimants became more numerous and importunate; besides which, the exigencies of the war never ceased, and the implacable repugnance raised by the spoliation amidst half of the Grecian world, left to the Phokians no security except under the protection of a continued mercenary force. Nor were Philomelus and his successors satisfied without also enriching their friends and adorning their wives or favourites.

Availing himself of the large resources of the temple, Philomelus raised the pay of his troops to a sum half as large again as before, and issued proclamations inviting new levies: at the same rate. Through such tempting offers he was speedily enabled to muster a force, horse and foot together, said to amount to 10,000 men; chiefly, as we are told, men of peculiarly wicked and reckless character, since no pious Greek would enlist in such a service. With these he attacked the Lokrians, who were however now assisted by the Thebans from one side, and by the Thessalians with their circumjacent allies from the other. Philomelus gained successive advantages against both of them, and conceived increased hopes from a reinforcement of 1500 Achaeans who came to him from Peloponnesus. The war assumed a peculiarly ferocious character; for the Thebans, confident in their superior force and chance of success, even though the Delphian treasure was employed against them, began by putting to death all their prisoners, as sacrilegious men standing condemned by the Amphiktyonic assembly. This so exasperated the foes of Philomelus, that they constrained him to retaliate upon the Boeotian prisoners. For some time such rigorous inflictions were continued on both sides, until at length the Thebans felt compelled to desist, and Philomelus followed their example. The war lasted awhile with indecisive result, the Thebans and their allies being greatly superior in number. But presently Philomelus incautiously exposed himself to attack in an unfavourable position, near the town of Neon, amidst embarrassing woods and rocks. He was here

2 Isokrates, Orat. v. (ed Philippum) p. 660, τελευτοντες δι χρόνο τῶν ἰδίων δαπάνων.
defeated with severe loss, and his army dispersed; himself re-
eceiving several wounds, and fighting with desperate bravery, until
further resistance became impossible. He then tried to escape,
but found himself driven to the brink of a precipice, where he
could only avoid the tortures of captivity by leaping down and
perishing. The remnant of his vanquished army was rallied at
some distance by Onomarchus.

The Thebans and their allies, instead of pressing the important
victory recently gained over Philomelus, seem to have
supposed that the Phokians would now disperse or sub-
mitt of their own accord, and accordingly returned home.
Their remissness gave time to Onomarchus to re-organize
his spirited countrymen. Convoking at Delphi a
general assembly of Phokians and allies, he strenuously
exhorted them to persevere in the projects, and avenge the death,
of their late general. He found however no inconsiderable amount
of opposition; for many of the Phokians—noway prepared for
the struggle in which they now found themselves embarked, and
themselves ashamed of the spoliation of the temple—were anxious
by some accommodation to put themselves again within the pale of
Hellenic religious sentiment. Onomarchus doubtless replied, and
with too good reason, that peace was unattainable upon any terms
short of absolute ruin; and that there was no course open except
to maintain their ground as they stood, by renewed efforts of force.
But even if the necessities of the case had been less imperative, he
would have been able to overbear all opposition of his own country-
men through the numerous mercenary strangers, now in Phokis
and present at the assembly under the name of allies. In fact, so
irresistible was his ascendency by means of this large paid force
under his command, that both Demosthenes and Aeschines
denominate him (as well as his predecessor and his successor) not
general, but despot, of the Phokians. The soldiers were not less
anxious than Onomarchus to prosecute the war, and to employ the
yet unexhausted wealth of the temple in every way conducive to
ultimate success. In this sense the assembly decreed, naming Ono-
marchus general with full powers for carrying the decree into effect.

1 Diodor, xvi. 31; Pausan. x. 2, 1, Πενθικηκοικοι, ἐδειγμένων περὶ τοῦ πο-
κίου, the dates and duration of these events
are only known to us in a loose and
superficial manner from the narrative of
Phidias.

2 Diodor, xvi. 32, ὁ δὲ Φωκικός—
ἐντεραινόντων τινὶ Δελφοῖς καὶ συνάρτοντω
κεῖται τῶν συμμαχων εἰς πολέμοιν.

3 Aeschines, Fals Leg. p. 246. c. 41,
τῶν εἰς Φωκίκους τιμάχων, &c. Demo-
sthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 661, b. 117,
Φαύλος ὁ Φωκικὸς ὁ τοῦ Ἑλλοὺ διο-but-
tης, &c.
His energetic measures presently retrieved the Phokian cause. Employing the temple funds still more profusely than Philomelus, he invited fresh soldiers from all quarters, and found himself after some time at the head of a larger army than before. The temple exhibited many donatives, not only of gold and silver, but also of brass and iron. While Onomarchus melted the precious metals and coined them into money, he at the same time turned the brass and iron into arms; so that he was enabled to equip both his own soldiers disarmed in the recent defeat, and a class of volunteers poorer than the ordinary self-armed mercenaries. Besides paying soldiers, he scattered everywhere presents or bribes to gain influential partisans in the cities favourable to his cause; probably Athens and Sparta first of all. We are told that the Spartan king Archidamus, with his wife Deinicia, were among the recipients; indeed the same corrupt participation was imputed, by the statement of the hostile-minded Messenians, to the Spartan Ephors and Senate. Even among enemies, Onomarchus employed his gold with effect, contriving thus to gain or neutralise a portion of the Thessalians; among them the powerful despots of Phera, whom we afterwards find allied to him. Thus was the great Delphian treasure turned to account in every way: and the unscrupulous Phokian despot strengthened his hands yet farther, by seizing such of his fellow-countrymen as had been prominent in opposition to his views, putting them to death, and confiscating their property.

Through such combination of profuse allurement, corruption, and violence, the tide began to turn again in favour of the Phokians. Onomarchus found himself shortly at the head of a formidable army, with which he marched forth from Delphi, and subdued successively the Lokrians of Amphissa, the Epiknemidian Lokrians, and the neighbouring territory of Doris. He carried his conquests even as far as the vicinity of Thermopylae; capturing Thronium, one of the towns which commanded that important pass,
and reducing its inhabitants to slavery. It is probable that he also took Nikæa and Alpōnus—two other valuable positions near Thermopylæ, which we know to have been in the power of the Phokians until the moment immediately preceding their ruin—since we find him henceforward master of Thermopylæ, and speedily opening his communications with Thessaly. Besides this extension of dominion to the north and east of Phokis, Onomarchus also invaded Bæotia. The Thbans, now deprived of their northern allies, did not at first meet him in the field, so that he was enabled to capture Orchomenus. But when he proceeded to attack Chaeroneia, they made an effective effort to relieve the place. They brought out their forces, and defeated him, in an action not very decisive, yet sufficient to constrain him to return into Phokis.

Probably the Thbans were at this time much pressed, and prevented from acting effectively against the Phokians, by want of money. We know at least, that in the midst of the Phokian war they hired out a force of 5000 hoplites commanded by Pammenēs, to ArtaΣizus the revolted Phrygian satrap. Here Pammenēs with his soldiers acquired some renown, gaining two important victories over the Persians. The Thbans, it would seem, having no fleet and no maritime dependencies, were less afraid of giving offence to the Great King than Athens had been, when she interdicted Chares from aiding Artabazus, and acquiesced in the unfavourable pacification which terminated the Social War. How long Pammenēs and the Thbans remained in Asia, we are not informed. But in spite of the victories gained by them, Artabazus was not long able to maintain himself against the Persian arms. Three years afterwards, we hear of him and his brother-in-law Memnon as expelled from Asia, and as exiles residing with Philip of Macedon.
While Pammenes was serving under Artabazus, the Athenian general Charês recaptured Sestos in the Hellespont, which appears to have revolted from Athens during the Social War. He treated the captive Sestians with rigour; putting to death the men of military age, and selling the remainder as slaves. This was an important acquisition for Athens, as a condition of security in the Chersonese as well as of preponderance in the Hellespont.

Alarmed at the successes of Charês in the Hellespont, the Thracian prince Kersobleptês now entered on an intrigue with Pammenes in Asia, and with Philip of Macedon (who was on the coast of Thrace, attacking Abdera and Maroneia), for the purpose of checking the progress of the Athenian arms. Philip appears to have made a forward movement, and to have menaced the possessions of Athens in the Chersonese; but his access thither was forbidden by Amadokus, another prince of Thrace, master of the intermediate territory, as well as by the presence of Charês with his fleet off the Thracian coast. Apollonidês of Kardia was the agent of Kersobleptês: who however finding his schemes abortive, and intimidated by the presence of Charês, came to terms with Athens, and surrendered to her the portion of the Chersonese which still remained to him, with the exception of Kardia. The Athenians sent to the Chersonese a further detachment of Kleruchs or out-settlers, for whom considerable room must have been made as well by the depopulation of Sestos, as by the recent cession from Kersobleptês.

1 Diodor. xvi. 34.
2 Polyb. iv. 29, seems to belong to this juncture.
3 The mention of Chares—being at the Chersonese, and sending home despatches—and the notice of Philip as being at Maroneia—all conspire to connect this passage with the year 353-352 B.C., and with the facts referred to that year by Diodorus, xvi. 54. There is an interval of five years between the presence of Chares here alluded to, and the presence of Charês noticed before in the same oration, p. 678, s. 206, immediately after the successful expedition to Edessa in 358 B.C. During these five years, Kersobleptês had acted in a hostile manner towards Athens in the neighbourhood of the Chersonese (p. 680, s. 214), and also towards the two rival Thracian princes, friends of Athens. At the same time Sestos had again revolted; the forces of Athens being engaged in the
the ensuing year (352 B.C.) that the Athenians also despatched a fresh batch of 2000 citizens as settlers to Samos, in addition to those who had been sent thither thirteen years before.

The mention of Philip as attacking Maroneia and menacing the Thracian Chersonese, shows the indefatigable activity of that prince and the steady enlargement of his power.

In 358 B.C., he had taken Amphipolis; before 355 B.C., he had captured Pydna and Potidaea, founded the new town of Philippi, and opened for himself the resources of the adjoining auriferous region; he had established relations with Thessaly, assisting the great family of the Alcmeades at Larissa in their struggles against Lakophron and Peitholous, the despots of Pherae; he had further again chastised the interior tribes bordering on Macedonia, Thracians, Paonians, and Illyrians, who were never long at rest, and who had combined to regain their independence. It appears to have been in 351–353 B.C., that he attacked Methone, the last remaining possession of Athens on the Macedonian coast. Situated on the Thermaic Gulf, Methone was doubtless a convenient station for Athenian privateers to intercept trading vessels, not merely to and from Macedonian ports, but also from Olynthus and Potidaea; so that the Olynthians, then in alliance with Philip against Athens, would be glad to see it pass into his power, and may perhaps have lent him their aid. He pressed the siege of the place with his usual vigour, employing all the engines and means of assault then known; while the besieged on their side were not less resolute in the defence. They repelled his attacks for so long a time, that news of the danger of the place reached Athens, and ample time was afforded from 658 to open the Hellespont, the Social War, from 368 to 355 B.C.; in 355 B.C. Charisias at the Hellespont recovers Sestos, and again defeats the forces of Kersobleptes, who makes a second expedition to Athens with a portion of territory which he still held in the Chersonese.

Diodorus narrates this version of Kersobleptes to the motive of aversion towards Philip and goodwill towards the Athenians. Possibly these may have been the motives pretended by Kersobleptes, to whom a certain party at Athens gave credit for more favourable dispositions than the Demosthenic oration against Aristocrates recognises—as we may see from that oration itself. But I rather apprehend that Diodorus, in describing Kersobleptes hostile to Philip, and friendly to Athens, has applied to the year 353 B.C., a state of relations which did not become true until a later date, nearer to the time when peace was made between Philip and the Athenians in 346 B.C.

2 Diodor. xvi. 14. This passage refers to the year 357–356 B.C., and possibly Philip may have begun to meddle in the Thessalian party-debates, even as early as that year; but his effective interference comes two or three years later. See the general order of Philip's aggressions indicated by Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 12, 8, 15.
3 Diodor. xvi. 22.
for sending relief, had the Athenians been ready and vigorous in their movement. But unfortunately they had not even now learnt experience from the loss of Pydna and Potidea. Either the Etesian winds usual in summer, or the storms of winter, both which circumstances were taken into account by Philip in adjusting the season of his enterprises—or (which is more probable)—the aversion of the Athenian respectable citizens to personal service on ship-board, and their slackness even in pecuniary payment—caused so much delay in preparations, that the expedition sent out did not reach Methone until too late. The Methoneans, having gallantly held out until all their means were exhausted, were at length compelled to surrender. Diodorus tells us that Philip granted terms so far lenient as to allow them to depart with the clothes on their backs. But this can hardly be accurate, since we know that there were Athenian citizens among them sold as slaves, some of whom were ransomed by Demosthenes with his own money. Being now master of the last port possessed by Athens in the Thermaic Gulf—an acquisition of great importance, which had never before belonged to the Macedonian kings—Philip was enabled to extend his military operations to the neighbourhood of the Thracian Chersonese on the one side, and to that of Thermopylae on the other. How he threatened the Chersonese, has been already related: and

1 See a striking passage in Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 39, s. 35. There was another place called Methone—the Thracian Methone—situated in the Chalkidic or Thracian peninsula, near Olynthus and Apollonia—of which we shall hear presently.

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Diodorus (xvi. 31-34) mentions the capture of Methone by Philip twice, in two successive years; first in 354-353 B.C.; again, more copiously, in 353-352 B.C. In my judgement, the earlier of the two dates is the more probable. In 353-352 B.C. Philip carried on his war in Thrace, near Abdera and Maronea—and also his war against Ochomarchus in Thessaly; which transactions seem enough to fill up the time. From the language of Demosthenes (Olynth. i. p. 12, s. 13), we see that Philip did not attack Thessaly until after the capture of Methone. Diodorus as well as Strabo (vii. p. 590), and Justin (vi. 6) state that Philip was wounded and lost the sight of one eye in this siege. But this seems to have happened afterwards, near the Thracian Methone.

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his campaign in Thessaly was yet more important. That country was, as usual, torn by intestine disputes. Lykophron the despot of Thessaly possessed the greatest sway; while the Auleuad of Larissa, too weak to contend against him with their own forces, invited assistance from Philip; who entered Thessaly with a powerful army. Such a reinforcement so completely altered the balance of Thessalian power, that Lykophron in his turn was compelled to entreat aid from Osnomargus and the Phokians.

So strong were the Phokians now, that they were more than a match for the Thebans with their other hostile neighbours, and had means to spare for combating Philip in Thessaly. As their force consisted of a large body of mercenaries, whom they were constrained for security to retain in pay—to keep them employed beyond the border was a point not undesirable. Hence they readily entered upon the Thessalian campaign. At this moment they counted, in the comparative assessment of Hellenic forces, as an item of first-rate magnitude. They were hailed both by Athenians and Spartans as the natural enemy and counterpoise of Thebes, alike odious to both. While the Phokians maintained their actual power, Athens could manage her foreign policy abroad, and Sparta her designs in Peloponnese, with diminished apprehensions of being counter-worked by Thebes. Both Athens and Sparta had at first supported the Phokians against unjust persecution by Thebes and abuse of Amphictyonic jurisdiction, before the spoliation of the Delphian temple was consummated or even anticipated. And though, when that spoliation actually occurred, it was doubtless viewed with reprobation among Athenians, accustomed to unlimited freedom of public discussion—as well as at Sparta, in so far as it became known amidst the habitual secrecy of public affairs—nevertheless political interests so far prevailed, that the Phokians (perhaps in part by aid of bribery) were still countenanced, though not much assisted, as useful rivals to Thebes. To restrain "the Leuktrie insolence of the Thebans," and to see the Bsockopt towns Orchomenus, Thebais, Plataea, restored to their

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1 Such is the description of Athenian feeling, as it then stood, given by Demosthenes twenty-four years afterwards in the Oration De Corona, p. 230, v. 21.

2 Diolor. xvi. 56. Βουλημένος τα Αμφίχειμα συντελέ ταυς Βουλητών, &c., an expression used in reference to Philip a few years afterwards, but more animated and emphatic than we usually find in Diodorus; who, perhaps, borrowed it from Theopompus.
pristine autonomy, was an object of paramount desire with each of the two ancient heads of Greece. So far both Athens and Sparta felt in unison. But Sparta cherished a farther hope—in which Athens by no means concurred—to avail herself of the embarrassments of Thebes for the purpose of breaking up Megalopolis and Messène, and recovering her former Peloponnesian dominion. These two new Peloponnesian cities, erected by Epaminondas on the frontier of Laconia, had been hitherto upheld against Sparta by the certainty of Theban interference if they were menaced. But so little did Thebes seem in a condition to interfere, while Onomarchus and the Phokians were triumphant in 353–352 B.C., that the Megalopolitans despatched envoys to Athens to entreat protection and alliance, while the Spartans on their side sent to oppose the petition.

It is on occasion of the political debates in Athens during the years 351 and 353 B.C., that we first have before us the Athenian Demosthenès, as adviser of his countrymen in the public assembly. His first discourse of public advice was delivered in 351–353 B.C., on an alarm of approaching war with Persia; his second, in 353–352 B.C., was intended to point out the policy proper for Athens in dealing with the Spartan and Megalopolitan envoys.

A few words must here be said about this eminent man, who forms the principal ornament of the declining Hellenic world. He was above twenty-seven years old; being born, according to what seems the most probable among contradictory accounts, in 382–381 B.C. His father, named also Demosthenès, was a citizen of considerable property, and of a character so unimpeachable that even Eschinès says nothing against him; his mother Kleobulé was one of the two daughters and co-heiresses of a citizen named Gylon, 1

1 The birth-year of Demosthenès is matter of notorious controversy. No one of the statements respecting it rests upon evidence thoroughly convincing. The question has been examined with much care and ability both by Mr. Clinton (Fasti Hellen. Appen. xx.) and by Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. vol. v. Appen. i. p. 483 s. q.); by Böhmecke (Norschungen, p. 1–24) more equivocally than conclusively, but still with much instruction; also by K. F. Hermann (De Anno Natali Demosthenis) and many other critics.

In adopting the year Olymp. 99. 3 (the archonship of Evander, 382–381 B.C.), I agree with the conclusion of Mr. Clinton and of K. F. Hermann; differing from Dr. Thirlwall, who prefers the previous year (Olymp. 99. 2), and from Böhmecke, who vindicates the year affirmed by Dionysius (Olymp. 99. 4). Mr. Clinton fixes the first month of Olymp. 99. 3, as the month in which Demosthenès was born. This appears to me greater precision than the evidence warrants.

2 Plutarch, Demosth. c. 4; Eschinès adv. Ktesiph. p. 58. c. 57; Demosth. cont. Aphob. B. p. 853. According to Aeschines, Gylon was put on his trial for having betrayed Nympheum to the
an Athenian exile, who, having become rich as a proprietor of land and exporter of corn in Bosphorus, sent his two daughters to Athens; where, possessing handsome dowries, they married two Athenian citizens—Democharēs and the elder Demosthenēs. The latter was a man of considerable wealth, and carried on two distinct manufactories; one of swords or knives, employing thirty-two slaves—the other, of couches or beds, employing twenty. In the new schedule of citizens and of taxable property, introduced in the archonship of Nausinikus (378 B.C.), the elder Demosthenēs was enrolled among the richest class, the leaders of Symmories. But he died about 375 B.C., leaving his son Demosthenēs seven years old, with a younger daughter about five years of age. The boy and his large paternal property were confided to the care of three guardians named under his father's will. These guardians—though the father, in hopes of ensuring their fidelity, had bequeathed to them considerable legacies, away from his own son, enemy, but not appearing, was sentenced to death in his absence, and became an exile. He then went to Bosporus Panthikapeum, obtained the favour of the king (probably Satyrus—see Mr. Clinton's Appendix on the kings of Bosporus. Fasti Hellenici. Appendix. § 941, p. 282), together with the grant of a district called Kepi, and married the daughter of a rich man there; by whom he had two daughters. In after-days, he sent these two daughters to Athens, where one of them, Kleobulē, was married to the elder Demosthenēs. Aristotēles has probably exaggerated the gravity of the sentence against Gylon, who seems only to have been fined. The guardians of Demosthenēs assert no more than that Gylon was fined, and dealt with the fine unpaid, while Demosthenēs asserts that the fine was paid.

Upon the facts here stated by Aristotēles, a few explanatory remarks will be useful. Demosthenēs was born 382–381 B.C., this would probably throw the birth of his mother Kleobulē to some period near the close of the Peloponnesian war, 405–404 B.C. We see, therefore, that the establishment of Gylon in the kingdom of Bosporus, and his nuptial connection there formed, must have taken place during the closing years of the Peloponnesian war; between 412 B.C. (the year after the Athenian catastrophe at Syracuse) and 405 B.C. These were years of great misfortune to Athens. After the disaster at Syracuse, she could no longer maintain ascendency over, or grant protection to, a distant tributary like Nymphæum in the Tauric Chersonesus. It was therefore natural that the Athenian citizens there settled, engaged probably in the export trade of corn to Athens, should seek security by making the best bargain they could with the neighbouring kings of Bosporus. In this transaction Gylon seems to have had strong conjointly forward, gaining both favour and profit to himself. And when, after the close of the war, the corn trade again became comparatively unimpeded, he was in a situation to carry it on upon a large and lucrative scale. Another example of Greeks who gained favour, held office, and made fortunes, under Satyrus in the Bosporus, is given in the Oratorio [xvii.] Trapezetica of Iatros, § 51. Compare also the case of Aristotēles the Athenian (Lyseus pro Murious, Or. xvi. 4), who was sent by his father to reside with Satyrus for some time, before the close of the Peloponnesian war; which shows that Satyrus was at that time, when Nymphæum was probably placed under his protection, in friendly relations with Athens.

I may remark that the woman whom Gylon married, though Aristotēles calls her a Scythian woman, may be supposed more probably to have been the daughter of some Greek (not an Athenian) resident in Bosporus.
and though all of them were rich men as well as family connections and friends—administered the property with such negligence and dishonesty, that only a sum comparatively small was left, when they came to render account to their ward. At the age of sixteen years complete, Demosthenes attained his civil majority, and became entitled by the Athenian law to the administration of his own property. During his minority, his guardians had continued to enrole him among the wealthiest class (as his father had ranked before), and to pay the increased rate of direct taxation chargeable upon that class; but the real sum handed over to him by his guardians was too small to justify such a position. Though his father had died worth fourteen talents,—which would be diminished by the sums bequeathed as legacies, but ought to have been increased in greater proportion by the interest on the property for the ten years of minority, had it been properly administered—the sum paid to young Demosthenes on his majority was less than two talents, while the guardians not only gave in dishonest accounts, but professed not to be able to produce the father’s will. After repeated complaints and remonstrances, he brought a judicial action against one of them—Aphobus, and obtained a verdict carrying damages to the amount of ten talents. Payment however was still evaded by the debtor. Five speeches remain delivered by Demosthenes, three against Aphobus, two against Onetor, brother-in-law of Aphobus. At the date of the latest oration, Demosthenes had still received nothing; nor do we know how much he ultimately realised, though it would seem that the difficulties thrown in his way were such as to compel him to forego the greater part of the claim. Nor is it certain whether he ever brought the actions, of which he speaks as intended, against the other two guardians Demophon and Therippides.

Demosthenes received during his youth the ordinary grammatical and rhetorical education of a wealthy Athenian. Even as a boy, he is said to have manifested extraordinary appetite and interest for rhetorical exercise. By earnest entreaty, he prevailed on his tutors to conduct him to hear Kallistratus, one of the ablest

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κεκομισμένον μηδ’ ὅτι οὖν, καὶ ταῦτα ἑβί-
λοτα ποιέων ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς, εἰτὶ τῶν δεότων ἐβιβάλεθε πράττειν.

That he ultimately got much less than he was entitled to, appears from his own statement in the oration against Meidas, p. 540.

See Westermann, Ἕλληνικά μεταφράσεις, p. 15.

Demosthenes oravit ipse, cap. i. p. 15, 16.

Plutarch (Vit. X. Olynth. p. 844) says that he voluntarily refrained from enforcing the judgement obtained. I do not clearly understand what is meant by Δασχίνος, when he designates Demosthenes as τὰ πατρίθα καταγελάστως προϊμυνόντως.
speakers in Athens, delivering an harangue in the Dikastery on the matter of Oropus. This harangue, producing a profound impression upon Demosthenes, stimulated his fondness for rhetorical studies. Still more was the passion excited, when on attaining his majority he found himself cheated of most of his paternal property, and constrained to claim his rights by a suit at law against his guardians. Being obliged, according to Athenian practice, to plead his own cause personally, he was made to feel keenly the helpless condition of an incompetent speaker, and the necessity of acquiring oratorical power, not simply as an instrument of ambition, but even as a means of individual defence and safety. It appears also that he was, from childhood, of sickly constitution and feeble muscular frame; so that partly from his own disinclination, partly from the solicitude of his mother, he took little part either as boy or youth in the exercises of the palaestra. His delicate clothing, and somewhat effeminate habits, procured for him as a boy the nickname of Batalus, which remained attached to him most part of his life, and which his enemies tried to connect with degrading imputations. Such comparative bodily disability

1 Plutarch, Demosth. c. 5; Vit. X, Orator. p. 844; Hieronymus ap. Adv. Gell. iii. 15. Nothing positive can be made out respecting this famous trial; neither the date, nor the exact point in question, nor the manner in which Kalistratus was concerned in it—nor who were his opponents. Many conjectures have been proposed, differing materially one from the other, and all uncertain.

These conjectures are brought together and examined in Rehdants, Vitae Graecarum, Chabrie, et Tanothei, p. 111-114.

In the month of November, 361 B.C., Kalistratus was in exile at Methone in the Thermaic Gulf. He had been twice condemned to death by the Athenians (Demosth. cont. Poly. p. 229). But when these condemnation took place, we do not know.

2 Plutarch, Demosth. c. 4. Such a view of the necessity of a power of public speaking is put forward by Kallikles in the Gorgias of Plato, p. 485, 511, c. 90, 142. The comparison of Aristotle, is instructive as to the point of view of a free Greek. "If it be disgraceful not to be able to protect yourself by your bodily force, it is equally so not to be able to protect yourself by your powers of speaking; which is in a more peculiar manner the privilege of man."

3 The foundation of the nickname Batalus is not clear, and was differently understood by different persons; compare also Libanius, Vita Demosth. p. 294, ap. Westcrown, Scriptores Biograplici. But it can hardly have been a very discréditable foundation, since Demosthenes takes the name to himself, De Corona, p. 289.
probably contributed to incite his thirst for mental and rhetorical acquisitions, as the only road to celebrity open. But it at the same time disqualified him from appropriating to himself the full range of a comprehensive Grecian education, as conceived by Plato, Isokratés, and Aristotelé; an education applying alike to thought, word, and action—combining bodily strength, endurance, and fearlessness, with an enlarged mental capacity and a power of making it felt by speech. The disproportion between the physical energy, and the mental force, of Demosthenes, beginning in childhood, is recorded and lamented in the inscription placed on his statue after his death.

As a youth of eighteen years of age, Demosthenes found himself with a known and good family position at Athens, being ranked in the class of richest citizens and liable to the performance of liturgies and trierarchy as his father had been before him; yet with a real fortune very inadequate to the outlay expected from him—embarrassed by a legal proceeding against guardians wealthy as well as unservile—and an object of dislike and annoyance from other wealthy men, such as Meidias and his brother Thrasylochus, friends of those guardians. His family position gave him a good introduction to public affairs, for which he proceeded to train himself carefully; first as a writer of speeches for others, next as a speaker in his own person. Plato and Isokratés were both at this moment in full celebrity, visited at Athens by pupils from every part of Greece; Isæus also, who had studied under Isokratés, was in great reputation as a composer of judicial harangues for plaintiffs or defendants in civil causes. Demosthenes put himself under the teaching of Isæus (who is said to have assisted him in composing the speeches against his guardians), and also profited largely by the discourse of Plato, of Isokratés, and others. As an ardent aspirant he would seek instruction from most of the best

1 Plutarch, Demosth. c. 30.
3 See the account given by Demosthenes (cont. Meidias, p. 539, 540) of the manner in which Meidias and Thrasylclus first began their persecution of him, while the suit against his guardians was still going on. These guardians attempted to get rid of the suit by inducing Thrasylclus to force upon him an exchange of properties (Antidosis), tendered by Thrasylclus, who had just been put down for a trierarchy. If the exchange had been effected, Thrasylclus would have given the guardians a release. Demosthenes could only avoid it by consenting to incur the cost of the trierarchy—20 minas.
sources, theoretical as well as practical—writers as well as lecturers. But besides living teachers, there was one of the past generation who contributed largely to his improvement. He studied Thucydidès with indefatigable labour and attention; according to one account, he copied the whole history eight times over with his own hand; according to another, he learnt it all by heart, so as to be able to rewrite it from memory when the manuscript was accidentally destroyed. Without minutely criticising these details, we ascertain at least that Thucydidès was the object of his peculiar study and imitation. How much the composition of Demosthenès was fashioned by the reading of Thucydidès—reproducing the daring, majestic and impressive phraseology, yet without the overstrained brevity and involutions of that great historian—and contriving to blend with it a perspicuity and grace not inferior to Lysias—may be seen illustrated in the elaborate criticism of the rhetor Dionysius.

While thus striking out for himself a bold and original style, Demosthenès had still greater difficulties to overcome in regard to the external requisites of an orator. He was not endowed by nature, like Eschinès, with a magnificent voice; nor, like Demades, with a ready flow of vehement improvisation. His thoughts required to be put together by careful preparation; his voice was bad and even lisping—his breath short—his gesticulation ungraceful; moreover he was overawed and embarrassed by the manifestations of the multitude. Such an accumulation of natural impediments were at least equal to those of which Isokrates complains, as having debarred him all his life from addressing the public assembly, and restrained him to a select audience of friends or pupils. The energy and success with which Demosthenès overcame his defects, in such manner as to satisfy a critical assembly like the Athenian, is one of the most memorable circumstances in the general history of self-education. Repeated humiliation and sharp pulse only spurred him on to fresh solitary efforts for improvement. He corrected his defective elocution by speaking with pebbles in his mouth; he prepared himself to overcome the voice of the assembly by declaiming in stormy weather on the sea-shore of Phalerum; he opened his lungs by running, and extended his powers of holding breath by pro-

1 Demosthenès both studied attentively the dialogues, and heard the discourse of Plato (Cicero, Brutus, 32). 2 Dionys. Hal. De Thucydidis Jud. &c. of Plato (Cicero, Brutus, 31); De Administr. Vi Dicendi, Orator, 4, 15; Plutarch, Vit. X. Demosthen. p. 982, 983. Orator, c. 322; Tacitus, Dialog. de
nouncing sentences in marching up-hill; he sometimes passed two or three months without interruption in a subterranean chamber, practising night and day either in composition or declamation, and shaving one-half of his head in order to disqualify himself from going abroad. After several trials without success before the assembly, his courage was on the point of giving way, when Eunomus and other old citizens reassured him by comparing the matter of his speeches to those of Perikles, and exhorting him to persevere a little longer in the correction of his external defects. On another occasion, he was pouring forth his disappointment to Satyrus the actor, who undertook to explain to him the cause, desiring him to repeat in his own way a speech out of Sophokles, which he (Satyrus) proceeded to repeat after him, with suitable accent and delivery. Demosthenes, profoundly struck with the difference, began anew the task of self-improvement; probably taking constant lessons from good models. In his unremitting private practice, he devoted himself especially to acquiring a graceful action, keeping watch on all his movements while declaiming before a tall looking-glass. After pertinacious efforts for several years, he was rewarded at length with complete success. His delivery became full of decision and vehemence, highly popular with the general body of the assembly; though some critics censured his modulation as artificial and out of nature, and savouring of low stage-effect; while others, in the same spirit, condemned his speeches as over-laboured and sickling of the lamp, ²

¹ These and other details are given in Plutarch’s Life of Demosthenes, c. 4. v. They depend upon good evidence; for he cites Demetrius the Phalerean, who heard them himself from Demosthenes in the latter years of his life. The subterranean chamber where Demosthenes practised was shown at Athens even in the time of Plutarch.

Cicero (who also refers to Demetrius Phalereus), De Divinar. ii. 46, 96, Libanius, Zosimus, and Photius, generally give the same statements, with some variations.

² Plutarch, Deomesth. c. 9. "Epei πλάκας γε καὶ δόρων οἱ λεκέντες διὰ αὐτόν λέγει τῶν ἑρμήνευσιν δίλλοι έχον εκ τοῖ διε προσέκει Agathodaios καὶ Αἰκατρινός τῷ Φαληρεῖ καὶ τοῖς κακώσις. Οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἑρμήνευσι μὲν οὖς αὐτόν ἐν τῷ δόρων παλαγ concerted γεγονότα· παρὰ βασιλεὺς, ὥς ἐν Φαληρεῖ τῶν ἑρμήνευσιν ἔκειν οὐκ ὑμᾶς πότε πρὸς τῶν ἑρμήνευσιν εὐθοετίων αὐτῶν. Θρίσκων, c. 11. Τοὺς μὲν οὖς πολλοὶ διαδυσκόμοντο ερωτών θαυμαστῶν, οὖς δὲ χρισθήσατε ταῦτα ἐν ἐρμήνευσιν γιγαντίω καὶ ἀγνηστικῶν αὐτῶν τῶν πλάσμων καὶ μαλακῶν, ὥς καὶ Δημήτριος οὐ Φαληρεῖ αὐτῶν ἐστιν."

This sentence is illustrated by a passage in Quintilian, i. 8. 2: "Sit alter in hume lecto virilis, et annu spectante quidam gravibus: et non quidam prosce simul—quia carmen est, et se poesae canere texturae non tamen in carmina disoluta, nec placuent (ut in a plessipe ibi) effeminntur." The meaning of placium, in the technical language of rhetoricians contemporany with Quintilian, seems different from that which it bears in Dionyzaus, p. 1900-1901. But whether Plutarch has exactly rendered to us what Demetrius Phalereus said of Demosthenes—whether Demetrius spoke of the modu-
So great was the importance assigned by Demosthenes himself to these external means of effect, that he is said to have pronounced "Action" to be the first, second, and third requisite for an orator. If we grant this estimate to be correct, with reference to actual hearers—we must recollect that his speeches are (not less truly than the history of Thucydides) "an everlasting possession rather than a display for momentary effect." Even among his contemporaries, the effect of the speeches, when read apart from the speaker, was very powerful. There were some who thought that their full excellence could only be thus appreciated; while to the after-world, who know them only by reading, they have been and still are the objects of an admiration reaching its highest pitch in the enthusiastic sentiment of the fastidious rhetor Dionysius. The action of Demosthenes—consummate as it doubtless was, and highly as he may himself have prized an accomplishment so laboriously earned—produced its effect only in conjunction with the matter of Demosthenes: his thoughts, sentiments, words, and above all, his sagacity in appreciating and advising on the actual situation, his political wisdom, and his lofty patriotic ideal, are in truth quite as remarkable as his oratory. By what training he attained either the one or the other of these qualities, we are unfortunately not permitted to know. Our informants have little interest in him except as a speaker; they tell us neither what he learnt, nor from whom, nor by what companions, or party-associates, his political point of view was formed. But we shall hardly err in supposing that his attentive meditation of Thucydides supplied him, not merely with force and majesty of expression, but also with that conception of Athens in her foretime which he is perpetually impressing on his countrymen—Athens at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, in days of exuberant energy, and under the advice of her noblest statesman.

In other respects, we are left in ignorance as to the mental
History of Demosthenès. Before he acquired reputation as a public adviser, he was already known as a logographer, or composer of discourses to be delivered either by speakers in the public assembly or by litigants in the Dikastery; for which compositions he was paid, according to usual practice at Athens. He had also pleaded in person before the Dikastery; in support of an accusation preferred by others against a law, proposed by Leptihes, for abrogating votes of immunity passed by the city in favour of individuals, and restraining such grants in future. Nothing is more remarkable, in this speech against Leptihes, than the intensity with which the young speaker enforces on the people the necessity of strict and faithful adherence to engagements, in spite of great occasional inconvenience in so doing. It would appear that he was in habitual association with some wealthy youths—among others, with Apollodorus son of the wealthy banker Pasion—whom he undertook to instruct in the art of speaking. This we learn from the denunciations of his rival Aschines, who accuses him of having thus made his way into various wealthy families—especially where there was an orphan youth and a widowed mother—using unworthy artifices to defraud and ruin them. How much truth there may be in such imputations, we cannot tell. But Aschines was not unwarranted in applying to his rival the obnoxious appellations of logographer and sophist; appellations all the more disparaging, because Demosthenès belonged to a triarchic family, of the highest class in point of wealth.

It will be proper here to notice another contemporary adviser, who stands in marked antithesis and rivalry to Demosthenès. Phokion was a citizen of small means, son of a pestle-maker. Born about 102 B.C., he was about twenty years older than Demosthenès. At what precise time his political importance commenced, we do not know; but he lived to the great age of 84, and was a conspicuous man throughout the last half-century of his life. He becomes known first as a military officer, having served in subordinate command under Chabrias, to whom he was greatly

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Compare the shame of the rich youth Hippokratēs, in the Platonic dialogue called Protagoras, when the idea is broached that he is about to visit Protagoras for the purpose of becoming himself a sophist (Plato, Protagoras. p. 164 F, 165 A, cap. 8-19).
attached, at the battle of Naxos in 376 B.C. He was a man of thorough personal bravery, and considerable talents for command; of hardy and enduring temperament, insensible to cold or fatigue; strictly simple in his habits, and above all, superior to every kind of personal corruption. His abstinence from plunder and peculation, when on naval expeditions, formed an honourable contrast with other Athenian admirals, and procured for him much esteem on the part of the maritime allies. Hence probably his surname of Phokion the Good.

I have already remarked how deep and strong was the hold acquired on the Athenian people, by any public man who once established for himself a character above suspicion on the score of personal corruption. Among Athenian politicians, but too many were not innocent on this point: moreover, even when a man was really innocent, there were often circumstances in his life which rendered more or less of doubt admissible against him. Thus Demosthenes—being known not only as a person of somewhat costly habits, but also as frequenting wealthy houses, and receiving money for speeches composed or rhetoric communicated—was sure to be accused, justly or unjustly, by his enemies, of having cheated rich clients, and would never obtain unquestioned credit for a high pecuniary independence, even in regard to the public affairs; although he certainly was not corrupt, nor generally believed to be corrupt—at least during the period which this volume embraces, down to the death of Philip. But Phokion would receive neither money nor gifts from any one—was notoriously and obviously poor—went barefoot and without an upper garment even in very cold weather—had only one female slave to attend on his wife; while he had enjoyed commands sufficient to enrich him if he had chosen. His personal incorruptibility thus stood forth prominently to the public eye. Combined as it was with bravery and fair generalship, it procured for him testimonies of confidence greater than those accorded even to Perikles. He was elected no less than forty-five times to the annual office of Strategus or General of the city—that is, one of the Board of Ten so denominated, the greatest

1 Allin, V. ii. iii. 47; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 10; Cornelius Nepos, Phokion, c. 1.
2 I introduce here this reservation as to time, not as meaning to allude the contrary with regard to the period after Philip's death, but as wishing to postpone for the present the consideration of the latter charges against Demosthenes—the receipt of money from Persia, and the abstraction from the treasuries of Harpalus. I shall examine these points at the proper time.
executive function at Athens—and elected too, without having ever on any occasion solicited the office, or even been present at the choice. In all Athenian history, we read of no similar multiplication of distinct appointments and honours to the same individual.

According to the picture of Athens and her democracy, as usually presented by historians, we are taught to believe that the only road open to honours or political influence, was, by a seductive address, and by courting the people with fine speeches, unworthy flattery, or unmeasured promises. Those who take this view of the Athenian character, will find it difficult to explain the career of Phokion. He was no orator—from disdain rather than incompetence. Besides receiving a good education, he had profited by the conversation of Plato as well as of Xenokratos, in the Academy; and we are not surprised that in their school he contracted a contempt for popular oratory, as well as a love for brief, concentrated, pungent reply. Once when about to speak in public, he was observed to be particularly absorbed in thought. "You seem meditative, Phokion," said a friend. "Ay, by Zeus," was the reply—"I am meditating whether I cannot in some way abridge the speech which I am just about to address to the Athenians." He knew so well, however, on what points to strike, that his telling brevity, strengthened by the weight of character and position, cut through the fine oratory of Demosthenes more effectually than any counter-orator from men like Aeschines. Demosthenes himself greatly feared Phokion as an opponent, and was heard to observe, on seeing him rise to speak, "Here comes the cleaver of my harangues." Polyekuptus—himself an orator and a friend of Demosthenes—drew a distinction highly complimentary to Phokion, by saying—"That Demosthenes was the finest orator, but Phokion the most formidable in speech." In public policy, in means of political effect,
and in personal character—Phokion was the direct antithesis of Demosthenes; whose warlike eloquence, unwarlike disposition, paid speech-writing, and delicate habits of life—he doubtless alike despised.

As Phokion had in his nature little of the professed orator, so he had still less of the flatterer. He affected and sustained the character of a blunt soldier, who speaks out his full mind without suppression or ornament, careless whether it be acceptable to hearers or not. His estimate of his countrymen was thoroughly and undisguisedly contemptuous. This is manifest in his whole proceedings; and appears especially in the memorable remark ascribed to him, on an occasion when something that he had said in the public assembly met with peculiar applause. Turning round to a friend, he asked—"Have I not unconsciously said something bad?" His manners, moreover, were surly and repulsive, though his disposition is said to have been kind. He had learnt in the Academy a sort of Spartan self-suppression and rigour of life. No one ever saw him either laughing, or weeping, or bathing in the public baths.

If then Phokion attained the unparalleled honour of being chosen forty-five times general, we may be sure that there were other means of reaching it besides the arts of oratory and demagogy. We may indeed ask with surprise, how it was possible for him to attain it, in the face of so many repulsive circumstances, by the mere force of bravery and honesty; especially as he never performed any supereminent service, though on various occasions he conducted himself with credit and ability. The answer to this question may be found in the fact, that Phokion, though not a flatterer of the people, went decidedly along with the capital weakness of the people. While despising their judgement, he manifested no greater foresight, as to the public interests and security of Athens, than they did. The Athenian people had doubtless many infirmities and committed many errors; but the worst error of all, during the interval between 356-336 B.C., was their unconquerable repugnance to the efforts, personal and

1 So Tacitus, after reporting the exact reply of the tribune Sabtius Flavian, when examined as an accomplice in the conspiracy against Nero—"Ipsa retuli verba: quia non, ut Somenee, vulgata erant; nec minus nesci decidbat se cum suis militaris virt uncompos; sed validos."

2 Plutarch, Phokion, c. 4, 5.

3 Cornelius Nepos (Phokion, c. 1) found in his authors no account of the military exploits of Phokion, but much about his personal integrity.
pecuniary, required for prosecuting a hearty war against Philip. Of this aversion to a strenuous foreign policy, Phokion made himself the champion; addressing, in his own vein, sarcastic taunts against those who called for action against Philip, as if they were mere brawlers and cowards, watching for opportunities to enrich themselves at the public expense. Eubulus the orator was among the leading statesmen who formed what may be called the peace-party at Athens, and who continually resisted or discouraged energetic warlike efforts, striving to keep out of sight the idea of Philip as a dangerous enemy. Of this peace-party, there were doubtless some who acted corruptly, in the direct pay of Philip. But many others of them, without any taint of personal corruption, espoused the same policy merely because they found it easier for the time to administer the city under peace than under war—because war was burdensome and disagreeable, to themselves as well as to their fellow-citizens—and because they either did not, or would not, look forward to the consequences of inaction. Now it was a great advantage to this peace-party, who wanted a military leader as partner to their civil and rhetorical leaders, to strengthen themselves by a colleague like Phokion; a man not only of unsuspected probity, but peculiarly disinterested in advising peace, since his importance would have been exalted by war. Moreover most of the eminent military leaders had now come to love only the license of war, and to disdain the details of the war-office at home; while Phokion, and he almost alone among them, was content to stay at Athens, and keep up that combination of civil with military efficiency which had been formerly habitual. Hence he was sustained, by the peace-party and by the aversion to warlike effort prevalent among the public, in a sort of perpetuity of the strategic functions, without any solicitation or care for personal popularity on his own part.

The influence of Phokion as a public adviser, during the period embraced in this volume, down to the battle of Chaeroneia, was eminently mischievous to Athens; all the more mischievous, partly (like that of Nikias) from the respectability of his personal qualities—partly because he espoused and sanctioned the most dangerous infirmity of the Athenian mind. His biographers mislead our judgment by pointing our attention chiefly to the last twenty
years of his long life, after the battle of Chaeroneia. At that
time, when the victorious military force of Macedonia had been
fully organized and that of Greece comparatively prostrated, it
might be argued plausibly (I do not say decisively, even then)
that submission to Macedonia had become a fatal necessity; and
that attempts to resist could only end by converting bad into
worse. But the pacific policy of Phokion—which might be called
prudence, after the accession of Alexander—was ruinously im-
prudent as well as dishonourable during the reign of Philip. The
odds were all against Philip in his early years; they shifted and
became more and more in his favour, only because his game was
played well, and that of his opponents badly. The superiority of
force was at first so much on the side of Athens, that if she had
been willing to employ it, she might have made sure of keeping
Philip at least within the limits of Macedonia. All depended
upon her will; upon the question, whether her citizens were prepared
in their own minds to incur the expense and fatigue of a vigorous
foreign policy—whether they would handle their pikes, open their
purses, and forego the comforts of home, for the maintenance of
Greek and Athenian liberty against a growing, but not as yet
irresistible, destroyer. To such a sacrifice the Athenians could
not bring themselves to submit; and in consequence of that re-
luctance, they were driven as the end to a much graver and more
 irreparable sacrifice—the loss of liberty, dignity, and security.
Now it was precisely at such a moment, and when such a question
was pending, that the influence of the peace-loving Phokion was
most ruinous. His anxiety that the citizens should be buried at
home in their own sepulchres—his despair, mingled with contempt,
of his countrymen and their refined habits—his hatred of the
orators who might profit by an increased war-expenditure—all
contributed to make him discourage public effort, and await
passively the preponderance of the Macedonian arms; thus play-
ing the game of Philip, and siding, though himself incorruptible,
with the orators in Philip’s pay.

The love of peace, either in a community, or in an individual,
usually commands sympathy without farther inquiry, though there
are times of growing danger from without, in which the adviser of
peace is the worst guide that can be followed. Since the Peloponnesian war, a revolution had been silently going on in Greece,
whereby the duties of soldiership had passed to a great degree

1 See the replies of Phokion in Plutarch, Phokion, c. 23.
from citizen militia into the hands of paid mercenaries. The resident citizens generally had become averse to the burthen of military service; while on the other hand the miscellaneous aggregate of Greeks willing to carry arms anywhere and looking merely for pay, had greatly augmented. Very differently had the case once stood. The Athenian citizen of 432 B.C.—by concurrent testimony of the eulogist Perikles and of the unfriendly Corinthians—was ever ready to brave the danger, fatigue, and privation, of foreign expeditions, for the glory of Athens. "He accounts it holiday work to do duty in her service (it is an enemy who speaks!); he wasted his body for her as though if had been the body of another."

Embracing with passion the idea of imperial Athens, he knew that she could only be upheld by the energetic efforts of her individual citizens, and that the talk in her public assemblies, though useful as a preliminary to action, was mischievous if allowed as a substitute, for action. Such was the Periklean Athenian of 431 B.C. But this energy had been crushed in the disasters closing the Peloponnesian war, and had never again revived. The Demosthenic Athenian of 330 B.C. had as it were grown old. Pugnacity, Pan-hellenic championship, and the love of enterprise, had died within him. He was a quiet, home-keeping, refined citizen, attached to the democratic constitution, and executing with cheerful pride his ordinary city-duties under it;
but immersed in industrial or professional pursuits, in domestic comforts, in the impressive manifestations of the public religion, in the atmosphere of discussion and thought, intellectual as well as political. To renounce all this for foreign and continued military service, he considered as a hardship not to be endured, except under the pressure of danger near and immediate. Precautionary exigencies against distant perils, however real, could not be brought home to his feelings; even to pay others for serving in his place, was a duty which he could scarcely be induced to perform.

Not merely in Athens, but also among the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta, the resident citizens had contracted the like indisposition to military service. In the year 431 B.C., these Peloponnesians (here too we have the concurrent testimony of Periklès and Archidamus) had been forward for service with their persons, and only backward when asked for money. In 383 B.C., Sparta found them so reluctant to join her standard, especially for operations beyond sea, that she was forced to admit into her confederacy the principle of pecuniary commutation; just as Athens had done (about 460-450 B.C.) with the unwarlike islanders enrolled in her confederacy of Delos.

Amidst this increasing indisposition to citizen military service, the floating, miscellaneous, bands who made soldiership a livelihood under any one who would pay them, increased, in number from year to year. In 102-101 B.C., when the Cyreian army (the Ten Thousand Greeks) were levied, it had been found difficult to bring so many together; large premiums were given to the chiefs, or enlisting agents; the recruits consisted, in great part, of settled men tempted by lucrative promises away from their homes. But active men ready for paid foreign service were perpetually multiplying, from poverty, exile, or love of enterprise; they were

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1 Thucyd. i. 80, 81, 141.
3 Thucyd. i. 99.
4 Isokr. Orat. v. (Philiipp.) s. 112.
5 Thucyd. i. 80, 81, 141.
7 Thucyd. i. 99.
8 See the mention of the mercenary Greeks in the service of the satraps Mana in Aabis, of the satraps Thasaphernes and Pherabazus, and of the Spartan Agesilaus—of Iphikrates and others. Xenoph. Hellen. tii. i, 13; iii. 3.
put under constant training and greatly improved, by Iphikratès and others, as peltasts or light infantry to serve in conjunction with the citizen force of hoplites. Jason of Pherai brought together a greater and better trained mercenary force than had ever been seen since the Cyreians in their upward march;¹ the Phokians also in the Sacred War, having command over the Delphian treasures, surrounded themselves with a formidable array of mercenary soldiers. There arose (as in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in modern Europe) Condottieri like Charidēmus and others—generals having mercenary bands under their command, and hiring themselves out to any prince or potentate who would employ and pay them. Of these armed rovers—poor, brave, desperate, and held by no civic ties—Isokratès makes repeated complaint, as one of the most serious misfortunes of Greece.² Such wanderers, indeed, usually formed the natural emigrants in new colonial enterprises. But it so happened that few Hellenic colonies were formed during the interval between 100-850 B.c.; in fact, the space open to Hellenic colonization was becoming more circumscribed by the peace of Antalkidas—by the despotism of Dionysius—and by the increase of Macedonians, Bruttians, and the inland powers generally. Isokratès, while extolling the great service formerly rendered to the Hellenic world by "Athens, in setting on foot the noble emigration, and thus providing new homes for so many unsettled Greeks—insists on the absolute necessity of similar means of emigration in his own day. He urges on Philip to put himself at the head of an Hellenic conquest of Asia Minor, and thus to acquire territory which might furnish settlement to the;

¹ Nenoph. Hellen, vi. 1. 5.
² Isokratès pours forth this complaint in many places: in the fourth or Panegyrical Oration B.C. 389; in the eighth or Oration de Pace (356 B.C.); in the fifth or Oration ad Philippum (346 B.C.). The latest of these discourses is delivered in the strongest language. See Orat. Panegyr. s. 156. τοῖς δ᾽ ἐπὶ Ξενωπ. ἓν ἐπὶ εἰσερχομένους ἀποθνήσκειν. See also Orat. de Pace (viii.) s. 55, 56, 58; Orat. ad Philipp. (v.) s. 112. οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει τα τόπους ἐλλάδας, ἢτε μᾶν εἰσαγωγή στρατηγεῖν μείζων καὶ κριτῶν ἐκ τῶν πλανώμενων ἢ τῶν πολεμώμενων, &c. ... Also s. 112, 149; Orat. de Permautat. (xv.) s. 122. Ὁτι στρατοπεδεύσας τοῖς πλανώμενοι κατατατμεῖσαι, &c. A melancholy picture of the like evils is also presented in the ninth Epistle of Isokratès, to Archidamus, s. 9, 12. Compare Demosth. cont. Aristocr. p. 693. s. 162. For an example of a disappointed lover who seeks distraction by taking foreign military service, see Theokritus, xiv. 58.
multitudes of homeless, roving, exiles, who lived by the sword, and disturbed the peace of Greece.¹

This decline of the citizen militia, and growing aversion to personal service, or military exercises—together with the contemporaneous increase of the professional, soldiery unmoved by civic obligations—is one of the capital facts of the Demosthenic age. Though not peculiar to Athens, it strikes us more forcibly at Athens, where the spirit of self-imposed individual effort had once been so high wrought—but where also the charm and stimulus of peaceful existence was most diversified, and the activity of industrial pursuit most continuous. It was a fatal severance of the active force of society from political freedom and intelligence; breaking up that many-sided combination, of cultivated thought with vigorous deeds, which formed the Hellenic ideal—and throwing the defence of Greece upon armed men looking up only to their general or their paymaster. But what made it irreparably fatal, was that just at this moment the Greek world was thrown upon its defence against Macedonia led by a young prince of indefatigable enterprise, who had imbied, and was capable even of improving, the best ideas of military organization started by Epaminondas and Iphikrates. Philip (as described by his enemy Demosthenes) possessed all that forward and unconquerable love of action which the Athenians had manifested in 491 B.C., as we now from enemies as well as from friends; while the Macedonian population also retained, amidst rudeness and poverty, that martial aptitude and readiness which had dwindled away within the walls of the Greek cities.

¹ Ἰσκράτης αὗτος Ἀλέξανδρος Βασιλεὺς Ἐτῶν Ἐξῆς. ¹v. v. 112.

² The remarkable organization of the Macedonian army, with its systematic combination of different arms and sorts of troops, was the work of Philip. Alexander found it ready made to his hands, in the very first months of his reign. It must doubtless have been gradually formed; year after year improved by Philip; and we should be glad to be enabled to trace the steps of its progress. But unfortunately we are without any information about the military measures of Philip, beyond bare facts and results. Accordingly I am compelled to postpone what is to be said about the Macedonian military organization until the reign of Alexander, about whose operations we have valuable details.
Though as yet neither disciplined nor formidable, they were an excellent raw material for soldiers, in the hands of an organising genius like Philip. They were still (as their predecessors had been in the time of the first Perdikkas, when the king’s wife baked cakes with her own hand on the hearth), mountain shepherds ill-clad and ill-housed—eating and drinking from wooden platters and cups—destitute to a great degree, not merely of cities, but of fixed residences. The men of substance were armed with breastplates and made good cavalry; but the infantry were a rabble destitute of order, armed with wicker shields and rusty swords, and contending at disadvantage, though constantly kept on the alert, to repel the inroads of their Illyrian or Thracian neighbours. Among some Macedonian tribes, the man who had never slain an enemy was marked by a degrading badge. These were the men whom Philip on becoming king found under his rule; not good soldiers, but excellent recruits to be formed into soldiers. Poverty, endurance, and bodies incurred to toil, were the natural attributes, well appreciated by ancient politicians, of a military population destined to make conquests. Such had been the native Persians, at their first outburst under Cyrus the Great; such were even the Greeks at the invasion of Xerxes, when the Spartan king Demaratus reckoned poverty both as an inmost of Greece, and as a guarantee of Grecian courage.

Now it was against these rude Macedonians, to whom camp-life...
presented chances of plunder without any sacrifice, that the industrious and refined Athenian citizen had to go forth and fight, renouncing his trade, family, and festivals; a task the more severe, as the perpetual aggressions and systematised warfare of his new enemies could only be counterbalanced by an equal continuity of effort on his part. For such personal devotion, combined with the anxieties of preventive vigilance, the Athenians of the Periclean age would have been prepared, but those of the Demosthenic age were not; though their whole freedom and security were in the end found to be at stake.

Without this brief sketch of the great military change in Greece since the Peloponnesian war—the decline of the citizen force and the increase of mercenaries—the reader would scarcely understand either the proceedings of Athens in reference to Philip, or the career of Demosthenes on which we are now about to enter.

Having by assiduous labour acquired for himself these high powers both of speech and of composition, Demosthenes stood forward in 354 B.C. to devote them to the service of the public. His first address to the assembly is not less interesting, objectively, as a memorial of the actual Hellenic political world in that year—than subjectively, as an evidence of his own manner of appreciating its exigences. At that moment, the predominant apprehension at Athens arose from reports respecting the Great King, who was said to be contemplating measures of hostility against Greece, and against Athens in particular, in consequence of the aid recently lent by the Athenian general Charis to the revolted Persian satrap Artabazus. By this apprehension—which had already, in part, determined the Athenians (a year before) to make peace with their revolted insular allies, and close the Social War—the public mind still continued agitated. A Persian armament of 300 sail, with a large force of Grecian mercenaries—and an invasion of Greece—was talked of as probable. It appears that Mardonius, prince or satrap of Karia, who had been the principal agent in

1 The oration De Symmoriis is placed by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in the archonsilip of Diotimus, 351-350 B.C. (Dionys. Hal. ad Ammecum, p. 721). And it is plainly composed prior to the expedition sent by the Thebans under Lamachus to assist the revolted Artabazus against the Great King; which expedition is placed by Diodorus (xxi. 34) in the ensuing year 353-352 B.C. | Whoever will examine the way in which Demosthenes argues, in the Oration De Symmoriis (p. 187, s. 49-52), as to the relations of the Thebans with Persia—will see that he cannot have known any thing about assistance given by the Thebans to Artabazus against Persia.

2 Diod. xvi. 21.
inflaming the Social War, still prosecuted hostilities against the islands even after the peace, announcing that he acted in execution of the king’s designs; so that the Athenians sent envoys to remonstrate with him. The Persians seem also to have been collecting inland forces, which were employed some years afterwards in reconquering Egypt, but of which the destination was not at this moment declared. Hence the alarm now prevalent at Athens. It is material to note—as a mark in the title of events—that few persons as yet entertained apprehensions about Philip of Macedon, though that prince was augmenting steadily his military force as well as his conquests. Nay, Philip afterwards asserted, that during this alarm of Persian invasion, he was himself one of the parties invited to assist in the defence of Greece.

Though the Macedonian power had not yet become obviously formidable, we trace in the present speech of Demosthenes that same Pan-hellenic patriotism which afterwards rendered him so strenuous in blowing the trumpet against Philip. The obligation incumbent upon all Greeks, but upon Athens especially, on account of her traditions and her station, to uphold Hellenic liberty against the foreigner at all cost, is insisted on with an emphasis and dignity worthy of Perikles. But while Demosthenes thus impresses upon his countrymen noble and Pan-hellenic purposes, he does not rest content with eloquent declamation, or negative criticism on the past. His recommendations as to means are positive and explicit; implying an attentive survey and a sagacious appreciation of the surrounding circumstances. While keeping before his countrymen a favourable view of their position, he never promises them success except on condition of earnest and persevering individual efforts, with arms and with money. He exhausts all his invention in the unpopular task of shaming them, by direct reproach as well as by oblique insinuation, out of that aversion to personal military service which, for the misfortune of Athens, had become a confirmed habit. Such positive and practical character as to means, always contemplating the full exigencies of a given situation—combined with the constant presentation of Athens, as the pledged champion of Grecian freedom, and with appeals

1 Demosthenes cont. Timokratem, 15: see also the second Argument prefixed to that Oration.
3 Demosthenes, De Symmoricis, p. 179.

τον βασιλέα τὴν βουλὴν οὖσαν — ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖσιν μὲν πολλοῖς ἐνδέχεσθαι μου δοκεῖ τῶν ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν του ἐξελθεῖν τινὸς αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων ἀποκατάστασιν παρὰ τῶν ἐδοξολογηθέντων καλοῦ ἐντού ὁμορρίτη τὴν δίκην, εἰπά τινος αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τῷ βαρβάρῳ γενισθα.
to Athenian foretime, not as a patrimony to rest upon, but as an example to imitate—constitute the imperishable charm of these harangues of Demosthenès, not less memorable than their excellence as rhetorical compositions. In the latter merit, indeed, his rival Ἀσχινῆς is less inferior to him than in the former.

In no one of the speeches of Demosthenès is the spirit of practical wisdom more predominant than in this his earliest known discourse to the public assembly—on the Symmories—delivered by a young man of twenty-seven years of age, who could have had little other teaching except from the degraded classes of sophists, rhetors, and actors. While proclaiming the king of Persia as the common and dangerous enemy of the Grecian name, he contends that no evidence of impending Persian attack had yet transpired, sufficiently obvious and glaring to warrant Athens in sending round to invoke a general league of Greeks, as previous speakers had suggested. He deprecates on the one hand any step calculated to provoke the Persian king or bring on a war—and on the other hand, any premature appeal to the Greeks for combination, before they themselves were impressed with a feeling of common danger. Nothing but such common terror could bring about union among the different Hellenic cities; nothing else could silence those standing jealousies and antipathies, which rendered intestine war so frequent, and would probably enable the Persian king to purchase several Greeks for his own allies against the rest.

"Let us neither be immoderately afraid of the Great King, nor on the other hand be ourselves the first to begin the war and wrong him—as well on our account as from the bad feeling and mistrust prevalent among the Greeks around us. If indeed we, with the full and unanimous force of Greece, could attack him unassisted, I should have held that even wrong, done towards him, was no wrong at all. But since this is impossible, I contend that we must take care not to give the king a pretence for enforcing claims of right on behalf of the other Greeks. While we remain quiet, he cannot do any such thing without being mistrusted; but if we have been the first to begin war, he will naturally seem to mean sincere friendship to the others, on account of their aversion to us. Do not, therefore, expose to light the sad distempers of the Hellenic world, by calling together its members when you will not persuade them, and by going to war when you will have no

adequate force; but keep the peace, confiding in yourselves, and making full preparation.”

It is this necessity of making preparation, which constitutes the special purpose of Demosthenes in his harangue. He produces an elaborate plan, matured by careful reflection, for improving and extending the classification by Symmories; proposing a more convenient and systematic distribution of the leading citizens as well as of the total financial and nautical means—such as to ensure both the ready equipment of armed force whenever required, and a fair apportionment both of effort and of expense among the citizens. Into the details of this plan of economical reform, which are explained with the precision of an administrator and not with the vagueness of a rhetor, I do not here enter; especially as we do not know that it was actually adopted. But the spirit in which it was proposed deserves all attention, as proclaiming, even at this early day, the home-truth which the orator reiterates in so many subsequent harangues. “In the preparation which I propose to you, Athenians (he says), the first and most important point is, that your minds shall be so set, as that each man individually will be willing and forward in doing his duty. For you see plainly, that of all those matters on which you have determined collectively, and on which each man individually has looked upon the duty of execution as devolving upon himself—not one has ever slipped through your hands; while, on the contrary, whenever, after determination has been taken, you have stood looking at one another, no man intending to do anything himself, but every one throwing the burden of action upon his neighbour—nothing has ever succeeded. Assuming you, therefore, to be thus disposed and wound up to the proper pitch, I recommend,”1 &c.

This is the true Demosthenic vein of exhortation, running with unabated force through the Philippics and Olynthiacs, and striving to revive that conjunction—of which Perikles had boasted as an established fact in the Athenian character¹—energetic individual action following upon full public debate and collective resolution. How often here, and elsewhere, does the orator denounce the uselessness of votes in the public assembly, even after such votes had been passed—if the citizens individually hung back, and shrank from the fatigue or the pecuniary burden indispensable for execution! Demus in the Pnyx (to use, in an altered sense, an Aristophanic comparison²) still remained Pan-hellenic and patriotic, when Demus at home had come to think that the city would march safely by itself without any sacrifice on his part, and that he was at liberty to become absorbed in his property, family, religion, and recreations. And so Athens might really have proceeded, in her enjoyment of liberty, wealth, refinement, and individual security—could the Grecian world have been guaranteed against the formidable Macedonian enemy from without.

It was in the ensuing year, when the alarm respecting Persia had worn off, that the Athenians were called on to discuss the conflicting applications of Sparta and of Megalopolis. The success of the Phokians appeared to be such as to prevent Thebes, especially while her troops, under Pammacos, were absent in Asia, from interfering in Peloponnesus for the protection of Megalopolis. There were even at Athens politicians who confidently predicted the approaching humiliation of Thebes, together with the emancipation and reconstitution of those Boeotian towns which she now held in dependence—Orchiomenus, Thespia, and Plataea; predictions cordially welcomed by the miso-Theban sentiment at

¹ Thucyd. ii. 39, 40.
² Aristophanes, Equit. 750, Ὅρατε γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθη-ηναῖοι, ὅταν, γε μὴν πάντωθ' ἀπαν-τες ὑμεῖς ἡμουληθήτες, καὶ μετὰ ταύτα τὸ πράττειν αὐτὸς ἐκα-τος ἐμαυτῷ προσήκειν ἔγησατο, οὕτων πάνω ἐματ' ἐξέφυγεν ὁ δὲ ἡμουληθήτε μὲν, μετὰ ταύτα δ' ἀπεβλέψατο πρὸς Ἀλλήλοις ὣς αὐτὸς μὲν ἐκατος ὡς ποι-ῦσαν, τὴν δὲ ἐμφάσιον πᾶραμένατα, ὡς πάνω ἐματ' ἐγγίνοτα. Ἐξώτων δ' ὑμῶν ὁτῳ καὶ παρωνμένων, &c.

³ Demosthenes, Orat. pro Megalopol. 1. 37, 8. 5. Ἄριστος παρ᾿ ὑμῖν λόγοις τεκμήμασθαι, ὥστε Θήβαντος μὲν, ὥστε Θεσπίους καὶ Πλαταιῶν ὁκτενίας ἀκενείς γενέσθαι, &c. "Ἀν μὲν ταύτιν καταπολεμήσων οἱ θεοί, διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ, &c." Compare Demosthenes on Arist. Just. p. 654, l. 120.
Athens. To the Spartans, the moment appeared favourable for breaking up Megalopolis and recovering Messene; in which scheme they hoped to interest not only Athens, but also Elis, Phlius, and some other Peloponnesian states. To Athens they offered aid for the recovery of Oropus, now and for about twelve years past in the hands of the Thebans; to Elis and Phlius they also tendered assistance for regaining respectively Triphylia and the Trikaranum, from the Arcadians and Argeians. This political combination was warmly espoused by a considerable party at Athens; being recommended not less by aversion to Thebes than by the anxious desire for repossessing the border town of Oropus. But it was contemned by others, and by Demosthenes among the number, who could not be tempted by any bait to acquiesce in the reconstitution of Lacedaemonian power as it had stood before the battle of Leuktra. In the Athenian assembly, the discussion was animated and even angry; the envoys from Megalopolis, as well as those from Sparta on the other side, finding strenuous partisans.

Demosthenes strikes a course professedly middle between the two, yet really in favour of defending Megalopolis against Spartan reconquest. We remark in this oration (as in the oration De Symmoriis, a year before) that there is no allusion to Philip; a point to be noticed as evidence of the gradual changes in the Demosthenic point of view. All the arguments urged turn upon Hellenic and Athenian interests, without reference to the likelihood of hostilities from without. In fact, Demosthenes lays down, as a position not to be disputed by any one, that for the interest of Athens, both Sparta and Thebes ought to be weak; neither of them in condition to disturb her security;—a position, unfortunately, but too well recognized among all the leading Grecian states in their reciprocal dealings with each other, rendering the Pan-hellenic aggregate comparatively defenceless against Philip or any skilful aggressor from without. While, however, affirming a general maxim, in itself questionable and perilous, Demosthenes deduces from it nothing but judicious consequences. In regard to Sparta, he insists only on keeping her in statu quo, and maintain-

1 Demosthenes pro Megalopolit, p. 204, 8. 19: compare Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 9, 4—compare a similar sentiment.
2 Demosthenes cont. Aiskokrat. p. 651, 8. 132.
3 Demosthenes pro Megalopolit, p. 203.
ing inviolate against her the independence of Megalopolis and Messénē. He will not be prevailed upon to surrender to her these two cities, even by the seductive prospect of assistance to Athens in recovering Oropus, and in reviving the autonomy of the Boeotian cities. At that moment the prevalent disposition among the Athenian public was antipathy against Thebes, combined with a certain sympathy in favour of Sparta, whom they had aided at the battle of Mantinæa against the Megalopolitans. Though himself sharing this sentiment, Demosthenès will not suffer his countrymen to be misled by it. He recommends that Athens shall herself take up the Theban policy in regard to Megalopolis and Messénē, so as to protect these two cities against Sparta; the rather, as by such a proceeding the Thebans will be excluded from Peloponnesus, and their general influence narrowed. He even goes so far as to say, that if Sparta should succeed in reconquering Megalopolis and Messénē, Athens must again become the ally of the Thebans to restrain her farther aggrandisement.

As far as we make out from imperfect information, it seems that the views of Demosthenès did not prevail, and that the Athenians declined to undertake the protection of Megalopolis against Sparta; since we presently find the Thebans continuing to afford that protection, as they had done before. The aggressive schemes of Sparta appear to have been broached at the moment when the Phokians under Onomarchus were so decidedly superior to Thebes as to place that city in some embarrassment. But the superiority of the Phokians was soon lessened by their collision with a more formidable enemy—Philip of Macedon.

That prince had been already partially interfering in Thessalian affairs, at the instigation of Eudikus and Simus, chiefs of the Alcuaed of Larissa, against Lykophron the despot of Phere. But his recent acquisition of Methonē left him more at liberty to extend his conquests southward, and to bring a larger force to bear on the desusions of Thessaly. In that country, the great cities were, as usual, contending for supremacy, and holding the smaller by means of garrisons; while Lykophron of Phere was exerting himself to regain that ascendency.

1 Demosthen. pro Megalopolit. p. 207. 2 Demosthenes, De Corone. p. 241. 3 Harpokration. 4 Philipp. 5 Isokratés, Orat. viii. (De Pace) s. 143. 144.
over the whole, which had once been possessed by Jason and Alexander. Philip now marched into the country and attacked him so vigorously as to constrain him to invoke aid from the Phokians. Onomarchus, at that time victorious over the Thebans and master as far as Thermopylae, was interested in checking the farther progress of Philip southward and extending his own ascendancy. He sent into Thessaly a force of 7000 men, under his brother Phyllus, to sustain Lykophron. But Phyllus failed altogether; being defeated and driven out of Thessaly by Philip, so that Lykophron of Pherae was in greater danger than ever. Upon this, Onomarchus went himself thither with the full force of Phokians and foreign mercenaries. An obstinate, and seemingly a protracted contest now took place, in the course of which he was at first decidedly victorious. He defeated Philip in two battles, with such severe loss that the Macedonian army was withdrawn from Thessaly, while Lykophron with his Phokian allies remained masters of the country.1

This great success of the Phokian arms was followed up by another victory in Boeotia. Onomarchus renewed his invasion of that territory, defeated the Thebans in battle, and made himself master of Koroneia, in addition to Orchomemus, which he held before.2 It would seem that the Thebans were at this time deprived of much of their force, which was serving in Asia under Artabazus, and which, perhaps from these very reverses, they presently recalled. The Phokians, on the other hand, were at the height of their power. At this juncture falls, probably, the aggressive combination of the Spartans against Megalopolis, and the debate, before noticed, in the Athenian assembly.

Philip was for some time in embarrassment from his defeat in Thessaly. His soldiers, discouraged and even mutinous, would hardly consent to remain under his standard. By great pains, and animated exhortation, he at last succeeded in reanimating them. After a certain interval for restoration and reinforcement, he advanced with a fresh army into Thessaly, and resumed his operations against Lykophron; who was obliged again to solicit aid from Onomarchus, and to promise that all Thessaly should henceforward be held under his dependence. Onomarchus accordingly joined him in Thessaly with a large army, said to consist of 20,000 foot and 500 cavalry. But he found on this occasion, within the

1 Diodor. xvi. 35. 2 Diodor. xvi. 35.
country, more obstinate resistance than before; for the cruel dynasty of Pheræ had probably abused their previous victory by aggravated violence and rapacity, so as to throw into the arms of their enemy a multitude of exiles. On Philip's coming into Thessaly with a new army, the Thessalians embraced his cause so warmly, that he soon found himself at the head of an army of 20,000 foot and 3000 horse. Onomarchus met him in the field, somewhere near the southern coast of Thessaly; not deficient of success, as well from his recent victories, as from the neighbourhood of an Athenian fleet under Charês, cooperating with him. Here a battle was joined, and obstinately contested between the two armies, nearly equal in numbers of infantry. Philip exalted the courage of his soldiers by decorating them with laurel wreaths, as crusaders in the service of the god against the despoilers of the Delphian temple; while the Thessalians also, forming the best cavalry in Greece and fighting with earnest valour, gave decisive advantage to his cause. The defeat of the forces of Onomarchus and Lykophron was complete. Six thousand of them are said to have been slain, and three thousand to have been taken prisoners; the remainder escaped either by flight, or by throwing away their arms, and swimming off to the Athenian ships. Onomarchus himself perished. According to one account, he was slain by his own mercenaries, provoked by his cowardice; according to another account, he was drowned—being carried into the sea by an unruly horse, and trying to escape to the ships. Philip caused his dead body to be crucified, and drowned all the prisoners as men guilty of sacrilege.

This victory procured for the Macedonian prince great renown as avenger of the Delphian god—and became an important step in his career of aggrandisement. It not only terminated the power of the Phokians north of Thermopylae, but also finally crushed the powerful dynasty of Pheræ in Thessaly. Philip laid siege to that city, upon which Lykophron and Peltolaus, surrounded by an adverse population and unable to make any long defence, capit.
lated, and surrendered it to him; retiring with their mercenaries, 2000 in number, into Phokis. Having obtained possession of Thera and proclaimed it a free city, Philip proceeded to besiege the neighbouring town of Pagasa, the most valuable maritime station in Thessaly. How long Pagasa resisted, we do not know; but long enough to send intimation to Athens, with entreaties for succour. The Athenians, alarmed at the successive conquests of Philip, were well-disposed to keep this important post out of his hands, which their naval power fully enabled them to do. But here again (as in the previous examples of Pydna, Potidaea, and Methone), the aversion to personal service among the citizens individually—and the impediments as to apportionment of duty or cost, whenever actual outgoing was called for—produced the un-ward result, that though an expedition was voted and despatched, it did not arrive in time. Pagasa surrendered and came into the power of Philip; who fortified and garrisoned it for himself, thus becoming master of the Pagasian Gulf, the great maritime inlet of Thessaly.

Philip was probably occupied for a certain time in making good his dominion over Thessaly. But as soon as sufficient precautions had been taken for this purpose, he sought to push this advantage over the Phokians by invading them in their own territory. He marched to a farce: er δ ᾿ ᾿ 3

uty and pyla, still proclaiming as his aim the liberation of the Delphian temple and the punishment of its sacrilegious robbers; while he at the same time conciliated the favour of the Thessalians by promising to restore to them the Pylea, or half-yearly Amphiktyonic festival at Thermopylae, which the Phokians had discontinued.
The Phokians, though masters of this almost insupposable pass, seemed to have been so much disheartened by their recent defeat, and the death of Onomarchus, that they felt unable to maintain it long. The news of such a danger, transmitted to Athens, excited extraordinary agitation. The importance of defending Thermopylae—and of prohibiting the victorious king of Macedon from coming to co-operate with the Thebans on the southern side of it, not merely against the Phokians, but probably also against Attica—were so powerfully felt, that the usual hesitations and delay of the Athenians in respect to military expedition were overborne. Chiefly from this cause—but partly also, we may suppose, from the vexations disappointment recently incurred in the attempt to relieve Pagaras—a Greek armament under Nausikles (amounting to 5000 foot and 100 horse, according to Diodorus) was fitted out with not less vigour and celebrity than had been displayed against the Thebans in Euboea, seven years before. Athenian citizens shook off their lethargy, and promptly volunteered. They reached Thermopylae in good time, placing the pass in such a condition of defence that Philip did not attack it at all. Often afterwards does Demosthenes, in combating the general remissness of his countrymen when military exigences arose, remind them of this unwonted act of energetic movement, crowned with complete effect. With little or no loss, the Athenians succeeded in guarding both themselves and their allies against a very menacing contingency, simply by the promptitude of their action. The cost of the armament altogether was more than 200 talents; and from the stress which Demosthenes lays on that portion of the expense which was defrayed by the soldiers privately and individually, we may gather that these soldiers (as in the Sicilian expedition under Nikias) were in considerable proportion opulent citizens. Among a portion of the Greek public, however, the Athenians incurred obloquy as accomplices in the Phokian sacrilege, and enemies of the Delphian god.

But though Philip was thus kept out of Southern Greece, and...
The Phokians enabled to re-organise themselves against Thebes, yet in Thessaly and without the straits of Thermopylae, Macedonian ascendency was henceforward an uncontested fact. Before we follow his subsequent proceedings, however, it will be convenient to turn to events both in Phokis and in Peloponnesus.

In the depressed condition of the Phokians after the defeat of Onomarchus, they obtained reinforcement not only from Athens, but also from Sparta (1000 men), and from the Peloponnesian Achaeans (2000 men). Phayllus, the successor (by some called brother) of Onomarchus, put himself again in a condition of defence. He had recourse a third time to that yet unexhausted store—the Delphian treasures and valuables. He despoiled the temple to a greater extent than Philomelas, and not less than Onomarchus; incurring aggravated odium from the fact, that he could not now supply himself without laying hands on offerings of conspicuous magnificence and antiquity, which his two predecessors had spared. It was thus that the splendid golden donatives of the Lydian king Krasus were now melted down and turned into money; 117 bricks or ingots of gold, most of them weighing two talents each; 360 golden goblets, together with a female statue three cubits high, and a lion, of the same metal—said to have weighed in the aggregate thirty talents. The abstraction of such ornaments, striking and venerable in the eyes of the numerous visitors of the temple, was doubtless deeply felt among the Grecian public. And the indignation was aggravated by the fact, that beautiful youths or women, favourites of Onomarchus or Phayllus, received some of the most precious gifts, and wore the most noted ornaments, which had decorated the temple—even the necklaces of Helen and Eriphyle. One woman, a flute-player named Bromias, not only received from Phayllus a silver cup and a golden wreath (the former dedicated in the temple by Demosthenes), but also received from Athenians other valuable gifts. The boasts of Demosthenes that no one else except Athens assisted or rescued the Phokians in this emergency, and that the Athenians, commanding a naval force, and on this rare occasion rapid in their movements, reached Thermopylae in time to arrest the progress of Philip, and before the Peloponnesian troops could arrive, the Athenian expedition to Thermopylae seems to have occurred about May 352 B.C.—as far as we can make out the chronology of the time.

1 Demosth. (Fals. Leg. p. 443) affirms that no one else except Athens assisted or rescued the Phokians in this emergency. But Diodorus (xvi. 37) mentions succours from the other allies also; and there seems no ground for disbelieving him. The boast of Demosthenes, however, that Athens single-handed saved the Phokians, is not incorrect as to the main fact, though overstated in the expansion. For the Athenians, commanding a naval force, and on this rare occasion rapid in their movements, reached Thermopylae in time to arrest the progress of Philip, and before the Peloponnesian troops could arrive. The Athenian expedition to Thermopylae seems to have occurred about May 352 B.C.—as far as we can make out the chronology of the time.
the Phokians, the latter by the Peparethians), but was also introduced by him, in his capacity of superintendent of the Pythian festival, to contend for the prize in playing the sacred Hymn. As the competitors for such prize had always been men, the assembled crowd so loudly resented the novelty, that Bromias was obliged to withdraw. Moreover profuse largesses, and flagrant malversation, became more notorious than ever. The Phokian leaders displayed with ostentation their newly-acquired wealth, and either imported for the first time bought slaves, or at least greatly multiplied the pre-existing number. It had before been the practice in Phokis, we are told, for the wealthy men to be served by the poor youthful freemen of the country; and complaints arose among the latter class that their daily bread was thus taken away.

Notwithstanding the indignation excited by these proceedings not only throughout Greece, but even in Phokis itself—Phayllus carried his point of levying a fresh army of mercenaries, and of purchasing new alliances among the smaller cities. Both Athens and Sparta profited more or less by the distribution; though the cost of the Athenian expedition to Thermopylae, which rescued the Phokians from destruction, seems clearly to have been paid by the Athenians themselves. Phayllus carried on war for some time against both the Boeotians and Lokrians. He is represented by Diodorus to have lost several battles. But it is certain that the general result was not unfavourable to him; that he kept possession of Orchomenus in Boeotia; and that his power remained without substantial diminution.

1 Theopomp. Fragm. 182, 183; Thyr-archus, Fragm. 60, ed. Didot; Anaxi- tendes and Ephorus ap. Athenaeum, vi, p. 231, 232. The Pythian games here alluded to must have been those celebrated in August or September 350 B.C. It would seem therefore that Phayllus survived over that period.
2 Diodor. xvi. 56, 57. The story annexed about Iphiklades and the ships of Dionysus of Symeus—a story which, at all events, comes quite out of its chronological place—appears to me not worthy of credit, in the manner in which Diodorus here gives it. The squadron of Dionysus, which Iphiklades captured on the coast of Korkyra, was coming to the aid and at the request of the Lacedaemonians, then at war with Athens (Xenoph. Hellon. vi. 2, 73). It was therefore a fair capture for an Athenian general, together with all on board. If, amidst the cargo, there happened to be presents intended for Olympia and Delphi, those, as being on board of ships of war, would follow the fate of the other persons and things along with them. They would not be considered as the property of the god until they had been actually dedicated in his temple. Nor would the person sending them be entitled to invoke the privilege of a consecrated cargo unless he divested it of all hostile accompaniment. The letter of complaint to the Athenians, which Diodorus gives having been sent by Dionysus, seems to me neither genuine nor even plausible.
5 Diodor. xvi. 37, 38.
The stress of war seems, for the time, to have been transferred to Peloponnesus, whither a portion both of the Phokian and Theban troops went to cooperate. The Lacedaemonians had at length opened their campaign against Megalopolis, of which I have already spoken as having been debated before the Athenian public assembly. Their plan seems to have been formed some months before, when Onomarchus was, at the maximum of his power, and when Thebes was supposed to be in danger; but it was not executed until after his defeat and death, when the Phokians, depressed for the time, were rescued only by the prompt interference of Athens—and when the Thebans had their hands comparatively free. Moreover, the Theban division which had been sent into Asia under Paumenê a year or two before, to assist Artabazus, may now be presumed to have returned; especially as we know that no very long time afterwards, Artabazus appears as completely defeated by the Persian troops—expelled from Asia—and constrained to take refuge, together with his brother-in-law Memnon, under the protection of Philip. The Megalopolitans had sent envoys to entreat aid from Athens, under the apprehension that Thebes would not be in a condition to assist them. It may be doubted whether Athens would have granted their prayer, in spite of the advice of Demosthenês; but the Thebans had now again become strong enough to uphold with their own force their natural allies in Peloponnesus.

Accordingly, when the Lacedaemonian army under king Archidamus invaded the Megalopolitan territory, a competent force was soon brought together to oppose them; furnished partly by the Argeians—who had been engaged during the preceding year in a border warfare with Sparta, and had experienced a partial defeat at Ornæ—partly by the Sikyonians and Messenians, who came in full muster. Besides this, the forces on both sides from Bœotia and Phokis were transferred to Peloponnesus. The Thebans sent 4000 foot, and 500 horse, under Kephision, to the aid of Megalopolis; while the Spartans not only recalled their own troops from Phokis, but also procured 3000 of the mercenaries in the service of Phayllus, and 150 Thessalian horse from Lykophron, the expelled despot of Phere. Archidamus received his reinforcements, and got together his aggregate forces, earlier than the enemy.
He advanced first into Arcadia, where he posted himself near Mantinea, thus cutting off the Argeians from Megalopolis; he next invaded the territory of Argos, attacked Ornea, and defeated the Argeians in a partial action. Presently the Thebans arrived, and effected a junction with their Argeian and Arcadian allies. The united force was greatly superior in number to the Lacedaemonians; but such superiority was counterbalanced by the bad discipline of the Thebans, who had sadly declined on this point during the interval of ten years since the death of Epaminondas. A battle ensued, partially advantageous to the Lacedaemonians; while the Argeians and Arcadians chose to go home to their neighbouring cities. The Lacedaemonians also, having ravaged a portion of Arcadia, and stormed the Arcadian town of Helissus, presently recrossed their own frontier and returned to Sparta. They left however a division in Arcadia under Anaxander, who, engaging with the Thebans near Telphusa, was worsted with great loss and made prisoner. In two other battles, also, the Thebans were successively victorious; in a third, they were vanquished by the Lacedaemonians. With such balanced and undecided success was the war carried on, until at length the Lacedaemonians proposed and concluded peace with Megalopolis. Either formally, or by implication, they were forced to recognise the autonomy of that city; thus abandoning, for the time at least, their aggressive purposes, which Demosthenes had combated and sought to frustrate before the Athenian assembly. The Thebans on their side returned home, having accomplished their object of protecting Megalopolis and Messene; and we may presume that the Phokian allies of Sparta were sent home also.1

The war between the Bœotians and Phokians had doubtless slackened during this episode in Peloponnesus; but it still went on, in a series of partial actions, on the river Kephissus, at Koroneia, at Abæ in Phokis, and near the Lokrian town of Naryx. For the most part, the Phokians are said to have been worsted; and their commander Phayllus presently died of a painful disease—the suitable punishment (in the point of view of a Grecian historian) for his sacrilegious deeds. He left as his successor Phalakus, a young man, son of Onomarchus, under the guardianship and advice of an experienced friend named Mnaseas. But Mnaseas was soon surprised at night, defeated, and slain, by the

1 Diodor. xvi. 39.  
2 Diodor. xvi. 39.
Thebans; while Phalakus, left to his own resources, was defeated in two battles near Chareonioa, and was unable to hinder his enemies from ravaging a large part of the Phokian territory.

We know the successive incidents of this ten years' Sacred War only from the meagre annals of Diodorus; whose warm sympathy in favour of the religious side of the question seems to betray him into exaggeration of the victories of the Thebans, or at least into some omission of counterbalancing reverses. For in spite of these successive victories, the Phokians were now at last put down, but remained in possession of the Boeotian town of Orchomenus; moreover the Thebans became so tired out and impoverished by the war, that they confined themselves presently to desultory incursions and skirmishes. Their losses fell wholly upon their own citizens and their own funds; while the Phokians fought with foreign mercenaries and with the treasures of the temple. The increasing poverty of the Thebans even induced them to send an embassy to the Persian king, entreatin pecuniary aid; which drew from him a present of 300 talents. As he was at this time organising a fresh expedition on an immense scale, for the reconquest of Phenicia and Egypt, after more than one preceding failure—he required Grecian soldiers as much as the Greeks required his money. Hence we shall see presently that the Thebans were able to send him an equivalent.

In the war just recounted on the Laconian and Arcadian frontier, the Athenians had taken no part. Their struggle with Philip had been becoming from month to month more serious and embarrassing. By occupying in time the defensible pass of Thermopylae, they had indeed prevented him both from crushing the Phokians and from meddling with the Southern states of Greece. But at the final battle wherein he had defeated Onomarchus, he had materially increased both his power and his military reputation. The numbers on both sides were very great; the result was decisive, and ruinous to the vanquished; moreover, we cannot doubt that the Macedonian phalanx, with the other military
improvements and manoeuvres which Philip had been gradually 
organising since his accession, was now exhibited in formidable 
efficiency. The king of Macedon had become the ascendent 
soldier and potentate hanging on the skirts of the Grecian world, 
exciting fears, or hopes, or both at once, in every city throughout 
its limits. In the first Philippic of Demosthenes, and in his 
oration against Aristokrates (delivered between Midsummer 352 
B.C. and Midsummer 351 B.C.), we discern evident marks of the 
terrors which Philip had come to inspire, within a year after his 
repulse from Thermopylae, to reflecting Grecian politicians. "It 
is impossible for Athens (says the orator) to provide any land-
force competent to contend in the field against that of Philip."

The reputation of his generalship and his indefatigable activity 
was already everywhere felt; as well as that of the officers and 
soldiers, partly native Macedonians, partly chosen Greeks, whom 
he had assembled round him—especially the boches or front-
rank men of the phalanx and the hypaspistes. Moreover, the 
excellent cavalry of Thessaly became embodied from henceforward 
as an element, in the Macedonian army; since Philip had acquired 
unbounded ascendency in that country, from his expulsion to the 
Phocean despotists and their auxiliaries the Phokians. The philo-
Macedonian party in the Thessalian cities had constituted him 
federal chief (or in some sort Tagus) of the country, not only 
rolling their cavalry in his armies, but also placing at his dis-
posal the customs and market-dues, which formed a standing 
common fund for supporting the Thessalian collective administra-
tion. The financial means of Philip, for payment of his foreign 
troops, and prosecution of his military enterprises, were thus 
materially increased.

But besides his irresistible land-force, Philip had now become 
master of no inconsiderable naval power also. During the early 
years of the war, though he had taken not only Amphipolis but 
also all the Athenian possessions on the Macedonian coast, yet 
the exports from his territory had been interrupted by the naval

1 Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 46, s. 25 (352-351 B.C.).
2 Compare Philippic iii. p. 144, s. 66.
3 Demosthenes, Olynth. ii. p. 23, s. 17 (delivered in 350 B.C.).
4 Οἱ δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὸν ὄντες ξένοι καὶ πεζέταιρι δόξαν μὲν ἔχουσιν ὡς εἰσὶ θαυμαστυὶ καὶ συγκεκροτημένυι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου, &c.
5 Demosthenes cant. Aristokrat. p. 657, s. 133 (352-351 B.C.); also De-
mosthen. Olynth. i. p. 18, s. 23 (349 B.C.). ἡκον δὲ ἐγραψε τόν ἀπὸ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀλένων καὶ τὰς ἀγορὰς ἐκ τοὺς ἄλλοις ἀλλὰ ποικιλοὶ τὰ γάρ κοινά τὰ ἑτερακά ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱματικοῦ καὶ τῶν διπλῶν διὸ ταύτης αὐτοῦ καταστήσεται.
force of Athens, so as to lessen seriously the produce of his export duties. 1 But he had now contrived to get together a sufficient number of armed ships and privateers, if not to ward off such damage from himself, at least to retaliate it upon Athens. Her navy indeed was still incomparably superior, but the languor and remissness of her citizens refused to bring it out with efficiency; while Philip had opened for himself a new avenue to maritime power by his acquisition of Pherae and Pagasae, and by establishing his ascendency over the Magnetes and their territory, round the eastern border of the Pagasian Gulf. That Gulf (now known by the name of Volе) is still the great inlet and outlet for Thessalian trade; the eastern coast of Thessaly, along the line of Mount Pelion, being craggy and harbourless. 2 The naval force belonging to Pherae and its seaport Pagasae was very considerable, and had been so even from the times of the despots Jason and Alexander; 3 at one moment painfully felt even by Athens. All these ships now passed into the service of Philip, together with the duties on export and import levied round the Pagasian Gulf; the command of which he further secured by erecting suitable fortifications on the Magnesian shore, and by placing a garrison in Pagasae. 4

1 Demosthenes, cont. Aristokrat. p. 657, s. 121-123; 352-354 n.c.; compare Isocrates, Orn. v., "ad Philipp.", s. 5.
2 Xenoph. Hellen. v. 4, 56; Herod. vi. 25, about the lucrative commerce in the Gulf, in reference to Demetrias and Thebes. Philh., see Livy, xxxix. 25.
4 Demosthenes, Olynth. ii. p. 15, s. 24. "Καὶ γὰρ Παγασᾶς ἀπαντήσεις ἀδικίας εἰσὶν ἐφροσύνην (the Thessalians demand the place from Philip), καὶ Μαγνησίαν κεκωλύκασε τεῖχες." In Olynth. ii. p. 21, s. 11 it stands—καὶ γὰρ νῦν εἰσὶν ἐφφορμύλων Παγασᾶς ἀπαντήσεως, καὶ περὶ Μαγνησίας λόγος ποιεῖ οὐσία. I take the latter expression to state the fact with more strict precision: the Thessalians passed a vote to reconquer strate with Philip; it is not probable that they actually invaded him. And if he afterwards "gave to them Magnesia," as we are told in a later edition delivered 344 n.c. (Philipp. ii. p. 71, s. 24), he probably gave it with reserve of the fortified posts to himself; since we know that his ascendency over Thessaly was not only not revoked, but became more violent and oppressive.

The value which the Macedonian kings always continued to set, from this time forward, upon Magnesia and the recess of the Pagasian Gulf, is shown in the foundation of the city of Demetrias that important position by Demetrias Polikrates, about sixty years afterwards. Demetrias, Chalkis, and Corinth came to be considered the most commanding positions in Greece. This fine bay, with the fertile territory lying on its shores under Mount Pelion, are well described by Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iv. ch. 41, p. 573 seqq. I doubt whether either Ulpian (ad Demosth.) or Colonel Leake (p. 381) are borne out in supposing that there was any town called Magnesia on the shores of the Gulf. None such is mentioned either by Strabo or by Skylax; and I apprehend that the passages above cited from Demosthenes mean Magnesia the royal inhabited by the Magnetes; as in Demosthenes cont. Neeran, p. 1382, s. 141.
Such additional naval means, combined with what he already possessed at Amphipolis and elsewhere, made him speedily annoying, if not formidable, to Athens, even at sea. His triremes showed themselves everywhere, probably in small and rapidly moving squadrons. He levied large contributions on the insular allies of Athens, and paid the costs of war greatly out of the capture of merchant vessels in the Ægean. His squadrons made incursions on the Athenian islands of Lemnos and Imbros, carrying off several Athenian citizens as prisoners. They even stretched southward as far as Geræstus, the southern promontory of Euboea, where they not only fell in with and captured a lucrative squadron of corn-ships, but also insulted the coast of Attica itself in the opposite bay of Marathon, towing off as a prize one of the sacred triremes. Such was the mischief successfully inflicted by the flying squadrons of Philip, though Athens had probably a considerable number of cruisers at sea, and certainly a far superior number of ships at home in Peireus. Her commerce and even her coasts were disturbed and endangered; her insular allies suffered yet more. Euboea especially, the nearest and most important of all her allies, separated only by a narrow strait from the Pagasæan Gulf and the southern coast of Phthiotis, was now within the immediate reach not only of Philip's marauding vessels, but also of his political intrigues.

It was thus that the war against Philip turned more and more to the disgrace and disadvantage of the Athenians. Though they had begun it in the hope of punishing him for his duplicity in appropriating Amphipolis, they had been themselves the losers by the capture of Pydna, Potidæa, Methone, &c.; and they were now thrown upon the defensive, without security for their maritime allies, their commerce, or their coasts. The intelligence of these various losses and insults endured at sea, in spite of indisputable maritime

1 Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 46. 8. ἦς δὲ τὰ σκέλη ἐκείνου ὡς τὸν μέγιστο τῶν ἐκείνου πόρων ὑφαίστησθε: ἐστὶ δ᾽ ἐστώ τοις τῶν ἐκείνων ἀρματον τοὺς πλέον τὴν θάλασσαν. Εἰς τὰς πάντας τοις τοῖς πόλεις τοῖς πολέμοις κακῶς ἔγραψε τὸν ἵππον τοῖς παράλληλοις κράτοις εἰς Δικαίως καὶ ἐμβολῶν αἰχμαλώτως πολιταί ὑπετέρους φέχες ἄγων, πρὸς τὴν Πειραιαύς τὰ πλούσια συλλαβά στα ἀκατάστατα χρήματα εἰς Ἀθηναις καὶ τὰς Ἀθηναίας εἰς Μαραθώνα ἀπέτιγμεν. καὶ τὴν ἱερὰν ἀπὸ τὴν χώραν φέχες ἄγων τρικέφαλον, &c. 2 We can hardly be certain that the Sacred Trireme thus taken was either the Paralus or the Salamis there may have been other sacred triremes besides these two.
preponderance, called forth at Athens acrimonious complaints against the generals of the state, and exaggerated outbursts of enmity against Philip. That prince, having spent a few months, after his repulse from Thermopylae, in Thessaly, and having so far established his ascendency over that country that he could leave the completion of the task to his officers, pushed with his characteristic activity into Thrace. He there took part in the disputes between various native princes, expelling some, confirming or installing others, and extending his own dominion at the cost of all. Among these princes were probably Kersobleptes and Amadokus; for Philip carried his aggressions to the immediate neighbourhood of the Thracian Chersonese.

In November 352 B.C., intelligence reached Athens, that he was in Thrace besieging Heraion Teichos; a place so near to the Chersonese, that the Athenian possessions and colonists in that peninsula were threatened with considerable danger. So great was the alarm and excitement caused by this news, that a vote was immediately passed in the public assembly to equip a fleet of forty triremes—to man it with Athenian citizens, all persons up to the age of 40 being made liable to serve on the expedition—and to raise 60 talents by a direct property-tax. At first active steps were taken to accelerate the armament. But before the difficulties of detail could be surmounted—before it could be determined, amidst the general aversion to personal service, what citizens should go abroad, and how the burden of triremacy should be distributed—fresh messengers arrived from the Chersonese, reporting first that Philip had fallen sick, next that he was actually dead. The last-mentioned report proved false; but the sickness

1 Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 690, s. 144. p. 696, s. 130. 'ἈΛΛ' ὁ μάλιστα δοκῶν μιν ἦν ἐκδόν μιν χρόνον εἰςα τί- λιπος οὖτος, κτ. (this harangue also between Midsummer 352 and Midsummer 351 B.C.).
2 Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 13, s. 13.
3 Demosthenes, Olynth. iii. p. 29, s. 5 (delivered in the latter half of 350 B.C.).
4 This Thracian expedition of Philip (alluded to also in Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 13, s. 11) stands fixed to the date of November 352 B.C., on reasonably good grounds.

That the town or fortress called 'Ἡραῖον Τεῖχος' was near to the Chersonese, cannot be doubted. The commentators identify it with 'Ἡραῖον', mentioned by Herodotus (iv. 90) as being near Perinthus. But this hypothesis is open to much doubt. 'Ἡραῖον Τεῖχος' is not quite the same as 'Ἡραῖον'; nor was the latter place very near to the Chersonese; nor would Philip be yet in a condition to provoke or menace so powerful a city as Perinthus—though he did so ten years afterwards (Diodor, xvi. 74).

I cannot think that we know where 'Ἡραῖον Τεῖχος' was situated; except that it was in Thrace, and near the Chersonese.
of Philip was an actual fact, and seems to have been severe enough to cause a temporary suspension of his military operations. Though the opportunity became thus only the more favourable for attacking Philip, yet the Athenians, no longer spurred on by the fear of farther immediate danger, relapsed into their former languor, and renounced or postponed their intended armament. After passing the whole ensuing summer in inaction, they could only be prevailed upon, in the month of September 351, to despatch to Thrace a feeble force under the mercenary chief Charidemus; ten triremes, without any soldiers aboard, and with no more than five talents in money.¹

At this time Charidemus was at the height of his popularity. It was supposed that he could raise and maintain a mercenary band by his own ingenuity and valour. His friends confidently averred before the Athenian assembly that he was the only man capable of putting down Philip and conquering Amphipolis.² One of these partisans, Aristokrates, even went so far as to propose that a vote should be passed ensuring inviolability to his person, and enacting that any one who killed him should be seized wherever found in the territory of Athens or her allies. This proposition was attacked judicially by an accuser named Euthyklès, who borrowed a memorable discourse from the pen of Demosthenes.

It was thus that the real sickness, and reported death, of Philip, which ought to have operated as a stimulus to the Athenians by exposing to them their enemy during a moment of peculiar weakness, proved rather an opiate exaggerating their chronic lethargy, and cheating them into a belief that no farther efforts were needed. That belief appears to have been proclaimed by the leading, best-known, and senior speakers, those who gave the tone to the public assembly, and who were principally relied upon for advice. These men—probably Eubulus at their head,
and Phokion, so constantly named as general, along with him—
either did not feel, or could not bring themselves to proclaim, the
painful necessity of personal military service and increased tax-
ation. Though repeated debates took place on the insults offered
to Athens in her maritime dignity, and on the sufferings of those
allies to whom she owed protection—combined with accusations
against the generals, and complaints of the inefficiency of such mer-
cenary foreigners as Athens took into commission but never paid—
still the recognised public advisers shrank from appeal to the
dormant patriotism or personal endurance of the citizens. The
serious, but indispensable, duty which they thus omitted, was per-
formed for them by a younger competitor,"ar beneath them in
established footing and influence -Demosthenes, now about thirty
years old—in an harangue known as the first Philippic.

We have already had before us this aspiring man, as a public
adviser in the assembly. In his first parliamentary
harangue two years before,¹ he had begun to inculeate on

the comfort,

energy and self-
sth reliance, and to remind them of that which the comfort,
activity, and peaceful refinement of Athenian life, had a

the former, and to view it as a portion
of some later oration. I follow the
more common opinion, accepting the
oration as one. There is a confusion
either in the text or the affirmations of
Dionysius, which has never yet been,
perhaps cannot be, satisfactorily cleared
up.

Bohnecke (in his Forschungen auf
dem Gebiete der Attischen Redner, p.
222 seq.) has gone into a full and elabo-
rate examination of the first Philippic
and all the controversy respecting it.
He rejects the statement of Dionysius
altogether. He considers that the or-
ation as it stands now is one whole, but
delivered three years later than Diony-
sius asserts; not in 351 n.c., but in the
Spring of 354 n.c., after the three Olyn-
thians, and a little before the fall of
Olynthus. He notices various chrono-
logical matters (in my judgement none
of them proving his point) tending to
show that the harangue cannot have
been delivered so early as 351 n.c. But
I think the difficulty of supposing that
the oration was spoken at so late a
period of the Olynthian war, and yet
that nothing is said in it about that
war, and next to nothing about Olyn-
thus itself—is greater than any of those
difficulties which Bohnecke tries to make
good against the earlier date.
constant tendency to put out of sight:—That the City, as a whole, could not maintain her security and dignity against enemies, unless each citizen individually, besides his home-duties, were prepared to take his fair share, readily and without evasion, of the hardship and cost of personal service abroad. But he had then been called upon to deal (in his discourse De Symmoriis) only with the contingency of Persian hostilities—possible indeed, yet neither near nor declared; he now renews the same exhortation under more pressing exigences. He has to protect interests already suffering, and to repel dishonourable insults, becoming from month to month more frequent, from an indefatigable enemy. Successive assemblies have been occupied with complaints from sufferers, amidst a sentiment of unwonted chagrin and helplessness among the public—yet with no material comfort from the leading and established speakers, who content themselves with inveighing against the negligence of the mercenaries—taken into service by Athens but never paid—and with threatening to impeach the generals. The assembly, wearied by repetition of topics promising no improvement for the future, is convoked, probably to hear some further instance of damage committed by the Macedonian cruisers, when Demosthenes, breaking through the common formalities of precedence, rises first to address them.

It had once been the practice at Athens, that the herald formally proclaimed, when a public assembly was opened—"Who among the citizens above fifty years old wishes to speak? and after them, which of the other citizens in his turn?"2 Though this old proclamation had fallen into disuse, the habit still remained, that speakers of advanced age and experience rose first after the debate had been opened by the presiding magistrates. But the relations of Athens with Philip had been so often discussed, that all these men had already delivered their sentiments and exhausted their recommendations. "Had their recommendations been good, you need not have been now debating the same topic over again."3—says Demosthenes, as an apology for standing forward out of his turn to produce his own views.

His views indeed were so new, so independent of party-sympa-

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1 Demosthenes, Do Symmori. p. 182. r. 18.
3 Demosthenes, Philipp. i. hist. Εἰ ἀναστὰς εἰκότως ἂν συγγνώμη τυγχά-μὲν περὶ καινύος πράγματος προὔτων οὗτοι συνεβούλευσαν, οὐδὲν ἂν στοι τῶν εἰωθότων γνώμην ἀπεφέ-νυμω... περὶ δὲ περὶ ὧν πολλάκις ἐφείσασαν οὕτως προέρχομαι πρὸς συμβαίνοι καὶ
νυνί σκοτείνῃ, ἡγοῦμαι καὶ πρῶτος ἀναστάτου εἰκότως ἂν συγγνώμη τυγχά-νειν εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου τὰ διώτα οὔτοι συμβολοδεκατεν, εὖδὲν ἂν ὑμᾶς νῦν ἔδει βουλεύσαται.
thies or antipathies, and so plain-spoken in comments on the past as well as in demands for the future—that they would hardly have been proposed except by a speaker instinct with the ideal of the Periklean foretime, familiar to him from his study of Thucydides. In explicit language, Demosthenes throws the blame of the public misfortunes, not simply on the past advisers and generals of the people, but also on the people themselves. It is from this proclaimed fact that he starts, as his main ground of hope for future improvement. Athens contended formerly with honour against the Lacedaemonians: and now also, she will exchange disgrace for victory in her war against Philip, if her citizens individually will shake off their past inactivity and negligence, each of them henceforward becoming ready to undertake his full share of personal duty in the common cause. Athens had undergone enough humiliation, and more than enough, to teach her this lesson. She might learn it farther from her enemy Philip himself, who had raised himself from small beginnings, and heaped losses as well as shame upon her, mainly by his own personal energy, perseverance, and ability; while the Athenian citizens had been backward as individuals, and so unprepared as a public, that even if a lucky turn of fortune were to hand over to them Amphipolis, they would be in no condition to seize it. Should the rumour prove true, that this Philip were dead, they would soon make for themselves another Philip equally troublesome.

After thus severely commenting on the past apathy of the citizens, and insisting upon a change of disposition as indispensable, Demosthenes proceeds to specify the particular acts whereby such change ought to be manifested. He entreats them not to be startled by the novelty of his plan, but to hear him patiently to the end. It is the result of his own meditations; other citizens may have better to propose; if they have, he shall not be found to stand in their way. What is past, cannot be helped; nor is extemporaneous speech the best way of providing remedies for a difficult future.

1 Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 40, 41. ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν δεόντων ποιοῦντων ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ πρᾶξειν, &c. Compare the previous harangue, De Symmormis, p. 82. 5.18.

2 Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 43. 8. ὡς δὲ νῦν ἔχετε, οὐδὲ διδύντων τῶν καιρῶν ᾿Αμφίπολιν δέξασθ᾽ ἄν, κἂν καὶ ἀπειρημένοι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς καὶ ταῖς γνώμαις.

3 Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 44. ἐπειδάν ἅπαντα ἀκούσας, κρίνατε—
He advises first, that a fleet of fifty triremes shall be immediately put in readiness; that the citizens shall firmly resolve to serve in person on board, whenever the occasion may require, and that triremes and other vessels shall be specially fitted out for half of the horsemen of the city, who shall serve personally also. This force is to be kept ready to sail at a moment’s notice, and to meet Philip in any of his sudden out-marches—to Chersonesus, to Thermopylae, to Olynthus, &c.

Secondly, that a farther permanent force shall be set on foot immediately, to take the aggressive, and carry on active continuous warfare against Philip, by harassing him in various points of his own country. Two thousand infantry, and 200 horse, will be sufficient; but it is essential that one-fourth part—500 of the former and 50 of the latter—shall be citizens of Athens. The remainder are to be foreign mercenaries; ten swift sailing war triremes are also to be provided to protect the transports against the naval force of Philip. The citizens are to serve by relays, relieving each other; every one for a time fixed beforehand, yet none for a very long time. The orator then proceeds to calculate the cost of such a standing force for one year. He assigns to each seaman, and to each foot soldier, ten drachmae per month, or two oboli per day; to each horseman, thirty drachmae per month, or one drachma (six oboli) per day. No difference is made between the Athenian citizen and the foreigner. The sum here assigned is not full pay, but simply the cost of each man’s maintenance. At the same time, Demosthenes pledges himself, that if this much be furnished by the state, the remainder of a full pay (or as much again) will be made up by what the soldiers will themselves acquire in the war; and that too, without wrong done to allies or neutral Greeks. The total annual cost thus incurred will be 92 talents (= about 22,000£). He does not give any estimate of the probable cost of his other armament, of 50 triremes; which are to be equipped and ready at a moment’s notice for emergences, but not sent out on permanent service.

His next task is, to provide ways and means for meeting such
additional cost of 92 talents. Here he produces and reads to the assembly, a special financial scheme, drawn up in writing. Not being actually embodied in the speech, the scheme has been unfortunately lost; though its contents would help us materially to appreciate the views of Demosthenes. It must have been more or less complicated in its details; not a simple proposition for an εἰσφορά or property-tax, which would have been announced in a sentence of the orator’s speech.

Assuming the money, the ships, and the armament for permanent service, to be provided, Demosthenes proposes that a formal law be passed, making such permanent service peremptory; the general in command being held responsible for the efficient employment of the force. The islands, the maritime allies, and the commerce of the Ægean would then become secure; while the profits of Philip from his captures at sea would be arrested. The quarters of the armament might be established, during winter or bad weather, in Skiathos, Thasos, Lemnos, or other adjoining islands, from whence they could act at all times against Philip on his own coast; while from Athens it was difficult to arrive thither either during the prevalence of the Etesian winds or during winter—the seasons usually selected by Philip for his aggressions.

The aggregate means of Athens (Demosthenes affirmed) were greater than could be found anywhere else. But hitherto they had never been properly employed. The Athenians, like awkward puritans, waited for Philip to strike, and then put up their hands to follow his blow. They never sought to look him in the face—nor to be ready with a good defensive system beforehand—not to anticipate him in offensive operations. While their religious festivals, the Panathenaic, Dionysiac, and others, were not only celebrated with costly splendour, but pre-arranged with the most careful pains, so that

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1 Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 48, 49, 51. 2 Α δ᾽ εὐπρέπειας δεί παρ᾽ εἰμι, ταῦτ᾽ εστίν ἄνω τῆς γέγραφα. 3 Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 49, s. 37. 4 Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 49, s. 38, 39. 5 Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 48, 49. 6 The Etesian winds, blowing from the north, made it difficult to reach Macedonia from Athens. Compare Demosthenes, De Rhet. Chersonesi, p. 93, s. 14. 7 Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 48, 49.
nothing was ever wanting in detail at the moment of execution—their military force was left without organisation or predetermined system. Whenever any new encroachment of Philip was made known, nothing was found ready to meet it; fresh decrees were to be voted, modified, and put in execution, for each special occasion; the time for action was wasted in preparation, and before a force could be placed on shipboard, the moment for execution had passed. This practice of waiting for Philip to act offensively, and then sending aid to the point attacked, was ruinous; the war must be carried on by a standing force put in motion beforehand.

To provide and pay such a standing force, is one of the main points in the project of Demosthenes; the absolute necessity that it shall consist, in large proportion at least, of citizens, is another. To this latter point he reverted again and again, insisting that the foreign mercenaries—sent out to make their pay where or how they could, and unaccompanied by Athenian citizens—were at best useless and untrustworthy. They did more mischief to friends and allies who were terrified at the very tidings of their approach—than to the enemy. The general, unprovided with funds to pay them, was compelled to follow them wheresoever they chose to go, disregarding his orders received from the city. To try him afterwards for that which he could not help, was unprofitable disgrace. But if the troops were regularly paid; if, besides, a considerable proportion of them were Athenian citizens, themselves interested in success, and inspectors of all that was done; then the general would be found willing and able to attack the enemy with vigour—and might be held to a rigorous accountability, if he failed. Such was the only way in which the formidable and ever-growing force of their enemy Philip could be successfully combated.

As matters now stood, the inefficiency of Athenian operations was so ridiculous, that men might be tempted to doubt whether Athens...
was really in earnest. Her chief military officers—her ten generals, ten taxiarchoi, ten phylarchi, and two hipparchi, annually chosen—were busied only in the affairs of the city and in the, showy religious processions. They left the real business of war to a foreign general named Menelaus. Such a system was disgraceful. The honour of Athens ought to be maintained by her own citizens, both as generals and as soldiers.

Such are the principal features in the discourse called the First Philippic; the earliest public harangue delivered by Demosthenes to the Athenian assembly, in reference to the war with Philip. It is not merely a splendid piece of oratory, emphatic and forcible in its appeal to the emotions: bringing the audience by many different roads, to the main conviction which the orator seeks to impress; profoundly animated with genuine Pan-hellenic patriotism, and with the dignity of that free Grecian world now threatened by a monarch from without. It has other merits besides, not less important in themselves, and lying more immediately within the scope of the historian. We find Demosthenes, yet only thirty years old—young in political life and thirteen years before the battle of Cheronea—taking accurate measure of the political relations between Athens and Philip; examining those relations during the past, pointing out how they had become every year more unfavourable, and foretelling the dangerous contingencies of the future, unless better precautions were taken; exposing with courageous frankness not only the past mis-management of public men, but also those defective dispositions of the people themselves wherein such management had its root: lastly, after fault found, adventuring on his own responsibility to propose specific measures of correction, and urging upon reluctant citizens a painful imposition of personal hardship as well as of taxation. We shall find him insisting on the same obligation, irksome alike to the leading politicians and to the people, throughout all the Olympiads and Philippics. We note his warnings, given at this early day, when timely prevention would have been easily practicable; and his
superiority to elder politicians like Eubulus and Phokion, in prudent appreciation, in foresight, and in the courage of speaking out unpleasant truths. More than twenty years after this period, when Athens had lost the game and was in her phase of humiliation, Demosthenes (in repelling the charges of those who imputed her misfortunes to his bad advice) measures the real extent to which a political statesman is properly responsible. The first of all things is,—"To see events in their beginnings—to discern tendencies beforehand, and proclaim them beforehand to others—to abridge as much as possible the rubs, impediments, jealousies, and tardy movements, inseparable from the march of a free city—and to infuse among the citizens harmony, friendly feelings, and zeal for the performance of their duties."¹ The first Philippic is alone sufficient to prove, how justly Demosthenes lays claim to the merit of having "seen events in their beginnings" and given timely warning to his countrymen. It will also go to show, along with other proofs hereafter to be seen, that he was not less honest and judicious in his attempts to fulfill the remaining portion of the statesman’s duty—that of working up his countrymen to unanimous and resolute enterprise; to the pitch requisite not merely for speaking and voting, but for acting and suffering, against the public enemy.

We know neither the actual course, nor the concluding vote, of this debate, wherein Demosthenes took a part so unexpectedly prominent. But we know that neither of the two positive measures which he recommends was carried into effect. The working armament was not sent out, nor was the home-force, destined to be held in reserve for instant movement in case of emergency, ever got ready. It was not until the following month of September (the oration being delivered some time in the first half of 351 B.C.), that any actual force was sent against Philip; and even then nothing more was done than to send the mercenary chief Chares to the Chersonese, with ten triremes, and five talents in money, but no soldiers.² Nor is there any probability that Demosthenes even obtained a favourable vote of the assembly;

¹ Demosthenes, De Corona, p. 308, s. φιλονεικίας, δ πολιτικὰ ται πόλεις πράσινοι. Αλλὰ μὴν ἧν γεν ο δρόμος εἰς την ἀπάνασι καὶ ἀναγεννήσια ἀναγγέλματα, ιπταίσας εἰς πίπαν ἑξάτοιο λάμποντες ταύτ᾽ ὡς εἰς ἐλάχιστα συνείλησιν, καὶ ὑπορετίσιμαι. Τίνα ὁπον ἐκεί πάντα. Τίνα ὁποιον μὲν ὀφείλεις, καὶ προοίμισθεῖς καὶ προεὐαγγείλεις τοῖς ἀλλήλοις. Τειτά πέραντοι μοι. Καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἰκανοτέρων βραδύττας, ἐκενοῦ, ἀγνοιας,

² Demosthenes, Olynth. ii, p. 29, v. 5.
though strong votes against Philip were often passed without being ever put in execution afterwards. 1

Demosthenes was doubtless opposed by those senior statesmen, whose duty it would have been to come forward themselves with the same propositions, assuming the necessity to be undeniable. But what ground was taken in opposing him, we do not know. There existed at that time in Athens a certain party or section who undervalued Philip as an enemy not really formidable—far less formidable than the Persian king. 2 The reports of Persian force and preparation, prevalent two years before when Demosthenes delivered his harangue on the Symmories, seem still to have continued, and may partly explain the inaction against Philip. Such reports would be magnified, or fabricated, by another Athenian party much more dangerous; in communication with, and probably paid by, Philip himself. To this party Demosthenes makes his earliest allusion in the first Philippic, 3 and reverts to them on many occasions afterwards. We may be very certain that there were Athenian citizens serving as Philip's secret agents, though we cannot assign their names. It would be not less his interest to purchase such auxiliaries, than to employ paid spies in his operations of war; 4 while the prevalent political antipathies at Athens, coupled with the laxity of public morality in individuals, would render it perfectly practicable to obtain suitable instruments. That not only at Athens, but also at Amphipolis, Potidaea, Olynthus and elsewhere, Philip achieved his successes, partly by purchasing corrupt partisans among the leaders of his enemies—is an assertion so intrinsically probable, that we may readily believe it, though advanced chiefly by unfriendly witnesses. Such corruption alone, indeed, would not have availed him, but it was eminently useful when combined with well-employed force and military genius.

1 Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 43. 8. — Olynth. ii. p. 21. s. 12; Olynth. iii. p. 29. s. 9, p. 12. s. 16; De Rhodiorum Libertate, p. 130. s. 1. And not merely votes against Philip, but against others also, remained either unexecuted or inadequately executed (Demosthenes, De Republica Ordinanda, p. 175, 176). 2 Demosthenes, De Rhodior, Libertat. p. 197 s. 34. ὅρω δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπίσταται, ἂν δὲ ἄριστον ἄξων πολιτείας ἀληθείας, βασιλεῖας ἡς ἄν ἔχει ἐν τοῖς ἀδρέοις οἰς ἦν προσπέπτων ἀφελείου.

3 Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 45. 8. — Olynthiae ii. p. 19. s. 4. 4 Compare the advice of the Thebans to Mardonius in 479 B.C.—during the Persian invasion of Greece (Herodot. ix. 2).
CHAPTER LXXXVIII.

OYNTHIAN POLICY.

If even in Athens, at the date of the first Philippic of Demosthenes, the uneasiness about Philip was considerable, much more serious had it become among his neighbours the Olynthians. He had gained them over, four years before, by transferring to them the territory of Authemus, and the still more important town of Potidæa, captured by his own arms from Athens. Grateful for these cessions, they had become his allies in his war with Athens, whom they hated on every ground. But a material change had since taken place. Since the loss of Methone, Athens, expelled from the coast of Thrace and Macedonia, had ceased to be a hostile neighbour, or to inspire alarm to the Olynthians; while the immense increase in the power of Philip, combined with his ability and ambition alike manifest, had overlaid their gratitude for the past by a sentiment of fear for the future. It was but too clear that a prince who stretched his encroaching arms in all directions—to Thermopylae, to Illyria, and to Thrace—would not long suffer the fertile peninsula between the Thermaic and Strymonic gulfs to remain occupied by free Grecian communities. Accordingly, it seems that after the great victory of Philip in Thessaly over the Phocians (in the first half of 352 B.C.), the Olynthians manifested their uneasiness by seceding from alliance with him against Athens. They concluded peace with that city, and manifested such friendly sentiments that an alliance began to be thought possible. This peace seems to have been concluded before November 352 B.C.\(^1\)

\(^1\) Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 356. p. 129. ἐκεῖνοι (Olynthians) ἕως φασὶ δὲ καὶ συμμάχους ποιήσεσθαι. μὲν ἑώρων αὐτὸν (Philp) τηλικοῦτον 

We know from Dionysius that this oration was delivered between Midsummer 352 B.C. and Midsummer 351 B.C. I have already remarked that it must have been delivered, in my judgment, before the month Mammartion (November) 352 B.C.
Here was an important change of policy on the part of the Olynthians. Though they probably intended it, not as a measure of hostility against Philip, but simply as a precaution to ensure to themselves recourse elsewhere in case of becoming exposed to his attack, it was not likely that he would either draw or recognize any such distinction. He would probably consider that by the cession of Potidæa, he had purchased their cooperation against Athens, and would treat their secession as at least making an end to all amicable relations.

A few months afterwards (at the date of the first Philippic) we find that he, or his soldiers, had attacked, and made sudden excursions into their territory, close adjoining to his own.

In this state of partial hostility, yet without proclaimed or vigorous war, matters seem to have remained throughout the year 351 B.C. Philip was engaged during that year in his Thracian expedition, where he fell sick, so that aggressive enterprise was for the time suspended. Meanwhile the Athenians seem to have proposed to Olynthia a scheme of decided alliance against Philip. But the Olynthians had too much to fear from him, to become themselves the aggressors. They still probably hoped that he might find sufficient enemies and occupation elsewhere, among Thracians, Hyrcania, Pivonian, Arcadian, and Athenians; at any rate, they would not be the first to provoke a contest. This state of reciprocal mistrust continued for several months, until at length Philip began serious operations against them; not very long after his recovery from the sickness in Thrace, and seemingly towards the middle of 350 B.C.; a little before the beginning of Olympiad 107, 3.

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1 Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 44. s. 100. 
2 Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 20. 
3 Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13.
4 Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 10. s. 8. 
5 Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13. 
6 Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13.
It was probably during the continuance of such semi-hostile relations that two half-brothers of Philip, sons of his father Amynatas by another mother, sought and obtained shelter at Olynthus. They came as his enemies; for he had put to death already one of their brothers, and they themselves only escaped the same fate by flight. Whether they had committed any positive act to provoke his wrath, we are not informed; but such tragedies were not unfrequent in the Macedonian royal family. While Olynthus was friendly and grateful to Philip, these exiles would not have resorted thither; but they were now favourably received, and may perhaps have held out hopes that in case of war they could raise a Macedonian party against Philip. To that prince, the reception of his fugitive enemies served as a plausible pretence for war—which he doubtless would under all circumstances have prosecuted—against Olynthus; and it seems to have been so put forward in his public declarations.

But Philip, in accomplishing his conquests, knew well how to blend the influences of deceit and seduction with those of arms, and to divide or corrupt those whom he intended to subdue. To such insidious approaches Olynthus was in many ways open. The power of that city consisted, in great part, in her position as chief of a numerous confederacy, including a large proportion, though probably not all, of the Grecian cities in the peninsula of Chalkidike. Among the different members of such a confederacy, there was more or less of dissentient interest or sentiment, which accidental circumstances might inflame so as to induce a wish for separation. In each city, moreover, and in Olynthus itself, there were ambitious citizens competing for power, and not scrupulous as to the means whereby it was to be acquired or retained. In each of them, Philip could open intrigues, and enlist partisans; in some, he would probably receive invitations to do so; for the greatness of his exploits, while it inspired alarm in some quarters, raised hopes among disappointed and jealous minorities. If, through such predisposing cir-

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1 Justin, xvi, 2; Orosius, iii. 12. Justin states this: as the cause of the attack made by Philip on Olynthus—which I do not believe. But I can see no ground for doubting the fact itself—or for doubting that Philip had hold of it as a pretext. He found the half-brothers in Olynthus when the city was taken, and put both of them to death.
cumstances, he either made or found partisans and traitors in the distant cities of Peloponnesus, much more was this practicable for him in the neighbouring peninsula of Chalkidike. Olynthus and the other cities were nearly all conterminous with the Macedonian territory, some probably with boundaries not clearly settled. Perdikkas II. had given to the Olynthians (at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war⁴) a portion of his territory near the Lake Bolbe: Philip himself had given to them the district of Anthems. Possessed of so much neighbouring land, he had the means, with little loss to himself, of materially favouring or enriching such individual citizens, of Olynthus or other cities, as chose to promote his designs. Besides direct bribes, where that mode of proceeding was most effective, he could grant the right of gratuitous pasture to the flocks and herds of one, and furnish abundant supplies of timber to another. Master as he now was of Amphipolis and Philippi, he could at pleasure open or close to them the speculations in the gold mines of Mount Pangæus, for which they had always hankered.² If his privateers harassed even the powerful Athens, and the islands under her protection, much more vexatious would they be to his neighbours in the Chalkidic peninsula, which they as it were eneircled, from the Thermaic Gulf on one side to the Strymoniac Gulf on the other. Lastly, we cannot doubt that some individuals in these cities had found it profitable to take service, civil or military, under Philip, which would supply him with correspondents and adherents among their friends and relatives.

It will thus be easily seen, that with reference to Olynthus and her confederate cities, Philip had at his command means of private benefit and annoyance to such an extent, as would ensure to him the cooperation of a venal and traitorous minority in each; such minority of course blending its proceedings, and concealing its purposes, among the standing political feuds of the place. These means however were only preliminary to the direct use of the sword. His seductions and presents commenced the work, but his excellent generalship and soldiers—the phalanx, the hypaspistæ, and the cavalry, all now brought into admirable training during the ten years of his reign—completed it.

Though Demosthenæs in one passage goes so far as to say that Philip rated his established influence so high as to expect to incorporate the Chalkidic confederacy in his empire without serious

¹ Thucyd. i. 58.
² Demosthenæs, Fals, Leg. p. 425, 426; Xenophon, Hellen, v. 2. 17.
difficulty and without even real war—there is ground for believing that he encountered strenuous resistance, avenged by unmeasured rigours after the victory. The two years and a half between Midsummer 350 B.C., and the commencement of 347 B.C. (the two last years of Olympiad 107 and the nine first months of Olympiad 108), were productive of phenomena more terror-striking than anything in the recent annals of Greece. No less than thirty-two free Grecian cities in Chalkidike were taken and destroyed, the inhabitants being reduced to slavery, by Philip. Among them was Olynthus, one of the most powerful, flourishing, and energetic members of the Hellenic brotherhood; Apollonia, whose inhabitants would now repent the untoward obstinacy of their fathers (thirty-two years before) in repudiating a generous and equal confederacy with Olynthus, and invoking Spartan aid to revive the falling power of Philip's father, Amyntas; and Stageira, the birth-place of Aristotle. The destruction of thirty-two free Hellenic communities in two years by a foreign prince, was a calamity the like of which had never occurred since the suppression of the Ionic revolt and the invasion of Xerxes. 1 Have already recounted in a previous chapter the manifestation of wrath at the festival of the 99th Olympiad (584 B.C.) against the envoys of the elder Dionysius of Syracuse, who had captured and subverted five or six free Hellenic communities in Italy and Sicily. Far more vehement would be the sentiment of awe and terror, after the Olynthian war, against the Macedonian destroyer of thirty-two Chalkidic cities. We shall find this plainly indicated in the phenomena immediately succeeding. We shall see Athens terrified into a peace alike dishonourable and improvident, which even Demosthenes does not venture to oppose; we shall see Aeschinés passing out of a free-spoken Athenian citizen into a servile whipping, if not a paid agent, of Philip; we shall observe Isokrates, once the champion of Pan-hellenic freedom and integrity, ostentatiously proclaiming Philip as the master and arbiter of Greece, while persuading him at the same time to use his power well for the purpose of conquering Persia. These were terrible times; suitably illustrated in their cruel details by the gangs of enslaved Chalkidic Greeks of both sexes, seen passing even into Peloponnesus. 3

1 Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 15. 22. 2 Ταῦτα τοῦτον ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐπιὼν ἅπαντα ἤλπιζε ἄλλ᾽ ἂν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐπιὼν ἀπεκτείνω τὰ πράγματα ἀναφηυνθεῖ, κἂν διῆφη. 3 Demosthenes himself met a person named

2 See Ch. LXXXIII.

as the property of new grantees who extolled the munificence of
the donor Philip; and suitably ushered in by awful celestial signs,
showers of fire and blood falling from the heavens to the earth, in
testimony of the wrath of the gods. 1

While, however, we make out with tolerable clearness the
general result of Philip's Olynthian war, and the terror
which it struck into the Grecian mind—we are not only
left without information as to its details, but are even
perplexed by its chronology. I have already remarked,
that though the Olynthians had contracted such suspi-
cions of Philip, even before the beginning of 351 B.C., as
to induce them to make peace with his enemy Athens—they had,
nevertheless, declined the overtures of Athens for a closer alliance,
not wishing to bring upon themselves decided hostility from so
powerful a neighbour, until his aggressions should become such as
to leave them no choice. We have no precise information as to
Philip's movements after his operations in Thrace and his sickness
in 351 B.C. But we know that it was not in his nature 

to remain inactive; that he was incessantly pushing his conquests:
and that no conquest could be so important to him as that of Olynthus
and the Chalkidic peninsula. Accordingly, we are not surprised to
find, that the Olynthian and Chalkidian confederates became the

Atreus's followers by one of these sorrowful troops. We may be sure
that this case was only one among

many.

1 Pliny, H. N. ii. 27. "Fit et epilep
tus hincus, quod recentus clausum. Fit
et saeva miseria quo nihil terrifi
bantur mortalium (non est) incendium
ad termes edens inde: sed Olym
plaeae evidentia replexe nume
1 mae, non esse

Philippus victor apud Deuc.

Atque ego

hinc statis temporibus natura, ut certum,

arbiter existere; non ut plerique

varius de causis, quas ingens erat neminem

excogitat. " Quae antiquitum rei leoni

fune parsumur: sed ea accidisse non

quia haec facta sunt arbiter, verum

haec ibi facta, quia increata erant illa:

ruinate antea occisam corre

esse rationem, ideoque non sient ex

curta superius dictae deliciisque et multa

alia nesci." 2

* The precision of this chronological

note makes it valuable. Olympia. 107, 3

—corresponds to the year between Mid

summer 350 and Midsummer 349 B.C.

Taylor, who cites this passage in his

Prolegomena ad Demosthenem (op.

Bekke Orrat. Gr. vol. viii. p. 758),
takes the liberty, without any manus

script authority, of altering &e into

imp.' which Bolmecke justly pron

onuce to be unreasonable (Forshun

gen. p. 212). The passage as it stands is

an evidence, not merely to authen

ticate the terror character of the time,

but also to prove, among other evi

dences, that the attack of Philip on the

Olynthians and Chalkidians began in

351 B.C.—not in the following Olympic year, or in the time after Mid

summer 350 B.C.

Bolmecke (Forshungen, p. 281-221)

has gone into an examination of the
dates and events of this Olynthian war,

and has arranged them in a manner
different from any preceding critic.

His examination is acute and instruc

tive, including however some reason

ings of little force or pertinence. I

follow him generally in placing the be

ginning of the Olynthian war, and the

Olynthians of Demosthenes, before

Olymp. 107, 4. This is the best opinion

which I can form, on matters himan

ably unattested and uncertain.
object of his direct hostility in 350 B.C. He raised pretences for attack against one or other of these cities separately; avoiding to deal with the confederacy as a whole, and disclaiming, by special envos, all purposes injurious to Olynthus.

Probably the philippising party in that city may have dwelt upon this disclaimer as satisfactory, and given as many false assurances about the purposes of Philip, as we shall find Ἀσκλίνης hereafter uttering at Athens. But the general body of citizens were not so deceived. Feeling that the time had come when it was prudent to close with the previous Athenian overtures, they sent envoys to Athens to propose alliance and invite cooperation against Philip. Their first propositions were doubtless not couched in the language of urgency and distress. They were not as yet in any actual danger; their power was great in reality, and estimated at its full value abroad; moreover, as prudent diplomatists, they would naturally overstate their own dignity and the magnitude of what they were offering. Of course they would ask for Athenian aid to be sent to Chalkidikē—since it was there that the war was being carried on—but they would ask for aid in order to act energetically against the common enemy, and repress the growth of his power—not to avert immediate danger menacing Olynthus.

There needed no discussion to induce the Athenians to accept this alliance. It was what they had long been seeking, and they willingly closed with the proposition. Of course they also promised—what indeed was almost involved in the acceptance—to send a force to cooperate against Philip in Chalkidikē. On this first recognition of Olynthus as an ally—or perhaps shortly afterwards, but before circumstances had at all changed—Demonisty described his earliest Olynthiac harangue. Of the three memorable compositions so denominated, the earliest is, in my judgement, that which stands second in the edited order. Their true chronological order has long been, and still is, matter of controversy; the best conclusion which I can form, is that the first and the second are erroneous placed, but that the third is really the latest; all of them being delivered during the six or seven last months of 350 B.C.

1 Demosth. Philipp. iii, p. 114. That Philip not only attacked, but even subdued, the thirty-two Chalkidike cities, before he marched directly and finally to assault Olynthus, is stated in the Fragment of Kallisthenēs, ap. Stephanum, Elog. Tit. vii. p. 92.

2 Kallisthēnē, whose history is lost, was a native of Olynthus, born a few years in fore the capture of the city.

3 Some remarks will be found on the order of the Olynthiacs in an Appendix to the present chapter.

It must be understood that I always
In this his earliest advocacy (the speech which stands printed as the second Olynthiac), Demosthenes insists upon the advantageous contingency which has just turned up for Athens, through the blessing of the gods, in the spontaneous tender of so valuable an ally. He recommends that aid be despatched to the new ally; the most prompt and effective aid will please him the best. But this recommendation is contained in a single sentence, in the middle of the speech; it is neither repeated a second time, nor emphatically insisted upon, nor enlarged by specification of quantity or quality of aid to be sent. No allusion is made to necessities or danger of Olynthus, nor to the chance that Philip might conquer the town; still less to ulterior contingencies, that Philip, if he did conquer it, might carry the seat of war from his own coasts to those of Attica. On the contrary, Demosthenes adverts to the power of the Olynthians—to the situation of their territory, close on Philip's flanks—to their fixed resolution that they will never again enter into amity or compromise with him—as evidences how valuable their alliance will prove to Athens; enabling her to prosecute with improved success the war against Philip, and to retrieve the disgraceful losses brought upon her by previous remissness. The main purpose of the orator is to inflame his countrymen into more hearty and vigorous efforts for the prosecution of this general war; while to furnish aid to the Olynthians, is only a secondary purpose, and a part of the larger scheme. "I shall not (says the orator) expatiate on the formidable power of Philip as an argument to urge you to the performance of your public duty. That would be too much both of compliment to him and of disparagement to you. I should, indeed, myself have thought him truly formidable, if he had achieved his present eminence by means consistent with justice. But he has aggrandised himself, partly through your negligence and improvidence, partly by treacherous means—by taking into pay corrupt partisans at Athens, and by cheating successively Olynthians, Thessalians, and all his other allies. These allies, having now detected his treachery, are deserting him; without them, his power will crumble away. Moreover, the Macedonians themselves have no sympathy with his personal ambition; they are fatigued with the labour imposed upon them by his endless military movements and impoverished by the closing of their ports through the war. His vaunted officers are men of worthless and dissolute
habits; his personal companions are thieves, vile ministers of amusement, outcasts from our cities. His past good fortune imparts to all this real weakness a fallacious air of strength; and doubtless his good fortune has been very great. But the fortune of Athens, and her title to the benevolent aid of the gods is still greater—if only you, Athenians, will do your duty. Yet here you are, sitting still, doing nothing. The sluggard cannot even command his friends to work for him—much less the gods. I do not wonder, that Philip, always in the field, always in movement, doing everything for himself, never letting slip an opportunity—prevails over you who merely talk, inquire, and vote, without action. Nay—the contrary would be wonderful—if under such circumstances, he had not been the conqueror. But what I do wonder at is, that you Athenians—who in former days contended for Panhellenic freedom against the Lacedaemonians—who, scorning unjust aggrandisement for yourselves, fought in person and lavished your substance to protect the rights of other Greeks—that you now shrink from personal service and payment of money for the defence of your own possessions. You, who have so often rescued others, can now sit still after having lost so much of your own! I wonder you do not look back to that conduct of yours which has brought your affairs into this state of ruin, and ask yourselves how they can ever mend, while such conduct remains unchanged. It was much easier at first to preserve what we once had, than to recover it now that it is lost; we have nothing left now to lose—we have every thing to recover. This must be done by ourselves, and at once; we must furnish money; we must serve in person by turns; we must give our generals means to do their work well, and then exact from them a severe account afterwards—which we cannot do, so long as we ourselves will neither pay nor serve. We must correct that abuse which has grown up, whereby particular symmories in the state combine to exempt themselves from burdensome duties, and to cast them all unjustly upon others. We must not only come forward vigorously and heartily, with person and with money, but each man must embrace faithfully his fair share of patriotic obligation."

Such are the main points of the earliest discourse delivered by Demosthenes on the subject of Olynthus. In the mind of modern readers, as in that of the rhetor Dionysius, there is an unco-
Disposition to magnify the practical effect of the speeches of Demosthenes — he was an opposition speaker, but as yet not enjoying much practical influence. It is moreover certain — to his honour — that he described and measured foreign dangers before they were recognised by ordinary politicians; that he advised a course, energetic and salutary indeed, but painful for the people to act upon, and disagreeable for recognised leaders to propose; that these leaders, such as Eubulus and others, were accordingly adverse to him. The tone of Demosthenes in these speeches is that of one who feels that he is contending against heavy odds — combating an habitual and deep-seated prejudice. He is an earnest remonstrant — an opposition speaker — contributing to raise up gradually a body of public sentiment and conviction which ultimately may pass into act. His rival Eubulus is the ministerial, spokes-man, whom the majority, both rich and poor, followed; a man, not at all corrupt (so far as we know), but of simple conservative routine, evading all painful necessities and extraordinary precautions; conciliating the rich by resisting a property-tax, and the general body of citizens by refusing to meddle with the Théâtric expenditure.

The Athenians did not follow the counsel of Demosthenes. They accepted the Olyanthian alliance, but took no active step to cooperate with Olyanthus in the war against Philip. Such un-
happily was their usual habit. The habit of Philip was the opposite. We need no witness to satisfy us, that he would not slacken in his attack—and that in the course of a month or two, he would master more than one of the Chalkidian cities, perhaps defeating the Olynthian forces also. The Olynthians would discover that they had gained nothing by their new allies; while the philippising party among themselves would take advantage of the remissness of Athens to depreciate her promises as worthless or insincere, and to press for accommodation with the enemy. Complaints would presently reach Athens, brought by fresh envoys from the Olynthians, and probably also from the Chalkidians, who were the greatest sufferers by Philip’s arms. They would naturally justify this renewed application by expatiating on the victorious progress of Philip; they would now call for aid more urgently, and might even glance at the possibility of Philip’s conquest of Chalkidike. It was in this advanced stage of the proceedings that Demosthenes again exerted himself in the cause, delivering that speech which stands first in the printed order of the Olynthiacs.

Here we have, not a Philippic, but a true Olynthiac. Olynthus is no longer part and parcel of a larger theme, upon the whole of which Demosthenes intends to discourse; but stands out as the prominent feature and specialty of his pleading. It is now pronounced to be in danger and in pressing need of succour; moreover its preservation is strenuously pressed upon the Athenians, as essential to their own safety. While it stands with its confederacy around it, the Athenians can fight Philip on his own coast; if it falls, there is nothing to prevent him from transferring the war into Attica, and assailing them on their own soil. Demosthenes is wound up to a higher pitch of emphasis, complaining of the lukewarmness of his countrymen on a crisis which calls aloud for instant action. He again urges that a vote be at once passed to assist Olynthus, and two armaments despatched as quickly as possible; one to

1 Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 9. δὲ ὡστὶ μὴ μᾶλις τὸνό δίών, μὴ παυομνὴν ἄν καὶ δεῖγος διήμερος (Philip) πράματα χρησίματά τα μέν εἰσάρη ἥν’ ἀντίκειται, τὰ δ᾽ ἀντίλα, τὰ δ᾽ ἡμῖς διαβόλικα καὶ τὴν ἀνομίαν τὴν ἡμετέραν πρότερον τε καὶ παραπαλαιντήν τι τῶν ἔλλον προμαχόντων.

Thus occurs in the next subsequent speech of Demosthenes, intimating what Philip and his partisans had already deduced an inference from the part neglect of the Athenians to send any aid to Olynthus. Of course no such inference could be started until some time had been allowed for expectation and disappointment, which is one among many reasons for believing the first Olynthiac to be posterior in time to the second.

2 Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 12, 13.
3 Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 9.
preserve to Olynthus her confederate cities—the other, to make a
diversion by simultaneous attack on Philip at home. Without
such two-fold aid (he says) the cities cannot be preserved. 1
Advice of aid generally he had already given, though less emphati-
cally, in his previous harangue; but he now superadds a new
suggestion—that Athenian envoys shall be sent thither, not merely
to announce the coming of the force, but also to remain at
Olynthus and watch over the course of events. For he is afraid,
that unless such immediate encouragement be sent, Philip may,
even without the tedious process of a siege, frighten or cajole the
Olynthian confederacy into submission; partly by reminding them
that Athens had done nothing for them, and by denouncing her as
a treacherous and worthless ally. 2 Philip would be glad to entrap
them into some plausible capitulation; and though they knew that
they could have no security for his keeping the terms of it after-
wards, still he might succeed, if Athens remained idle. Now, if
ever, was the time for Athenians to come forward and do their
duty without default; to serve in person and submit to the
necessary amount of direct taxation. They had no longer the
smallest pretence for continued inaction; the very conjuncture
which they had so long desired, had turned up of itself—war
between Olynthus and Philip, and that too upon grounds special
to Olynthus—not at the instigation of Athens. 3 The Olynthian
alliance had been thrown in the way of Athens by the peculiar
goodness of the gods, to enable her to repair her numerous past
errors and short-comings. She ought to look well and deal
rightly with these last remaining opportunities, in order to wipe off
the shame of the past; but if she now let slip Olynthus, and suffer
Philip to conquer it, there was nothing else to hinder him from
marching whithersoever he chose. His ambition was so insatiable,
his activity so incessant, that, assuming Athens to persist in her
careless inaction, he would carry the war forward from Thrace
into Attica—of which the ruinous consequences were but too
clear. 4

"I maintain (continued the orator) that you ought to lend aid

3 Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 11. 4 Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 9, 10.
at the present crisis in two ways; by preserving for the Olynthians their confederated cities, through a body of troops sent out for that express purpose—and by employing at the same time other troops and other triremes to act aggressively against Philip's own coast. If you neglect either of these measures, I fear that the expedition will fail.—As to the pecuniary provision, you have already more money than any other city, available for purposes of war; if you will pay that money to soldiers on service, no need exists for further provision—if not, then need exists; but above all things, money must be found. What then! I shall be asked—are you moving that the Theoric fund shall be devoted to war purposes? Not I, by Zeus. I merely express my conviction, that soldiers must be equipped, and that receipt of public money, and performance of public service, ought to go hand in hand; but your practice is to take the public money, without any such condition, for the festivals. Accordingly, nothing remains except that all should directly contribute; much, if much is wanted—little, if little will suffice. Money must be had; without it, not a single essential step can be taken. There are moreover different ways and means suggested by others. Choose any one of these which you think advantageous; and lay a vigorous grasp on events while the opportunity still lasts."

It was thus that Demosthenes addressed his countrymen some time after the Olynthians had been received as allies, but before any auxiliary force had been either sent to them or even positively decreed—yet when such postponement of action had inspired them with distrust, threatening to throw them, even without resistance into the hands of Philip and their own philippising party. We observe in Demosthenes the same sagacious appreciation, both of the present and the future, as we have already remarked in the first Philippic—foresight of the terrible consequences of this Olynthian war, while as yet distant and unobserved by others. We perceive the same good sense and courage in invoking the right remedies; though his propositions of personal military service, direct taxation, or the diversion of the Theoric fund—were all of them the most unpopular which could be made. The last of the three, indeed, he does not embody in a substantive motion; nor could he move it without positive illegality, which would have rendered him liable to the indictment called Graphé Paranomon. But he approaches it near enough to raise in the public mind the question.
as it really stood—that money must be had; that there were only
two ways of getting it—direct taxation, and appropriation of
the festival fund; and that the latter of these ought to be resorted
to as well as the former. We shall find this question about the
Theoric Fund coming forward again more than once, and shall
have presently to notice it more at large.

At some time after this new harangue of Demosthenes—how
long after it, or how far in consequence of it, we cannot
say—the Athenians commissioned and sent a body of
foreign mercenaries to the aid of the Olynthians and
Chalkidians. The outfit and transport of these troops
was in part defrayed by voluntary subscriptions from rich
Athenian citizens. But no Athenian citizen-soldiers were sent;
nor was any money assigned for the pay of the mercenaries.
The expedition appears to have been sent towards the autumn of 350
B.C., as far as we can pretend to affirm anything respecting the
obscure chronology of this period. It presently gained some
victory over Philip or Philip’s generals, and was enabled to

1 In my view, it is necessary to se-
parate entirely the proceedings alluded
to in the Demosthenic Olynthiacs, from
the three expeditions to Olynthus, men-
tioned by Philochorus during the fol-
lowing year—349-348 B.C., the archon-
ship of Callimachus. I see no reason to
counteract the statement of Philo-
chorus, that there were three expedi-
tions during that year, such as he
describes. But he must be mistaken
(or Dionysius must have copied him
erroneously) in setting forth those three
expeditions as the whole Olynthian war,
and the first of the three as being the
beginning of the war. The Olynthian
war began in 350 B.C., and the three
Olynthiacs of Demosthenes refer, in my
judgement, to the first months of the
war. But it lasted until the early
spring of 347 B.C., so that the arma-
ments mentioned by Philochorus may
have occurred during the last half of
the war. I cannot but think that
Dionysius, being satisfied with finding
three expeditions to Olynthus which
might be attached as results to the
three olynthiacs of Demosthenes, has too
hastily copied out the three from Phi-
lochorus, and has assigned the date of
349-348 B.C. to the three: which,
simply because he found that date
given to the three expeditions by Philo-
chorus.

The revolt in Euboea, the expedition
of Phokion with the battle of Tamynae
and the prolonged war in that island,
began about January or February 349
B.C., and continued throughout that
year and the next. Mr. Clinton even
places these events a year earlier;
which I do not concur, but which, if
adopted, would throw back the begin-
ing of the Olynthian war one year
further still. It is certain that there
was one Athenian expedition at least
sent to Olynthus before the Euboean war
(Demosthen, cont. Meidiam. p. 566-
573)—an expedition so considerable,
that voluntary donations from the rich
citizens were obtained towards the cost.
Here is good proof (better than Phi-
lochorus, if indeed it be inconsistent
with what he really said) that the
Athenians not only contracted the al-
lance of Olynthus, but actually assisted
Olynthus, during the year 350 B.C.
Now the Olynthiacs of Demosthenes
present to my mind strong evidence
of belonging to the earliest months of
the Olynthian war. I think it reason-
able therefore to suppose that the ex-
pedition of foreign mercenaries to
Olynthus, which the third Olynthiac
implies as having been sent, is the same
as that for which the οἰκήματα men-
tioned in the Meidiana were required.
See Bobeck, Forschungen, p. 202;
and K. F. Herrmann, De Anno Natali
Demosthenis, p. 9.
transmit good news to Athens, which excited much exultation there, and led the people to fancy that they were in a fair way of taking revenge on Philip for past miscarriages. According to some speakers, not only were the Olynthians beyond all reach of danger, but Philip was in a fair way of being punished and humbled. It is indeed possible that the success may really have been something considerable, such as to check Philip's progress for the time. Though victorious on the whole, he must have experienced partial and temporary reverses, otherwise he would have concluded the war before the early spring of 317 B.C. Whether this success coincided with that of the Athenian general Chares over Philip's general Adatus, we cannot say.

But Demosthenes had sagacity enough to perceive, and frankness to proclaim, that it was a success noway decisive of the war generally; worse than nothing, if it induced the Athenians to fancy that they had carried their point.

To correct the delusive fancy, that enough had been done—to combat that chronic malady under which the Athenians so readily found encouragement and excuses for inaction—to revive in them the conviction that they had contracted a debt, yet unpaid, towards their Olynthian allies and towards their own ultimate security—is the scope of Demosthenes in his third Olynthiac harangue; third in the printed order, and third also, according to my judgement, in order of time; delivered towards the close of the year 350 B.C. Like Perikles,

1 Theopompos ap. Athenee. xii. p. 532. This victory would seem to belong more naturally (as Dr. Thirlwall remarks) to the operations of Chares and Onomarchus against Philip in Thessaly, in 354-352 B.C. But the point cannot be determined.

2 Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 29. μετά, οἵτινες, ὅτε ἀπηγγέλθη Φίλιππος ὑμῖν ἐν Θράκῃ, τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ἔτος τούτῳ, Ἡραῖον τεῖχος πολιορκῶν τότε τοῖς μὴν ἄνδρεσιν ἢν Μαυμακτήριον. &c. This was the month Menanderion or November 352 B.C. Calculating forward from that date, τρίτον ἔτος means the next year but one; that is the Attic year Olymp. 107, 3, or the year between Midsummer 350 and Midsummer 349 B.C. Dionysius of Halikarnassus says (p. 726) εἰς Καλλίμαχον τοῦ τρίτον μετὰ Θέσσαλον ἄρξατος—though there was only one archon between Thessalus and Kallimachus. When Demosthenes says τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ἔτος—it is clear that both cannot be accurate; we must choose one or the other; and τρίτον ἔτος brings us to the year 350-349 B.C. To show that the oration was probably spoken during the first half of that year, or before February 349 B.C., another point of evidence may be noticed.

At the time when the third Olynthiac was spoken, no expedition of Athenian citizens had yet been sent to the help of Olynthus. But we shall see presently, that Athenian citizens were sent thither during the first half of 349 B.C.

Indeed, it would be singular, if the Olynthiac had been spoken after the expedition to Euboea, that Demosthenes should make no allusion in any one of them to that expedition, an affair of so much moment and interest, which kept Athens in serious agitation during much of the year, and was followed by prolonged war in that neighbouring country.
he was not less watchful to abate extravagant and unseasonable illusions of triumph in his countrymen, than to raise their spirits in moments of undue alarm and despondency.1

"The talk which I hear about punishing Philip (says Demosthenes, in substance) is founded on a false basis. The real facts of the case teach us a very different lesson.2 They bid us look well to our own security, that we be not ourselves the sufferers, and that we preserve our allies. There was indeed a time—and that too within my remembrance not long ago—when we might have held our own and punished Philip besides; but now, our first care must be to preserve our own allies. After we have made this sure, then it will be time to think of punishing others. The present juncture calls for anxious deliberation. Do not again commit the same error as you committed three years ago. When Philip was besieging Heraea in Thrace, you passed an energetic decree to send an expedition against him: presently came reports that he was sick, and that he was dead: this good news made you fancy that the expedition was unnecessary, and you let it drop. If you had executed promptly what you resolved, Philip would have been put down then, and would have given you no further trouble.3

"Those matters indeed are past, and cannot be mended. But I advert to them now, because the present war-crisis is very similar, and I trust you will not make the like mistake again. If you do not send aid to Olynthus with all your force and means, you will play Philip’s game for him now, exactly as you did then. You have been long anxious and working to get the Olynthians into war with Philip. This has now happened: what choice remains, except to aid them heartily and vigorously? You will be covered with shame, if you do not. But this is not all. Your own security at home requires it of you also; for there is nothing

1 Thucyd. ii, 65. "Οποτε γεύνε αλοθεύτω τι αὐτῶν παρὰ καριόν ἐβλεπε, ἐφικάλησες, λέγων καταπλησεσεν (Periklöis) εἰς τὸ

2 Compare the argument of the third Olynthia by Libanius.

3 Demost. Olynth. iii. p. 28, 29. Τοὺς μὲν γὰρ λόγους, περὶ τοῦ τεμοροδοτοῦσαν Φίλιππου διὰ γεγομένους, τὰ δὲ πράγματα εἰς τούτο πρόσκειται, ὡστε ἔτει καὶ τις πρὸς καὶ τοὺς πρόπτων καὶ καταφέρει διὸν.

. . . . . τοῦθ’ ἵκανον προηλαβεῖν ἠμῖν εἶναι τὴν πράτην, διὸς τὸν συμμάχους σώσων.

to hinder Philip, if he conquers Olynthus, from invading Attica. The Phokians are exhausted in funds—and the Thebans are your enemies.

"All this is superfluous, I shall be told. We have already resolved unanimously to succour Olynthus, and we will succour it. We only want you to tell us how. You will be surprised, perhaps, at my answer. Appoint Nomotheta at once. Do not submit to them any propositions for new laws, for you have laws enough already—but only repeal such of the existing laws as are hurtful at the present juncture—I mean, those which regard the Théòric fund (I speak out thus plainly), and some which bear on the citizens in military service. By the former, you hand over money, which ought to go to soldiers on service, in Théòric distribution among those who stay at home. By the latter, you let off without penalty those who evade service, and discourage those who wish to do their duty. When you have repealed these mischievous laws, and rendered it safe to proclaim salutary truths, then expect some one to come forward with a formal motion such as you all know to be required. But until you do this, expect not that any one will make these indispensable propositions on your behalf, with the certainty of ruin at your hands. You will find no such man; especially as he would only incur unjust punishment for himself without any benefit to the city—while his punishment would make it yet more formidable to speak out upon that subject in future, than it is even now. Moreover, the same men who proposed these laws should also take upon them to propose the repeal; for it is not right that these men should continue to enjoy a popularity which is working mischief to the whole city, while the unpopularity of a reform beneficial to us all, falls on the head of the reforming mover. But while you retain this prohibition, you can neither tolerate that any one among you shall be powerful enough to infringe a law with impunity—nor expect that any one will be fool enough to run with his eyes open into punishment."

I lament that my space confines me to this brief and meagre abstract of one of the most splendid harangues ever delivered—the third Olynthiac of Demosthenes. The partial advantage gained over Philip being prodigiously over-rated, the Athenians seemed to fancy that they had done enough, and were receding from their resolution to assist Olynthus energetically. As on so many other occasions, so on this—Demosthenes undertook to combat a prevalent sentiment.
which he deemed unfounded and unseasonable. With what courage, wisdom, and dexterity—so superior to the insulting sarcasms of Phokion—does he execute this self-imposed duty, well knowing its unpopularity!

Whether any movement was made by the Athenians in consequence of the third Olynthiac of Demosthenès, we cannot determine. We have no ground for believing the affirmative; while we are certain that the specific measure which he recommended—the sending of an armament of citizens personally serving—was not at that time (before the end of 350 B.C.) carried into effect. At or before the commencement of 349 B.C., the foreign relations of Athens began to be disturbed by another supervening embarrassment—the revolt of Euboea.

After the successful expedition of 358 B.C., whereby the Athenians had expelled the Thebans from Euboea, that island remained for some years in undisturbed connection with Athens. Chalkis, Eretria, and Oreus, its three principal cities, sent each a member to the synod of allies holding session at Athens, and paid their annual quota (seemingly five talents each) to the confederate fund. During the third quarter of 352 B.C., Mencenstratus the despot or principal citizen of Eretria is cited as a particularly devoted friend of Athens. But this state of things changed shortly after Philip conquered Thessaly and made himself master of the Pegasanean Gulf (in 353 and the first half of 352 B.C.). His power was then established immediately over against Oreus and the northern coast of Euboea, with which island his means of communication became easy and frequent. Before the date of the first Philippic of Demosthenès (seemingly towards the summer of 351 B.C.) Philip had opened correspondences in Euboea, and had despatched thither various letters, some of which the orator reads in the course of that speech to the Athenian assembly. The actual words of the letters are not given; but from the criticism of the orator himself, we discern that they were highly offensive to Athenian feelings; instigating the Eubeans probably to sever themselves from Athens, with offers of Macedonian aid towards that object. Philip's naval warfare also brought his cruisers to Gerestus in Euboea, where they captured several Athenian corn-ships; insulting even the opposite coast of Attica at Marathon, so

1 Aschinès adv. Ktesiphont. p. 67, αὐτῷ ψηφίσασθαι, ἢ Φάνθος ὁ Φωκεὺς, &c., 68.
2 Demosthenès cont. Aristokrat. p. 3 Demosthenès, Philipp. i. p. 49.
3 Demosthenès, Philipp. i. p. 51.
4 Demosthenès, Philipp. i. p. 661.
as to lower the reputation of Athens among her allies. Accordingly, in each of the Euboean cities, parties were soon formed aiming at the acquisition of dominion through the support of Philip; while for the same purpose detachments of mercenaries could also be procured across the western Euboean strait, out of the large numbers now under arms in Phokis.

About the beginning of 349 B.C.—while the war of Philip, unknown to us in its details against the Olynthians and Chalkidians, was still going on, with more or less of help from mercenaries sent by Athens—hostilities, probably raised by the intrigues of Philip, broke out at Eretria in Euboea. An Eretrian named Plutarch (we do not know what had become of Mene-stratus), with a certain number of soldiers at his disposal, but opposed by enemies yet more powerful, professed to represent Athenian interests in his city, and sent to Athens to ask for aid. Demosthenes, suspecting this man to be a traitor, dissuaded compliance with the application. But Plutarch had powerful friends at Athens, seemingly among the party of Eubulus; one of whom, Meidias, a violent personal enemy of Demosthenes, while advocating the grant of aid, tried even to get up a charge against Demosthenes, of having himself fomented these troubles in Euboea against the reputed philo-Athenian Plutarch. The Athenian assembly determined to despatch a force under Phokion; who accordingly crossed into the island, somewhat before the time of the festival Anthesteria (February) with a body of hoplites. The cost of fitting out triremes for this transport was in part defrayed by voluntary contributions from rich Athenians; several of whom, Nikératus, Enktemon, Euthydémus, contributed each the outfit of one vessel.

A certain proportion of the horsemen of the city were sent also; yet the entire force was not very large, as it was supposed that the partisans there to be found would make up the deficiency.

This hope however turned out fallacious. After an apparently friendly reception and a certain stay at or near Eretria, Phokion found himself betrayed. Kallias, an ambitious leader of Chalkis, collected as much Euboean force as he could, declared openly

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1 Demosthenes, De Pace, p. 58.
3 Demosthenes cont. Meidiam, p. 558.
against Athens, and called in Macedonian aid (probably from Philip's commanders in the neighbouring Paguscan Gulf); while his brother Taurosthenes hired a detachment of mercenaries out of Phokis. The anti-Athenian force thus became more formidable than Phokion could fairly cope with; while the support yielded to him in the island was less than he expected. Crossing the eminence named Kotyleum, he took a position near the town and hippodrome of Tamyna, on high ground bordered by a ravine; Plutarch still professing friendship, and encamping with his mercenaries along with him. Phokion's position was strong; yet the Athenians were outnumbered and beleaguered so as to occasion great alarm. Many of the slack and disorderly soldiers deserted; a loss which Phokion affected to despise—though he at the same time sent to Athens to make known his difficulties and press for reinforcement. Meanwhile he kept on the defensive in his camp, which the enemy marched up to attack. Disregarding his order, and acting with a deliberate treason which was accounted at Athens unparalleled—Plutarch advanced forward out of the camp to meet them; but presently fled, drawing along with his flight the Athenian horse, who had also advanced in some disorder. Phokion with the infantry was now in the greatest danger. The enemy, attacking vigorously, were plucking up the palisade, and on the point of forcing his camp. But his measures were so well taken, and his hoplites behaved with so much intrepidity and steadiness in this trying emergency, that he repelled the assailants with loss, and gained a complete victory. Thallus and Nineas distinguished themselves by his side; Meophanes also was conspicuous in partially rallying the broken horsemen; while Eschinés the orator, serving among the hoplites, was complimented for his bravery, and 500 to Athens to carry the first news of the victory. Phokion pursued his success, expelled Plutarch
from Eretria, and captured a strong fort called Zageta, near the narrowest part of the island. He released all his Greek captives, fearing that the Athenians, incensed at the recent treachery, should resolve upon treating them with extreme harshness. Kallias seems to have left the island and found shelter with Philip.

The news brought by Aeschines (before the Dionysiac festival) of the victory of Tamyna, relieved the Athenians from great anxiety. On the former despatch from Phokion, the Senate had resolved to send to Euboea another armament, including the remaining half of the cavalry, a reinforcement of hoplites, and a fresh squadron of triremes. But the victory enabled them to dispense with any immediate reinforcement, and to celebrate the Dionysiac festival with cheerfulness. The festival was on this year of more than usual notoriety. Demosthenes, serving in it as chorégus for his tribe the Pandionis, was brutally insulted, in the theatre and amid the full pomp of the ceremony, by his enemy the wealthy Meidias; who, besides other outrages, struck him several times with his fist on the head. The insult was the more poignant, because Meidias at this time held the high office of Thesparch, or over the commanders of the horse. It was the practice at Athens to convene a public assembly immediately after the Dionysiac festival, for the special purpose of receiving notifications and hearing complaints about matters which had occurred at the festival itself. At this special assembly Demosthenes preferred a complaint against Meidias for the unwarrantable outrage offered, and found warm sympathy among the people, who passed a

in the island (in 319-318 B.C.) to the

Nothing indeed can be more obscure and difficult to disentangle than the sequence of Euboean transactions. It is to be observed that Aeschines lays the blame of the treachery, whereby the Athenian army was entrapped and endangered, on Kallias of Chalkis; while Demosthenes throws it on Plutarch of Eretria. Probably both Plutarch and Kallias deserve the stigma. But Demosthenes is on this occasion more worthy of credit than Aeschines, since the harangue against Meidias, in which the assertion occurs, was delivered only a few months after the battle of Tamyna; while the allegation of Aeschines is contained in his harangue against Ktesiphon, which was not spoken till many years afterwards.

1 Plutarch, Phokion, c. 13.
2 Aeschines indeed says, that Kallias, having been forgiven by Athens on this occasion, afterwards, gratuitously, and from pure hostility and ingratitude to Athens, went to Philip. But I think this is probably an exaggeration. The orator is making a strong point against Kallias, who afterwards became connected with Demosthenes, and rendered considerable service to Athens in Italy.

The treason of Kallias and Tamyna is alluded to by Demarchus in his harangue against Demosthenes, c. 45.

3 Demosthenes cont. Meidias, p. 567.
HISTORY OF GREECE. PART II.

From the despatches of Phokion, the treason of Plutarch of Eretria had become manifest; so that Demosthenês gained credit for his previous remarks on the impolicy of granting the armament; while the friends of Plutarch—Hegesilaus and others of the party of Eubulus—incurred displeasure; and some, as it appears, were afterwards tried. But he was reproached by his enemies for having been absent from the battle of Tamyne; and a citizen named Euktémon, at the instigation of Meidias, threatened an indictment against him for desertion of his post. Whether Demosthenês had actually gone over to Eubara as a hoplite in the army of Phokion, and obtained leave of absence to come back for the Dionysia—or whether he did not go at all—we are unable to say. In either case, his duties as choréeus for this year furnished a conclusive excuse; so that Euktémon, though he formally hung up before the statues of the Eponymous Ierôs public proclamation of his intended indictment, never thought fit to take even the first step for bringing it to actual trial, and incurred legal disgrace for such non-performance of his engagement. Nevertheless the opprobrious and undeserved epithet of

1 Ἐσχινῆς cont. Ktesiph. p. 61; Plutarch, De Pace, p. 58; De Fals. Leg. p. 434—with the Scholion.
3 Ἐσχινῆς says that Nikodémus entered an indictment against Demosthenês for deserting his place in the ranks; but that he was bought off by Demosthenês, and refrained from bringing it before the Dikastery (Esch. Fals. Leg. p. 292).
The deserter was ever afterwards put upon Demosthenes by Aeschines and his other enemies; and Meidias even applied the like vituperation to most of those who took part in that assembly wherein the Probolé or vote of censure against him had been passed. Not long after the Dionysiac festival, however, it was found necessary to send fresh troops, both horsemen and hoplites, to Euboea; probably to relieve either some or all of those already serving there. Demosthenes on this occasion put on his armour and served as a hoplite in the island. Meidias also went to Argura in Euboea, as commander of the horsemen; yet, when the horsemen were summoned to join the Athenian army, he did not join along with them, but remained as trierarch of a trireme the outfit of which he had himself defrayed. How long the army stayed in Euboea, we do not know. It appears that Demosthenes had returned to Athens by the time when the annual Senate was chosen in the last month of the Attic year (Skirrophorion—June); having probably by that time been relieved. He was named (by the lot) among the Five Hundred Senators for the coming Attic year (beginning Midsummer 349 B.C.—Olymp. 107, 4) his old enemy Meidias in vain impugning his qualification as he passed through the Dokimasy or preliminary examination previous to entering office.

What the Athenian army did farther in Euboea, we cannot make out. Phokion was recalled—we do not know when— and replaced by a general named Molossus; who is said to have managed the war very unsuccessfully, and even to have been made prisoner himself by the enemy. The hostile parties in the island, aided by Philip, were not subdued, nor was it until the summer of 348 B.C. that they applied for peace. Even then, it appears, none was concluded, so that the Euboans remained unfriendly to Athens until the peace with Philip in 316 B.C.

But while the Athenians were thus tasked for the maintenance of Euboea, they found it necessary to undertake more effective measures for the relief of Olynthus, and they thus had upon their hands at the same time the burden of two wars. We know that they had to provide force for both Euboea and Olynthus, at once;°

and that the occasion which called for these simultaneous efforts was one of stringent urgency. The Olynthian requisition and communications made themselves so strongly felt, as to induce Athens to do, what Demosthenes in his three Olynthiacs had vainly insisted on during the preceding summer and autumn—to send thither a force of native Athenians, in the first half of 349 B.C.

Of the horsemen who had gone from Athens to Euboea under Meidias, to serve under Phokion, either all, or a part, crossed by sea from Euboea to Olynthus, during that half-year. Meidias did not cross with them, but came back as trierarch in his trireme to Athens. Now the Athenian horsemen were not merely citizens, but citizens of wealth and consequence; moreover the transport of them by sea was troublesome as well as costly. The sending of such troops implies a strenuous effort and sense of urgency on the part of Athens. We may further conclude that a more numerous body of hoplites were sent along with the horsemen at the same time; for horsemen would hardly under any circumstances be sent across sea alone; besides which Olynthus stood most in need of auxiliary hoplites, since her native force consisted chiefly of horsemen and spartiasts.

This speech was delivered before the Dikastery by a person named Theomnestus, in support of an indictment against Nicer—perhaps six or eight years after 349 B.C. Whether Demosthenes was the author of the speech or not, its value as evidence will not be materially altered.

This transit of the Athenian horsemen to Olynthus, which took place after the battle of Tamynae, is an occurrence distinct from the voluntary contributions at Athens towards an Olynthian expedition (ἐπιδοτίς εἰς Ὁλυνθόν—Demosth. cont. Meidias, p. 5601; which contributions took place before the battle of Tamynae, and before the expedition to Euboea, of which that battle made part.

These horsemen went from Euboea to Olynthus a few days before Meidias returned to Athens. But we know that he returned to Athens before the beginning of the new Attic or Olympic year (Olymp. 197, 4, 349-348 B.C.; that is, speaking approximately, before the 1st of July 349 B.C.). For he was present at Athens and accused Demosthenes in the senatorial Dokimasy, or preliminary examination, which all senators underwent before they took their seats with the beginning of the new year (Demosth. cont. Meid. p. 551.)

It seems therefore clear that the Athenian expedition—certainly horsemen, and probably hoplites also—went to Olynthus before July 1, 349 B.C. I alluded to this expedition of Athenian citizens to Olynthus in a previous note—as connected with the date of the third Olynthiac of Demosthenes.
The evidence derived from the speech against Neaira being thus corroborated by the still better evidence of the speech against Meidias, we are made certain of the important fact, that the first half of the year 349 B.C. was one in which Athens was driven to great public exertions—even to armaments of native citizens—for the support of Olynthus as well as for the maintenance of Euboea.

What the Athenians achieved, indeed, or helped to achieve, by these expeditions to Olynthus—or how long they stayed there—we have no information. But we may reasonably presume—that Philip during this year 349 B.C., probably conquered a certain number of the thirty-two Chalkidic towns—that the allied forces, Olynthian, Chalkidic and Athenian, contended against him with no inconsiderable effect, and threw back his conquest of Chalkidike into the following year. After a summer's campaign in that peninsula, the Athenian citizens would probably come home. We learn that the Olynthians made prisoner a Macedonian of rank named Derdas, with other Macedonians attached to him.

So extraordinary a military effort, however, made by the Athenians in the first half of 349 B.C.—to recover Euboea and to protect Olynthus at once—naturally placed them in a state of financial embarrassment. Of this, one proof is to be found in the fact, that for some time there was not sufficient money to pay the Dikasteries, which accordingly got little; so that few causes were tried for some time—for how long we do not know.

To meet in part the pecuniary wants of the moment, a courageous effort was made by the senator Apollodorus. He moved a decree in the Senate, that it should be submitted to the vote of the public assembly, whether the surplus of revenue, over and above the ordinary and permanent peace establishment of the city, should be paid to the Theoric Fund for the various religious festivals—or should be devoted to the pay, outfit, and transport of soldiers for the actual war. The Senate approved the motion of Apollodorus, and adopted a (probouleuma) preliminary resolution authorising him to submit it to the public assembly. Under such authority, Apollodorus made the motion in the assembly, where also he was fully successful. The assembly

1 Theopompus, Fragm. 155; οἱ ἐπορίσθη τὰς δικαστήριας, εἰσῆγυν ἐν Αθηναῖοι, x. p. 436; Ζελλάν, V. H. ii. 41.
2 See Demosthenes, adv. Reoestum De Nomine, p. 999. . . . . καὶ εἰ μεν θέλεις.
(without a single dissentient voice, we are told) passed a decree enjoining that the surplus of revenue should under the actual pressure of war be devoted to the pay and other wants of soldiers. Notwithstanding such unanimity, however, a citizen named Stephanus impeached both the decree and its mover on the score of illegality, under the Graphic Paranomon. Apollodorus was brought before the Dikastery, and there found guilty; mainly (according to his friend and relative the prosecutor of Neaira) through suborned witnesses and false allegations foreign to the substance of the impeachment. When the verdict of guilty had been pronounced, Stephanus as accuser assessed the measure of punishment at the large fine of fifteen talents, refusing to listen to any supplications from the friends of Apollodorus, when they entreated him to name a lower sum. The Dikasts however, more lenient than Stephanus, were satisfied to adopt the measure of fine assessed by Apollodorus upon himself—one talent—which he actually paid.¹

There can hardly be a stronger evidence both of the urgency and poverty of the moment, than the fact, that both Senate and people passed this decree of Apollodorus. That fact there is no room for doubting. But the additional statement—that there was not a single dissentient, and that every one, both at the time and afterwards, always pronounced the motion to have been an excellent one—is probably an exaggeration. For it is not to be imagine that the powerful party, who habitually resisted the diversion of money from the Theoric Fund to war purposes, should have been wholly silent or actually concurrent on this occasion, though they may have been out-voted. The motion of Apollodorus was one which could not be made without distinctly breaking the law, and rendering the mover liable to those penal consequences which afterwards actually fell upon him. Now, that even a majority, both of senate and assembly, should have overleaped this illegality, is a proof sufficiently remarkable how strongly the crisis pressed upon their minds.

The expedition of Athenian citizens, sent to Olynthus before Midsummer 349 B.C., would probably return after a campaign of two or three months, and after having rendered some service against the Macedonian army. The warlike operations of Philip

Cuar, LXXXVII. WAR IN CHALKIDIKE.

He pressed the Chalkidians more and more closely throughout all the ensuing eighteen months (from Midsummer 349 B.C. to the early spring of 347 B.C.). During the year Olymp. 107, 4, if the citation from Philochorus is to be trusted, the Athenians despatched to their aid three expeditions; one at the request of the Olynthians, who sent envoys to pray for it—consisting of 2000 peltasts under Charès, in thirty ships partly manned by Athenian seamen. A second went thither under Charidémus, at the earnest entreaty of the suffering Chalkidians; consisting of 18 triremes, 4000 peltasts and 150 horsemen. Charidémus, in conjunction with the Olynthians, marched over Bottiaea and the peninsula of Pallène, laying waste the country; whether he achieved any important success, we do not know. Respecting both Charès and Charidémus, the anecdotes descending to us are of insolence, extortion, and amorous indulgences, rather than of military exploits. It is clear that neither the one nor the other achieved anything effectual against Philip, whose arms and corruption made terrible progress in Chalkidike. So grievously did the strength of the Olynthians fail, that they transmitted a last and most urgent appeal to Athens; imploring the Athenians not to abandon them to ruin, but to send them a force of citizens in addition to the mercenaries already there. The Athenians complied, despatching thither 17 triremes, 2000 hoplites, and 300 horsemen, all under the command of Charès.

To make out anything of the successive steps of this important war is impossible; but we discern that during this latter portion of the Olynthian war, the efforts made by Athens were considerable. Demosthenes (in a speech six years afterwards) affirms that the Athenians had sent to the aid of Olynthus 4000 citizens, 10,000 mercenaries, and 50 triremes. He represents the Chalkidic cities as having been betrayed successively to Philip by corrupt and traitorous citizens. That the conquest was achieved greatly by the aid of corruption, we cannot doubt; but the orator’s language carries no accurate information. Mekyberna and Toronné are said to have been among the towns betrayed without resistance. After Philip had

1 Philochorus ap. Dionys. Hal. ad Amm. p. 734, 735. Philochorus tells us that the Athenians now contracted the alliance with Olynthus; which certainly is not accurate. The alliance had been contracted in the preceding year.

2 Theopomp. Fragm. 183-238; Athenaeus, xii. p. 532.


4 Diodor. xvi, 52.
captured the thirty-two Chalkidic cities, he marched against Olynthus itself, with its confederate neighbours—the Thracian Methôné and Apollonia. In forcing the passage of the river Sardon, he encountered such resistance that his troops were at first repulsed; and he was himself obliged to seek safety by swimming back across the river. He was moreover wounded in the eye by an Olynthian archer named Aster, and lost the sight of that eye completely, notwithstanding the skill of his Greek surgeon Kritobulus. On arriving within forty furlongs of Olynthus, he sent to the inhabitants a peremptory summons, intimating that either they must evacuate the city, or he must leave Macedonia. Rejecting this notice, they determined to defend their town to the last. A considerable portion of the last Athenian citizen-armament was still in the town to aid in the defence; so that the Olynthians might reasonably calculate that Athens would strain every nerve to guard her own citizens against captivity. But their hopes were disappointed. How long the siege lasted—or whether there was time for Athens to send farther reinforcement—we cannot say. The Olynthians are said to have repulsed several assaults of Philip with loss; but according to Demosthenés, the philippising party, headed by the venal Euthyratès and Lasthenès, brought about the banishment of their chief opponent Apollonidès, nullified all measures for energetic defence, and treasonably surrendered the city. Two defeats were sustained near its walls, and one of the generals of this party, having 500 cavalry under his command, betrayed them designedly into the hands of the invader. Olynthus, with all its inhabitants and property, at length fell into the hands of Philip. His mastery of the Chalkidic peninsula thus became complete—towards the end of winter 348-347 B.C.

Miserable was the ruin which fell upon this flourishing peninsula. The persons of the Olynthians—men, women, and children—were sold into slavery. The wealth of the city gave to Philip the means of recompensing his soldiers for the toils of the war; the city itself he is said to have destroyed, together with Apollonia, Methôné, Stageira, &c.—in all, thirty-two Chalkidic cities. Demosthenés, speaking

1 Kallisthenès ap. Stobæum, t. vii. p. 92; Plutarch, Parallel. c. 8; Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 117. Kritobulus could not save the sight of the eye, but he is said to have prevented any visible disfigurement. 2 Demosthenès, Philipp. iii. p. 113. 3 Aschines, Fal. Leg. p. 30. 4 Demosthenès, Philipp. iii. p. 125-128; Fal. Leg. p. 428; Lucian. xvi. 53.
about five years afterwards, says that they were so thoroughly and cruelly ruined as to leave their very sites scarcely discernible. Making every allowance for exaggeration, we may fairly believe, that they were dismantled and bereft of all citizen proprietors; that the buildings and visible marks of Hellenic city-life were broken up or left to decay; that the remaining houses, as well as the villages around, were tenanted by dependent cultivators or slaves—now working for the benefit of new Macedonian proprietors, in great part non-resident, and probably of favoured Grecian grantees also. Though various Greeks thus received their recompense for services rendered to Philip, yet Demosthenes affirms that Euthykrates and Lasthenes, the traitors who had sold Olynthus, were not among the number; or at least that not long afterwards they were dismissed with dishonour and contempt.

In this Olynthian war—ruinous to the Chalkidian Greeks, terrific to all other Greeks, and doubling the power of Philip—Athens too must have incurred a serious amount of expense. We find it stated loosely, that in her entire war against Philip from the time of his capture of Amphipolis in 358-357 B.C. down to the peace of 346 B.C. or shortly afterwards, she had expended not less than 1500 talents. On these computations no great stress is to be laid; but we may well believe that her outlay was considerable. In spite of all reluctance, she was obliged to do something; what she did was both too little, too intermittent, and done behind-time, so as to produce no satisfactory result; but nevertheless the aggregate cost, in a series of years, was a large one. During the latter portion of the Olynthian war, as far as we can judge, she really seems to have made efforts,

1 Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 117; Justin, viii. 3.
2 Demosthenes (Fals. Leg. p. 386) says, that both Philokrates and Eschines received from Philip, not only presents of timber and corn, but also grants of productive and valuable farms in the Olynthian territory. He calls some Olynthian witnesses to prove his assertion; but their testimony is not given at length.
3 Demosth. De Chersones. p. 99. The existence of these Olynthian traitors, sold to Philip, proves that he could not have needed the aid of the Stageirite philosopher Aristotle to indicate to him who were the richest Olynthian citizens, at the time when the prisoners were put up for sale as slaves. The Athenian Demochares, about forty years afterwards, in his virulent speech against the philosophers, alleged that Aristotle had rendered this disgraceful service to Philip (Aristokles ap. Euseb. Prep. Ev. p. 792). Wesseling (ad Diodor. xvi. 53) refutes the charge by saying that Aristotle was at that time with Hermeias at Athens; a refutation not very conclusive, which I am glad to be able to strengthen.
4 Eschines, Fals. Leg. p. 37. c. 24. Demosthenes (Olynth. iii. p. 35) mentions the same amount of public money as having been wasted in attēs —even in the early part of the Olynthian war and before the Eubcean war. As evidences of actual amount, such statements are of no value.
though she had done little in the beginning. We may presume that the cost must have been defrayed, in part at least, by a direct property-tax; for the condemnation of Apollodorus put an end to the proposition of taking from the Theoric Fund.¹ Means may also have been found of economising from the other expenses of the state.

Though the appropriation of the Theoric Fund to other purposes continued to be thus interdicted to any formal motion, yet in the way of suggestion and insinuation it was from time to time glanced at, by Demosthenes and others. And whenever money was wanted for war, the question whether it should be taken from this source or from direct property-tax, was indirectly revived. The appropriation of the Theoric Fund however remained unchanged until the very eve of the battle of Chaeroneia. Just before that Dies Ira, when Philip was actually fortifying Elateia, the fund was made applicable to war-purposes; the views of Demosthenes were realized, twelve years after he had begun to enforce them.

This question about the Theoric expenditure is rarely presented by modern authors in the real way that it affected the Athenian mind. It has been sometimes treated as a sort of alms-giving to the poor—and sometimes as an expenditure by the Athenians upon their pleasures. Neither the one nor the other gives a full or correct view of the case; each only brings out a part of the truth.

Doubtless, the Athenian democracy cared much for the pleasures of the citizens. It provided for them the largest amount of refined and imaginative pleasures ever tasted by any community known to history; pleasures essentially social and multitudinous, attaching the citizens to each other, rich and poor, by the strong tie of community of enjoyment.

But pleasure, though an usual accessory, was not the primary idea or predominant purpose of the Theoric expenditure. That expenditure was essentially religious in its character, incurred only for various festivals, and devoted exclusively to the honour of the gods. The ancient religion, not simply at Athens, but through-

¹ Ulpian, in his Commentary on the first Olynthiac, tells us that after the fine imposed upon Apollodorus, Eubulus moved and carried a law, enacting that any future motion to encroach on the Theoric Fund should be punished with death. The authority of Ulpian is not sufficient to accredit this statement. The fine inflicted by the Dikastery upon Apollodorus was lenient; we may therefore reasonably doubt whether the popular sentiment would go along with the speaker in making the like offence capital in future.
out Greece and the contemporary world—very different in this respect from the modern—included within itself and its manifestations nearly the whole range of social pleasures.\(^1\)

Now the Théoric Fund was essentially the Church-Fund at Athens; that upon which were charged all the expenses incurred by the state in the festivals and the worship of the gods. The Diobely, or distribution of two oboli to each present citizen, was one part of this expenditure; given in order to ensure that every citizen should have the opportunity of attending the festival, and doing honour to the god; never given to any one who was out of Attica—because of course he could not attend; \(^2\) but given to all alike within the country, rich or poor.\(^3\) It was essential to that universal communion which formed a prominent feature of the festival, not less in regard to the god, than in regard to the city;\(^4\) but it was only one portion of the total disbursements covered by the Théoric Fund.

To this general religious fund it was provided by law that the surplus of ordinary revenue should be paid over, after all the cost of the peace establishment had been defrayed. There was no appropriation more thoroughly coming home to the common sentiment, more conducive as a binding force to the unity of the city, or more productive of satisfaction to each individual citizen.

We neither know the amount of the Théoric Fund, nor of the distributions connected with it. We cannot therefore say what proportion it formed of the whole peace-expenditure—itself unknown also. But we cannot doubt that it was large. To be sparing of expenditure in manifestations for the honour of the god was the general fund of Athens for religious festivals and worship—distribution one part of it—the character of the ancient religious festivals.

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\(^1\) Among the many passages which illustrate this association in the Greek mind, between the idea of religious festivals, and that of enjoyment—we may take the expressions of Herodotus about the great festival at Sparta called Hyakinthia. In the summer of 479 B.C., the Spartans were tardy in bringing out their military force for the defence of Athens—being engaged in that festival. Or τὰς Λακεδαμανιὰς ὄρθρον τὴν χρήσαν τόν τούτον, καὶ σφ’ ἴνα Ἰεράκα θεορίαν περὶ πλεῖστον ἄγετε καὶ παίζετε, καταπρόδοντες τὰς συμμάχους (Herod. ix. 7). Presently the Athenian envoys come to Sparta to complain of the delay in the following language: Τοῖς μὲν ἀκαδημαῖοι, μηδὲν τὴν μέλοντες, ἡμὶν δὲ τὴ  ἀγετε καὶ παίζετε, καταπρόδοντες τὸς συμμάχους.

\(^2\) Here the expressions "to fulfil the requirements of the god"—and "to amuse themselves"—are used in description of the same festival, and almost as equivalents.

\(^3\) Ἡρόδοτος ν. Θεωρίκά... διένειμεν Εὔβουλος ἐν τὴν θυσίαν, ὧν πάντες ἐφερτάσαντες καὶ μηδέν τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπολύττοντα δι᾿ ἀπεθανείαν τῶν ἱδιῶν... Ὑπερίδης δεδήλωκεν ἐν τῷ Κατ’ Ἀρχεστράτιῳ.


\(^5\) See the directions of the old oracles quoted by Demosthenes cont. Median, p. 541. Ἰστάναι ὧναυιν θρημίζει ἱδρύμεν ἄμαγα πάντας. &c. στεφανάσατος ἔλευθερος καὶ δούλους, &c.
gods, was accounted the reverse of virtue by Greeks generally; and the Athenians especially, whose eyes were every day contemplating the glories of their acropolis, would learn a different lesson; moreover magnificent religious display was believed to conciliate the protection and favour of the gods. We may affirm, however, upon the strongest presumptions, that this religious expenditure did not absorb any funds required for the other branches of a peace establishment. Neither naval, nor military, nor administrative exigences, were starved in order to augment the Theoric surplus. Eubulus was distinguished for his excellent keeping of the docks and arsenals, and for his care in replacing the decayed triremes by new ones. And after all the wants of a well-mounted peace-establishment were satisfied, no Athenian had scruple in appropriating what remained under the conspiring impulses of piety, pleasure, and social brotherhood.

It is true that the Athenians might have laid up that surplus annually in the acropolis, to form an accumulating war-fund. Such provision had been made half a century before, under the full energy and imperial power of Athens—when she had a larger revenue, with numerous tribute-paying allies—and when Perikles presided over her councils. It might have been better if she had done something of the same kind in the age after the Peloponnesian war. Perhaps if men, like Perikles, or even like Demosthenes, had enjoyed marked ascendency, she would have been advised and prevailed on to continue such a precaution. But before we can measure the extent of improvidence with which Athens is here fairly chargeable, we ought to know what was the sum thus expended on the festivals. What amount of money could have been stored up for the contingency of war, even if all the festivals and all the distributions had been suppressed? How far would it have been possible, in any other case than that of obvious present necessity, to carry economy into the festival-expenditure—truly denominated by Demadèς the cement of the political system—without impairing in the bosom of each individual, that sentiment

1 See the boast of Isokrates, Orat. iv. (Panegyr.) s. 46; Plato, Alkibiad. ii. p. 148. Xenophon (Vestigal. vi. 1), in proposing some schemes for the improvement of the Athenian revenue, sets forth as one of the advantages, that "the religious festivals will be cultivated then with still greater magnificence than they are now."
2 Plutarch, Question. Platonic. p. 1011. οὐ ήλην Δημάδης, κόλλαν δυναμώς τα θεωρικα του πολιτεύματος (erroneously written δισμαθητα).
of communion, religious, social, and patriotic, which made the Athenians a City, and not a simple multiplication of units? These are points on which we ought to have information, before we can fairly graduate our censure upon Athens for not converting her Théoric Fund into an accumulated capital to meet the contingency of war. We ought also to ask, as matter for impartial comparison, how many governments, ancient or modern, have ever thought it requisite to lay up during peace a stock of money available for war?

The Athenian peace-establishment maintained more ships of war, larger docks, and better-stored arsenals than any city in Greece, besides expending forty talents annually upon the Horsemen of the state, and doubtless something farther (though we know not how much) upon the other descriptions of military force. All this, let it be observed, and the Théoric expenditure besides, was defrayed without direct taxation, which was reserved for the extraordinary cost incident to a state of war, and was held to be sufficient to meet it, without any accumulated war-fund. When the war against Philip became serious, the proprietary classes at Athens, those included in the schedule of assessment, were called upon to defray the expense by a direct tax, from which they had been quite free in time of peace. They tried to evade this burden by requiring that the festival-fund should be appropriated instead; thus menacing what was dearest to the feelings of the majority of the citizens. The ground which they took was the same in principle, as if the proprietors in France or Belgium claimed to exempt themselves from direct taxation for the cost of a war, by first taking either all or half of the annual sum voted out of the budget for the maintenance of religion. We may judge how

1 According to the author of the oration against Neera, the law did actually provide, that in time of war, the surplus revenue should be devoted to warlike purposes — κελευστών τῶν νόμων, ἵνα τὸ λέοντο χρήσατα τῆς διοικήσεως στρατιωτικὰ εἴναι (p. 1340). But it seems to me that this must be a misstatement, for even in time of war, the French revenue is raised by direct taxation. Voltaire observes very justly — "L'argent que le public emploie à ces spectacles n'est un argent sacré. C'est pourquoi Déméthiste emploie tant de circonspection et tant de détour pour engager les Athéniens à employer cet argent à la guerre contre Philippe: c'est comme si en entreprenant en la lice de soudoyer des troupes avec le trésor de Notre Dame de Lorette" (Voltaire, Des Divers changeméns arrivés à l'Art Tragique, Oeuvres, tom. 65, p. 73, ed. 1832, Paris).
strong a feeling would be raised among the Athenian public generally, by the proposal of impoverishing the festival expenditure in order to save a property-tax. Doubtless, after the proprietary class had borne a certain burthen of direct taxation, their complaints would become legitimate. The cost of the festivals could not be kept up undiminished, under severe and continued pressure of war. As a second and subsidiary resource, it would become essential to apply the whole or a part of the fund in alleviation of the burthens of the war. But even if all had been so applied, the fund could not have been large enough to dispense with the necessity of a property-tax besides.

We see this conflict of interests—between direct taxation on one side and the festival-fund on the other, as a means of paying for war—running through the Demosthenic orations, and especially marked in the fourth Philippic.\(^1\) Unhappily the conflict served as an excuse to both parties, for throwing the blame on each other, and starving the war; as well as for giving effect to the repugnance, shared by both rich and poor, against personal military service abroad. Demosthenes sides with neither—tries to mediate between them—and calls for patriotic sacrifice from both alike. Having before him an active and living enemy, with the liberties of Greece as well as of Athens at stake—he urges every species of sacrifice at once; personal service, direct-tax-payments, abnegation of the festivals. Sometimes the one demand stands most prominent, sometimes the other; but oftener of all, comes his appeal for personal service. Under such military necessities, in fact, the Theoric expenditure became mischievous, not merely because it absorbed the public money, but also because it chained the citizens to their home and disinclined them to active service abroad. The great charm and body of sentiment connected with the festival, essentially connected as it was with presence in Attica, operated as a bane; at an exigency when one-third or one-fourth of the citizens ought to have been doing hard duty as soldiers on the coasts of Macedonia or Thrace, against an enemy who never slept. Unfortunately for the Athenians, they could not be convinced, by all the patriotic eloquence of Demosthenes, that the festivals which fed their piety

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\(^1\) Demosth. Philipp. iv. p. 141-143; De Republicâ Ordinanda, p. 167. Whether these two orations were actually delivered in their present form may perhaps be doubted. But I allude to them with confidence as Demosthenic compositions; put together out of Demosthenic fragments and thoughts.
and brightened their home-existence during peace, were unmain-
tainable during such a war, and must be renounced for a time, if
the liberty and security of Athens were to be preserved. The
same want of energy which made them shrink from the hardship
of personal service, also rendered them indisposed to so great a
sacrifice as that of their festivals; nor indeed would it have
availed them to spare all the cost of their festivals had their
remissness as soldiers still continued. Nothing less could have
saved them, than simultaneous compliance with all the three
requisitions urged by Demosthenes in 350 B.C.; which compliance
ultimately came, but came too late, in 339-338 B.C.

APPENDIX.

ON THE ORDER OF THE OLYNTIAC ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.

Respecting the true chronological order of these three harangues, dissentent
opinions have been transmitted from ancient times, and still continue among
modern critics.

Dionysius of Halikarnassus cites the three speeches by their initial words, but
places them in a different chronological order from that in which they stand edited.
He gives the second as being first in the series; the third, as second; and the
first as third.

It will be understood that I always speak of and describe these speeches by the
order in which they stand edited; though, as far as I can judge, that order is not
the true one.

Edited Order ... ... ... ... ... ... I. II. III.
Order of Dionysius: ... ... ... ... ... ... I. III. II.

The greater number of modern critics defend the edited order; the main argu-
ments for which have been ably stated in a dissertation published by Petrenz in
1833. Dindorf, in his edition of Demosthenes, places this dissertation in front of
his notes to the Olynthiacs; affirming that it is conclusive, and sets the question
at rest. Behmecke also (Forschungen, p. 151), treats the question as no longer
open to doubt.

On the other hand, Flathe (Geschichte Makedoniens, p. 185-187) expresses
himself with equal confidence in favour of the order stated by Dionysius. A
much higher authority, Dr. Thirlwall, agrees in the same opinion; though with
less confidence, and with a juster appreciation of our inadequate means for settling
the question. See the Appendix iii. to the fifth volume of his History of Greece,
p. 572.

Though I have not come to the same conclusion as Dr. Thirlwall, I agree with
him, that unqualified confidence, in any conclusion as to the order of these
harangues, is unsuitable and not warranted by the amount of evidence. We have
nothing to proceed upon except the internal evidence of the speeches, taken in
conjunction with the contemporaneous history; of which we know little or no-
thing from information in detail.
On the best judgement that I can form, I cannot adopt wholly either the edited order or that of Dionysius, though agreeing in part with both. I concur with Dionysius and Dr. Thirlwall in placing the second Olynthiac first of the three. I concur with the edited order in placing the third last. I observe, in Dr. Thirlwall’s Appendix, that this arrangement has been vindicated in a Dissertation by Stueve. I have not seen this Dissertation; and my own conclusion was deduced—even before I knew that it had ever been advocated elsewhere—only from an attentive study of the speeches.

To consider first the proper place of the second Olynthiac (I mean that which stands second in the edited order).

The most remarkable characteristic of this oration is, that scarcely anything is said in it about Olynthus. It is, in fact, a Philippic rather than an Olynthiac. This characteristic is not merely admitted, but strongly put forward, by Petrenz, p. 11—"Quid! quod ipsorum Olynthiorum hac quidem in causi tantum uno loco fuit mentio est—at uno illo verbo sublato, vix ex ipsa oratione, quia in causam habita, certis rationibus evinci posset." How are we to explain the absence of all reference to Olynthus? According to Petrenz, it is because the orator had already, in his former harangue, said all that could be necessary in respect to the wants of Olynthus, and the necessity of upholding that city even for the safety of Athens; he might now therefore calculate that his first discourse remained impressed on his countrymen, and that all that was required was, to combat the extraordinary fear of Philip which hindered them from giving effect to a resolution already taken to assist the Olynthiaus.

In this hypothesis I am unable to acquiesce. It may appear natural to a reader of Demosthenes, who passes from the first printed discourse to the second without any intervening time to forget what he has just read. But it will hardly fit the case of a real speaker in busy Athens. Neither Demosthenes in the fluctuating Athenian assembly—nor even any orator in the more fixed English Parliament or American Congress—could be rash enough to calculate that a discourse delivered some time before had remained engraven on the minds of his audience. If Demosthenes had previously addressed the Athenians with so strong a conviction of the distress of Olynthus, and of the motives for Athens to assist Olynthus, as is embodied in the first discourse—if his speech, however well received, was not acted upon, so that in the course of a certain time he had to address them again for the same purpose—I cannot believe that he would allude to Olynthus only once by the by, and that he would merely dilate upon the general chances and conditions of the war between Athens and Philip. However well calculated the second Olynthiac may be "ad concitandos exacerbandosque civium animos" (to use the words of Petrenz), it is not peculiarly calculated to procure aid to Olynthus. If the orator had failed to procure such aid by a discourse like the first Olynthiac, he would never resort to a discourse like the second Olynthiac to make good the deficiency; he would repeat anew, and more impressively than before, the danger of Olynthus, and the danger to Athens herself if she suffered Olynthus to fall. This would be the way to accomplish his object, and at the same time to combat the fear of Philip in the minds of the Athenians.

According to my view of the subject, the omission (or mere single passing notice) of Olynthus clearly shows that the wants of that city, and the urgency of assisting it, were not the main drift of Demosthenes in the second Olynthiac. His main drift is, to encourage and stimulate his countrymen in their general war against Philip; taking in, thankfully, the new ally Olynthus, whom they have
just acquired—but taking her in only as a valuable auxiliary (ἐν προσθήκης μέρει), to cooperate with Athens against Philip as well as to receive aid from Athens—not presenting her either as peculiarly needing succour, or as likely, if allowed to perish, to expose the vitals of Athens.

Now a speech of this character is what I cannot satisfactorily explain, as following after the totally different spirit of the first Olynthiac; but it is natural and explicable, if we suppose it to precede the first Olynthiac. Olynthus does not approach Athens at first in a form of pauperis, as if she were in danger and requiring aid against an overwhelming enemy. She presents herself as an equal, offering to cooperate against a common enemy, and tendering an alliance which the Athenians had hitherto sought in vain. She will of course want aid—but she can give cooperation of equal value. Demosthenes advises to assist her:—this comes of course, when her alliance is accepted:—but he dwells more forcibly upon the value of what she will give to the Athenians, in the way of cooperation against Philip. Nay, it is remarkable that the territorial vicinity of Olynthus to Philip is exhibited, not as a peril to which the Athenians must assist her in averting, but as a godsend to enable them the better to attack Philip in conjunction with her. Moreover Olynthus is represented, not as apprehending any danger from Philip’s arms, but as having recently discovered how dangerous it is to be in alliance with him. Let us thank the gods (says Demosthenes at the opening of the second Olynthiac)—τὸ τοὺς πολεμήσοντας Φιλίππῳ γεγενῆσθαι καὶ χώραν τυπος καὶ δύναμιν τινα κεκτημένου, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀπάντων, τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ πολέμου γνώμην τοιαύτην ἔχοντας, ὥστε τὰς πρὸς εκεῖνον διαλλαγὰς, πρῶτον μὲν ἀπάντων, εἶτα τὶς τῶν πατρίδος τοιούτων ἀνάστασιν εἰναι, δαιμονία τινα καὶ θεία παντάπασιν εὐεργεσίᾳ.

The general tenor of the second Olynthiac is in harmony with this opening. Demosthenes looks forward to a vigorous aggressive war, carried on by Athens and Olynthus jointly against Philip, and he enters at large into the general chances of such war, noticing the vulnerable as well as the odious points of Philip, and striving (as Petrezz justly remarks) to “excite and exasperate the minds of the citizens.”

Such is the first bright promise of the Olynthian alliance with Athens. But Athens, as usual, makes no exertions; leaving the Olynthians and Chalkidians to contend against Philip by themselves. It is presently found that he gains advantages over them; bad news come from Thrace, and probably complaining envoys to announce them. It is then that Demosthenes delivers his first Olynthiac, so much more urgent in its tone respecting Olynthus. The main topic is now—“Protect the Olynthians; save their confederate cities; think what will happen if they are ruined; there is nothing to hinder Philip in that case from marching into Attica.” The views of Demosthenes have changed from the offensive to the defensive.

I cannot but think, therefore, that all the internal evidence of the Olynthiacs indicates the second as prior in point of time both to the first and to the third. Stewart (as cited by Dr. Thirlwall) mentions another reason tending to the same conclusion. Nothing is said in the second Olynthiac about meddliing with the Thoric Fund; whereas, in the first, that subject is distinctly adverted to—and in the third, forcibly and repeatedly pressed, though with sufficient artifice to save the illegality. This is difficult to explain, assuming the second to be posterior to the first; but noway difficult, if we suppose the second to be the earliest of the three, and to be delivered with the purpose which I have pointed out.

On the other hand, this manner of handling the Theoric Fund in the third oration, as compared with the first, is one strong reason for believing (as Petrezz justly contends) that the third is posterior to the first—and not prior, as Dionysius places it.
As to the third Olynthiac, its drift and purpose appear to me correctly stated in the argument prefixed by Libanius. It was delivered after Athens had sent some succour to Olynthus, whereas both the first and the second were spoken before anything at all had yet been done. I think there is good ground for following Libanius (as Petrenz and others do) in his statement that the third oration recognizes Athens as having done something, which the two first do not; though Dr. Thirlwall (p. 599) agrees with Jacobs in doubting such a distinction. The successes of mercenaries, reported at Athens (p. 38), must surely have been successes of mercenaries commissioned by her; and the triumphant hopes noticed by Demosthenes as actually prevalent, are most naturally explained by supposing such news to have arrived. Demosthenes says no more than he can help about the success actually gained, because he thinks it of no serious importance. He wishes to set before the people, as a corrective to the undue confidence prevalent, that all the real danger yet remained to be dealt with.

Though Athens had done something, she had done little—sent no citizens—provided no pay. This Demosthenes urges her to do without delay, and relies upon the Theoric Fund as one means of obtaining money along with personal service. Dr. Thirlwall indeed argues that the first Olynthiac is more urgent than the third, in setting forth the crisis; from whence he infers that it is posterior in time. His argument is partly founded upon a sentence near the beginning of the first Olynthiac, wherein the safety of Athens herself is mentioned as involved—τῶν πραγμάτων ᾧ ἦν αὐτὸς ἀντιληπτόν εἶναι, εἰπέρ ὅπερ σωτηρίας αὕτων φροντίζετε; upon which I may remark, that the reading αὐτῶν is not universally admitted. Dindorf in his edition reads αὐτῶν, referring it to πραγμάτων; and stating in his note that αὐτῶν is the reading of the vulgate, first changed by Reiske into αὑτῶν on the authority of the Codex Bavarius. But even if we grant that the first Olynthiac depicts the crisis as more dangerous and urgent than the third, we cannot infer that the first is posterior to the third. The third was delivered immediately after news received of success near Olynthus; Olynthian affairs did really prosper for the moment and to a certain extent—though the amount of prosperity was greatly exaggerated by the public. Demosthenes sets himself to combat this exaggeration; he passes as lightly as he can over the recent good news, but he cannot avoid allowing something for them, and throwing the danger of Olynthus a little back into more distant contingency. At the same time he states it in the strongest manner, both section 2 and sections 9, 10.

Without being insensible, therefore, to the fallibility of all opinions founded upon such imperfect evidence, I think that the true chronological order of the Olynthiacs is that proposed by Stueve, II. 1. III. With Dionysius I agree so far as to put the second Olynthiac first; and with the common order in putting the third Olynthiac last.
CHAPTER LXXXIX.

FROM THE CAPTURE OF OLYNTIUS TO THE TERMINATION OF THE SACRED WAR BY PHILIP.

It was during the early spring of 347 B.C., as far as we can make out, that Olynthi, after having previously seen the thirty Chalkidic cities conquered, underwent herself the like fate from the arms of Philip. Exile and poverty became the lot of such Olynthians and Chalkidians as could make their escape; while the greater number of both sexes were sold into slavery. A few painful traces present themselves of the diversities of suffering which befel these unhappy victims. Atrestidas, an Arcadian who had probably served in the Macedonian army, received from Philip a grant of thirty Olynthian slaves, chiefly women and children, who were seen following him in a string, as he travelled homeward through the Grecian cities. Many young Olynthian women were bought for the purpose of having their persons turned to account by their new proprietors. Of these purchasers, one, an Athenian citizen who had exposed his new purchase at Athens, was tried and condemned for the proceeding by the Dikastery.1 Other anecdotes come before us, inaccurate probably as to names and details,2 yet illustrating the general hardships brought upon this once free Chalkidic population.

Meanwhile the victor Philip was at the maximum of his glory. In commemoration of his conquests, he celebrated a splendid festival to the Olympian Zeus in Macedonia, with unbounded

1 Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 93; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 439, 440. Demosthenes asserts also that Olynthian women were given as a present by Philip to Philokrates (p. 386-440). The outrage which he imputes (p. 401) to Eschinus and Phrynion in Macedonia, against the Olynthian woman—is not to be received as a fact, since it is indignantly denied by Eschinus (Fals. Leg. inst. and p. 48). Yet it is probably but too faithful a picture of real deeds, committed by others, if not by Eschinus.

2 The story of the old man of Olynthus (Seneca, Controv. v. 10) bought by Purchasius the painter and tortured in order to form a subject for a painting of the suffering Prometheus—is more than doubtful; since Purchasius, already in high repute as a painter before 400 B.C. (see Xenoph. Mem. iii. 19), cannot hardly have been still flourishing in 347 B.C. It discloses, however, at least, one of the many forms of slave-suffering occasionally realized.
hospitality, and prizes of every sort, for matches and exhibitions, both gymnastic and poetical. His donations were munificent, as well to the Grecian and Macedonian officers who had served him, as to the eminent poets or actors who pleased his taste. Satyrus the comic actor, refusing all presents for himself, asked and obtained from him the release of two young women taken in Olynthus, daughters of his friend the Pydnaean Apollophanès, who had been one of the persons concerned in the death of Philip's elder brother Alexander. Satyrus announced his intention not only of ensuring freedom to these young women, but likewise of providing portions for them and giving them out in marriage. 1 Philip also found at Olynthus his two exiled half-brothers, who had served as 'pretexts for the war—and put both of them to death. 2

It has already been stated that Athens had sent to Olynthus more than one considerable reinforcement, especially during the last year of the war. Though we are ignorant what these expeditions achieved, or even how much was their exact force, we find reason to suspect that they were employed by Charês and other generals to no good purpose. The opponents of Charês accused him, as well as Deiarês and other mercenary chiefs, of having wasted the naval and military strength of the city in idle enterprises or rapacious extortions upon the traders of the Ægean. They summed up 1500 talents and 150 triremes thus lost to Athens, besides widespread odium incurred among the islanders by the unjust contributions levied upon them to enrich the general. 3 In addition to this disgraceful ill-success, came now the fearful ruin in Olynthus and Chalkidikè, and the great aggrandisement of their enemy Philip. The loss of Olynthus, with the miserable captivity of its population, would have been sufficient of themselves to excite powerful sentiment among the Athenians. But there was a farther circumstance which came yet more home to their feelings. Many of their own citizens were serving in Olynthus as an auxiliary garrison, and had now become captives along with the rest. 4 No such calamity as this had befallen Athens for a century past, since the defeat of Tolmidès at Koroncia in Boeotia. The whole Athenian people, and especially the relations of the captives, were full of agitation and anxiety, increased by alarming news from other quarters. The conquest threatened the security of all the Athenian possessions in

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Justin, viii. 3. 4
Lemnos, Imbros, and the Chersonese. This last peninsula, especially, was altogether unprotected against Philip, who was even reported to be on his march thither; insomuch that the Athenian settlers within it began to forsake their properties and transfer their families to Athens. Amidst the grief and apprehension which disturbed the Athenian mind, many special assemblies were held to discuss suitable remedies. What was done, we are not exactly informed. But it seems that no one knew where the general Charès with his armament was; so that it became necessary even for his friends in the assembly to echo the strong expressions of displeasure among the people, and to send a light vessel immediately in search of him. ¹

The gravity of the crisis forced even Eubulus, and others among the statesmen hitherto languid in the war, to hold a more energetic language than before against Philip. Denouncing him now as the common enemy of Greece,² they proposed missions into Peloponnesus and elsewhere for the purpose of animating the Grecian states into confederacy against him. Ἀσchinês assisted strenuously in procuring the adoption of this proposition, and was himself named as one of the envoys into Peloponnesus.³

This able orator, immortalised as the rival of Demosthenês, has come before us hitherto only as a soldier in various Athenian expeditions—to Phlius in Peloponnesus (368)—to the battle of Mantinea (362)—and to Euboea under Phokion (349 B.C.); in which last he had earned the favourable notice of the general, and had been sent to Athens with the news of the victory at Tamynæ. Ἀσchinês was about six years older than Demosthenês, but born in a much humbler and poorer station. His father Atrométus taught to boys the elements of letters; his mother Glaukothea made a living by presiding over certain religious assemblies and rites of initiation, intended chiefly for poor communicants; the boy Ἀσchinês assisting both one and the other in a menial capacity. Such at least is the statement which comes to us, enriched with various degrading details, on the doubtful authority of his rival Demosthenês;⁴ who also affirms, what we may accept as generally true, that Ἀσchinês had passed his early manhood partly as an actor, partly as a scribe or reader

¹ Ἀσchinês, Fals. Leg. p. 37.
³ Demosthenês affirms this at two distinct times—Fals. Leg. p. 415-416; De Corona, p. 334. Stechow (Vita Ἀσchinês, p. 1-10) brings together the little which can be made out respecting Ἀσchinês.
to the official boards. For both functions he possessed some natural advantages—an athletic frame, a powerful voice, a ready flow of unpremeditated speech. After some years passed as scribe, in which he made himself useful to Eubulus and others, he was chosen public scribe to the assembly—acquired familiarity with the administrative and parliamentary business of the city—and thus elevated himself by degrees to influence as a speaker. In rhetorical power, he seems to have been surpassed only by Demosthenes.

As envoy of Athens despatched under the motion of Eubulus, Eschines proceeded into Peloponnesus in the spring of 347; others being sent at the same time to other Grecian cities. Among other places, he visited Megalopolis, where he was heard before the Arcadian collective assembly called the Ten Thousand. He addressed them in a strain of animated exhortation, adjuring them to combine with Athens for the defence of the liberties of Greece against Philip, and inveighing strenuously against those traitors who, in Arcadia as well as in other parts of Greece, sold themselves to the aggressor and paralysed all resistance. He encountered however much opposition from a speaker named Hieronymus, who espoused the interest of Philip in the assembly: and though he professed to bring back some flattering hopes, it is certain that neither in Arcadia, nor elsewhere in Peloponnesus, was his influence of any real efficacy. The strongest feeling among the Arcadians was fear and dislike of Sparta, which rendered them in the main indifferent, if not favourable, to the Macedonian successes. In returning from Arcadia to Athens, Eschines met the Arcadian Atrestidas, with the unhappy troop of Olynthian slaves following; a sight which so deeply affected the Athenian orator, that he dwelt upon it afterwards in his speech before the assembly with indignant sympathy; deploring the sad effects of Grecian dissen-sion, and the ruin produced by Philip’s combined employment of arms and corruption.

Eschines returned probably about the middle of the summer of 347 B.C. Other envoys, sent to more distant cities, remained out longer; some indeed even until the ensuing winter. Though it appears that some envoys from other cities were induced in return to visit Athens, yet no

1 Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Discend. of Eschines at this juncture is much Demosth. p. 1063; Cicero, Orator, c. the same, as described by his rival, and as admitted by himself. It was in

sincere or hearty cooperation against Philip could be obtained in any part of Greece. While Philip, in the fulness of triumph, was celebrating his magnificent Olympic festival in Macedonia, the Athenians were disheartened by finding that they could expect little support from independent Greeks, and were left to act only with their own narrow synod of allies. Hence Eubulus and Aeschines became earnest partisans of peace, and Demosthenes also seems to have been driven by the general despondency into a willingness to negotiate. The two orators, though they afterwards became bitter rivals, were at this juncture not very discordant in sentiment. On the other hand, the philippising speakers at Athens held a bolder tone than ever. As Philip found his ports greatly blocked up by the Athenian cruisers, he was likely to profit by his existing ascendancy for the purpose of strengthening his naval equipments. Now there was no place so abundantly supplied as Athens, with marine stores and muniments for armed ships. Probably there were agents or speculators taking measures to supply Philip with these articles, and it was against them that a decree of the assembly was now directed, adopted on the motion of a senator named Timarchus—to punish with death all who should export from Athens to Philip either arms or stores for ships of war.  

1 Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 133. This decree must have been proposed by Timarchus either towards the close of Olymp. 108, or towards the beginning of the following year Olymp. 108, 2; that is, not long before, or not long after, Midsummer 347 B.C. But which of these two dates is to be preferred, is matter of controversy. Franke (Prolegom. ad Aeschin. cont. Timarch. p. xxxviii.-ali.) thinks that Timarchus was senator in Olymp. 108, 1 — and proposed the decree then; he supposes the oration of Aeschines to have been delivered in the beginning of Olymp. 108, 3 — and that the expression (p. 11) announcing Timarchus as having been senator "the year before" (πέρυσιν), is to be construed loosely as signifying "the year but one before." Mr. Clinton, Boeckh, and Westermann, suppose the oration of Aeschines against Timarchus to have been delivered in Olymp. 108, 4—not in Olymp. 108, 3. On that supposition, if we take the word πέρυσιν in its usual sense, Timarchus was senator in 108, 3. Now it is certain that he did not propose the decree forbidding the export of naval stores to Philip, at a date so late as 108, 3; because the peace with Philip was concluded in Elaphebolion Olymp. 108, 2 (March 446 B.C.). But the supposition might be admissible, that Timarchus was senator in two different years both in Olymp. 108, 1, and in Olymp. 108, 3 (not in two consecutive years). In that case, the senatorial year of Timarchus, to which Aeschines alludes (cont. Timarch. p. 11) would be Olymp. 108, 3; while the other senatorial year in which Timarchus moved the decree prohibiting export, would be Olymp. 108, 1. Nevertheless, I agree with the views (of Boeckh (Forschungen, p. 294), who thinks that the oration was delivered Olymp. 108, 3—and that Timarchus had been senator and had proposed the decree prohibiting export of stores to Philip, in the year preceding—that is, Olymp. 108, 2; at the beginning of the year — Midsummer 347 B.C.
that the disposition towards peace, if peace were attainable, was on the increase at Athens.

Some months before the capture of Olynthus, ideas of peace had already been started, partly through the indirect overtures of Philip himself. During the summer of 348 B.C., the Euboeans had tried to negotiate an accommodation with Athens; the contest in Euboea, though we know no particulars of it, having never wholly ceased, for the last year and a half. Nor does it appear that any peace was even now concluded; for Euboea is spoken of as under the dependence of Philip during the ensuing year.1 The Euboean envoys, however, intimated that Philip had desired them to communicate from him a wish to finish the war and conclude peace with Athens.2 Though Philip had at this time conquered the larger portion of Chalkidike, and was proceeding successfully against the remainder, it was still his interest to detach Athens from the war, if he could. Her manner of carrying on war was indeed faint and slack; yet she did him much harm at sea, and she was the only city competent to organise an extensive Grecian confederacy against him; which, though it had not yet been brought about, was at least a possible contingency under her presidency.

An Athenian of influence named Phrynon had been captured by Philip's cruisers, during the truce of the Olympic festival in 348 B.C.; after a certain detention, he procured from home the required ransom and obtained his release. On returning to Athens, he had sufficient credit to prevail on the public assembly to send another citizen along with him, as public envoy from the city to Philip; in order to aid him in getting back his ransom, which he alleged to have been wrongfully demanded from one captured during the holy truce. Though this seems a strange proceeding during mid-war,3 yet the Athenian public took up the case with

2 Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 29.
3 There is more than one singularity in the narrative given by Æschines about Phrynon. The complaint of Phrynon implies an assumption, that the Olympic truce suspended the operations of war everywhere throughout Greece, between belligerent Greeks. But such was not the maxim recognised or acted on; so far as we know the operations of warfare. vomel (Proleg. ad Demosth. De Pace, p. 246), feeling this difficulty, understands the Olympic truce, here mentioned, to refer to the Olympic festival celebrated by Philip himself in Macedonia, in the spring or summer of 347 B.C. This would remove the difficulty about the effect of the truce; for Philip of course would respect his own proclaimed truce. But it is liable to another objection; that Æschines plainly indicates the capture of Phrynon to have been anterior to the fall of Olynthus. Besides, Æschines would hardly use the words ἐν ταῖς Ολυμπικαῖς σπονδαῖς, without any special addition, to signify the Macedonian games.
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sympathy; Ktesiphon was named envoy, and went with Phrynon to Philip, whom they must have found engaged in the war against Olynthus. Being received in the most courteous manner, they not only obtained restitution of the ransom, but were completely won over by Philip. With his usual good policy, he had seized the opportunity of gaining (we may properly say, of bribing, since the restoration of ransom was substantially a bribe) two powerful Athenian citizens, whom he now sent back to Athens as his pronounced partisans.

Phrynon and Ktesiphon, on their return, expatiated warmly on the generosity of Philip, and reported much about his flattering expressions towards Athens, and his reluctance to continue the war against her. The public assembly, being favourably disposed, a citizen named Philokrates, who now comes before us for the first time, proposed a decree, granting to Philip leave to send a herald and envoys, if he chose, to treat for peace; which was what Philip was anxious to do, according to the allegation of Ktesiphon. The decree was passed unanimously in the assembly, but the mover Philokrates was impeached some time afterwards before the Dikastêry, as for an illegal proposition, by a citizen named Lykinus. On the cause coming to trial, the Dikastêry pronounced an acquittal so triumphant, that Lykinus did not even obtain the fifth part of the suffrages. Philokrates being so sick as to be unable to do justice to his own case, Demosthenês stood forward as his supporter, and made a long speech in his favour.

The motion of Philokrates determined nothing positive, and only made an opening; of which, however, it did not suit Philip's

1 Eschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 30. c. 7; our knowledge of these events is derived almost wholly from one, or other, or both, of the two rival orators, in their speeches delivered four or five years afterwards, on the trial De Falsê Legatione. Demosthenês seeks to prove that before the embassy to Macedonîa, in which he and Eschinês were jointly concerned, Eschinês was eager for continued war against Philip, and only became the partisan of Philip during and after the embassy. Eschinês does not deny that he made efforts at that juncture to get up more effective war against Philip; nor is the fact at all dishonourable to him. On the other hand, he seeks to prove against Demosthenês, that he (Demosthenês) was at that time both a partisan of peace with Philip, and a friend of Philokrates to whom he afterwards became so bitterly opposed. For this purpose Eschinês adverts to the motion of Philokrates about permitting Philip to send envoys to Athens—and the speech of Demosthenês in the Dikastêry in favour of Philokrates. It would prove nothing discreditâble to Demosthenês if both these allegations were held to be correct. The motion of Philokrates was altogether indefinite, pledging Athens to nothing; and Demosthenês might well think it unreasonable to impeach a statesman for such a motion.

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purpose to avail himself. But we see that ideas of peace had been thrown out by some persons at Athens, even during the last months of the Olynthian war, and while a body of Athenian citizens, were actually assisting Olynthus against the besieging force of Philip. Presently arrived the terrible news of the fall of Olynthus, and of the captivity of the Athenian citizens in garrison there. While this great alarm (as has been already stated) gave birth to new missions for anti-Macedonian alliances, it enlisted on the side of peace all the friends of those captives whose lives were now in Philip's hands. The sorrow thus directly inflicted on many private families, together with the force of individual sympathy widely diffused among the citizens, operated powerfully upon the decisions of the public assembly. A century before, the Athenians had relinquished all their acquisitions in Bœotia, in order to recover their captives taken in the defeat of Tolmidès at Koroneia; and during the Peloponnesian war, the policy of the Spartans had been chiefly guided for three or four years by the anxiety to ensure the restoration of the captives of Sphakteria. Moreover, several Athenians of personal consequence were taken at Olynthus; among them, Eukratus and Iatrotiès. Shortly after the news arrived, the relatives of these two men, presenting themselves before the assembly in the solemn guise of suppliants, deposited an olive branch on the altar hard by, and entreated that care might be had for the safety of their captive kinmen. This touching appeal, echoed as it would be by the cries of so many other citizens in the like distress, called forth unanimous sympathy in the assembly. Both Philokratès and Demosthenès spoke in favour of it; Demosthenès probably, as having become a strenuous advocate of the war, was the more anxious to show that he was keenly alive to so much individual suffering. It was resolved to open indirect negotiations with Philip for the release of the

1. Eschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 30. c. 8. 'Ταύτες δὲ τούς ἅρπας χρόνους Ὀλυνθός ἄνευς, καὶ πολλὰς τῶν ἡμετέρων ἐγκατ- λαμβάνονσαν πολιτῶν, διὸν ἦν ἱπτρικῆς καὶ Ἐκκλησίας. 'Ετζέρ χάρις τούτων ἱπτριαίς ἔτι τότε ὑπέζευξε ὁ Πιλεύς, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐνευκεκχείας πολέμου ἑπτάετες παρεδόθηνες 8 αὐτοῖς συν- χρόνους Φιλοκράτης καὶ Δημοσθένης, ἀλλ' ἐν γάρ ἑκατόν τε. To illustrate the effect of this impressive ceremony upon the Athenian assembly, we may recall the memorable scene mentioned by Xenophon and Diodorus (Xen. Hell. i. 7, 8; Diod. xiii. 101) after the battle of Arginusæ, when the relatives of the warriors who had perished on board of the foundered ships, presented themselves before the assembly with shaven heads and in mourning garb. Compare also, about presentations of solemn supplication to the assembly, Demosthenês De Corone, p. 262—with the note of Dissen; and Eschinês contra Timarchum, p. 9. c. 13.
captives, through some of the great tragic and comic actors; who, travelling in the exercise of their profession to every city in Greece, were everywhere regarded in some sort as privileged persons. One of these, Neoptolemus, had already availed himself of his favoured profession and liberty of transit to assist in Philip's intrigues and correspondences at Athens; another, Aristodemus, was also in good esteem with Philip; both were probably going to Macedonia to take part in the splendid Olympic festival there preparing. They were charged to make application, and take the best steps in their power, for the safety or release of the captives.

It would appear that these actors were by no means expeditious in the performance of their mission. They probably spent some time in their professional avocations in Macedonia; and Aristodemus, not being a responsible envoy, delayed some time even after his return before he made any report. That his mission had not been wholly fruitless, however, became presently evident from the arrival of the captive Iatroklés, whom Philip had released without ransom. The Senate then summoned Aristodemus before them, inviting him to make a general report of his proceedings; which he did, first before the Senate—next before the public assembly. He affirmed that Philip had entertained his propositions kindly, and that he was in the best dispositions towards Athens; desirous not only to be at peace with her, but even to be admitted as her ally. Demosthenés, then a senator, moved a vote of thanks and a wreath to Aristodemus.

This report, as far as we can make out, appears to have been made about September or October 347 B.C.; Æschines, and the other roving commissioners sent out by Athens to raise up anti-Macedonian combinations, had returned with nothing but disheartening announcement of refusal or lukewarmness. And there occurred also about the same time in Phokis and Thermopylae, other events of grave augury to Athens, showing that the Sacred War and the contest between the Phokians and

1 Demosth. De Pace, p. 58.
2 Æschiné (Fals. Leg. p. 30, c. 8) mentions only Aristodemus. But from various passages in the oration of Demosthenés (De Fals. Leg. p. 344, 346, 371, 444), we gather that the actor Neoptolemus must have been conjoined with him; perhaps also the Athenian Ktesiphon, though this is less certain. Demosthenés mentions Aristodemus again, in the speech De Cor
rona (p. 232) as the first originator of the peace. Demosthenés (De Pace, p. 58) had, even before this, denounced Neoptolemus as playing a corrupt game for the purposes of Philip at Athens. Soon after the peace, Neoptolemus sold up all his property at Athens, and went to reside in Macedonia.
Thebans was turning—as all events had turned for the last ten years—to the farther aggrandisement of Philip.

During the preceding two years, the Phokians, now under the command of Phalekös in place of Thyyllus, had maintained their position against Thebes—had kept possession of the Boeotian towns Orchomenus, Koronia, and Korsia—and were still masters of Alpinus, Thronium, and Nikæa, as well as of the important pass of Thermopylae adjoining. But though on the whole successful in regard to Thebes, they had fallen into disunion among themselves. The mercenary force, necessary to their defence, could only be maintained by continued appropriation of the Delphian treasures, an appropriation becoming from year to year both less lucrative and more odious. By successive spoliation of gold and silver ornaments, the temple is said to have been stripped of 10,000 talents (= about 2,300,000 L), all its available wealth; so that the Phokian leaders were now reduced to dig for an unauthenticated treasure, supposed (on the faith of a verse in the Iliad, as well as on other grounds of surmise) to lie concealed beneath its stone floor. Their search however was not only unsuccessful, but arrested, as we are told, by violent earthquakes, significant of the anger of Apollo.

As the Delphian treasure became less and less, so the means of Phalekös to pay troops and maintain ascendency declined. While the foreign mercenaries relaxed in their obedience, his opponents in Phokis manifested increased animosity against his continued sacrilege. So greatly did these opponents increase in power, that they deposed Phalekös, elected Deinokratés with two others in his place, and instituted a strict inquiry into the antecedent appropriation of the Delphian treasure. Gross peculation was found to have been committed for the profit of individual leaders, especially one named Philon; who, on being seized and put to the torture, disclosed the names of several accomplices. These men were tried, compelled to refund, and ultimately put to death. Phalekös however still retained his ascendency over the mercenaries, about 8000 in number, so as to hold Thermopylae and the places adjacent, and even presently to be re-appointed general.
Such intestine dispute, combined with the gradual exhaustion of the temple-funds, sensibly diminished the power of the Phokians. Yet they still remained too strong for their enemies the Thebans; who, deprived of Orchomenus and Koroneia, impoverished by military efforts of nine years, and unable to terminate the contest by their own force, resolved to invoke foreign aid. An opportunity might perhaps have been obtained for closing the war by some compromise, if it had been possible now to bring about an accommodation between Thebes and Athens; which some of the philo-Theban orators (Demosthenes seemingly among them) attempted, under the prevalent uneasiness about Philip. But the adverse sentiments in both cities, especially in Thebes, were found invincible; and the Thebans, little anticipating consequences, determined to invoke the ruinous intervention of the conqueror of Olynthus. The Thessalians, already valuable allies of Philip, joined them in soliciting him to crush the Phokians, and to restore the ancient Thessalian privilege of the Pyla (or regular yearly Amphiktyonic meeting at Thermopylae) which the Phokians had suppressed during the last ten years. This joint prayer for intervention was preferred in the name of the Delphian god, investing Philip with the august character of champion of the Amphiktyonic assembly, to rescue the Delphian temple from its sacrilegious plunderers.

The king of Macedon, with his past conquests and his well-known spirit of aggressive enterprise, was now a sort of present Deity, ready to lend force to all the selfish ambition, or blind fear and antipathy, prevalent among the discontented fractions of the Hellenic world. While his intrigues had procured numerous partisans even in the centre of Peloponnesus—as Demosthenes, on return from his mission, had denounced, not having yet himself enlisted in the number—he was now furnished with a piouss pretence, and invited by powerful cities, to penetrate into the heart of Greece, within its last line of common defence, Thermopylae.

The application of the Thebans to Philip excited much alarm in Phokis. A Macedonian army under Parmenio did actually

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1 Demosth. De Corona, p. 231. Demosthenes, in his oration De Corona, spoken many years after the facts, affirms the contingency of alliance between Athens and Thebes at this juncture, as having been much more probable than he ventures to state it in the earlier speech De Falsa Legatione.
enter Thessaly—where we find them, three months later, besieging Halus. Reports seem to have been spread, about September 317 B.C., that the Macedonians were about to march to Thermopylae; upon which the Phokians took alarm, and sent envoys to Athens as well as to Sparta, entreatiing aid to enable them to hold the pass, and offering to deliver up the three important towns near it—Alpinus, Thronium, and Nikaea. So much were the Athenians alarmed by the message, that they not only ordered Proxenus, their general at Oresus, to take immediate possession of the pass, but also passed a decree to equip fifty triremes, and to send forth their military citizens under thirty years of age, with an energy like that displayed when they checked Philip before at the same place. But it appears that the application had been made by the party in Phokis opposed to Phalækus. So vehemently did that chief resent the proceeding, that he threw the Phokian envoys into prison on their return; refusing to admit either Proxenus or Archidamus into possession of Thermopylae, and even dismissing without recognition the Athenian heralds, who came in their regular rounds to proclaim the solemn truce of the Eleusinian mysteries. This proceeding on the part of Phalækus was dictated seemingly by jealousy of Athens and Sparta, and by fear that they would support the party opposed to him in Phokis. It could not have originated (as Aeschines alleges) in superior confidence and liking towards Philip; for if Phalækus had entertained such sentiments, he might have admitted the Macedonian troops at once; which he did not do until ten months later, under the greatest pressure of circumstances.

Such insulting repudiation of the aid tendered by Proxenus at Thermopylae, combined with the distracted state of parties in Phokis, menaced Athens with a new embarrassment. Though

2 Aeschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41. It is this notice of the μουστηριωτιδεις σημασία which serves as indication of time for the event. The Eleusinian mysteries were celebrated in the month Boedromion (September). These events took place in September 347 B.C. Olymp. 108, 2—the archonship of Themistokles at Athens. There is also a further indication of time given by Aeschines; that the event happened before he was nominated ευγορος—προς τιν χειραυνηθης πρεσβευτην (p. 46. c. 41). This refutes the supposition of Vannel (Proleg. ad Demosth. De Peace, p. 255), who refers the proceeding to the following month Elaphelbolion (March), on the ground of some other words of Aeschines, intimating "that the news reached Athens while the Athenians were deliberating about the peace." Dolieneke too, supposes that the mysteries here alluded to are the lesser mysteries, celebrated in Anthesterion—not the greater, which belong to Boedromion. This supposition appears to me improbable and unnecessary. We may reasonably believe that there were many discussions on the peace at Athens, before the envoys were actually nominated. Some of those debates may well have taken place in the month Boedromion.
Phaleckus still held the pass, his conduct had been such as to raise doubts whether he might not treat separately with Philip. Here was another circumstance operating on Athens—besides the refusal of cooperation from other Greeks and the danger of her captives at Olynthus—to dishearten her in the prosecution of the war, and to strengthen the case of those who advocated peace. It was a circumstance the more weighty because it really involved the question of safety or exposure to her own territory, through the opening of the pass of Thermopylae. It was here that she was now under the necessity of keeping watch; being thrown on the defensive for her own security at home—not, as before, stretching out a long arm for the protection of distant possessions such as the Chersonese, or distant allies such as the Olynthians. So speedily had the predictions of Demosthenes been realized, that if the Athenians refused to carry on strenuous war against Philip on his coast, they would bring upon themselves the graver evil of having to resist him on or near their own frontier.

The maintenance of freedom in the Hellenic world against the extra-Hellenic invader, now turned once more upon the pass of Thermopylae; as it had turned 158 years before, during the onward march of the Persian Xerxes. To Philip, that pass was of incalculable importance. It was his only road into Greece; it could not be forced by any land-army; while at sea the Athenian fleet was stronger than his. In spite of the general remissness of Athens in warlike undertakings, she now twice manifested her readiness for a vigorous effort to maintain Thermopylae against him. To become master of the position, it was necessary that he should disarm Athens by concluding peace—keep her in ignorance or delusion as to his real purposes—prevent her from conceiving alarm or sending aid to Thermopyla—and then overawe or buy off the isolated Phocians. How ably and cunningly his diplomacy was managed for this purpose, will presently appear.

It is at this juncture, in trying to make out the diplomatic transactions between Athens and Philip, from the summer of 347 to that of 346 B.C.—that we find ourselves plunged amidst the contradictory assertions of the two rival orators—Demosthenes and Aeschines; with very little of genuine historical authority to control them. In 343-342 B.C., Demosthenes impeached Aeschines for corrupt betrayal of the interest of Athens in the second of his three embassies to Philip (in 346 B.C.). The long harangue (De Falst Legatio), still remaining, wherein his charge stands embodied, enters into copious details respecting the peace with its immediate antecedents and consequents. We possess also the speech delivered by Aeschines, in his own defence, and in counter-accusation of Demosthenes; a speech going over
On the other hand, to Athens, to Sparta, and to the general cause of Pan-Hellenic independence, it was of capital moment that Philip should be kept on the outside of Thermopylae. And here Athens had more at stake than the rest; since not merely her influence abroad, but the safety of her own city and territory against invasion, was involved in the question. The Thebans had already invited the presence of Philip, himself always ready even without invitation, to come within the pass; it was the first interest, as well as the first duty, of Athens, to counterwork them, and to keep him out. With tolerable prudence, her guarantee of the pass might have been made effective; but we shall find her measures ending only in shame and disappointment, through the flagrant improvidence, and apparent corruption, of her own negotiators.

The increasing discouragement as to war, and yearning for peace, which prevailed at Athens during the summer and autumn of 347 B.C., has been already described. We may be sure that the friends of the captives taken at Olynthus would be importunate in demanding peace, because there was no other way of procuring their release; since Philip did not choose to exchange them for money, reserving them as an item in political negotiation. At length, about the month of November, the public assembly decreed that envoys should be sent to Philip for peace, to ascertain on what conditions peace could be made; ten Athenian envoys, and one from the same ground, suitably to his own purpose and point of view. Lastly, we have the two speeches, delivered several years later (in 330 B.C.), of Aeschines in prosecuting Ktesiphon, and of Demosthenes in defending him; wherein the conduct of Demosthenes as to the peace of 346 B.C. again becomes matter of controversy. All these harangues are interesting, not merely as eloquent compositions, but also from the striking conception which they impart of the living sentiment and controversy of the time. But when we try to extract from them real and authentic matter of history, they become painfully embarrassing; so glaring are the contradictions not only between the two rivals, but also between the earlier and later discourses of the same orator himself, especially Aeschines; so evident is the spirit of perversion, so unscrupulous are the manifestations of hostile feeling on both sides. We can place little faith in the allegations of either orator against the other, except where some collateral grounds of fact or probability can be adduced in confirmation. But the allegations of each as to matters which do not make against the other, are valuable; even the misrepresentations, since we have them on both sides, will sometimes afford mutual correction; and we shall often find it practicable to detect a basis of real matter of fact which one or both may seek to pervert, but which neither can venture to set aside, or can keep wholly out of sight. It is indeed deeply to be lamented that we know little of the history except so much as it suits the one or the other of these rival orators, each animated by purposes totally at variance with that of the historian, to make known either by direct notice or oblique allusion.
the synod of confederate allies, sitting at Athens. The mover of the decree was Philokratès, the same who had moved the previous decree permitting Philip to send envoys if he chose. Of this permission Philip had not availed himself, in spite of all that the philippisers at Athens had alleged about his anxiety for peace and alliance with the city. It suited his purpose to have the negotiations carried on in Macedonia, where he could act better upon the individual negotiators of Athens.

The decree having been passed in the assembly, ten envoys were chosen—Philokratès, Demosthenès, Æschinès, Ktesiphon, Phrynon, Iatroklès, Derkyllus, Kimon, Nausi-klès, and Aristodemus the actor. Aglaokreon of Tenedos was selected to accompany them, as representative of the allied synod. Of these envoys, Ktesiphon, Phrynon, and Iatroklès had already been gained over as partisans by Philip, while in Macedonia; moreover Aristodemus was a person to whom, in his histrionic profession, the favour of Philip was more valuable than the interests of Athens. Æschinès was proposed by Nausi-klès; Demosthenès, by Philokratès the mover. Though Demosthenès had been before so earnest in advocating vigorous prosecution of the war, it does not appear that he was now adverse to the opening of negotiations. Had he been ever so adverse, he would probably have failed in obtaining even a hearing, in the existing temper of the public mind. He thought indeed that Athens inflicted so much damage on her enemy by ruining the Macedonian maritime commerce, that she was not under the necessity of submitting to peace on bad or humiliating terms. But still he did not oppose the overtures, nor did his opposition begin until afterwards, when he saw the turn which the negotiations were taking. Nor, on the other hand, was Æschinès as yet suspected of a leaning towards Philip. Both he and Demosthenès obeyed, at this moment, the impulse of opinion generally prevalent at Athens. Their subsequent discordant views and bitter rivalry grew out of the embassy itself; out of its result and the behaviour of Æschinès.

The eleven envoys were appointed to visit Philip, not with any power of concluding peace, but simply to discuss with him and ascertain on what terms peace could be had. So much is certain; though we do not possess the original decree under which they were nominated. Having sent

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ad Demosth. Fals. Leg.
before them a herald to obtain a safe-conduct from Philip, they left Athens about December, 347 B.C., and proceeded by sea to Oreus on the northern coast of Euboea, where they expected to meet the returning herald. Finding that he had not yet come back, they crossed the strait at once, without waiting for him, into the Pegasian Gulf, where Parmenio, with a Macedonian army was then besieging Halus. To him they notified their arrival, and received permission to pass on, first to Parga, next to Larissa. Here they met their own returning herald, under whose safeguard they pursued their journey to Pella.

Our information respecting this (first) embassy proceeds almost wholly from Aeschinés. He tells us that Demosthenés was, from the very day of setting out, intolerably troublesome both to him and his brother envoys; malignant, faithless, and watching for such matters as might be turned against them in the way of accusation afterwards; lastly, boastful, even to absurd excess, of his own powers of eloquence. In Greece, it was the usual habit to transact diplomatic business, like other political matters, publicly before the governing body—the council, if the constitution happened to be oligarchical—the general assembly, if democratical. Pursuant to this habit, the envoys were called upon to appear before Philip in his full pomp and state, and there address him formal harangues (either by one or more of their number as they chose), setting forth the case of Athens; after which Philip would deliver his reply in the like publicity, either with his own lips or by those of a chosen minister. The Athenian envoys resolved among themselves, that when introduced, each of them should address Philip, in the order of seniority; Demosthenés being the youngest of the Ten, and Aeschinés next above him. Accordingly, when summoned before Philip, Ktesiphon, the oldest envoy, began with a short address; the other seven followed with equal brevity, while the stress of the business was left to Aeschinés and Demosthenés.

Aeschinés recounts in abridgement to the Athenians, with much satisfaction, his own elaborate harangue, establishing the right of Athens to Amphipolis, the wrong done by Philip in taking it and holding it against her, and his paramount obligation to make restitution—but touching upon no other subject whatever. He

2 Aeschinés, Fals. Leg. p. 31. c. 10, 11.  
3 Aeschinés, Fals. Leg. p. 31. c. 11.
then proceeds to state—probably with yet greater satisfaction—that Demosthenes, who followed next, becoming terrified and confused, utterly broke down, forgot his prepared speech, and was obliged to stop short, in spite of courteous encouragements from Philip.\(^1\) Gross failure, after full preparation, on the part of the greatest orator of ancient or modern times, appears at first hearing so incredible, that we are disposed to treat it as pure fabrication of his opponent. Yet I incline to believe that the fact was substantially as \(\alpha\)scchin\(\acute{e}\)s states it; and that Demosthenes was partially divested of his oratorical powers by finding himself not only speaking before the enemy whom he had so bitterly denounced, but surrounded by all the evidences of Macedonian power, and doubtless exposed unequivocal marks of well-earned hatred, from those Macedonians who took less pains than Philip to disguise their real feelings.\(^2\)

Having dismissed the envoys after their harangues, and taken a short time for consideration, Philip recalled them into his presence. He then delivered his reply with his own lips, combating especially the arguments of \(\alpha\)scchin\(\acute{e}\)s, and according to that orator, with such pertinence and presence of mind, as to excite the admiration of all the envoys, Demosthenes among the rest. What Philip said, we do not learn from \(\alpha\)scchin\(\acute{e}\)s; who expatiates only on the shuffling, artifice, and false pretences of Demosthenes, to conceal his failure as an orator, and to put himself on a point of advantage above his colleagues. Of these personalities it is impossible to say how much is true; and even were they true, they are scarcely matter of general history.

It was about the beginning of March when the envoys returned to Athens. Some were completely fascinated by the hospitable treatment and engaging manners of Philip, especially when entertaining them at the banquet; with others he had come to an understanding at once more intimate and more corrupt. They brought back a letter from Philip, which was read both in the Senate and the assembly; while Demosthenes, senator of that year, not only praised them all in the Senate, but also became himself the mover of a resolution, that they should be crowned

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1. *\(\alpha\)scchin\(\acute{e}\)s, Fala. Leg. p. 32. c. 13, 14.*
2. *\(\alpha\)scchin\(\acute{e}\)s, Fala. Leg. p. 32, 33. c.*
3. *\(\alpha\)scchin\(\acute{e}\)s, Fala. Leg. p. 33. c. 17, 18.*
4. *The effect of the manner and behaviour of Philip upon Ktesiphon the envoy, is forcibly stated here by \(\alpha\)scchin\(\acute{e}\)s.*
with a wreath of honour, and invited to dine next day in the Prytanæum.¹

We have hardly any means of appreciating the real proceedings of this embassy, or the matters treated in discussion with Philip. Æschines tells us nothing, except the formalities of the interview, and the speeches about Amphipolis. But we shall at any rate do him no injustice, if we judge him upon his own account; which, if it does not represent what he actually did, represents what he wished to be thought to have done. His own account certainly shows a strange misconception of the actual situation of affairs. In order to justify himself for being desirous for peace, he lays considerable stress on the losing game which Athens had been playing during the war, and on the probability of yet farther loss if she persisted. He completes the cheerless picture by adding—what was doubtful but too familiar to his Athenian audience—that Philip on his side, marching from one success to another, had raised the Macedonian kingdom to an elevation truly formidable, by the recent extinction of Olynthus. Yet under this state of comparative force between the two contending parties, Æschines presents himself before Philip with a demand of exorbitant magnitude—for the cession of Amphipolis. He says not a word about anything else. He delivers an eloquent harangue to convince Philip of the uncontestable right of Athens to Amphipolis, and to prove to him that he was in the wrong for taking and keeping it. He affects to think, that by this process he should induce Philip to part with a town, the most capital and unparalleled position in all his dominions; which he had now possessed for twelve years, and which placed him in communication with his new foundation Philippi and the auriferous region around it. The arguments of Æschines would have been much to the purpose, in an action tried between two litigants before an impartial Dikastery at Athens. But here were two belligerent parties, in a given ratio of strength and position as to the future, debating terms of peace. That an envoy on the part of Athens, the losing party, should now stand forward to

¹ Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 34. c. 19; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 414. This vote of thanks, and invitation to dinner, appears to have been so uniform a custom, that Demosthenes (Fals. Leg. p. 350) comments upon the withholding of the compliment, when the second embassy returned, as a disgrace without parallel. That Demosthenes should have proposed a motion of such customary formality, is a fact of little moment any way. It rather proves that the relations of Demosthenes with his colleagues during the embassy, cannot have been so ill-tempered as Æschines had affirmed. Demosthenes himself admits that he did not begin to suspect his colleagues until the debates at Athens after the return of this first embassy.
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demand from a victorious enemy the very place which formed the original cause of the war, and which had become far more valuable to Philip than when he first took it—was a pretension altogether preposterous. When Ἀσχίνες reproduces his eloquent speech reclaiming Amphipolis, as having been the principal necessity and most honourable achievement of his diplomatic mission, he only shows how little qualified he was to render real service to Athens in that capacity—to say nothing as yet about corruption. The Athenian people, extremely retentive of past convictions, had it deeply impressed on their minds that Amphipolis was theirs by right; and probably the first envoys to Macedon—Ἀριστοδέμος, Νεοπτολέμος, Κτησίφων, Φρύνων, &c.—had been so cajoled by the courteous phrases, deceptions, and presents of Philip, that they represented him on their return as not unwilling to purchase friendship with Athens by the restoration of Amphipolis. To this delusive expectation in the Athenian mind Ἀσχίνες addressed himself, when he took credit for his earnest pleading before Philip on behalf of Athenian right to the place, as if it were the sole purpose of his mission. We shall see him throughout, in his character of envoy, not only fostering the actual delusions of the public at Athens, but even circulating gross fictions and impostures of his own, respecting the proceedings and purposes of Philip.

It was on or about the first day of the month of Elaphebolion (March) when the envoys reached Athens on returning from the court of Philip. They brought a letter from him couched in the most friendly terms; expressing great anxiety not only to be at peace with Athens, but also to become her ally; stating moreover that he was prepared to render her valuable service and that he would have specified more particularly what the service

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2 There is great contradiction between the two orators, Ἀσχίνες and Demosthenes, as to this speech of Ἀσχίνες before Philip respecting Amphipolis. Demosthenes represents Ἀσχίνες as having said in this report to the people on his return, "I (Ἀσχίνες) said nothing about Amphipolis, in order that I might leave that subject fresh for Demosthenes, &c.


As to this particular matter of fact, I incline to believe Ἀσχίνες rather than his rival. He probably did make an eloquent speech about Amphipolis before Philip.

3 The eighth day of Elaphebolion fell some little time after their arrival, so that possibly they may have even reached Athens on the last days of the month Anthesterion (Ἀσχίνες adv. Κτεσιφ. p. 63. c. 24). The reader will understand that the Grecian lunar months do not correspond precisely, but only approximately, with ours.
would be, if he could have felt certain that he should be received
as her ally. But in spite of such amenities of language, affording
an occasion for his partisans in the assembly—Æschinés, Philo-
kratés, Ktesiphon, Phrynón, Iatroklés, and others—to expatiate
upon his excellent dispositions—Philip would grant no better terms
of peace than that each party should retain what they already
possessed. Pursuant to this general principle, the Chersonesus
was assured to Athens, of which Æschinés appears to have made
some boast. Moreover, at the moment when the envoys were
quitting Pella to return home, Philip was also leaving it at the
head of his army on an expedition against Kersobleptés in Thrace.
He gave a special pledge to the envoys that he would not attack
the Chersonese until the Athenians should have had an opportunity
of debating, accepting, or rejecting, the propositions of peace.
His envoys, Autipater and Parmenio, received orders to visit
Athens with little delay; and a Macedonian herald accompanied
the Athenian envoys on their return.

Having ascertained on what terms peace could be had, the
envoys were competent to advise the Athenian people,
and prepare them for a definite conclusion, as soon as
this Macedonian mission should arrive. They first gave an account
of their proceedings to the public assembly. Ktesiphon, the oldest,
who spoke first, expatiated on the graceful presence and manners
of Philip, as well as upon the charm of his company in wine-
drinking. Æschinés dwelt upon his powerful and pertinent ora-
tory;—after which he recounted the principal occur-
rences of the journey, and the debate with Philip,
intimating that in the previous understanding of the
envoys among themselves, the duty of speaking about
Amphipolis had been confided to Demosthenés, in case
any point should have been omitted by the previous
speakers. Demosthenés then made his own statement, in lan-
guage (according to Æschinés) censorious and even insulting
towards his colleagues; especially affirming that Æschinés in his
vanity chose to preoccupy all the best points in his own speech,


3 Æschinés, Fals. Leg. p. 39, c. 28; Æschinés cont. Ktesiphont. p. 65, c. 29;

4 Æschinés, Fals. Leg. p. 34, c. 20.

De Halonneso, p. 85. Æschinés al-
ludes to this letter, Fals. Leg. p. 34.

c. 21.

c. 21.
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leaving none open for any one else.\(^1\) Demosthenes next proceeded to move various decrees; one, to greet by libation the herald who had accompanied them from Philip—and the Macedonian envoys who were expected; another, providing that the prytanés should convene a special assembly on the eighth day of Elaphebolion (a day sacred to Ἀσκαλώπιος, on which generally no public business was ever transacted), in order that if the envoys from Macedonia had then arrived, the people might discuss without delay their political relations with Philip; a third, to commend the behaviour of the Athenian envoys (his colleagues and himself), and to invite them to dinner in the prytaneion. Demosthenes further moved in the Senate, that when Philip's envoys came, they should be accommodated with seats of honour at the Dionysiac festival.\(^2\)

Presently these Macedonian envoys—Antipater, Parmenio, and Eurylochus—arrived; yet not early enough to allow the full debate to take place on the assembly of the eighth of Elaphebolion. Accordingly (as it would seem, in that very assembly), Demosthenes proposed and carried a fresh decree, fixing two later days for the special assemblies to discuss peace and alliance with Macedonia. The days named were, the eighteenth and nineteenth days of the current month Elaphebolion (March); immediately after the Dionysiac festival and the assembly in the temple of Dionysus which followed upon it.\(^3\) At the same time Demosthenes showed great personal civility to the Macedonian envoys, inviting them to a splendid entertainment, and not only conducting them to their

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\(^{1}\) Αἰσχίνης, Fals. Leg. p. 34, 35, c. 21; Dem. Fals. Leg. p. 421. Yet Αἰσχίνης, when describing the same facts in his oration against Ktesiphon (p. 62, c. 20), simply says that Demosthenes gave to the assembly an account of the proceedings of the first embassy, similar to that given by the other envoys—ταῦτα τοῖς ἄλλοις πρεσβεύσιν ἀπήγγειλεν, &c.

The point noticed in the text (that Demosthenes charged Αἰσχίνης with reluctance to let any one else have anything to say) is one which appears both in Αἰσχίνης and Demosthenes, De Fals. Legat., and may therefore in the main be regarded as having really occurred. But probably the statement made by Demosthenes to the people as to the proceedings of the embassy, was substantially the same as that of his colleagues. Yet though the later oration of Αἰσχίνης is, in itself, less trustworthy evidence than the earlier—yet when we find two different statements of Αἰσχίνης respecting Demosthenes, we may reasonably presume that the one which is most unfavourable is the most credible of the two.

\(^{2}\) Αἰσχίνης, Fals. Leg. p. 34, 35, 42, c. 20, 21, 34; Αἰσχίνης adv. Ktesiph. p. 63, 63, c. 24, 24. In the first of the two speeches, Αἰσχίνης makes no mention of the decree proposed by Demosthenes relative to the assembly on the eighth of Elaphebolion. He mentions it in the speech against Ktesiphon, with considerable specification.

\(^{3}\) Αἰσχίνης, Fals. Leg. p. 34, 35, c. 22, ἀρχαῖος ἕγγυς Ἀσκ. Αἰσχ. Ἀδρ. Ktesiph. p. 63, c. 24. This last decree, fixing the two special days of the month, could scarcely have been proposed until after Philip's envoys had actually reached Athens.
place of honour at the Dionysiac festival, but also providing for them comfortable seats and cushions.1

Besides the public assembly held by the Athenians themselves, to receive report from their ten envoys returned out of Macedonia, the synod of Athenian confederates was also assembled, to hear the report of Aglaokreon, who had gone as their representative along with the Ten. This synod agreed to a resolution, important in reference to the approaching debate in the Athenian assembly, yet unfortunately nowhere given to us entire, but only in partial and indirect notice from the two rival orators. It has been already mentioned, that since the capture of Olynthus, the Athenians had sent forth envoys throughout a large portion of Greece, urging the various cities to unite with them either in conjoint war against Philip, or in conjoint peace to obtain some mutual guarantee against his farther encroachments. Of these missions, the greater number had altogether failed, demonstrating the hopelessness of the Athenian project. But some had been so far successful, that deputies, more or fewer, were actually present in Athens, pursuant to the invitation: while a certain number were still absent and expected to return—the same individuals having perhaps been sent to different places at some distance from each other. The resolution of the synod (noway binding upon the Athenian people, but merely recommendatory) was adapted to this state of affairs, and to the dispositions recently manifested at Athens towards conjoint action with other Greeks against Philip. The synod advised, that immediately on the return of the envoys still absent on mission (when probably all such Greeks, as were willing even to talk over the proposition, would send their deputies also), the Athenian prytanes should convene two public assemblies, according to the laws, for the purpose of debating and deciding the question of peace. Whatever decision might be here taken, the synod adopted it beforehand as their own. They farther recommended that an article should be annexed, reserving an interval of three months for any Grecian city not a party to the peace, to declare its adhesion, to inscribe its name on the column of record, and to be included under the same conditions as the rest. Apparently this resolution of the synod was adopted before the arrival of the

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1 Αρχίνδης, Fals. Leg. p. 42. c. 34; adv. Ktesiphol. p. 62. c. 22; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 414; De Corona, p. 234. This courtesy and politeness towards the Macedonian envoys is admitted by Demosthenes himself. It was not a circumstance of which he had any reason to be ashamed.
Macedonian deputies in Athens, and before the last-mentioned decree proposed by Demosthenès in the public assembly; which decree, fixing two days (the 18th and 19th of Elaphebolion) for decision of the question of peace and alliance with Philip, coincided in part with the resolution of the synod.  

If we follow the argument of Ἀσσίνης (in the speech De Fals. Leg.), we shall see that it is quite enough if we suppose some of the envoys sent out on mission, and not all of them, to be absent. To prove this fact, he adds (p. 35, 36) the resolution of the confederate synod, alluding to the absent envoys, and recommending a certain course to be taken after their return. This does not necessarily imply that all were absent. Stechow remarks justly, that some of the envoys would necessarily be out a long time, having to visit more than one city, and perhaps cities distant from each other (Vita ᾿Ασσίνης, p. 41).

Also accept what Ἀσσίνης says about the resolution of the confederate synod, as being substantially true. About the actual import of this resolution, he is consistent with himself, both in the earlier and in the later oration. Winiewski (Comment. Historic. in Demosth. De Corona, p. 74-77) and Westermann (De Litibus quas Demosthenes oravit apse, p. 38-42) affirm, I think without reason, that the import of this resolution is differently represented by Ἀσσίνης in the earlier and in the later orations. What is really different in the two orations, is the way in which Ἀσσίνης perverts the import of the resolution to implicate Demosthenès; affirming in the later oration, that if Athens had waited for the return of her envoys on mission, she might have made peace with Philip jointly with a large body of Greek allies; and that it was Demosthenès who hindered her from doing this by hurrying on the discussions about the peace (῾Ασσ. adv. Ktesiph. p. 61-63), &c. Westermann thinks that the synod would not take upon them to prescribe how many assemblies the Athenians should convene for the purpose of debating about peace. But it seems to have been a common practice with the Athenians, about peace or other special and important matters, to convene two assemblies on two days immediately succeeding; all that the synod here recommended was, that the
Accordingly, after the great Dionysiac festival, these two prescribed assemblies were held—on the 18th and 19th of Elaphebolion. The three ambassadors from Philip—Parmenio, Antipater, and Eurylochus—were present both at the festival and the assemblies. The general question of the relations between Athens and Philip being here submitted for discussion, the resolution of the confederate synod was at the same time communicated. Of this resolution the most significant article was, that the synod accepted beforehand the decree of the Athenian assembly, whatever that might be; the other articles were recommendations, doubtless heard with respect, and constituting a theme for speakers to insist on, yet carrying no positive authority. But in the pleadings of the two rival orators some years afterwards (from which alone we know the facts), the entire resolution of the synod appears invested with a factitious importance; because each of them had an interest in professing to have supported it—each accuses the other of having opposed it; both wished to disconnect themselves from Philokrates, then a disgraced exile, and from the peace moved by him, which had become discredited. It was Philokrates who stood forward in the assembly as the prominent mover of peace and alliance with Philip. His motion did not embrace either of the recommendations of the synod, respecting absent envoys, and interval to be left for adhesions from other Greeks; nor did he confine himself, as the synod had done, to the proposition of peace with Philip. He proposed that not only peace, but alliance, should be concluded between the Athenians and Philip: who had expressed by letter his great anxiety both for one and for the other. He included in his proposition Philip with all his allies on one side—and Athens with all her allies on the other; making special exception, however, of two among the allies of Athens—the Phokians—and the town of Halus near the Pagasean Gulf, recently under siege by Parmenio.  

1 Aschinés adv. Ktesiph. p. 64.  
What part Ἀσχινής and Demosthenēs took in reference to this motion, it is not easy to determine. In their speeches, delivered three years afterwards, both denounce Philokratēs; each accuses the other of having supported him; each affirms himself to have advocated the recommendations of the synod. The contradictions between the two, and between Ἀσχινής in his earlier and Ἀσχινής in his later speech, are here very glaring. Thus, Demosthenēs accuses his rival of having, on the 18th of the month or on the first of the two assemblies, delivered a speech strongly opposed to Philokratēs; but of having changed his politics during the night, and spoken on the 19th in support of the latter so warmly, as to convert the hearers when they were predisposed the other way. Ἀσχινής altogether denies such sudden change of opinion; alleging that he made but one speech, and that in favour of the recommendation of the synod; and averring moreover that to speak on the second assembly-day was impossible, since that day was exclusively consecrated to putting questions and voting, so that no oratory was allowed. Yet Ἀσχινής, though in his earlier harangue (De Fals. Leg.) he insists so strenuously on this impossibility of speaking on the 19th—in his later harangue (against Ktesiphon) accuses Demosthenēs of having spoken at great length on that very day the 19th, and of having thereby altered the temper of the assembly.

In spite, however, of the discredit thus thrown by Ἀσχινής upon his own denial, I do not believe the sudden change of speech in the assembly ascribed to him by Demosthenēs. It is too unexplained, and in itself too improbable to be credited on the mere assertion of a rival. But I think it certain that neither he, nor Demosthenēs, can have advocated the recommendations of the synod, though both profess to have done so—if we are to believe the statement of Ἀσχινής (we have no statement from Demosthenēs) as to the tenor of those recommendations. For the synod (according to Ἀσχινής) had recommended to await the return of the absent envoys before the question of peace was debated. Now this proposition was impracticable under the circumstances; since it amounted to nothing less than an indefinite postponement of the question. But the Macedonian envoys Antipater and Parmenio were now in Athens, and actually present in the assembly; having come, by special invitation, for the purpose either of concluding

peace or of breaking off the negotiation; and Philip had agreed (as Ἀσχίνης himself states) to refrain from all attack on the Chersonese, while the Athenians were debating about peace. Under these conditions, it was imperatively necessary to give some decisive and immediate answer to the Macedonian envoys. To tell them—"We can say nothing positive at present; you must wait until our absent envoys return, and until we ascertain how many Greeks we can get into our alliance"—would have been not only in itself preposterous, but would have been construed by able men like Antipater and Parmenio as a mere dilatory manoeuvre for breaking off the peace altogether. Neither Demosthenès nor Ἀσχίνης can have really supported such a proposition, whatever both may pretend three years afterwards. For at that time of the actual discussion, not only Ἀσχίνης himself, but the general public of Athens, were strongly anxious for peace; while Demosthenès, though less anxious, was favourable to it.¹ Neither of them were

¹ Ἀσχίνης, Fals. Leg. p. 39.
² From the considerations here stated, we can appreciate the charges of Ἀσχίνης against Demosthenès, even on his own showing; though the precise course of either is not very clear.

He accuses Demosthenès of having sold himself to Philip (adv. Ktes. p. 63, 64); a charge utterly futile and incredible, refuted by the whole conduct of Demosthenès, both before and after. Whether Demosthenès received bribes from Harpalus—or from the Persian court—will be matter of future inquiry. But the allegation that he had been bribed by Philip is absurd. Ἀσχίνης himself confesses that it was quite at variance with the received opinion at Athens (adv. Ktes. p. 62, c. 22).

He accuses Demosthenès of having, under the influence of these bribes, opposed and frustrated the recommendation of the confederate synod—of hurrying on the debate about peace at once—and of having thus prevented Athens from waiting for the return of her absent envoys, which would have enabled her to make peace in conjunction with a powerful body of cooperating Greeks. This charge is advanced by Ἀσχίνης, first in the speech De Fals. Leg. p. 36—next, with greater length and emphasis, in the later speech, adv. Ktes. p. 63, 64. From what has been said in the text, it will be seen that such indefinite postponement, when Antipater and Parmenio were present in Athens by invitation, was altogether impossible, without breaking off the negotiation. Not to mention, that Ἀσχίνης himself affirms, in the strongest language, the ascertained impossibility of prevailing upon any other Greeks to join Athens, and complains bitterly of their backward dispositions (Fals. Leg. p. 38, c. 25). In this point Demosthenès perfectly concurs with him (De Coron. p. 231, 232). So that even if postponement could have been had, it would have been productive of no benefit, nor of any increase of force, to Athens, since the Greeks were not inclined to cooperate with her.

The charge of Ἀσχίνης against Demosthenès is thus untenable, and suggests its own refutation, even from the mouth of the accuser himself. Demosthenès indeed replies to it in a different manner. When Ἀσχίνης says—"You hurried on the discussion about the peace, without allowing Athens to await the return of her envoys, then absent on mission"—Demosthenès answers—"There were no Athenian envoys then absent on mission. All the Greeks had been long ago detected as incurably apathetic" (De Coron. p. 233). This is a slashing and decisive reply, which it might perhaps be safe for Demosthenès to hazard, at an interval of thirteen years after the events. But it is fortunate that another answer can be provided; I conceive the assertion to be neither correct in point
at all disposed to frustrate the negotiations by insidious delay; nor, if they had been so disposed, would the Athenian public have tolerated the attempt.

On the best conclusion which I can form, Demosthenes supported the motion of Philokrates (enacting both peace and alliance with Philip), except only that special clause which excluded both the Phokians and the towns of Halus, and which was ultimately negatived by the assembly. That Aeschines supported the same motion entire, and in a still more unqualified manner, we may infer from his remarkable admission in the oration against Timarchus (delivered in the year after the peace, and three years before his own trial), wherein he acknowledges himself as joint author of the peace along with Philokrates, and avows his hearty approbation of the conduct and language of Philip, even after the ruin of the Phokians. Eubulus, the friend and partisan of Aeschines, told the Athenians the plain alternative: “You must either march forthwith to Peiraeus, serve on shipboard, pay direct taxes, and convert the Theoric Fund to military purposes—or else you must vote the terms of peace moved by Philokrates.” Our inference respecting the conduct of Aeschines is strengthened by what is here affirmed respecting Eubulus. Demosthenes had been vainly urging upon his countrymen, for the last five years, at a time when Philip was less formidable, the real adoption of these energetic measures: Eubulus his opponent now holds them out in terror, as an irksome and intolerable necessity, constraining the people to vote for the terms of peace proposed. And however painful it might be to acquiesce in the statu quo, of fact, nor consistent with the statements of Demosthenes himself in the speech De Falsa Legatione, 1

1 Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 391-430. Aeschines affirms strongly, in his later oration against Ktesiphon (p. 63), that Demosthenes warmly advocated the motion of Philokrates for alliance as well as peace with Philip. He professes to give the precise phrase used by Demosthenes—which he censures as an inelegant phrase—οι δειν ἀπορρήξαι τῆς εἰρήνης τὴν συμμαχίαν, &c. He adds that Demosthenes called up the Macedonian ambassador Antipater to the rostrum, put a question to him, and obtained an answer concerted beforehand. How much of this is true, I cannot say. The version given by Aeschines in his later speech, is, as usual, different from that in his earlier.

The accusation against Demosthenes, of corrupt collusion with Antipater, is incredible and absurd.

2 Aesch. adv. Timarch. p. 24, 25. c. 34. παρεμβάλλων (Demosthenes) τὰς ἔμας δημηγορίας, καὶ ψέγων τὴν εἰρήνην τὴν δὲ ἐμοῦ καὶ Φιλοκράτους γεγενημένην, ὥστε οὐδὲ ἀπαντῆσει τοῖς ἐμοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ δικαστηρίου ἀπολογησόμενον, καὶ τὰς τῆς πρεσβείας εὐθύνας διδό, &c. .. . Φίλιππον δὲ νῦν μὲν διὰ τὴν τῶν λόγων εὐφημίαν ἐπικυρίως, &c.

which recognised Philip as master of Amphipolis and of so many other possessions once belonging to Athens—I do not believe that even Demosthenês, at the time when the peace was actually under debate, would put the conclusion of it to hazard, by denouncing the shame of such unavoidable cession, though he professes three years afterwards to have vehemently opposed it.

I suspect therefore that the terms of peace proposed by Philokratês met with unqualified support from one of our two rival orators, and with only partial opposition to one special clause, from the other. However this may be, the proposition passed, with no other modification (so far as we know) except the omission of that clause which specially excepted Halus and the Phokians. Philokratês provided—that all the possessions actually in the hands of each of the belligerent parties, should remain to each, without disturbance from the other; that on these principles, there should be both peace and alliance between Athens with all her allies on the one side, and Philip with all his allies on the other. These were the only parties included in the treaty. Nothing was said about other Greeks, not allies either of Philip or of Athens. Nor was any special mention made about Kersobleptês.

Such was the decree of peace and alliance, enacted on the second of the two assembly-days—the nineteenth of the month Elaphbolion. Of course—without the fault of any one—it was all to the advantage of Philip. He was in the superior position; and it sanctioned his retention of all his conquests. For Athens, the inferior party, the benefit to be expected was, that she would prevent these conquests from being yet farther multiplied, and protect herself against being driven from bad to worse.

But it presently appeared that even this much was not realized. On the twenty-fifth day of the same month (six days after the

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2 Pseudo-Demosth. De Halomneso, p. 81-83. Demosthenês in one passage (Fals. Leg. p. 385) speaks as if it were a part of the Athenian oath—that they would oppose and treat as enemies all who should try to save from Philip and to restore to Athens the places now recognised as Philip's possessions for the future. Though Vemuel (Proleg. ad Demosth. De Pace, p. 265) and Bou nonce (p. 303) insert these words as a part of the actual formula, I doubt whether they are anything more than a constructive expansion, given by Demosthenês himself, of the import of the formula.
3 This fact we learn from the subsequent discussions about amending the peace, mentioned in Pseudo-Demosth. De Halomneso, p. 84.
5 This date is preserved by Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 64, c. 27. ἐνή ποιήνετο τοῦ Ἐλαφηβολιῶν μνήμης, &c. In the earlier oration (De Fals. Leg. p. 40, c. 29) Æschines states that Demosthenês was among the Proedri or pre-
previous assembly), a fresh assembly was held, for the purpose of providing ratification by solemn oath for the treaty which had been just decreed. It was now moved and enacted, that the same ten citizens, who had been before accredited to Philip, should again be sent to Macedonia for the purpose of receiving the oaths from him and from his allies. Next, it was resolved that the Athenians, together with the deputies of their allies then present, in Athens, should take the oath forthwith, in the presence of Philip’s envoys.

But now arose the critical question, Who were to be included as allies of Athens? Were the Phokians and Kersobleptes to be included? The one and the other represented those two capital positions—Thermopylae and the Hellespont—which Philip was sure to covet, and which it most behoved Athens to ensure against him. The assembly, by its recent vote, had struck out the special exclusion of the Phokians proposed by Philokratés, thus by implication admitting them as allies along with the rest. They were in truth allies of old standing and valuable; they had probably envoys present in Athens, but no deputies sitting in the synod. Nor had Kersobleptes any such deputy in that body; but a citizen of Lampsakus, named Kritobulus, claimed on this occasion to act for him, and to take the oaths in his name.

As to the manner of dealing with Kersobleptes, Eschinês tells us two stories (one in the earlier oration, the other in the later) quite different from each other; and agreeing only in this—
that in both Demosthenes is described as one of the presiding magistrates of the public assembly, and as having done all that he could to prevent the envoy of Kersobleptes from being admitted to take the oaths as an ally of Athens. Amidst such discrepancies, to state in detail what passed is impossible. But it seems clear—that from Aeschines (in his earliest speech) and Demosthenes—first, that the envoy from Kersobleptes, not having a seat in the confederate synod, but presenting himself and claiming to be sworn as an ally of Athens, found his claim disputed; secondly, that upon this dispute arising, the question was submitted to the vote of the public assembly, who decided that Kersobleptes was an ally, and should be admitted to take the oath as such.  

Antipater and Parmenio, on the part of Philip, did not refuse to recognise Kersobleptes as an ally of Athens, and to receive his oath. But in regard to the Phokians, they announced a determination distinctly opposite. They gave notice, at or after the assembly of the 25th Elaphbolion, that Philip positively refused to admit the Phokians as parties to the convention.

This determination, formally announced by Antipater at Athens, must probably have been made known by Philip himself to Philokrates and Aeschines, when on mission in Macedonia. Hence Philokrates, in his motion about the terms of peace, had proposed that the Phokians and Halus should be specially excluded (as I have already related). Now, however, when the Athenian assembly, by expressly repudiating such exclusion, had determined that the Phokians should be received as parties, while the envoys of Philip were not less express in rejecting them—the leaders of the peace, Aeschines and Philokrates, were in great embarrassment. They had no other way of surmounting the difficulty, except by holding

1 Compare Aeschines, Fals. Leg. p. 39. c. 26, with Aeschines cont. Ktesiphont. p. 64. c. 27.

Franke (Proleg. ad Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 30, 31), has some severe comments on the discrepancy between the two statements.

That the question was put, and affirmed by vote, to admit Kersobleptes, appears from the statement of Aeschines in the speech De Fals. Leg.—


Philip, in his letter some years afterwards to the Athenians, affirmed that Kersobleptes wished to be admitted to take the oaths, but was excluded by the Athenian generals, who declared him to be an enemy of Athens (Epist. Phil. ap. Demosth. p. 160). If it be true that the generals tried to exclude him, their exclusion must have been overruled by the vote of the assembly.
out mendacious promises, and unauthorised assurances of future intention in the name of Philip. Accordingly, they confidently announced that the king of Macedon, though precluded by his relations with the Thebans and Thessalians (necessary to him while he remained at war with Athens) from openly receiving the Phokians as allies, was nevertheless in his heart decidedly adverse to the Thebans; and that, if his hands were once set free by concluding peace with Athens, he would interfere in the quarrel just in the manner that the Athenians would desire; that he would uphold the Phokians, put down the insolence of Thebes, and even break up the integrity of the city—restoring also the autonomy of Thespiae, Plataea and the other Boetian towns, now in Theban dependence. The general assurances—previously circulated by Aristodemus, Ktesiphon, and others—of Philip's anxiety to win favourable opinions from the Athenians—were now still farther magnified into a supposed community of antipathy against Thebes; and even into a disposition to compensate Athens for the loss of Amphipolis, by making her complete mistress of Euboea as well as by recovering for her Oræus.

By such glowing fabrications and falsehoods, confidently asseverated, Philokratés, Aeschincés, and the other partisans of Philip present, completely deluded the assembly; not indeed to decree the special exclusion of the Phokians, as Philokratés had at first proposed—but to swear the convention with Antipater and Parmenio without the Phokians. These latter were

1 Demosthenés, Fals. Leg. p. 444. ἐπίθεν οἱ μὲν παρ᾽ ἐκεῖνον πρόσβεσις προβλέψαν ὑμῖν ὅτι Φωκίας οὐ προσέχεται Φιλίππος συμμάχους, οὗτος ἐκδεχόμενο τοιαύτ᾽ ἐδημηγόρουσας, ὡς φανερῶς μὲν οὐχὶ καλῶς ἔχει τῷ Φιλίππῳ προσδέξασθαι τοὺς Φωκίας συμμάχους, διὰ τοῦ Θηβαίου καὶ τοῦ Θετταλοῦ, ἀν δὲ γένηται τῶν πραγμάτων κύριος καὶ τῇ εἰρήνῃ τοῦχη, ἀπερὶ δὲ συνθέσιον μόνον ἄξιωσαμεν αὐτοῖς, παύσατε πολιτείας. Τὴν μὲν τοῖς εἰρήνῃ ταύτην ταύτην ταῖς ἐγκοπασίαις ἐθέρμαντο παρ᾽ ἐμῶν ἄνεν Φωκίων.

Ibid. p. 409. Εἰ δὲ πάντα τῶν τούτων τούτων καὶ πολλά καὶ φιλάνθρωποι εἴπο- τεῖς Φιλίππον, φιλεῖς τὴν πόλιν, ἑοκίας σώσεις, οὐδαμος παύσας τὴς ἐθέρμας, ἐτὶ πρὸς τούτως μειξωνα ἡ κατ᾽ Ἀμφίπολιν εὐ ποιησειν ὑμᾶς, ἐν τούχῃ τῇ εἰρήνῃ, Ἑβοίοιαν. Ἀραὶ δὲ ἐποδώσατε—εἰ τούτῳ εἴποτε καὶ ἀνασφάλεσατε τὴν ἐθέρμανα καὶ πεφενακίκασι καὶ πεφενακίκασι, &c.

Compare also, p. 346, 388, 391, about the false promises under which the Athenians were induced to consent to the peace—τῶν ὑποσχέσεων, ἐφ᾽ αἷς εἰρήνη (Philip) τὴν εἰρήνην. The same false promises put forward before the peace and determining the Athenians to conclude it, are also noticed by Demosthenés in the second Philippic (p. 69), τὰς ὑποσχέσεις, ἐφ᾽ αἷς τὴν εἰρήνην ἔτυχεν (Philip)—p. 72. τοὺς ἐπείσθην τὰς ὑποσχέσεις, ἐφ᾽ αἷς ἐξελαλήθη ποιήσασθαι τὴν εἰρήνην. This second Philippic is one year earlier in date than the oration de Falsis Legationibus, and is better authority than that oration, not merely on account of its...
thus shut out in fact, though by the general words of the peace, Athens had recognised their right to be included. Their deputies were probably present, claimed to be admitted, and were refused by Antipater, without any peremptory protest on the part of Athens.

This tissue, not of mere exaggerations, but of impudent and monstrous falsehood, respecting the purposes of Philip—will be seen to continue until he had carried his point of penetrating within the pass of Thermopylae, and even afterwards. We can hardly wonder that the people believed it, when proclaimed and guaranteed to them by Philokratés, Aîschinés, and the other envoys, who had been sent into Macedonia for the express purpose of examining on the spot and reporting, and whose assurance was the natural authority for the people to rely upon. In this case, the deceptions found easier credence and welcome, because they were in complete harmony with the wishes and hopes of Athens, and with the prevalent thirst for peace. To betray allies like the Phokians appeared of little consequence, when once it became a settled conviction that the Phokians themselves would be no losers by it. But this plea, though sufficient as a tolerable excuse for the Athenian people, will not serve for a statesman like Demosthenés; who, on this occasion (as far as we can make out even from his own language), did not enter any emphatic protest against the tacit omission of the Phokians, though he had opposed the clause (in the motion of Philokratés) which formally omitted them by name. Three months afterwards, when the ruin of the isolated Phokians was about to be consummated as a fact, we shall find Demosthenés earnest in warning and denunciation; but there is reason to presume that his opposition1 was at best only faint, when the positive refusal

earlier date, but because it is a parliamentary harangue, not tainted with an accusatory purpose, nor mentioning Aîschinés by name.

1 Demosthenés speaks of the omission of the Phokians in taking the oaths at Athens, as if it were a matter of small importance (Fals. Leg. p. 387, 388; compare p. 372); that is, on the supposition that the promises made by Aîschinés turned out to be realized.

In his speech De Pace (p. 59) he takes credit for his protests on behalf of the Phokians; but only for protests made after his return from the second embassy—not for protests made when Antipater refused to admit the Phokians to the oaths.

Westermann (De Litibus quas Demosthenés oravit ipse, p. 48) suspects that Demosthenés did not see through the deception of Aîschinés until the Phokians were utterly ruined. This, perhaps, goes beyond the truth; but at the time when the oaths were exchanged at Athens, he either had not clearly detected the consequences of that miserable shuffle into which Athens
of Antipater was first proclaimed against that acquiescence on the part of Athens, whereby the Phokians were really surrendered to Philip. Yet in truth this was the great diplomatic turning-point, from whence the sin of Athens, against duty to allies as well as against her own security, took its rise. It was a false step of serious magnitude, difficult, if not impossible, to retrieve afterwards. Probably the temper of the Athenians—then eager for peace, trembling for the lives of their captives, and prepossessed with the positive assurances of Aschinês and Philokratês—would have heard with repugnance any strong protest against abandoning the Phokians, which threatened to send Antipater home in disgust and intercept the coming peace; the more so as Demosthenês, if he called in question the assurances of Aschinês as to the projects of Philip, would have no positive facts to produce in refuting them, and would be constrained to take the ground of mere scepticism and negation;¹ of which a public, charmed with hopeful auguries and already disarmed through the mere comfortable anticipations of peace, would be very impatient. Nevertheless, we might have expected from a statesman like Demosthenês, that he would have begun his energetic opposition to the disastrous treaty of 346 B.C., at that moment when the most disastrous and disgraceful portion of it—the abandonment of the Phokians—was first shuffled in.

After the assembly of the 25th Elaphebolion, Antipater administered the oaths of peace and alliance to Athens and to all her other allies (seemingly including the envoy of Kersobleptês) in the Board-room of the Generals.² It now became the duty of the ten Athenian envoys, with one more from the confederate synod—the same persons who had been employed in the first embassy—to go and receive the oaths from Philip. Let us see how this duty was performed.

was tricked by Philokratês, &c.—or he was afraid to proclaim them emphatically.

¹ Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 355. θαραχεῖς τ᾽ ὑμῶν τῷ “μηδὲ προσδοκᾶν, δο.” (the Athenian public were displeased with Demosthenês when he told them that he did not expect the promises of Aschinês to be realized; this was after the second embassy, but it illustrates the temper of the assembly even before the second embassy)—ibid. p. 349. τίς γὰρ ἄν ἱσχύει, τηλεκαία καὶ τωταί ἐνεσθο ἀμελοῦσιν ἅγαθα, ή ταῦθ’ ἀς οὐκ ἐσται λέγουσι τινος, ἡ κατηγορούσι τῶν πεπραγμένων τούτων:

How unpopular it was to set up mere negative mistrust against glowing promises of benefits to come is here strongly urged by Demosthenês.

Respecting the premature disarming of the Athenians, see Demosth. De Corona, p. 234.

² Aschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 39. c. 27.
The decree of the assembly, under which these envoys held their trust, was large and comprehensive. They were to receive an oath of amity and alliance with Athens and her allies, from Philip as well as from the chief magistrate in each city allied with him. They were forbidden (by a curious restriction) to hold any intercourse singly and individually with Philip; but they were farther enjoined, by a comprehensive general clause, "to do anything else which might be within their power for the advantage of Athens."—"It was our duty as prudent envoys (says Aeschines to the Athenian people) to take a right measure of the whole state of affairs, as they concerned either you or Philip." Upon these rational views of the duties of the envoys, however, Aeschines unfortunately did not act. It was Demosthenes who acted upon them, and who insisted, immediately after the departure of Antipater and Parmenio, on going straight to the place where Philip actually was, in order that they might administer the oath to him with as little delay as possible. It was not only certain that the king of Macedon, the most active of living men, would push his conquests up to the last moment; but it was farther known to Aeschines and the envoys that he had left Pella to make war against Kersobleptes in Thrace, at the time when they returned from their first embassy. Moreover on the day of, or the day after, the public assembly last described (that is, on the 25th or 26th of the month Elaphebolion), a despatch had reached Athens from Charès, the Athenian commander at the Hellespont, intimating that Philip had gained important advantages in Thrace, had "taken the important place called the Sacred Mountain, and deprived Kersobleptes of great part of his kingdom." Such successive conquests on the part of Philip strengthened the reasons for despatch on the part of the envoys, and for going straight to Thrace to arrest his progress. As the peace

1 Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 430, 01 to μὲν ψήφισμα, ε1 οδηγοῦ μόνους εντυνχών μιλητάριο; οὗτος δ᾽ οὖν ἔπαυσαντο ἐπετερεῖτοτε ἐν χρηματίστοις:

2 Aeschines, Fals. Leg. p. 41. c. 32. Τὸ δὲ ἄφει τῶν ἄλων ἄρθρως βουλεύσασθαι, ὡς, καθ᾽ ἐκεὶς ἐκτείνῃς ἕκκλησιον, τοῦτο ἔτη ἔργων ἐστὶ πρεσβίων προφετικῶν...Ἀργυριέθαν τὸ ἔργον ἐγκρατεῖς, καὶ ἄλλα ἐκ δύναμεν τοῖς προσβείς; καὶ ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ, τι ἐκ δύναμεν αὐτόν.
just concluded was based on the *uti possidetis*, dating from the day on which the Macedonian envoys had administered the oaths at Athens—Philip was bound to restore all conquests made after that day. But it did not escape Demosthenès that this was an obligation which Philip was likely to evade; and which the Athenian people, bent as they were on peace, were very unlikely to enforce.¹ The more quickly the envoys reached him, the fewer would be the places in dispute, the sooner would he be reduced to inaction—or at least, if he still continued to act, the more speedily would his insincerity be exposed.

Impressed with this necessity for an immediate interview with Philip, Demosthenès urged his colleagues to set out at once. But they resisted his remonstrances, and chose to remain at Athens; which, we may remark, was probably in a state of rejoicing and festivity in consequence of the recent peace. So reckless was their procrastination and reluctance to depart, that on the third of the month Munychion (April—nine days after the solemnity of oath-taking before Antipater and Parmenio) Demosthenès made complaint and moved a resolution in the Senate, peremptorily ordering them to begin their journey forthwith, and enjoining Proxenus, the Athenian commander at Oreus in Euboea, to transport them without delay to the place where Philip was, wherever that might be.² But though the envoys were forced to leave Athens and repair to Oreus, nothing was gained in respect to the main object; for they, as well as Proxenus, took upon them to disobey the express order of the Senate, and never went to find Philip. After a certain stay at Oreus, they moved forward by leisurely journeys to Macedonia; where they remained inactive at Pella until the return of Philip from Thrace, fifty days after they had left Athens.³

Had the envoys done their duty as Demosthenès recommended, they might have reached the camp of Philip in Thrace within five

¹ See the just and prudent reasoning of Demosthenès, Fals. Leg. p. 388, and De Coronâ, p. 234.
² Compare also Pseudo-Demosthenès, De Halomesso, p. 65, 86.
³ Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 380; De Coronâ, p. 234. Ἐσχινῆς (Fals. Leg. p. 40, e. 29, 30) recognises the fact that this decree was passed by the Senate on the third of Munychion, and that the envoys left Athens in consequence of it. He does not mention that it was proposed by Demosthenès. Ἐσχινῆς here confirms, in a very important manner, the fact of the delay, as alleged by Demosthenès, while the explanation which he gives, why the envoys did not go to Thrace, is altogether without value. A document purporting to be this decree, is given in Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 214; but the authenticity is too doubtful to admit of citing it.⁴ Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 380.
or six days after the conclusion of the peace at Athens; had they been even content to obey the express orders of the Senate, they might have reached it within the same interval after the third of Munychion; so that from pure neglect, or deliberate collusion, on their part, Philip was allowed more than a month to prosecute his conquests in Thrace, after the Athenians on their side had sworn to peace. During this interval, he captured Doriskus with several other Thracian towns; some of them garrisoned by Athenian soldiers; and completely reduced Kersobleptés, whose son he brought back as prisoner and hostage. The manner in which these envoys, employed in an important mission at the public expense, wasted six weeks of a critical juncture in doing nothing—and that too in defiance of an express order from the Senate—confirms the supposition before stated, and would even of itself raise a strong presumption, that the leaders among them were lending themselves corruptly to the schemes of Philip.

The protests and remonstrances addressed by Demosthenes to his colleagues became warmer and more unmeasured as the delay was prolonged. His colleagues doubtless grew angry on their side, so that the harmony of the embassy was overthrown. Ἐσχινής affirms that none of the other envoys would associate with Demosthenes, either in the road or at the resting-places.

Pella was now the centre of hope, fear, and intrigue, for the entire Grecian world. Ambassadors were already there from Thebes, Sparta, Euboea, and Phokis; moreover a large Macedonian army was assembled around, ready for immediate action.

At length the Athenian envoys, after so long a delay of their own making, found themselves in the presence of Philip. And we should have expected that they would forthwith perform their special commission by administering the oaths. But they still went on postponing this ceremony, and saying nothing about the obligation incumbent on him, to restore all the places captured

1 Ἐσχινής, Fals. Leg. p. 38, c. 26; 40, c. 29.
Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 85; Fals. Leg. p. 390-448; compare Philippic iii. p. 114. Among the Thracian places captured by Philip during this interval, Demosthenes enumerates the Sacred Mountain. But this is said to have been captured before the end of Elaphebolion, if Ἐσχινής quotes correctly from the letter of Charès, Fals. Leg. p. 2

2 Ἐσχινής, Fals. Leg. p. 41, c. 30. Demosthenes (and doubtless the other envoys also) walked on the journey, with two slaves to carry his clothes and bedding. In the pack carried by one slave, was a talent in money, destined to aid some of the poor prisoners towards their ransom.
since the day of taking the oaths to Antipater at Athens; places, which had now indeed become so numerous, through waste of time on the part of the envoys themselves, that Philip was not likely to yield the point even if demanded. In a conference held with his colleagues, Ἀσχινής—assuming credit to himself for a view, larger than that taken by them, of the ambassadorial duties—treated the administration of the oath as merely secondary; he insisted on the propriety of addressing Philip on the subject of the intended expedition to Thermopylae (which he was on the point of undertaking, as was plain from the large force mustered near Pella), and exhorting him to employ it so as to humble Thebes and reconstitute the Boeotian cities. The envoys (he said) ought not to be afraid of braving any ill-will that might be manifested by the Thebans. Demosthenès (according to the statement of Ἀσχινής) opposed this recommendation—insisting that the envoys ought not to mingle in disputes belonging to other parts of Greece, but to confine themselves to their special mission—and declared that he should take no notice of Philip’s march to Thermopylae. At length, after much discussion, it was agreed among the envoys, that each of them, when called before Philip, should say what he thought fit, and that the youngest should speak first. According to this rule, Demosthenès was first heard, and delivered a speech (if we are to believe Ἀσχινής) not only leaving out all useful comment upon the actual situation, but so spiteful towards his colleagues, and so full of extravagant flattery to Philip, as to put the hearers to shame. The turn now came to Ἀσχινής, who repeats in abridgment his own long oration delivered to Philip, we can reason upon it with some confidence, in our estimate of Ἀσχινής, though we cannot trust his reports about Demosthenès. Ἀσχινής addressed himself exclusively to the subject of Philip’s intended expedition to Thermopylae. He exhorted Philip to settle the controversy, pending with respect to the Amphiktyonis and the Delphian temple, by peaceful arbitration and not by arms. But if
armed interference was inevitable, Philip ought carefully to inform himself of the ancient and holy bond whereby the Amphiktyonic synod was held together. That synod consisted of twelve different nations or sections of the Hellenic name, each including many cities, small as well as great; each holding two votes and no more; each binding itself by an impressive oath, to uphold and protect every other Amphiktyonic city. Under this venerable sanction, the Boeotian cities, being Amphiktyonic like the rest, were entitled to protection against the Thebans their destroyers. The purpose of Philip's expedition, to restore the Amphiktyonic council, was (Æschines admitted) holy and just. ¹ He ought to carry it through in the same spirit; punishing the individuals originally concerned in the seizure of the Delphian temple, but not the cities to which they belonged, provided those cities were willing to give up the wrong-doers. But if Philip should go beyond this point, and confirm the unjust dominion of Thebes over the other Boeotian towns, he would do wrong on his own side, add to the number of his enemies, and reap no gratitude from those whom he favoured.²

Demosthenês, in his comments upon this second embassy, touches little on what either Æschines or himself said to Philip. He professes to have gone on the second embassy with much reluctance, having detected the treacherous purposes of Æschines and Philokratês. Nay, he would have positively refused to go (he tells us) had he not bound himself by a promise made during the first embassy, to some of the poor Athenian prisoners in Macedonia, to provide for them the means of release. He dwells much upon his disbursements for their ransom during the second embassy, and his efforts to obtain the consent of Philip.³ This (he says) was all that lay in his power, to do, as an individual; in regard to the collective proceedings of the embassy, he was constantly outvoted. He affirms that he detected the foul play of Æschines and the rest with Philip; that he had written a despatch to send home for the purpose of exposing it; that his colleagues not only prevented him from forwarding it, but sent another despatch of their own with false information.⁴ Then, he had resolved to come home

personally, for the same purpose, sooner than his colleagues, and had actually hired a merchant-vessel—but was hindered by Philip from sailing out of Macedonia.

The general description here give by Demosthenes, of his own conduct during the second embassy, is probably true. Indeed it coincides substantially with the statement of Æschines, who complains of him as in a state of constant and vexatious opposition to his colleagues. We must recollect that Demosthenes had no means of knowing what the particular projects of Philip really were. This was a secret to every one except Philip himself, with his confidential agents or partisans. Whatever Demosthenes might suspect, he had no public evidence by which to impress his suspicions upon others, or to countervail confident assertions on the favourable side transmitted home by his colleagues.

The army of Philip was now ready, and he was on the point of marching southward towards Thessaly and Thermopylae. That pass was still held by the Phokians, with a body of Lacedaemonian auxiliaries; a force quite sufficient to maintain it against Philip's open attack, and likely to be strengthened by Athens from seaward, if the Athenians came to penetrate his real purposes. It was therefore essential to Philip to keep alive a certain belief in the minds of others that he was marching southward with intentions favourable to the Phokians—though not to proclaim it in any such authentic manner as to alienate his actual allies the Thebans and Thessalians. And the Athenian envoys were his most useful agents in circulating the imposture.

Some of the Macedonian officers round Philip gave explicit assurance, that the purpose of his march was to conquer Thebes, and reconstitute the Boeotian cities. So far indeed was this deception carried, that (according to Æschines) the Theban envoys in Macedonia, and the Thebans themselves, became seriously alarmed. The movements of Philip were now the pivot on which

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1 Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 445. ἐγὼ δ᾽ ὑπὲρ ἀκμαίωσ᾽ ἂν τοῖς πολλάκις, οὐ μὴν ὑπερφέρως προσπελάθω, ἀλλὰ καὶ μὲ συμβατέων πλοίον κατακωλού- 

2 The Lacedaemonian troops remained at Thermopylae until a little time before Philip reached it (Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 365).

3 Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46, c. 41. ἀυτοὶ δὲ οὐκ ἥποροι καὶ ἐφ᾽ 

Match of Philip to Thermopylae— he makes his purposes, holding out false hopes to the opposing parties. In 

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1 Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 445. ἐγὼ δ᾽ ὑπὲρ ἀκμαίωσ᾽ ἂν τοῖς πολλάκις, οὐ μὴν ὑπερφέρως προσπελάθω, ἀλλὰ καὶ μὲ συμβατέων πλοίον κατακωλού- 

2 The Lacedaemonian troops remained | ληλύθεσαν πανδημεὶ, ἀπιστοῦντες τοῖς 

Philip reached it (Demosth. Fals. Leg. | Pemosthenés greatly culogises the 

p. 365), * | incorruptibihty and hearty efforts of 

* Alschinés® Fals. Leg. p. 384) ;
Grecian affairs turned, and Pella the scene wherein the greatest cities in Greece were bidding for his favour. While the Thebans and Thessalians were calling upon him to proclaim himself openly Amphiktyonic champion against the Phokians—the Phokian envoys,\(^1\) together with those from Sparta and Athens, were endeavours to enlist him in their cause against Thebes. \(^2\) Wishing to isolate the Phokians from such support, Philip made many tempting promises to the Lacedaemonian envoys; who on their side came to open quarrel, and indulged in open menace, against those of Thebes. Such was the disgraceful auction wherein these once great states, in prosecution of their mutual antipathies, bartered away to a foreign prince the dignity of the Hellenic name and the independence of the Hellenic world: \(^3\) following the example set by Sparta in her applications to the Great King, during the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, and at the peace of Antalkidas. Amidst such a crowd of humble petitioners and expectants, all trembling to offend him—with the aid too of Aschinês, Philokrates, and the other Athenian envoys who consented to play his game—Philip had little difficulty in keeping alive the hopes of all, and preventing the formation of any common force or decisive resolution to resist him.\(^4\)

After completing his march southward through Thessaly, he reached Phere near the Pagasean Gulf, at the head of a powerful army of Macedonians and allies. The Phokian envoys accompanied his march, and were treated, if not as friends, at least in manner as to make it appear doubtful whether Philip was

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\(^{1}\) Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 113; Justin, viii. 4. "Contra Phocensium legati, adhibitis Lacedaemonius et Atheniensibus, bellum deprecabantur, cujus ab eo dilatationem ter jam emerant." I do not understand to what facts Justin refers, when he states, that the Phokians "had already purchased three times from Philip a postponement of war."


\(^{3}\) This thought is strikingly presented (Justin viii. 4), probably from Theopompus—"Festum promovit missorum spectaculum, Graeciam, etiam urbes et viribus et dignitate orbis terrarum principem, regnum cetera gentiumque sempere victorem et multarum adhibit urbium dominum, alium excubare sodibus, aut regnatum bellum aut deprecantum: in albis quis omnem opem postuisset orbis terrarum vincula; eosque disceret sae civilibusque bellis redactos, ut salutem ullo sodibus paulo orte clientela sua partem: et hve potissimum facere Thebanos Lacedaemoniosque, ante inter se imperti, nunquam imperante, unius." Justin, viii. 4.
going to attack the Phokians or the Thebans.\(^1\) It was at Pheræ that the Athenian envoys at length administered the oath both to Philip and to his allies.\(^2\) This was done the last thing before they returned to Athens, which city they reached on the 13th of the month Skirrophorion;\(^3\) after an absence of seventy days, comprising all the intervening month Thargelion, and the remnant (from the third day of the month Munychion. They accepted, as representatives of the allied cities, all whom Philip sent to them; though Demosthenes remarks that their instructions directed them to administer the oath to the chief magistrate in each city respectively.\(^4\) And among the cities whom they admitted to take the oath as Philip’s allies, was comprised Kardia, on the borders of the Thracian Chersonese. The Athenians considered Kardia as within the limits of the Chersonese, and therefore as belonging to them.\(^5\)

It was thus that the envoys postponed both the execution of their special mission, and their return, until the last moment, when Philip was within three days’ march of Thermopylae. That they so postponed it, in corrupt connivance with him, is the allegation of all the probabilities of the case. Philip was anxious to come upon Thermopylae by surprise,\(^6\) and to leave as little time as possible either to the Phokians or to Athens for organising defence. The oath which ought to have

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\(^1\) Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 113. τοῦτο δ' εἰς Φώκεας ὡς πρὸς συμμάχους ἑκο-

\(^2\) πρεσβείας Φωκέων ἦσαν οἱ παρηκολουθῶν αὐτῷ πορευόμενοι καὶ παρ’ ἑνίαν βρῶν πολλά, Ὀμβρίας δὲ ἀνωτε-

\(^3\) πέσει τὴν ἔκεινον πάροδον. The words παρ᾽ ἡμῖν denote the Athenian envoys (of whom Demosthenes was one) and the persons around them, marching along with Philip; the oaths not having been yet taken.

\(^4\) Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 390. The oath was administered in the inn in front of the chapel of the Dioskuri, near Pherae.


\(^6\) Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 351. ἐν γὰρ τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀπάντων τῶν ἀδικη-

\(^7\) μάτων, τὸ τοῦ Φίλιππου ἐπιστῆσαι τοῖς πράγμασι τούτοις, καὶ δεόν εἰς Ἰκώνιαν περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, εἰτά βουλεύσαι, μέτα ταύτα δὲ πράττειν ὅτι, δοξᾶ, ἀμα ἀκόνια κάκων παρείζει, καὶ μηδ᾽ ὅτι χρὴ ποιεῖν βαθὺν εἰτέν εἰναι. Compare Demosth. De Coronæ, p. 236. πάλιν ἀνέπτηκα ταύτας ὡς μὴ ἀπίστως ἐκ Μακεδονίας τῶν τῆς στρατείας τῆς ἐν τούτῳ Φώκειας εὐθεῖας ποιήσεται, &c.
been administered, in Thrace—but at any rate at Pella—was not taken until Philip had got as near as possible to the important pass; nor had the envoys visited one single city among his allies in execution of their mandate. And as Aischines was well aware that this would provoke inquiry, he took the precaution of bringing with him a letter from Philip to the Athenian people, couched in the most friendly terms; wherein Philip took upon himself any blame which might fall upon the envoys, affirming that they themselves had been anxious to go and visit the allied cities, but that he had detained them in order that they might assist him in accommodating the difference between the cities of Halus and Pharsalus. This letter, affording farther presumption of the connivance between the envoys and Philip, was besides founded on a false pretence; for Halus was (either at that very time or shortly afterwards) conquered by his arms, given up to the Pharsalians, and its population sold or expelled.  

In administering the oaths at Pherae to Philip and his allies, Aischines and the majority of the Athenian envoys had formally and publicly pronounced the Phokians to be excluded and out of the treaty, and had said nothing about Kersoblatés. This was, if not a departure from their mandate, at least a step beyond it; for the Athenian people had expressly rejected the same exclusion when proposed by Philokratès at Athens; though when the Macedonian envoy declared that he could not admit the Phokians, the Athenians had consented to swear the Peace with them without them. Probably Philip and his allies would not consent to take the oath, to Athens and her allies, without an express declaration that the Phokians were out of the pale. But though Philokratès and Aischines thus openly repudiated the Phokians, they still persisted in affirming that the intentions of Philip towards that people were highly

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1. Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 352, 353; ad Philipp. Epistol. p. 152. Demosthenes affirms farther that Aischines himself wrote the letter in Philip’s name. Aischines denies that he wrote it, and sustains his denial upon sufficient grounds. But he does not deny that he brought it. (Aischines, Fals. Leg. p. 44, c. 40, 41). The inhabitants of Pharsalus were attached to Philip; while those of Pherae were opposed to him as much as they dared, and even refused (according to Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 444) to join his army on this expedition. The old rivalry between the cities here again appears.  

favourable. They affirmed this probably to the Phokians themselves, as an excuse for having pronounced the special exclusion; they repeated it loudly and emphatically at Atheus, immediately on their return. It was then that Demosthenes also, after having been outvoted and silenced during the mission, obtained an opportunity for making his own protest public. Being among the senators of that year, he made his report to the Senate forthwith, seemingly on the day, or the day next but one, after his arrival, before a large audience of private citizens standing by to witness so important a proceeding. He recounted all the proceedings of the embassy—recalling the hopes and promises under which Aischines and others had persuaded the Athenians to agree to the peace—arraigning these envoys as fabricators, in collusion with Philip, of falsehoods and delusive assurances—and accusing them of having already by their unwarrantable delays betrayed Kerseleptes to ruin. Demosthenes at the same time made known to the Senate the near approach and rapid march of Philip; entreat- ing them to interpose even now at the eleventh hour, for the purpose of preventing what yet remained, the Phokians and Thermopylae, from being given up under the like treacherous fallacies. A fleet of fifty triremes had been voted, and were ready at a moment’s notice to be employed on sudden occasion. The majority of the Senate went decidedly along With Demosthenes, and passed a resolution in that sense to be submitted to the public assembly. So adverse was this resolution to the envoys, that it neither commended them nor invited them to dinner in the Prytanæum; an insult (according to Demosthenes) without any former precedent.

On the 16th of the month Skirrophorion, three days after the return of the envoys, the first public assembly was held; where, according to usual form, the resolution just passed by the Senate ought to have been discussed. But it was not even read to the

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3 Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 350, 351. Demosthenes causes this resolution of the Senate (μισθοθέμενα) to be read to the Dikasts, together with the testimony of the senator who moved it. The document is not found verbatim, but Demosthenes comments upon it before the Dikasts after it has been read, and especially points out that it contains neither praise nor invitation, which the Senate was always in the habit of voting to returning envoys. This is sufficient to refute the allegation of Aischines (Fals. Leg. p. 44. c. 38), that Demosthenes himself moved a resolution to praise the envoys and invite them to a banquet in the Prytanæum. Aischines does not produce such resolution, nor cause it to be read before the Dikasts.
assembly; for immediately on the opening of business (so Demo-

mthénés tells us), Ἄeschinés rose and proceeded to

tell the people, who were naturally impatient to hear

him before any one else, speaking as he did in the name

of his colleagues generally. He said nothing either

about the recent statements of Demosthenés before the

Senate, or the senatorial resolution following, or even

the past history, of the embassy—but passed at once

to the actual state of affairs, and the coming future.

He acquainted the people that Philip, having sworn the oaths at

Phere, had by this time reached Thermopylae with his army.

But he comes there (said Aeschines) as the friend and ally of

Athens, the protector of the Phokians, the restorer of the enslaved

Boeotian cities, and the enemy of Thebes alone. We your envys

have satisfied him that the Thebans are the real wrong-doers, not

only in their oppression towards the Boeotian cities, but also in

regard to the spoliation of the temple, which they had conspired,
to perpetrate earlier than the Phokians. (Aeschines) exposed

in an emphatic speech before Philip the iniquities of the Thebans,

for which proceeding they have set a price on my life. You

Athenians will hear, in two or three days, without any trouble of

your own, that Philip is vigorously prosecuting the siege of Thebes.

You will find that he will capture and break up that city—that he

will exact from the Thebans compensation for the treasure ravished

from Delphi—and that he will restore the subjurgated communities

of Platæa and Thespiae. Nay more, you will hear of benefits still

more direct, which we have determined Philip to confer upon you,

but which it would not be prudent as yet to particularize. Euboea

will be restored to you as a compensation for Amphipolis: the

Euboeans have already expressed the greatest alarm at the con-

fidential relations between Athens and Philip, and the probability

of his ceding to you their island. There are other matters too, on

which I do not wish to speak out fully, because I have false friends

even among my own colleagues.” These last ambiguous allusions

were generally understood, and proclaimed by the persons round

the orator, to refer to Oropus, the ancient possession of Athens,

now in the hands of Thebes. Such glowing promises, of benefits.

1 Demosth., Fals., Leg., p. 347, 351, 352. τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν ἀνέγνω τῷ δήμῳ τὸ προβούλευμα, οὐδ᾽ ἐκομονεὶ ὁ δῆμος, ἄναστας δ᾽ ὁδὸς ἐπιμυγγόλη. The date

of the 16th Skiræphorion is specified, p. 359.

2 I have here condensed the substance

of what is stated by Demosthenés, Fals.,

Leg., p. 347, 348, 351, 352, 364, 411, &c. Another statement, to the same

effect, made by Demosthenés in the

Oration De Pace (delivered only a few
to come, were probably crowned by the announcement, more worthy of credit, that Philip had engaged to send back all the Athenian prisoners by the coming Panathenaic festival, which fell during the next month Hekatombæon.

The first impression of the Athenians, on hearing Eschines, was that of surprise, alarm, and displeasure, at the unforeseen vicinity of Philip; which left no time for deliberation, and scarcely the minimum of time for instant precautionary occupation of Thermopylae, if such a step were deemed necessary. But the sequel of the speech—proclaiming to them the speedy accomplishment of such favourable results, together with the gratification of their antipathy against Thebes—effaced this sentiment, and filled them with agreeable prospects. It was in vain that Demosthenes rose to reply, arraigned the assurances as fallacious, and tried to bring forward the same statement as had already prevailed with the Senate. The people refused to hear him; Philokratés with the other friends of Eschines hooted him off; and the majority were full of the satisfactory prospect opened to them, that all mistrust or impeachment of its truth appeared spiteful and vexatious.

It is to be remembered that these were the same promises previously made to them by Philokratés and others, nearly three months before, when the peace with Philip was first voted. The immediate accomplishment of them was now again promised on the same authority—by envoys who had communicated a second

months after the assembly here described, and not a judicial hear-against Eschines, but a deliberative message before the public assembly), is even better evidence than the assur-ecatory speech De Fals Legatione—ἐπικα τὸν ὄρασ τοῦ ἐν γνόμαις ἄπει-λυγος ἔμεσον οἱ πρόβασε, τοῦθε θεωρί-κοι καὶ Πλαταίαι ἀπειρομένων εἰς τὸ κεῖ-σαν, καὶ τοῖς μὴ φιλίας τὸν Φιλίππου, ἐν γνώμαις, σώφρως, τὴν δὲ Ἐθελοῦς πάλιν δικαιω, καὶ τὸν Ἑρωτοῦ ὡς ἔπαθεν, καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδαν ἀμφοτέρους ἀκωδοθηκαίας, καὶ ταυτὰς ἀπειρίως καὶ φενικισμοὺς, οἷς ἐσχάροιτος τὸς εἰς ἐπιφανείας νομιμώς νος προειπός γενέσθαι, καὶ τοῖς μὴ προηγεί τοῦ Φιλίππου, καὶ τούτων ὑμᾶς ἐκπεπληγμένος τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῦ φιλίππου, καὶ τοῖς οργιζομένοις ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ προείλεσθαι, προαγόμενοι γενέ-σανς τούς, πάνθ᾽ ἐν' ἐβούλεσθ' ὑμῖν προσδοκήσαντας, καὶ τοῖς ἐπὶ μητρικούς, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐπὶ προέστοι, νόμως δὲ τὸν λέ-ντοντα ἀμφοτέρους (De Pace, p. 29).
time with Philip, and thus had farther means of information—so that the comfortable anticipation previously raised was confirmed and strengthened. No one thought of the danger of admitting Philip within Thermopylae, when the purpose of his coming was understood to be, the protection of the Phokians, and the punishment of the hated Thebans. Demosthenes was scarcely allowed even to make a protest, or to disclaim responsibility as to the result. Eschinés triumphantly assumed the responsibility to himself; while Philokratés amused the people by saying—“No wonder, Athenians, that Demosthenes and I should not think alike. He is an ungenial water-drinker; I am fond of wine.”

It was during this temper of the assembly that the letter of Philip, brought by the envoys, was produced and read. His abundant expressions of regard, and promises of future benefit, to Athens, were warmly applauded; while, prepossessed as the hearers were, none of them discerned, nor was any speaker permitted to point out, that these expressions were thoroughly vague and general, and that not a word was said about the Thebans or the Phokians. Philokratés next proposed a decree, extolling Philip for his just and beneficent promises—providing that the peace and alliance with him should be extended, not merely to the existing Athenians, but also to their posterity—and enacting that if the Phokians should still refuse to yield possession of the Delphian temple to the Amphiktyons, the people of Athens would compel them to do so by armed intervention.

During the few days immediately succeeding the return of the envoys to Athens (on the 13th of Skirrophorion), Philip wrote two successive letters, inviting the Athenian troops to join him forthwith at Thermopylae. Probably these were sent at the moment when

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1 Dem. Fals. Leg. p. 353; Phil. ii. p. 73.
4 So also Eschinés, Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41. ὡρο δὲ ταῦτα ὥρων ὑμῶν ἐγγράφας ἐπιτρεπόμενος ὁ Φίλιππος, εἰς τὴν τῆς ἁμφικτύονος τῆς νίκαι. Φίλιππος δὲ τοῖς ἀκούοντας τοῦτο τέτελε.
Phalekus, the Phokian leader at that pass, answered his first summons by a negative reply. The two letters must have been despatched one immediately after the other, betraying considerable anxiety on the part of Philip; which it is not difficult to understand. He could not be at first certain what effect would be produced by his unforeseen arrival at Thermopylae on the public mind at Athens. In spite of all the persuasions of Aeschines and Philokrates, the Athenians might conceive so much alarm as to obstruct his admission within that important barrier; while Phalekus and the Phokians—having a powerful mercenary force, competent, even unaided, to a resistance of some length—were sure to attempt resistance, if any hope of aid were held out to them from Athens. Moreover it would be difficult for Philip to carry on prolonged military operations in the neighbourhood, from the want of provisions; the lands having been unsown through the continued antecedent war, and the Athenian triremes being at hand to intercept his supplies by sea. Hence it was important to him to keep the Athenians in illusion and quiescence for the moment; to which purpose his letters were well adapted, whichever way they were taken. If the Athenians came to Thermopylae, they would come as his allies—not as allies of the Phokians. Not only they would be in the midst of his superior force, and therefore as it were hostages; but they would be removed from contact with the Phokians, and would bring to bear upon the latter an additional force of intimidation. If, on the contrary, the Athenians determined not to come, they would at any rate interpret his desire for their presence as a proof that he contemplated no purposes at variance with their wishes and interests; and would trust the assurances, given by Aeschines and his other partisans at Athens, that he secretly meant well towards the Phokians. This last alternative was what Philip both desired and anticipated. He wished only to deprive the Phokians of all chance of aid from Athens, and to be left to deal with them himself. His letters served to blind the Athenian public, but his partisans took care not to move the assembly to a direct compliance with their invita-

412) conceives the letters as having been written and sent between the 16th and 23rd of the month Skirrophorion.
3 This was among the grounds of objection, taken by Demosthenes and his friends, against the despatch of forces to Thermopylae in compliance with the letter of Philip—according to the assertion of Aeschines (Fal. Leg. p. 46, c. 41), who treats the objection with contempt, though it seems well grounded and reasonable.
tion. Indeed the proposal of such an expedition (besides the standing dislike of the citizens towards military service) would have been singularly repulsive, seeing that the Athenians would have had to appear, ostensibly at least, in arms against their Phokian allies. The conditional menace of the Athenian assembly against the Phokians (in case of refusal to surrender the temple to the Amphiktyons), decreed on the motion of Philokratès, was in itself sufficiently harsh, against allies of ten years' standing; and was tantamount at least to a declaration that Athens would not interfere on their behalf—which was all that Philip wanted.

Among the hearers of these debates at Athens were deputies from these very Phokians, whose fate now hung in suspense. It has already been stated that during the preceding September, while the Phokians were torn by intestine dissensions, Phalakus, the chief of the mercenaries, had repudiated aid (invited by his Phokian opponents) both from Athens and Sparta; feeling strong enough to hold Thermopylae by his own force. During the intervening months, however, both his strength and his pride had declined. Though he still occupied Thermopylae with 8000 or 10,000 mercenaries, and still retained superiority over Thebes, with possession of Orchomenus, Koroneia, and other places taken from the Thebans—yet his financial resources had become so insufficient for a numerous force, and the soldiers had grown so disorderly from want of regular pay, that he thought it prudent to invite aid from Sparta—during the spring, while Athens was deserting the Phokians to make terms with Philip. Archidamus accordingly came to Thermopylae, with 1000 Lacedaemonian auxiliaries. The defensive force thus assembled was amply sufficient against Philip by land; but that important pass could not be held without the cooperation of a superior fleet at sea. Now the Phokians had powerful enemies even within the pass—the Thebans; and there was no obstacle, except the Athenian fleet under Proxenus at Oreus, to prevent Philip from landing troops in the rear of

1. Eschin. Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41. 2. Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 367. 3. Eschin. Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41. 4. Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 365; Diodor. xvi. 59. 5. For the defence of Thermopylae, at the period of the invasion of Xerxes, the Greek fleet at Artemision was not less essential than the land force of Leonidas encamped in the pass itself. 6. That the Phokians could not maintain Thermopylae without the aid of (delivered four years earlier). ἀπομένων ᾿᾿ ᾿ ᾿ χρήσιν ᾿ ᾿ χρήσιν, &c. 7. This statement of Alcibiades about the declining strength of the Phokians and the causes thereof—has every appearance of being correct in point of fact; though it will not sustain the conclusions which he builds upon it.
Thermopylae, joining the Thebans, and making himself master of Phokis from the side towards Boeotia.

To the safety of the Phokians, therefore, the continued maritime protection of Athens was indispensable; and they doubtless watched with trembling anxiety the deceitful phases of Athenian diplomacy during the winter and spring of 347-346 B.C. Their deputies must have been present at Athens when the treaty was concluded and sworn in March 346 B.C. Though compelled to endure not only the refusal of Antipater excluding them from the oath, but also the consent of their Athenian allies, tacitly acted upon without being formally announced, to take the oath without them—they nevertheless heard the assurances, confidently addressed by Philokratēs and Eschinēs to the people, that this refusal was a mere feint to deceive the Thessalians and Thebans—that Philip would stand forward as the protector of the Phokians—and that all his real hostile purposes were directed against Thebes. How the Phokians interpreted such tortuous and contradictory policy, we are not told. But their fate hung upon the determination of Athens; and during the time when the Ten Athenian envoys were negotiating or intriguing with Philip at Pella, Phokian envoys were there also, trying to establish some understanding with Philip, through Lacedaemonian and Athenian support. Both Philip and Eschinēs probably amused them with favourable promises. And though, when the oaths were at last administered to Philip at Pherae, the Phokians were formally pronounced to be excluded—still the fair words of Eschinēs, and his assurances of Philip’s good intentions towards them, were not discontinued.

While Philip marched straight from Pherae to Thermopylae—and while the Athenian envoys returned to Athens—Phokian deputies visited Athens also, to learn the last determination of the Athenian people, upon which their own destiny turned. Though Philip, on reaching the neighbourhood of Thermopylae, summoned the Phokian leader Phalākēs to surrender the pass, and offered him terms—Phalākēs would make no reply until his deputies returned from the frontier of Attica, without any intermediate obstacle to prevent him, if Olynthus were suffered to fall into his hand—is laid down emphatically by Demosthenēs in the first Olynthion, nearly four years before the mouth of Skirrophorion, 346 B.C.

*Ἀν δ’ ἐκείνα Φιλίππος λάβῃ, τίς αὐτὸν καλύσῃ δύομοι βαδίζειν; Ὑπάθεια: οὗ, εἰ μὴ λαμ πεπείν εἰπέν, καὶ συνεπαλαίλων ἐτύμων. Ἀλλὰ φωκεῖς; οἱ τὴν οὐκεῖαν αὐτὸν οὐχ οἴκει τε ὑπὲτε φαλάκτερι, εἰπ. μὴ βοηθήσετ' ὑμεῖς (Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 16).
The deputies, present at the public assembly of the 6th Skirrophorion, heard the same fallacious assurances as before, respecting Philip's designs, repeated by Philokratés and Aeschinés with unabated impudence, and still accepted by the people. But they also heard, in the very same assembly, the decree proposed by Philokratés and adopted, that unless the Phokians restored the Delphian temple forthwith to the Amphiktyons, the Athenian people would compel them to do so by armed force. If the Phokians still cherished hopes, this conditional declaration of war, from a city which still continued in name to be their ally, opened their eyes, and satisfied them that no hope was left except to make the best terms they could with Philip. To defend Thermopylae successfully without Athens—much more against Athens—was impracticable.

Leaving Athens after the assembly of the 16th Skirrophorion, the Phokian deputies carried back the tidings of what had passed to Phalakus, whom they reached near Thermopylae about the 20th of the same month. Three days afterwards, Phalakus, with his powerful army of 8000 or 10,000 mercenary infantry and 1000 cavalry, had concluded a convention with Philip. The Lacedaemonian auxiliaries, perceiving the insincere policy of Athens and the certain ruin of the Phokians, had gone away a little before. It was stipulated in the convention that Phalakus should evacuate the territory, and retire

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1 Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 359. ἢκομεν δὲ δεύτη ἀντὶ τῆς πρεσβείας τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς ὅρκους γρηγέτευσε ἐπὶ δέκα τοῖς Σκιῤῥοφοριῶνοι μηνίς, καὶ παρῆν ὁ Φίλιππος ἐν Πύλαις ἦδη καὶ τοῖς Φωκεῖσι οὕτως ἐπηγέλετο ἀν ὁ Φίλιππος ἔπιστευον ἐκεῖνοι. Ἐπειδὼν δὲ—οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐπῆρθαν ὅ όν οὕτως . . . παρῆσαν γὰρ οἱ τῶν Φωκέων πρέσβεις ἐνθάδε καὶ ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ τῇ ἀπαγγελίᾳ οὕτως (Aischinés, Philokratés, &c.) καὶ τῇ ψήφιεσθε ὑμεῖς, ἐπιμελὲς εἰδέκα. 2 Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 357. οἱ πάντων Φωκεῖσι ὡς τὰ παρ᾽ ὑμῶν ἐπύθοντο ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας καὶ τοῦ τοῦ Φιλοκράτους, καὶ τῇ ἀπαγγελίᾳ ἐπηγέλετο τὴν τούτων ὃς τὰς ὑποσχέσεις—κατὰ πάντα τοὺς τρόπους ἀπάλληλον. Aischinés (Fals. Leg. p. 45, c. 41) touches upon the statements made by Demosthenes respecting the envoys of Phalakus at Athens, and the effect of the news which they carried back in determining the capitulation. He complains of them generally as being "got up against him" (ὁ κατήγορος πενθημάτητα), but he does not contradict them upon any specific point. Nor does he at all succeed in repelling the main argument, brought home with great precision of date by Demosthenes.

2 Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 359: compare Diodor. xvi. 59. In this passage, Demosthenes reckons up seven days between the final assembly at Athens and the capitulation concluded by the Phokians. In another passage, he states the same interval at only five days (p. 365); which is doubtless inaccurate, in a third passage, the same interval, seemingly, stands at five or six days, p. 379.

wherever else he pleased, with his entire mercenary force and with all such Phokians as chose to accompany him. The remaining natives threw themselves on the mercy of the conqueror.

All the towns in Phokis, twenty-two in number, together with the pass of Thermopylae, were placed in the hands of Philip; all surrendering at discretion; all without resistance. The moment Philip was thus master of the country, he joined his forces with those of the Thebans, and proclaimed his purpose of acting thoroughly upon their policy; of transferring to them a considerable portion of Phokis; of restoring to them Orchomenus, Korsia, and Koroneia, Breetian towns which the Phokians had taken from them; and of keeping the rest of Breetia in their dependence, just as he found it.1

In the meantime, the Athenians, after having passed the decree above mentioned, re-appointed (in the very same assembly of the 16th Skirrophorion—June) the same ten envoys to carry intelligence of it to Philip, and to be witnesses of the accomplishment of the splendid promises made in his name. But Demosthenes immediately swore off, and refused to serve; while Aischines, though he did not swear off, was nevertheless so much indisposed as to be unable to go. This at least is his own statement; though Demosthenes affirms, that the illness was a mere concerted pretence, in order that Aischines might remain at home to counterwork any reaction of public feeling at Athens, likely to arise on the arrival of the bad news, which Aischines knew to be at hand, from Phokis.2 Others having been chosen in place of Aischines and Demosthenes,3 the ten envoys set out, and proceeded

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Because the Phokians capitulated to Philip and not to the Thebans (p. 360) — because not one of their towns made any resistance — Demosthenes argues that this proves their confidence in the favourable dispositions of Philip, as testified by Aischines. But he overstrains this argument against Aischines.

2 Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 379; Aischines, Fals. Leg. p. 40, c. 30. It appears that the ten envoys were not all the same—τῶν ἄλλων τῶν θείων σετοὺς τῶν αἰτῶν, &c.

3 Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 380, ὁ δὲ προευθετής καὶ υ̣τοὶ προευθετὴς καὶ υ̣τοὶ θείων αἰτῶν, &c. Aischines (Fals. Leg. p. 46, c. 43) does not seem to deny this distinctly.

The Phokians had no choice but to surrender, as soon as all chance of Athenian aid was manifestly shut out. The belief of favourable dispositions on the part of Philip, was doubtless an auxiliary motive, but not the primary or predominant.
as far as Chalkis in Euboea. It was there that they learned the fatal intelligence from the mainland on the other side of the Euboean strait. On the 23rd of Skirrophorion, Thalakus and all the Phokian towns had surrendered; Philip was master of Thermopylae, had joined his forces with the Thebans, and proclaimed an unqualified philo-Theban policy; on the 37th of Skirrophorion, Derkyllus, one of the envoys, arrived in haste back at Athens, having stopped short in his mission on hearing the facts.

At the moment when he arrived, the people were holding an assembly in the Peiraeus, on matters connected with the docks and arsenal; and to this assembly, actually sitting, Derkyllus made his unexpected report. The shock to the public of Athens was prodigious. Not only were all their splendid anticipations of anti-Theban policy from Dik (hitherto believed and welcomed by the people on the positive assurances of Philokrates and Aeschinè) now dashed to the ground—not only were the Athenians smitten with the consciousness that they had been overreached by Philip, that they had played into the hands of their enemies the Thebans, and that they had betrayed their allies the Phokians to ruin—but they felt also that they had yielded up Thermopylae, the defence at once of Attica and of Greece; and that the road to Athens lay open to their worst enemies the Thebans, now aided by Macedonian force. Under this pressure of surprise, sorrow, and terror, the Athenians, on the motion of Kallisthenes, passed these votes—To put the Peiraeus, as well as the fortresses throughout Attica, in immediate defence—To bring within these walls for safety all the women and children, and all the moveable property, now spread abroad in Attica—To celebrate the approaching festival of the Herakleia, not in the country, as was usual, but in the interior of Athens.

Such were the significant votes, the like of which had not been passed at Athens since the Peloponnesian war, attesting the
terrible reaction of feeling occasioned at Athens by the disastrous news from Phokis. Æschines had now recovered from his indisposition; or (if we are to believe Demosthenes) found it convenient to lay aside the pretence. He set out as self-appointed envoy, without any new nomination by the people—probably with such of the Ten as were favourable to his views—to Philip and to the joint Macedonian and Theban army in Phokis. And what is yet more remarkable, he took his journey thither through Thebes itself;¹ though his speeches and his policy had been for months past (according to his own statement) violently anti-Theban;² and though he had affirmed (this however rests upon the testimony of his rival) that the Thebans had set a price upon his head. Having joined Philip, Æschines took part in the five sacrifices and solemn pasages celebrated by the Macedonians, Thebans, and Thessalians,³ in commemoration and thanksgiving for their easy, though long-deferred triumph over the Phokians, and for the conclusion of the Ten-Years Sacred War.

Shortly after Philip had become master of Thermopylae and Phokis, he communicated his success in a letter to the Athenians. His letter betokened a full consciousness of the fear and repugnance which his recent unexpected proceedings had excited at Athens;⁴ but in other respects, it was conciliatory and even seductive; expressing great regard for them as his sworn allies, and promising again that they should reap solid fruits from the alliance. It allayed that keen apprehension of Macedonian and Theban attack, which had induced the Athenians recently to sanction the precautionary measures proposed by Callisthenes. In his subsequent communications also with Athens, Philip found his advantage in continuing to profess the same friendship and to intersperse similar promises;⁵ which, when enlarged upon by his partisans in

the assembly, contributed to please the Athenians and lull them into repose, thus enabling him to carry on without opposition real measures of an insidious or hostile character. Even shortly after Philip's passage of Thermopylae, when he was in full cooperation with the Thebans and Thessalians, Aeschinés boldly justified him by the assertion, that these Thebans and Thessalians had been too strong for him, and had constrained him against his will to act on their policy, both to the ruin of the Phokians and to the offence of Athens. And we cannot doubt that the restoration of the prisoners taken at Olynthus, which must soon have occurred, diffused a lively satisfaction at Athens, and tended for the time to counteract the mortifying public results of her recent policy.

Master as he now was of Phokis, at the head of an irresistible force of Macedonians and Thebans, Philip restored the Delphian temple to its inhabitants, and convoked anew the Amphiaktyonic assembly, which had not met since the seizure of the temple by Philomelus. The Amphiaktyons reassembled under feelings of vindictive antipathy against the Phokians, and of unqualified devotion to Philip. Their first vote was to dispossess the Phokians of their place in the assembly as one of the twelve ancient Amphiaktyonic races, and to confer upon Philip the place and two votes (each of the twelve races had two votes) thus left vacant. All the rights to which the Phokians laid claim over the Delphian temple were formally cancelled. All the towns in Phokis, twenty-two in number, were dismantled and broken up into villages. Abae alone was spared; being preserved by its ancient and oracular temple of Apollo, and by the fact that its inhabitants had taken no part in the spoliation of Delphi. No village was allowed to contain more than fifty houses, nor to be nearer to another than a minimum distance of one furlong. Under such restriction, the Phokians were still allowed to possess and cultivate their territory, with the exception of a certain portion of the frontier transferred to the Thebans; but they were required to

wards Athens, and the great benefits which Philip promised to confer upon her, for at least several months after this capture of Thermopylae. Aeschinés, cont. Timarch. p. 24, c. 33. Φίλακτος δὲ μὲν μὲν διὰ τὴν τῶν λόγων εὐφημίαν ἐπανόρθωσε τῶν δὲ αἵτων ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ὧν ἔργοι διέγερσε, διὰ τῶν ἑτέρων ἐν πᾶσιν ὑποκατέστησεν, δασφάλη καὶ βέβαια τῶν καθόπιστον ποιήσατο ἐπαυνών.

This oration was delivered apparently about the middle of Olymp. 108, 3; some months after the conquest of Thermopylae by Philip.

1 Demosth. De Pace, p. 62; Philippic ii, p. 69.
2 Pausanias, x. 3, 2.
3 This transfer to the Thebans is not mentioned by Diodorus, but seems contained in the words of Demosthenes (Fals. Leg. p. 385)—τῆς τῶν Φωκέων χώρας ὁπόσην βούλονται: compare p. 380.
pay to the Delphian temple an annual tribute of fifty talents, until
the wealth taken away should have been made good. The horses
of the Phokians were directed to be sold; their arms were to be
cast down the precipices of Parnassus, or burnt. Such Phokians as
had participated individually in the spoliation, were proclaimed
accursed, and rendered liable to arrest wherever they were found.¹

By the same Amphiktyonic assembly, farther, the Lacedæmonians, as having been allies of the Phokians, were dispossessed
of their franchise, that is, of their right to concur in the Amphik-
tyonic suffrage of the Dorian nation. This vote probably ema-
nated from the political antipathies of the Argeians and Messe-
nians.²

The sentence, rigorous as it is, pronounced by the Amphiktyons
against the Phokians, was merciful as compared with
some of the propositions made in the assembly. The
Cleans went so far as to propose, that all the Phokians
of military age should be cast down the precipice; and Aeschines
takes credit to himself for having induced the assembly to hear
their defence, and thereby preserved their lives.³ But though the
terms of the sentence may have been thus softened, we may be sure
that the execution of it by Thebans, Thessalians, and other
foreigners quartered on the country—all bitter enemies of the
Phokian name, and giving vent to their antipathies under the
mask of pious indignation against sacrilege—went far beyond the
literal terms in active cruelty. That the Phokians were stripped
and slain—a—that children were torn from their parents, wives from
their husbands, and the images of the gods from their temples—that
Philip took for himself the lion's share of the plunder and moveable
property—all these are facts naturally to be expected, as incidental
to the violent measure of breaking up the cities and scattering the
inhabitants. Of those, however, who had taken known part in the
spoliation of the temple, the greater number went into exile with
Phalekus; and not they alone, but even all such of the moderate

¹ Diodor. xvi. 60; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 385. ούτως τῶν ὑπό τῶν πόλεων ἰτῶν τῶν ἱερῶν ἀναμένεται. Demosthenes
causes this severe sentence of the
Amphiktyonic council to be read to the
Dikastery (Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 361). Unfortunately it has not been
preserved.

² Pausanias, x. 8, 2.
³ Aeschines, Fals. Leg. p. 47, c. 44.
⁴ Justin, xil. 5. "Victi igitur ne-
cessitate, pacta salute se dediderunt.

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and meritorious citizens as could find means to emigrate. Many of them obtained shelter at Athens. The poorer Phokians remained at home by necessity. But such was the destruction inflicted by the conquerors, that even two or three years afterwards, when Demosthenes and other Athenian envoys passed through the country in their way to the Amphiktyonic meeting at Delphi, they saw nothing but evidences of misery; old men, women, and little children, without adults—ruined houses, impoverished villages, half-cultivated fields. Well might Demosthenes say that events more terrific and momentous had never occurred in the Grecian world, either in his own time or in that of his predecessors.

It was but two years since the conquest and ruin of Olynthus, and of thirty-two Chalkidic Grecian cities besides, had spread abroad everywhere the terrors and majesty of Philip's name. But he was now exalted to a still higher pinnacle, by the destruction of the Phokians, the capture of Thermopylae, and the sight of a permanent Macedonian garrison, occupying from henceforward Nikae and other places commanding the pass. He was exalted as restorer of the Amphiktyonic assembly, and as avenging champion of the Delphian god, against the sacrilegious Phokians. That he should have acquired possession of an unassailable pass, dismissed the formidable force of Phaleokus, and become master of the twenty-two Phokian cities, all without striking a blow—was accounted the most wondrful of all his exploits. It strengthened more than ever the prestige of his constant good fortune. Having now, by the vote of the Amphiktyons, invested with the right of Amphiktyonic suffrage previously exercised by the Phokians, he acquired a new Hellenic rank, with increased facilities for encroachment and predominance in Hellenic affairs. Moreover, in the month of August 316 B.C., about two months after the surrender of Phokis to Philip, the season recurring for celebrating the great Pythian festival, after the usual interval of four years, the Amphiktyonic assembly was once more convened at Delphi, and the great festival held in honor of Zeus. As this oration was delivered in 343-342 B.C., the adverb of time νῦν may be reasonably referred to the early part of that year, and the journey to Delphi was perhaps undertaken for the spring meeting of the Amphiktyonic council of that year; between two and three years after the destruction of the Phokians by Philip.

1. Ἑσσινῆς, Fals. Leg. p. 47. c. 44; Demosth. Fals.-Leg. p. 366; Demosthen. De Pace, p. 61, ὅτι τοὺς Φωκέων φυγαδεύτως σώζομεν, &c.

As this oration was delivered in 343-342 B.C., the adverb of time νῦν may be reasonably referred to the early part of that year, and the journey to Delphi was perhaps undertaken for the spring meeting of the Amphiktyonic council of that year; between two and three years after the destruction of the Phokians by Philip.

ktyons conferred upon Philip the signal honour of nominating him president to celebrate this festival, in conjunction with the Thebans and Thessalians; an honorary pre-eminence, which ranked among the loftiest aspirations of ambitious Grecian despots, and which Jason of Pheræ had prepared to appropriate for himself twenty-four years before, at the moment when he was assassinated. It was in vain that the Athenians, mortified and indignant at the unexpected prostration of their hopes and the utter ruin of their allies, refused to send deputies to the Amphiktyons—affected even to disregard the assembly as irregular—and refrained from despatching their sacred delegation as usual, to sacrifice at the Pythian festival. The Amphiktyonic vote did not the less pass; without the concurrence, indeed, either of Athens or of Sparta, yet with the hearty support not only of the Thebans and Thessalians, but also of Argians, Messenians, Arcadians, and all those who counted upon Philip as a probable auxiliary against their dangerous Spartan neighbour. And when envoys from Philip and from the Thessalians arrived at Athens, notifying that he had been invested with the Amphiktyonic suffrage, and inviting the concurrence of Athens in his reception, prudential considerations obliged the Athenians, though against their feelings, to pass a vote of concurrence. Even Demosthenes was afraid to break the recent peace, however inglorious, and to draw upon Athens a general Amphiktyonic war, headed by the king of Macedon.

1 Diodor. xvi. 60. τιθέναι δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς θεωροὺς μήτε τοὺς ἐκ τῶν Πυθίων Φίλιππον μετὰ Βοιωτῶν καὶ Θεσσαλῶν, διὰ τὸ Κορινθίους μετασχηκέναι τοῖς Θεοκότοις τῆς εἰς τὸ θειὸν παρανομίας.

The reason here assigned by Diodorus, why the Amphiktyons placed the celebration of the Pythian festival in the hands of Philip, cannot be understood. It may be true, as matter of fact, that the Corinthians had allied themselves with the Pheræans during the Sacred War—though there is no other evidence of the fact except this passage. But the Corinthians were never invested with any authoritative character in reference to the Pythian festival. They were the recognised presidents of the Isthmian festival. I cannot but think that Diodorus has been misled by a confusion of these two festivals one with the other. 2 Xenoph. Hellen. vi.

3 Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 380-398. οὕτω δὲ τοὺς Θεσσαλουμένων τοὺς ταλαπώρους πάλαις εὑσθέν, χωτε μήτε τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Βουλῆς θεωροὺς μήτε τοὺς δισμοῦτες εἰς τὰ Πυθία πέμψαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀποστῆναι τῆς πατρίου θεωρίας, καὶ τοῖς Φωκεῦσι της εἰς τὸ moxth. De Pace, p. 60, τοὺς συνελημμέρησαν τοὺς θεωροὺς καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκοντας ἀμφικτύονας ἐλυθότας καὶ φάσκο


5 Demosth. De Pace, p. 60-63; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 375. In the latter passage, p. 375, Demosthenes accuses Aeschines of having been the only orator in the city who spoke in favour of the proposition, there being a strong feeling in the assembly and in the people against it. Demosthenes must have forgotten, or did not wish to remember, his own harangue De Pace, delivered three years before. In spite of the repugnance of the people, very easy to understand, I conclude that the decree must have passed; since, if it had been rejected, consequences must have arisen which would have come to our knowledge.
Here then was a momentous political change doubly fatal to the Hellenic world: first, in the new position of Philip both as master of the keys of Greece and as recognised Amphiktyonic leader, with means of direct access and influence even on the inmost cities of Peloponnesus; next, in the lowered banner and uncovered frontier of Athens, disgraced by the betrayal both of her Phokian allies and of the general safety of Greece, and recompensed only in so far as she regained her captives.

How came the Athenians to sanction a peace at once dishonourable and ruinous, yielding to Philip that important pass, the common rampart of Attica and of Southern Greece, which he could never have carried in war at the point of the sword? Doubtless the explanation of this proceeding is to be found, partly, in the general state of the Athenian mind; repugnance to military cost and effort——sickness and shame at their past war with Philip——alarm from the prodigious success of his arms——and pressing anxiety to recover the captives taken at Olynthus. But the feelings here noticed, powerful as they were, would not have ended in such a peace, had they not been seconded by the deliberate dishonesty of Aeschines and a majority of his colleagues, who deceived their countrymen with a tissue of false assurances as to the purposes of Philip, and delayed their proceedings on the second embassy in such manner that he was actually at Thermopylae before the real danger of the pass was known at Athens.

Making all just allowance for mistrust of Demosthenes as a witness, there appears in the admissions of Aeschines himself sufficient evidence of corruption. His reply to Demosthenes, though successfully meeting some collateral aggravations, seldom touches, and never repels, the main articles of impeachment against himself. The dilatory measures of the second embassy——the postponement of the oath-taking until Philip was within three days’ march of Thermopylae——the keeping back of information about the danger of that pass, until the Athenians were left without leisure for deliberating on the conjuncture——all these grave charges remain without denial or justification. The refusal to depart at once on the second embassy, and to go straight to Philip in Thrace for the protection of Kersobleptes, is indeed explained, but in a manner which makes the case rather worse than better. And the gravest matter of all——
the false assurances given to the Athenian public respecting Philip’s purposes—are plainly admitted by Aéschinés.¹

In regard to these public assurances given by Aéschinés about Philip’s intentions, corrupt mendacity appears to me the only supposition admissible. There is nothing, even in his own account, to explain how he came to be beguiled into such flagrant misjudgement; while the hypothesis of honest error is yet farther refuted by his own subsequent conduct. “If (argues Demosthenés) Aéschinés had been sincerely misled by Philip, so as to pledge his own veracity and character to the truth of positive assurances given publicly before his countrymen, respecting Philip’s designs—then on finding that the result belied him, and that he had fatally misled those whom he undertook to guide, he would be smitten with compunction, and would in particular abominate the name of Philip as one who had disgraced him and made him an unconscious instrument of treachery. But the fact has been totally otherwise; immediately after the peace, Aéschinés visited Philip to share his triumph, and has been ever since his avowed partisan and advocate.”²

Such conduct is inconsistent with the supposition of honest mistake, and goes to prove—that the proceedings of the second embassy all bear out—that Aéschinés was the hired agent of Philip for deliberately deceiving his countrymen with gross falsehood. Even as reported by himself, the language of Aéschinés betokens his ready surrender of Grecian freedom, and his recognition of Philip as a master; for he gives not only his consent, but his approbation, to the entry of Philip within Thermopylae,² only exhorting him, when

¹ Aéschinés, Fals. Leg. p. 43. c. 37. Ἐνόια ἐνεμέρωσα ἑαυτῷ ὑποσχέσθαι μὲ φήσιν.

² Compare p. 43. c. 36. p. 46. c. 41. p. 52. c. 54.—also p. 31-41—also the speech against Kleonphon, p. 63. c. 30. ἦσαν τῆς πόλεως ἐνω πολὺ καὶ παραδότους πάλιν εἰς πολέμιον παράδοτος ἑαυτῷ, &c.

3 Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 373, 374. I translate the substance of the argument, not the words.

4 Aéschinés, Fals. Leg. p. 43. c. 36. In rebutting the charge against him of having betrayed the Phokians to Philip, Aéschinés (Fals. Leg. p. 46, 47) dwells upon the circumstance, that none of the Phokian exiles appeared to assist in the accusation, and that some three or four Phokians and Boeotians (whom he calls by name) were ready to appear as witnesses in his favour.

The reason why none of them appeared against him appears to me sufficiently explained by Demosthenés. The Phokians were in a state far too prostrate and terror-stricken to incur new enmities, or to come forward as accusers of one of the Athenian partisans of Philip, whose soldiers were in possession of their country.

The reason why some of them appeared in his favour is also explained by Aéschinés himself, when he states that he had pleaded for them before the Amphiktyone assembly, and had obtained for them a mitigation of that extreme penalty which their most violent enemies urged against them. To captives at the mercy of their opponents, such an interference might well appear deserving of gratitude; quite apart from the question, how far Aéschinés as envoy, by his previous communications to the Athenian people, had contributed to betray Thermopylae and the Phokians to Philip.
he comes there, to act against Thebes and in defence of the
Boeotian cities. This, in an Athenian envoy, argues a blindness
little short of treason. The irreparable misfortune, both for Athens
and for free Greece generally, was to bring Philip within Ther-
mpylæ, with power sufficient to put down Thebes and reconstitute
Boeotia—even if it could have been made sure that such would be
the first employment of his power. The same negotiator, who had
begun his mission by the preposterous flourish of calling upon
Philip to give up Amphipolis, ended by treacherously handing
over to him a new conquest which he could not otherwise have
acquired. Thermopylae, betrayed once before by Ephialtæs the
Malian to Xerxes, was now betrayed a second time by the Athe-
nian envoys to an extra-Hellenic power yet more formidable.

The ruinous peace of 346 B.C. was thus brought upon Athens not
simply by mistaken impulses of her own, but also by the
corruption of Æschinès and the major part of her envoys. Demosthenès had certainly no hand in the result. He
stood in decided opposition to the majority of the envoys;
a fact manifest as well from his own assurances, as from
the complaints vented against him, as a colleague insus-
portably troublesome, by Æschinès. Demosthenès affirms too, that
after fruitless opposition to the policy of the majority, he tried to
make known their misconduct to his countrymen at home both by
personal return and by letter; and that in both cases his attempts
were frustrated. Whether he did all that he could towards this
object, cannot be determined; but we find no proof of any short-
coming. The only point upon which Demosthenès appears open to
censure, is, on his omission to protest emphatically during the
debates of the month Elaphebolion at Athens, when the Phokians
were first practically excluded from the treaty. I discover no other
fault established on probable grounds against him, amidst the mul-
tifarious accusations, chiefly personal and foreign to the main issue,
prefere by his opponent.

Respecting Philokratès—the actual mover, in the Athenian
assembly, of all the important resolutions tending to bring
about this peace—we learn, that being impeached by
Hyperidès not long afterwards, he retired from Athens
without standing trial, and was condemned in his absence. Both

1 Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 376. This
impeachment is alluded to by Hyperidès
himself in his oration in defence of
Euxenippus, recently discovered in an
Egyptian papyrus, and edited by Mr.
Churchill Babington, along with frag-
ments from another oration of Hy-
peridès (Cambridge, 1855, p. 13). Hy-
peridès takes some credit to himself for
having made his accusation very special.
Having set forth the express words of
the decree proposed and carried in the
he and Æschines (so Demosthenes asserts) had received from Philip bribes and grants out of the spoils of Olynthus; and Philokrates, especially, displayed his newly-acquired wealth at Athens with impudent ostentation. These are allegations in themselves probable, though coming from a political rival. The peace, having disappointed every one's hopes, came speedily to be regarded with shame and regret, of which Philokrates bore the brunt as its chief author. Both Æschines and Demosthenes sought to cast upon each other the imputation of confederacy with Philokrates.

The pious feeling of Diodorus leads him to describe, with peculiar seriousness, the divine judgments which fell on all those concerned in despoiling the Delphian temple. Phalaekus, with his mercenaries out of Phokis, retired first into Peloponnesus; from thence seeking to cross to Tarentum, he was forced back when actually on shipboard by a mutiny of his soldiers, and passed into Crete. Here he took service with the inhabitants of Knossus against those of Lyktus. Over the latter he gained a victory, and their city was only rescued from him by the unexpected arrival of the Spartan king Archidamus. That prince, recently the auxiliary of Phalaekus in Phokis, was now on his way across the sea towards Tarentum, near which city he was slain a few years afterwards. Phalaekus, repulsed from Lyktus, next laid siege to Kydonia, and was bringing up engines to batter the walls, when a storm of thunder and lightning arose, so violent that his engines "were burnt by the divine fire," and he himself with several soldiers perished in trying to extinguish the flames. His remaining army passed into Peloponnesus, where they embraced the cause of some Eleian exiles against the government of Elis; but were vanquished, compelled to surrender, and either sold into slavery or put to death. Even the wives of the Phokian leaders, who had adorned themselves with some of the sacred donatives out of the Delphian temple, were visited with the like extremity of suffering. And while the gods dealt thus rigorously with the authors of the sacrilege, they exhibited favour no less manifest towards their champion Philip, whom they exalted more and more towards the pinnacle of honour and dominion.

Public assembly by Philokrates, he denounced the decree as mischievous to the people, and the proposer as having been bribed.

2 Diodor. vii. 63, ἐπὶ τοῦ θείου πυρὸς παραλύκησεν, &c.
3 Diodor. vii. 61, 62, 63.
4 Diodor. xvi. 64; Justin, viii. 2. "Dignum itaque qui a Dei proximus habeat, quae Deorum majestas vindicata sit." Some of these mercenaries, however, who had been employed in Phokis, perished in Sicily in the service of Timoleon—as has been already related.
I have described in my last chapter the conclusion of the Sacred War, and the re-establishment of the Amphiktyonic assembly by Philip; together with the dishonourable peace of 346 B.C., whereby Athens, after a war, feeble in management and inglorious in result, was betrayed by the treachery of her own envoys into the abandonment of the pass of Thermopylae—a new sacrifice, not required by her actual position, and more fatal to her future security than any of the previous losses. This important pass, the key of Greece, had now come into possession of Philip, who occupied it, together with the Phokian territory, by a permanent garrison of his own troops. The Amphiktyonic assembly had become an instrument for his exaltation. Both Thebans and Thessalians were devoted to his interest; rejoicing in the ruin of their common enemies the Phokians, without reflecting on the more formidable power now established on their frontiers. Though the power of Thebes had been positively increased by regaining Orchomenus and Koroneia, yet, comparatively speaking, the new position of Philip brought upon her, as well as upon Athens and the rest of Greece, a degradation and extraneous mastery such as had never before been endured.

This new position of Philip, as champion of the Amphiktyonic assembly, and within the line of common Grecian defence, was profoundly felt by Demosthenes. A short time after the surrender of Thermopylae, when the Thessalian and Macedonian envoys had arrived at Athens, announcing the recent determination of the Amphiktyons to confer upon Philip the place in that assembly from whence the Phokians had been just expelled, concurrence of Athens in this vote was invited; but the Athenians, mortified and exaspe-
rated at the recent turn of events, were hardly disposed to acquiesce. Here we find Demosthenēs taking the cautious side, and strongly advising compliance. He insists upon the necessity of refraining from any measure calculated to break the existing peace, however deplorable may have been its conditions; and of giving no pretence to the Amphiktyōns for voting conjoint war against Athens, to be executed by Philip.¹ These recommendations, prudent under the circumstances, prove that Demosthenēs, though dissatisfied with the peace, was anxious to keep it now that it was made; and that if he afterwards came to renew his exhortations to war, this was owing to new encroachments and more menacing attitude on the part of Philip.

We have other evidences, besides the Demosthenic speech just cited, to attest the effect of Philip’s new position on the Grecian mind. Shortly after the peace, and before the breaking up of the Phokian towns into villages had been fully carried into detail, Isokratēs published his letter addressed to Philip—the Oratio ad Philippum. The purpose of this letter is, to invite Philip to reconcile the four great cities of Greece—Sparta, Athens, Thebes, and Argos; to put himself at the head of their united force, as well as of Greece generally; and to invade Asia, for the purpose of overthrowing the Persian empire, of liberating the Asiatic Greeks, and of providing new homes for the unsettled wanderers in Greece. The remarkable point here is, that Isokratēs puts the Hellenic world under subordination and pupilage to Philip, renouncing all idea of it as a self-sustaining and self-regulating system. He extols Philip’s exploits, good fortune, and power, above all historical parallels—treats him unequivocally as the chief of Greece—and only exhorts him to make as good use of his power, as his ancestor Heraklēs had made in early times.² He recommends him, by impartial and conciliatory behaviour towards all, to acquire for himself the same devoted esteem among the Greeks as that which now prevailed among his own Macedonian officers—or as that which existed among the Lacedaemonians towards the Spartan kings.³ Great and melancholy indeed is the change which had come over the old age of Isokratēs, since he published the Panegyrical Oration (380 B.C.—thirty-four years before), wherein he invokes a united

¹ Demosth. De Pace, p. 60, 61.
² Isokratēs, Or. v. ad Philipp. s. 128—135.
³ Isokratēs, Or. v. ad Philipp. s. 91. καὶ ἐντὸς ἐπιθέτος τῶν ἑλληνας, ἀπανθεῖσθαι εἰς ἔκδοσιν ἄλλοις ἀνεξηγοῦντες τοῖς ἑαυτῶν λαῖναι. ἦστι δ᾽ οὗ τοῖς χαλκοῖς πλῆθος τούτων, ἦν ἐθνικὸς κοινὸς ἐπικαίρως, καὶ.
Pan-hellenic expedition against Asia, under the joint guidance of the two Hellenic chiefs by land and sea—Sparta and Athens; and wherein he indignantly denounces Sparta for having, at the peace of Antalkidas, introduced for her own purposes a Persian rescript to impose laws on the Grecian world. The prostration of Grecian dignity, serious as it was, involved in the peace of Antalkidas, was far less disgraceful than that recommended by Isokratês towards Philip—himself indeed personally of Hellenic parentage, but a Macedonian or barbarian (as Demosthenês terms him) by power and position. As Ἀσχινῆς, when employed in embassy from Athens to Philip, thought that his principal duty consisted in trying to persuade him by eloquence to restore Amphipolis to Athens, and put down Thebes—so Isokratês relies upon his skilful pen to dispose the new chief to a good use of imperial power—to make him protector of Greece, and conqueror of Asia. If copious and elegant flattery could work such a miracle, Isokratês might hope for success. But it is painful to note the increasing subservience, on the part of estimable Athenian freemen like Isokratês, to a foreign potentate; and the declining sentiment of Hellenic independence and dignity, conspicuous after the peace of 346 B.C., in reference to Philip.

From Isokratês as well as from Demosthenês, we thus obtain evidence of the imposing and intimidating effect of Philip's name in Greece after the peace of 346 B.C. Ochus, the Persian king, was at this time embarrassed by unsubdued revolt among his subjects; which Isokratês urges as one motive for Philip to attack him. Not only Egypt, but also Phenicia and Cyprus, were in revolt against the Persian king. One expedition (if not two) on a large scale, undertaken by him for the purpose of reconquering Egypt, had been disgracefully repulsed, in consequence of the ability of the generals (Diophantus an Athenian and Lamius a Spartan) who commanded the Grecian mercenaries in the service of the Egyptian prince Nektanebus. About the time of the peace of 346 B.C. in Greece, however, Ochus appears to have renewed with better success his attack on Cyprus, Phenicia, and Egypt. To reconquer Cyprus, he put in requisition the force of the Karian prince Idrienus (brother and successor of Mausolus and Artemisia), at this time not only the most powerful

1 Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 118.
2 Isokratês, Or. v. Philipp. s. 118; Diodor, xv. 40, 44, 48. Diodorus alludes three several times to this repulse of Ochus from Egypt. Compare Demosth.
3 Trogus mentions three different expeditions of Ochus against Egypt (Arguments. ad Justin. lib. x.).
RECONQUEST OF PHENICIA BY OCHUS.

The Phenicians had revolted from Ochus at the same time as the Cypriots, and in concert with Nectanebus prince of Egypt, from whom they received a reinforcement of 4000 Greek mercenaries under Mentor the Rhodian. Of the three great Phenician cities, Sidon, Tyre, and Aradus—each a separate political community, but administering their common affairs at a joint town called Tripolis, composed of three separate walled circuits, a furlong apart from each other—Sidon was at once the oldest, the richest, and the greatest sufferer from Persian oppression. Hence the Sidonian population, with their prince Tennês, stood foremost in the revolt against Ochus, employing their great wealth in hiring soldiers, preparing arms, and accumulating every means of defence. In the first outbreak they expelled the Persian garrison, seized and punished some of the principal officers, and destroyed the adjoining palace and park reserved for the satrap or king. Having farther defeated the neighbouring satraps of Kilikia and Syria, they strengthened the defences of the city by triple ditches, heightened walls, and a fleet of 100 triremes and quinqueremes. Incensed at these proceedings, Ochus marched with an immense force from Babylon. But his means of corruption served him better than his arms. The Sidonian prince Tennês, in combination with Mentor, entered into private bargain with him,

1 Isokratés, Or. v. Philipp. s. 102. Τορίον γά τον ευπορώτατον τῶν νῦν περὶ τὴν ἔπειρον, &c.

2 Diodor. xvi. 42-46. In the Inscription No. 87 of Boeckh's Corpus Inscription. we find a decree passed by the Athenians recognising friendship and hospitality with the Sidonian prince Strato— from whom they seem to have received a donation of ten talents. The note of date in this decree is not preserved; but M. Boeckh conceives it to date between Olympiad 101-104.

 prince in Asia Minor, but also master of the Grecian islands Chios, Kos, and Rhodes, probably by means of an internal oligarchy in each, who ruled in his interest and through his soldiers. 1 Idrieus sent to Cyprus a force of 40 triremes and 8000 mercenary troops, under the command of the Athenian Phokion and of Evagoras, an exiled member of the dynasty reigning at Salamis in the island. After a long siege of Salamis itself, which was held against the Persian king by Protagoras, probably another member of the same dynasty—and after extensive operations throughout the rest of this rich island, affording copious plunder to the soldiers, so as to attract numerous volunteers from the mainland—all Cyprus was again brought under the Persian authority. 2

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betrayed to him first one hundred of the principal citizens, and next placed the Persian army in possession of the city-walls. Ochus, having slain the hundred citizens surrendered to him, together with five hundred more who came to him with boughs of supplication, intimated his purpose of taking signal revenge on the Sidonians generally; who took the desperate resolution, first of burning their fleet that no one might escape—next, of shutting themselves up with their families, and setting fire each man to his own house. In this deplorable conflagration 40,000 persons are said to have perished; and such was the wealth destroyed, that the privilege of searching the ruins was purchased for a large sum of money. Instead of rewarding the traitor Tennès, Ochus concluded the tragedy by putting him to death.1

Flushed with this unexpected success, Ochus marched with an immense force against Egypt. He had in his army 10,000 Greeks: 6000 by requisition from the Greek cities in Asia Minor; 3000 by request from Argos; and 1000 from Thebes.2 To Athens and Sparta, he had sent a like request, but had received from both a courteous refusal. His army, Greek and Asiatic, the largest which Persia had sent forth for many years, was distributed into three divisions, each commanded by one Greek and one Persian general; one of the three divisions was confided to Mentor and the eunuch Bagôas, the two ablest servants of the Persian king. The Egyptian prince Nektanebus, having been long aware of the impending attack, had also assembled a numerous force; no less than 20,000 mercenary Greeks, with a far larger body of Egyptians and Libyans. He had also taken special care to put the eastern branch of the Nile, with the fortress of Pelusium at its mouth, in a full state of defence. But these ample means of defence were rendered unavailing, partly by his own unskilfulness and incompetence, partly by the ability and cunning of Mentor and Bagôas. Nektanebus was obliged to retire into Ethiopia; all Egypt fell with little resistance into the hands of the Persians; the fortified places capitulated—the temples were pillaged, with an immense booty to the victors—and even the sacred archives of the temples were carried off, to be afterwards resold to the priests for an additional sum of money. The wealthy territory of Egypt again became a Persian province, under the satrap Pherendatês; while Ochus returned to

1 Diodor. xvi, 42, 43, 45. “Occisis optimibus Sidona cepit Ochus” (Trog. Panathenæis, s. 171.)
2 Diodor. xvi, 47; Isokratês, Or. xii. gus, Argum. ad Justin. lib. x.).
Babylon, with a large increase both of dominion and of reputation. The Greek mercenaries were dismissed to return home, with an ample harvest both of pay and plunder. They constituted in fact the principal element of force on both sides; some Greeks enabled the Persian king to subdue revolters, while others lent their strength to the revolters against him.

By this re-conquest of Phenicia and Egypt, Ochus relieved himself from that contempt into which he had fallen through the failure of his former expedition, and even exalted the Persian empire in force and credit to a point nearly as high as it had ever occupied before. The Rhodian Mentor, and the Persian Bagocas, both of whom had distinguished themselves in the Egyptian campaign, became from this time among his most effective officers. Bagocas accompanied Ochus into the interior provinces, retaining his full confidence; while Mentor, rewarded with a sum of 100 talents, and loaded with Egyptian plunder, was invested with the satrapy of the Asiatic seaboard. He here got together a considerable body of Greek mercenaries, with whom he rendered signal service to the Persian king. Though the whole coast was understood to belong to the Persian empire, yet there were many separate strong towns and positions, held by chiefs who had their own military force; neither paying tribute nor obeying orders. Among these chiefs, one of the most conspicuous was Hermias, who resided in

2 Isokratés, Or. iv. Philipp. s. 149. καὶ τοὺς ἀφισταμένους τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς βασιλείας συγκαταστρεφόμεθα, &c.
3 Isokratés, Or. iv. Philipp. s. 117, 1-1, 160. Diodorus places the successful expeditions of Ochus against Phenicia and Egypt during the three years between 351-348 B.C. (Diodor, xvi. 49-52). In my judgment, they were not executed until after the conclusion of the peace between Philip and Athens in March 346 B.C.; they were probably brought to a close in the two summers of 346-345 B.C. The Discourse or Letter of Isokratés to Philip appears better evidence on this point of chronology, than the assertion of Diodorus. The Discourse of Isokratés was published shortly after the peace of March 346 B.C., and addressed to a prince perfectly well informed of all the public events of his time. One of the main arguments used by Isokratés to induce Philip to attack the Persian empire, is the weakness of Ochus in consequence of Egypt and Phenicia being still in revolt and unsubdued—and the contempt into which Ochus had fallen from having tried to reconquer Egypt and having been ignominiously repulsed—ἀπῆλθεν ἐκεῖθεν (Ochus) οὐ μόνον ἡττηθεὶς ἀλλὰ καὶ καταγελασθεὶς, καὶ δόξας οὔτε βασιλεύειν οὔτε στρατηγεῖν ἄξιος εἶναι (8.118).... ὡσ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ὅπι πάντως τῶν βασιλευόντων (8.100).

The reconquest of Egypt by Ochus, with an immense army and a large number of Greeks engaged on both sides, must have been one of the most impressive events of the age. Diodorus may perhaps have confounded the date of the first expedition, wherein Ochus failed, with that of the second, wherein he succeeded.

4 Diodor, xvi. 50-52.
the stronghold of Atarneus (on the mainland opposite to Lesbos), but had in pay many troops and kept garrisons in many neighbouring places. Though partially disabled by accidental injury in childhood, Hermeias was a man of singular energy and ability, and had conquered for himself this dominion. But what has contributed most to his celebrity, is, that he was the attached friend and admirer of Aristotle; who passed three years with him at Atarneus, after the death of Plato in 348-347 B.C.—and who has commemorated his merits in a noble ode. By treachery and false promises, Mentor seduced Hermeias into an interview, seized his person, and employed his signet-ring to send counterfeit orders whereby he became master of Atarneus and all the remaining places held by Hermeias. Thus, by successful perfidy, Mentor reduced the most vigorous of the independent chiefs on the Asiatic coast; after which, by successive conquests of the same kind, he at length brought the whole coast effectively under Persian dominion.

The peace between Philip and the Athenians lasted without any formal renunciation on either side for more than six years; from March 346 B.C. to beyond Midsummer 340 B.C. But though never formally renounced during that interval, it became gradually more and more violated in practice by both parties. To furnish a consecutive history of the events of these few years, is beyond our
power. We have nothing to guide us but a few orations of
Demosthenes;\textsuperscript{1} which, while conveying a lively idea of the feel-
ing of the time, touch, by way of allusion and as materials for
reasoning, upon some few facts; yet hardly enabling us to string
together those facts into an historical series. A brief sketch of
the general tendencies of this period is all that we can venture
upon.

Philip was the great aggressor of the age. The movement
everywhere, in or near Greece, began with him, and
with those parties in the various cities, who acted on his
instigation and looked up to him for support. We hear
of his direct intervention, or of the effects of his exciting
suggestions, everywhere; in Peloponnese, at Ambrakia and
Leukas, in Euboea, and in Thrace. The inhabitants of
Megalopolis, Messene and Argos, were soliciting his presence in
Pelopon-
nese, and his active co-operation against Sparta. Philip intimated
a purpose of going there himself, and sent in the mean time
soldiers and money, with a formal injunction to Sparta that she
must renounce all pretension to Messene.\textsuperscript{2} He established a footing
in Elis,\textsuperscript{3} by furnishing troops to an oligarchical faction, and
enabling them to become masters of the government, after a
violent revolution. Connected probably with this intervention in
Elis, was his capture of the three Eolian colonies, Pandosia,
Bucheta, and Elateia, on the coast of the Epirotic Kassopia, near
the Gulf of Ambrakia. He made over those three towns to his
brother-in-law Alexander, whom he exalted to be prince of the
Epirotic Molossians\textsuperscript{4}—deposing the reigning prince Arrhybas.
He farther attacked the two principal Grecian cities in that
region—Ambrakia and Leukas; but here he appears to have
failed.\textsuperscript{5} Detachments of his troops showed themselves near

\begin{itemize}
\item Demosthenes, Philippic ii. \textsuperscript{1} B.C. 344-343
\item De Halomnes, not genuine \textsuperscript{1} B.C. 343-342
\item De Falsa Legatione \textsuperscript{1} B.C. 342
\item Eschinus, De Falsa Legatione \textsuperscript{1} B.C. 342
\item Demosthenes, De Chersoneso \textsuperscript{1} B.C. 342-341
\item Philipp, iii. \textsuperscript{1} B.C. 341
\item Philipp, iv. \textsuperscript{1} B.C. 341-340
\item ad Philipp. Epist. \textsuperscript{1} B.C. 310-339
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{1} Demosthenes, Philippic ii. Delivered in

\textsuperscript{2} Demosth. De Pace, p. 61; Phil-

\textsuperscript{3} Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 424; Pausan.

\textsuperscript{4} Justin, viii. 6. Diodorus states

\textsuperscript{5} Pseudo-Demosth. De Halomnes, p.

that Alexander did not become prince

\textsuperscript{4} Philipp. iii. p. 117-120; Philippic iv.

\textsuperscript{5} As these enterprises of Philip against

\textsuperscript{5} P. 133.
Megara and Eretria, to the aid of philippising parties in these cities and to the serious alarm of the Athenians. Philip established more firmly his dominion over Thessaly, distributing the country into four divisions, and planting a garrison in Phere, the city most disaffected to him. We also read, that he again overran and subdued the Illyrian, Dardanian, and Paeonian tribes on his northern and western boundary; capturing many of their towns, and bringing back much spoil; and that he defeated the Thracian prince Kersobleptes, to the great satisfaction of the Greek cities on and near the Hellespont. He is said farther to have redistributed the population of Macedonia, transferring inhabitants from one town to another according as he desired to favour or discourage residence—to the great misery and suffering of the families so removed.

Such was the exuberant activity of Philip, felt everywhere from the coasts of the Propontis to those of the Ionian sea and the Corinthian Gulf. Every year his power increased; while the cities of the Grecian world remained passive, uncombined, and without recognising any one of their own number as leader. The philippising factions were everywhere rising in arms or conspiring to seize the governments for their own account under Philip's auspices; while those who clung to free and popular Hellenism were discouraged and thrown on the defensive.

It was Philip's policy to avoid or postpone any breach of peace with Athens; the only power under whom Grecian combination against him was practicable. But a politician like Demosthenes foresaw clearly enough the coming absorption of the Grecian world, Athens included, into the dominion of Macedonia, unless some means could be found of reviving among its members a spirit of vigorous and united defence. In or before the year 344 B.C., we find this orator again coming forward in the Athenian assembly, persuading his countrymen to send a

 presume that they did not take place till after Olymp. 109, 1= n.c. 344-343. But this is not a very certain inference.

 1 Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 368, 424, 436; Philipp. iii, 117, 118, iv. p. 133; De Corone, p. 324; Psuedo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 84.

 Compare Harpokration, τ. Δαιδαλ-, ξανα.

 2 Diocor. xvi. 69, 71.

 3 Justin, viii. 5, 6. "Reversus in regnum, ut pecora pastores nune in hybemos, nune in aestivos saltus transiunt—sic ille populus et urbes, ut illi vel replenda vel derelinquenda quaque loca videbantur, ad libidinem suam transfert. Miseranda ubique facies et similis excidio erat;" &c. Compare Livy, xii. 3, where similar proceedings of Philip son of Demetrius (n.c. 182) are described.

 4 See a striking passage in the fourth Philippic of Demosthenes, p. 192.
mission into Peloponnesus, and going himself among the envoys. He addressed both to the Messenians and Argeians emphatic remonstrances on their devotion to Philip; reminding them that from excessive fear and antipathy towards Sparta, they were betraying to him their own freedom, as well as that of all their Hellenic brethren. Though heard with approbation, he does not flatter himself with having worked any practical change in their views. But it appears that envoys reached Athens (in 344-343 B.C.) to whom some answer was required, and it is in suggesting that answer that Demosthenes delivers his second Philippic. He denounces Philip anew, as an aggressor stretching his power on every side, violating the peace with Athens, and preparing ruin for the Grecian world. Without advising immediate war, he calls on the Athenians to keep watch and ward, and to organise defensive alliance among the Greeks generally.

The activity of Athens, unfortunately, was shown in nothing but words; to set off against the vigorous deeds of Philip. But they were words of Demosthenes, the force of which was felt by Philip’s partisans in Greece, and occasioned such annoyance to Philip himself that he sent to Athens more than once envoys and letters of remonstrance. His envoy, an eloquent Byzantine named Python, addressed the Athenian assembly with much success, complaining of the calumnies of the orators against Philip—asserting emphatically that Philip was animated with the best sentiments towards Athens, and desired only to have an opportunity of rendering service to her—and offering to review and amend the terms of the late peace. Such general assurances of friendship, given with eloquence and emphasis, produced considerable effect in the Athenian assembly, as they had done from the mouth of Aeschines during the discussions on the peace. The proposal...
of Python was taken up by the Athenians, and two amendments were proposed. 1. Instead of the existing words of the peace—“That each party should have what they actually had”—it was moved to substitute this phrase—“That each party should have their own.” 2. That not merely the allies of Athens and of Philip, but also all the other Greeks, should be included in the peace; That all of them should remain free and autonomous; That if any of them were attacked, the parties to the treaty on both sides would lend them armed assistance forthwith. 3. That Philip should be required to make restitution of those places, Doriskus, Serriumi, &c., which he had captured from Kersobleptes after the day when peace was sworn at Athens.

The first amendment appears to have been moved by a citizen named Hegesippus, a strenuous anti-philippising politician, supporting the same views as Demosthenes. Python, with the other envoys of Philip, present at the assembly, either accepted these amendments, or at least did not protest against them. He partook of the public hospitality of the city as upon an understanding mutually settled. Hegesippus with other Athenians was sent to Macedonia to procure the ratification of Philip; who admitted the justice of the second amendment, offered arbitration respecting the third, but refused to ratify the first—disavowing both the general proposition and the subsequent acceptance of his envoys at Athens. Moreover he displayed great harshness in the reception of Hegesippus and his colleagues; banishing from Macedonia the Athenian poet Xenokleides, for having shown hospitality towards them. The original treaty therefore remained unaltered.

1 Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneo, p. 81. Περὶ δὲ τῆς εἰρήνης, ἦν ἐδοσαν ἵμιν οἱ πρεσβεῖς οἱ παρ' ἐκεῖνον περιφέρεται ἐπανορθώσασθαι, οἵ ἐκεῖνος τὰ ἐναντιωμένα, ὃ παρὰ τῶν ἀθηναίων ἡμιολογεύεται δικαίων εἶναι, ἐκατέρως ἔχειν τὰ ἐαυτῶν, ἀμφισβητεῖ (Philip) μὴ δεδωκέναι, μηδὲ τοὺς πρεσβεῖς ταῦτα εἰρηκέναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, &c.


3 Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneo, p. 81. Περὶ δὲ τῆς εἰρήνης, ἦν ἐδοσαν ἵμιν οἱ πρέσβεις οἱ παρ' ἐκεῖνον περιφέρεται ἐπανορθώσασθαι, οἵ ἐκεῖνος τὰ ἐναντιωμένα, ὃ παρὰ τῶν ἀθηναίων ἡμιολογεύεται δικαίων εἶναι, ἐκατέρως ἔχειν τὰ ἐαυτῶν, ἀμφισβητεῖ (Philip) μὴ δεδωκέναι, μηδὲ τοὺς πρεσβεῖς ταῦτα εἰρηκέναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, &c.

4 Hegesippus was much denounced by the philippising orators at Athens (Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 364). His enmity to Philip has been treated by some authors as enforcing a “grossly sophistical construction of an article in the peace,” which Philip justly resented. But in my judgement it was no construction of the original treaty, nor was there any sophistry on the part of Athens. It was an amended clause, presented by the Athenians in place of the original. They never affirmed that the amended clause meant the same thing as the clause prior to amendment. On the contrary, they imply that the meaning is not the same—and it is on that ground that they submit the amended form of words.
Hegesippus and his colleagues had gone to Macedonia, not simply to present for Philip's acceptance the two amendments just indicated, but also to demand from him the restoration of the little island of Halonnesus (near Skiathos), which he had taken since the peace. Philip denied that the island belonged to the Athenians, or that they had any right to make such a demand; affirming that he had taken it, not from them, but from a pirate named Sostratus, who was endangering the navigation of the neighbouring sea—and that it now belonged to him. If the Athenians disputed this, he offered to submit the question to arbitration; to restore the island to Athens, should the arbitrators decide against him—or to give it to her, even should they decide in his favour.

Since we know that Philip treated Hegesippus and the other envoys with peculiar harshness, it is probable that the diplomatic argument between them, about Halonnesus as well as about other matters, was conducted with angry feeling on both sides. Hence an island, in itself small and insignificant, became the subject of prolonged altercation for two or three years. When Hegesippus and Demosthenes maintained that Philip had wronged the Athenians about Halonnesus, and that it could only be received from him in restitution of rightful Athenian ownership, not as a gift proprio motu—Eschinés and others treated the question with derision, as a controversy about syllables. "Philip (they said) offers to give us Halonnesus. Let us take it and set the question at rest. What need to care whether he gives it to us, or gives it back to us?"

The comic writers made various jests on the same verbal distinction, as though it were a mere silly subtlety. But though party-orators and wits might here find a point to turn or a sarcasm to place, it is certain that well-conducted diplomacy, modern as well as ancient, has been always careful to note the distinction as important. The question here had no reference to capture during war, but during peace. No modern diplomatist will accept restitution of what has been unlawfully taken, if he is called upon to recognise it as gratuitous cession from the captor. The plea of Philip—that he had taken the island, not from Athens, but from

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1 Compare Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 77, and the Epistola Philip, p. 162. The former says, ἔλεγε Ἡγεσίππου καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιούτου λόγους, ἵνα καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς των ἀφελόμενων λόγους μιᾶς, ἵνα μηδὲν ἐκεῖνος τῷ παρευμένῳ τὴν ἐπομον κτῆσιν, μηὶ προσήκειν αὐτὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἑφαίνει. The latter agrees as to the main facts.

the pirate Sostratus—was not a valid excuse, assuming that the island really belonged to Athens. If Sostratus had committed piratical damage, Philip ought to have applied to Athens for redress, which he evidently did not do. It was only in case of redress being refused, that he could be entitled to right himself by force; and even then, it may be doubted whether his taking of the island could give him any right to it against Athens. The Athenians refused his proposition of arbitration; partly because they were satisfied of their own right to the island—partly because they were jealous of admitting Philip to any recognised right of interference with their insular ascendency.1

Halonnesus remained under garrison by Philip, forming one among many topics of angry communication by letters and by envoys, between him and Athens—until at length (seemingly about 341 B.C.) the inhabitants of the neighbouring island of Peparethus retook it and carried off his garrison. Upon this proceeding Philip addressed several remonstrances, both to the Peparethians and to the Athenians. Obtaining no redress, he attacked Peparethus, and took severe revenge upon the inhabitants. The Athenians then ordered their admiral to make reprisals upon him, so that the war, though not yet actually declared, was approaching nearer and nearer towards renewal.2

But it was not only in Halonnesus that Athens found herself beset by Philip and the philippising factions. Even her own frontier on the side towards Boeotia now required constant watching, since the Thebans had been relieved from their Phokian enemies; so that she was obliged to keep garrisons of hoplites at Drymus and Panaktum.3 In Megara an insurgent party under Perilaus had laid plans for seizing the city through the aid of a body of Philip's troops, which could easily be sent from the Macedonian army now occupying Phokis, by sea to Pega, the Megarian port on the Krissean Gulf. Apprised of this conspiracy, the Megarian

2 Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 162. The oration of Pseudo-Demosthenes De Halonneso is a discourse addressed to the people on one of these epistolary communications of Philip, brought by some envoys who had also addressed the people vid roce. The letter of Philip adverted to several other topics besides, but that of Halonnesus came first.
3 Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 446. I take these words to denote, not any one particular outmarch to these places, but a standing guard kept there since the exposure of the northern frontier of Attica after the peace. For the great importance of Panaktum, as a frontier position between Athens and Thebes, see Thucydides, v, 55, 36, 39.
government solicited aid from Athens. Phokion, conducting the Athenian hoplites to Megara with the utmost celerity, assured the safety of the city, and at the same time re-established the Long Walls to Nisaea, so as to render it always accessible to Athenians by sea. In Euboea, the cities of Oreus and Eretria fell into the hands of the philippising leaders, and became hostile to Athens. In Oreus, the greater part of the citizens were persuaded to second the views of Philip's chief adherent Philistides; who prevailed on them to silence the remonstrances, and imprison the person of the opposing leader Euphranor, as a disturber of the public peace. Philistides then, watching his opportunity, procured the introduction of a body of Macedonian troops, by means of whom he assured to himself the rule of the city as Philip's instrument; while Euphranor, agonized with grief and alarm, slew himself in prison. At Eretria, Kleitarchus with others carried on the like conspiracy. Having expelled their principal opponents, and refused admission to Athenian envoys, they procured 1000 Macedonian troops under Hipponikus; they thus mastered Eretria itself, and destroyed the fortified seaport called Porthmus, in order to break the easy communication with Athens. Oreus and Eretria are represented by Demosthenes as suffering miserable oppression under these two despots, Philistides and Kleitarchus. On the other hand, Chalkis, the chief city in Euboea, appears to have been still free, and leaning to Athens rather than to Philip, under the predominant influence of a leading citizen named Kallias.

At this time, it appears, Philip was personally occupied with operations in Thrace, where he passed at least eleven months, and probably more, leaving the management of affairs in Euboea to his commanders in Phokis and Thessaly. He was now seemingly preparing his schemes for mastering the important outlets from the Euxine into the Aegean—the Bosphorus and Hellespont—and the Greek cities on those coasts. Upon these straits depended the main supply of imported corn for...

1 Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 368, 455; Philippic iv. p. 123; D. of Corone, p. 324; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16.
2 The general state of things, as here given, at Oreus and Eretria, existed at the time when Demosthenes delivered his two orations—the third Philippic and the oration on the Chersonese; in the late spring and summer of 341 B.C.—De Chersoneso, p. 98, 99, 104; Philipp. iii. p. 112, 113, 125, 126.
3 . . . Σοκλειναι γε μαστιγομένου καὶ στρεβλομένου (the people of Eretria under Kleitarchus, p. 122).
part with Athens and a large part of the Grecian world; and hence the great value of the Athenian possession of the Chersonese.

Respecting this peninsula, angry disputes now arose. To protect her settlers there established, Athens had sent Diopithês with a body of mercenaries—unprovided with pay, however, and left to levy contributions where they could; while Philip had taken under his protection Kardia—a city situated within the peninsula near its isthmus, but ill-disposed to Athens, asserting independence and admitted at the peace of 346 B.C., by Æschinês and the Athenian envoys, as an ally of Philip to take part in the peace-oaths.\(^1\) In conjunction with the Kardians, Philip had appropriated and distributed lands which the Athenian settlers affirmed to be theirs; and when they complained he insisted that they should deal with Kardia as an independent city, by reference to arbitration.\(^2\) This they refused, though their envoy Æschinês had recognised Kardia as an independent ally of Philip when the peace was sworn.

Here was a state of conflicting pretensions out of which hostilities were sure to grow. The Macedonian troops overran the Chersonese, while Diopithês on his side made excursions out of the peninsula, invading portions of Thrace subject to Philip; who sent letters of remonstrance to Athens.\(^3\) While thus complaining at Athens, Philip was at the same time pushing his conquests in Thrace against the Thracian princes Kersobleptês, Terês, and Sitalkês,\(^4\) upon whom the honorary grant of Athenian citizenship had been conferred.

The complaints of Philip, and the speeches of his partisans at Athens, raised a strong feeling against Diopithês at Athens, so that the people seemed disposed to recall and punish him. It is against this step that Demosthenês protests in his speech on the Chersonese. Both that speech, and his third Philippic were delivered in 341–340 B.C.; seemingly in the last half of 341 B.C. In both, he resumes that energetic and uncompromising tone of hostility towards Philip, which had characterized the first Philippic and the Olynthiacs. He calls upon his countrymen not only to sustain Diopithês, but also to renew the

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\(^2\) Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 87. 
\(^3\) Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 181. 
\(^4\) Epistol. Philipp. I. c. 87.
war vigorously against Philip in every other way. Philip (he says), while pretending in words to keep the peace, had long ago broken it by his acts, and by aggressions in numberless quarters. If Athens chose to imitate him by keeping the peace in name, let her do so; but at any rate, let her imitate him also by prosecuting a strenuous war in reality. Chersonesus, the ancient possession of Athens, could be protected only by encouraging and reinforcing Diopeithes; Byzantium also was sure to become the next object of Philip's attack, and ought to be preserved, as essential to the interests of Athens, though hitherto the Byzantines had been disaffected towards her. But even these interests, important as they were, must be viewed only as parts of a still more important whole. The Hellenic world altogether was in imminent danger; overridden by Philip's prodigious military force; torn in pieces by local factions leaning upon his support; and sinking every day into degradation more irrecoverable. There was no hope of rescue for the Hellenic name except from the energetic and well-directed military action of Athens. She must stand forth in all her might and resolution; her citizens must serve in person, pay direct taxes readily, and forego for the time their festival-fund; when they had thus shown themselves ready to bear the real pinch and hardship of the contest, then let them send round envoys to invoke the aid of other Greeks against the common enemy.

Such, in its general tone, is the striking harangue known as the third Philippic. It appears that the Athenians were now coming round more into harmony with Demosthenes than they had ever been before. They perceived—what the orator had long ago pointed out—that Philip went on pushing from one acquisition to another, and became only the more dangerous in proportion as others were quiescent. They were really alarmed for the safety of the two important positions of the Hellespont and Bosphorus. From this time to the battle of Chaeroneia, the positive influence of Demosthenes in determining the proceedings of his countrymen, becomes very considerable. He had already been employed several times as envoy—to Peloponnesus (344-343 B.C.), to Ambrakia, Leukas, Korkyra, the Illyrians,

and Thessaly. He now moved, first a mission of envoys to Euboea, where a plan of operations was probably concerted with Kallias and the Chalkidians—and subsequently, the despatch of a military force to the same island, against Oreus and Eretria. This expedition, commanded by Phokion, was successful. Oreus and Eretria were liberated; Kleitarchus and Philistides, with the Macedonian troops, were expelled from the island, though both in vain tried to propitiate Athens. Kallias also, with the Chalkidians of Euboea, and the Megarians, contributed as auxiliaries to this success. On his proposition, supported by Demosthenes, the attendance and tribute from deputies of the Euboic cities to the synod at Athens, were renounced; and in place of it was constituted an Euboic synod, sitting at Chalkis; independent of, yet allied with, Athens. In this Euboic synod Kallias was the leading man; forward both as a partisan of Athens and as an enemy of Philip. He pushed his attack beyond the limits of Euboea to the Gulf of Pagasae, from whence probably came the Macedonian troops who had formed the garrison of Oreus under Philistides. He here captured several of the towns allied with or garrisoned by Philip; together with various Macedonian vessels, the crews of which he sold as slaves. For these successes the Athenians awarded to him a public vote of thanks. He also employed himself (during the autumn and winter of 341-340 B.C.) in travelling as missionary through Peloponnesus, to organise a confederacy against Philip. In that mission he strenuously urged the cities to send deputies to a congress at Athens, in the ensuing month Anthesterion (February), 340 B.C. But though he made flattering announcement at Athens of concurrence and support promised to him, the projected congress came to nothing.

1 Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 252.
2 Diodor. xvi. 74.
3 Stephanus Byz. v. \*\*\*\*\*.
4 \*\*\*\*\* adv. Ktesiphont. p. 67, 68. \*\*\*\*\* greatly stigmatises Demosthenes for having deprived the Athenian synod of these important members. But the Euboic members certainly had not been productive of any good to Athens by their attendance, real or nominal, at her synod, for some years past. The formation of a free Euboic synod probably afforded the best chance of ensuring real harmony between the island and Athens.

\*\*\*\*\* gives here a long detail of allegations, about the corrupt intrigues between Demosthenes and Kallias at Athens. Many of these allegations are impossible to reconcile with what we know of the course of history at the time. We must recollect that \*\*\*\*\* makes the statement eleven years after the events.


\*\*\*\*\* here specifies the month, but not the year. It appears to me that Anthesterion, 340 B.C. (Olymp. 109, 4), is the most likely date; though Böhmecke and others place it a year earlier.
While the important success in Euboea relieved Athens from anxiety on that side, Demosthenes was sent as envoy to the Chersonese and to Byzantium. He would doubtless encourage Diopithes, and may perhaps have carried to him some reinforcements. But his services were principally useful at Byzantium. That city had long been badly disposed towards Athens—from recollections of the Social War, and from jealousy about the dues on corn-ships passing the Bosphorus; moreover, it had been for some time in alliance with Philip; who was now exerting all his efforts to prevail on the Byzantines to join him in active warfare against Athens. So effectively did Demosthenes employ his eloquence at Byzantium, that he frustrated this purpose, overcame the unfriendly sentiment of the citizens, and brought them to see how much it concerned both their interest and their safety to combine with Athens in resisting the farther preponderance of Philip. The Byzantines, together with their allies and neighbours the Perinthians, contracted alliance with Athens. Demosthenes takes just pride in having achieved for his countrymen this success as a statesman and diplomatist, in spite of adverse probabilities. Had Philip been able to obtain the active cooperation of Byzantium and Perinthus, he would have become master of the corn-supply and probably of the Hellespont also, so that war in those regions would have become almost impracticable for Athens."

As this unexpected revolution in the policy of Byzantium was eminently advantageous to Athens, so it was proportionally mortifying to Philip; who resented it so much, that he shortly afterwards commenced the siege of Perinthus by land and sea, a little before Midsummer 410 B.C. He brought up his fleet through the Hellespont into the Propontis, and protected it in its passage, against the attack of the Athenians in the Chersonese;
by causing his land-force to traverse and lay waste that peninsula. This was a violation of Athenian territory, adding one more to the already accumulated causes of war. At the same time, it appears that he now let loose his cruisers against the Athenian merchantmen, many of which he captured and appropriated. These captures, together with the incursions on the Chersonese, served as last additional provocations, working up the minds of the Athenians to a positive declaration of war. Shortly after Midsummer 340 B.C., at the beginning of the archonship of Theophratus, they passed a formal decree to remove the column on which the peace of 346 B.C. stood recorded, and to renew the war openly and explicitly against Philip. It seems probable that this was done while Demosthenes was still absent on his mission at the Hellespont and Bosphorus; for he expressly states that none of the decrees immediately bringing on hostilities were moved by him, but all of them by other citizens; a statement which we may reasonably believe, since he would be rather proud than ashamed of such an initiative.

About the same time, as it would appear, Philip on his side addressed a manifesto and declaration of war to the Athenians. In this paper he enumerated many wrongs done by them to him, and still remaining unredressed in spirit of formal remonstrance; for which wrongs he

1 That these were the two last causes which immediately preceded, and determined the declaration of war, we may see by Demosthenes, De Corona, p. 249—Kal μὴν τὴν εἰρήνην γ᾽ ἐκείνην ἔλυσε τὰ πλοῖα λαβὼν, οὐχ ἦν πόλις, &c.

2 Philochorus, Frag. 135, ed. Didot; Dionys. Hal. ad Annamum, p. 738-741; Diodorus, xvi. 77. The citation given by Dionysius out of Philochorus is on one point not quite accurate. It states that Demosthenes moved the decisive resolution for declaring war; whereas Demosthenes himself tells us that none of the motions at this juncture were made by him (De Corona, p. 250).

3 Demosth. De Corona, p. 250. It will be seen that I take no notice of the two decrees of the Athenians, and the letter of Philip, embodied in the oration De Corona, p. 249, 250, 251. I have already stated that all the documents which we read as attached to this oration are so tainted either with manifest error or with causes of doubt, that I cannot cite them as authorities in this history, wherever they stand alone. Accordingly, I take no account either of the supposed siege of Selymbria, mentioned in Philip's pretended letter, but mentioned nowhere else—nor of the twenty Athenian ships captured by the Macedonian admiral Amytus, and afterwards restored by Philip on the remonstrance of the Athenians, mentioned in the pretended Athenian decree moved by Eubulus. Neither Demosthenes, nor Philochorus, nor Diodorus, nor Justin, says anything about the siege of Selymbria, though all of them allude to the attacks on Byzantium and Perinthos. I do not believe that the siege of Selymbria ever occurred. Moreover, Athenian vessels captured, but afterwards restored by Philip on remonstrance from the Athenians, can hardly have been the actual cause of war. The pretended decrees and letter do not fit the passage of Demosthenes to which they are attached.
announced his intention of taking a just revenge by open hos-
tilities.\(^1\) He adverted to the seizure, on Macedonian soil, of
Nikias his* herald carrying despatches; the Athenians (he alleged)
had detained this herald as prisoner for ten months and had
read the despatches publicly in their assembly. He complained
that Athens had encouraged the inhabitants of Thasos, in har-
bouring triremes from Byzantium and privateers from other
quarters, to the annoyance of Macedonian commerce. He dwelt
on the aggressive proceedings of Diópeithès in Thrace, and of
Kallias in the Gulf of Pagasæ. He denounced the application
made by Athens to the Persians for aid against him, as a
departure from Hellenic patriotism, and from the Athenian
maxims of aforesaid. He alluded to the unbecoming interven-
tion of Athens in defence of the Thracian princes Terès and
Kersobleptès, neither of them among the sworn partners in the
peace, against him; to the protection conferred by Athens on the
inhabitants of Peparèthus, whom he had punished for hostilities
against his garrison in Halonnesus; to the danger incurred by
his fleet in sailing up the Hellespont, from the hostilities of the
Athenian settlers in the Chersonese, who had cooperated with
his enemies the Byzantines, and had rendered it necessary for
him to guard the ships by marching a land-force through the
Chersonese. He vindicated his own proceedings in aiding his
allies to the inhabitants of Karélia, complaining that the Athenians
had refused to submit their differences with that city to an
equitable arbitration. He repelled the Athenian pretensions of
right to Amphipolis, asserting his own better right to the place,
on all grounds. He insisted especially on the offensive behaviour
of the Athenians, in refusing, when he had sent envoys con-
jointly with all his allies, to “conclude a just convention on
behalf of the Greeks generally.”—“Had you acceded to this
proposition (he said), you might have placed out of danger all
those who really suspected my purposes, or you might have
exposed me publicly as the most worthless of men. It was to

\(^1\) Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 165. This Epistle of Philip to the
Athenians appears here inserted among the orations of Demosthenès. Some
critics reject it as spurious, but I see no sufficient ground for such an
opinion. Whether it be the composition of Philip himself, or of some
Greek employed in Philip’s cabinet, is a point which we have no means of deter-
mining.

The oration of Demosthenès, which
is said to be delivered in reply to this
letter of Philip (Orgt. xi.), is, in my
judgement, wrongly described. Not
only it has no peculiar bearing on the
points contained in the letter—but it
must also be two or three months later
in date, since it mentions the aid sent
by the Persian satraps to Perinthus, and
the raising of the siege of that city by
Philip (p. 133).
the interest of your people to accede, but not to the interest of your orators. To them—as those affirm who know your government best—peace is war, and war, peace; for they always make money at the expense of your generals, either as accusers or as defenders; moreover, by reviling in the public assembly your leading citizens at home, and other men of eminence abroad, they acquire with the multitude credit for popular dispositions. It would be easy for me, by the most trifling presents to silence their invectives and make them trumpet my praises. But I should be ashamed of appearing to purchase your good-will from them."

It is of little moment to verify or appreciate the particular complaints here set forth, even if we had adequate information for the purpose. Under the feeling which had prevailed during the last two years between the Athenians and Philip, we cannot doubt that many detached acts of a hostile character had been committed on their side as well as on his. Philip's allegation—that he had repeatedly proposed to them amicable adjustment of differences—whether true or not, is little to the purpose. It was greatly to his interest to keep Athens at peace and tranquil, while he established his ascendancy everywhere else, and accumulated a power for ultimate employment such as she would be unable to resist. The Athenians had at length been made to feel, that farther acquiescence in these proceedings would only ensure to them the amount of favour tendered by Polyphemus to Odysseus—that they should be devoured last. But the lecture, which he thinks fit to administer both to them and to their popular orators, is little better than insulting derision. It is strange to read encomiums on peace—as if it were indisputably advantageous to the Athenian public, and as if recommendations of war originated only with venal and calumnious orators for their own profit—pronounced by the greatest aggressor and conqueror of his age, whose whole life was passed in war and in the elaborate organisation of great military force; and addressed to a people whose leading infirmity then was, an aversion almost unconquerable to the personal hardships and pecuniary sacrifices of effective war. This passage of the manifesto may probably be intended as a theme for Aeschines and the other philippising partisans in the Athenian assembly.

1 Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 139, 164; compare Isokratès, Or. v. (Philip.) s. 82.
War was now an avowed fact on both sides. At the instigation of Demosthenês and others, the Athenians decreed to equip a naval force, which was sent under Charis to the Hellespont and Propontis.

Meanwhile Philip brought up to the siege of Perinthus an army of 30,000 men, and a stock of engines and projectiles such as had never before been seen. His attack on this place was remarkable not only for great bravery and perseverance on both sides, but also for the extended scale of the military operations. Perinthus was strong and defensible: situated on a promontory terminating in abrupt cliffs southward towards the Propontis, unassailable from seaward, but sloping, though with a steep declivity towards the land, with which it was joined by an isthmus of not more than a furlong in breadth. Across this isthmus stretched the outer wall, behind which were seen the houses of the town, lofty, strongly built, and rising one above the other in terraces up the ascent of the promontory. Philip pressed the place with repeated assaults on the outer wall; battering it with rams, undermining it by sap, and rolling up moveable towers said to be 120 feet in height (higher even than the towers of the Perinthian wall), so as to chase away the defenders by missiles, and to attempt an assault by boarding-planks hand to hand. The Perinthians, defending themselves with energetic valour, repelled him for a long time from the outer wall. At length the besieging engines, with the reiterated attacks of Macedonian soldiers animated by Philip's promises, overpowered this wall, and drove them back into the town. It was found, however, that the town itself supplied a new defensible position to its citizens. The lower range of houses, united by strong barricades across the streets, enabled the Perinthians still to hold out. In spite of all their efforts, however, the town would have shared the fate of Olynthus, had they not been sustained by effective foreign aid. Not only

did their Byzantine kinsmen exhaust themselves to furnish every sort of assistance by sea, but also the Athenian fleet, and Persian satraps on the Asiatic side of the Propontis, coöperated: A body of Grecian mercenaries under Apollodorus, sent across from Asia by the Phrygian satrap Arisêtes, together with ample supplies of stores by sea, placed Perinthus in condition to defy the besiegers. ¹

After a siege which can hardly have lasted less than three months, Philip found all his efforts against Perinthus baffled. He then changed his plan, withdrew a portion of his forces, and suddenly appeared before Byzantium. The walls were strong, but inadequately manned and prepared; much of the Byzantine force being in service at Perinthus. Among several vigorous attacks, Philip contrived to effect a surprise on a dark and stormy night, which was very near succeeding. The Byzantines defended themselves bravely, and even defeated his fleet; but they too were rescued chiefly by foreign aid. The Athenians—now acting under the inspirations of Demosthenés, who exhorted them to bury in a generous oblivion all their past grounds of offence against Byzantium—sent a still more powerful fleet to the rescue, under the vigorous guidance of Phokion ² instead of the loose and rapacious Charés. Moreover the danger of Byzantium called forth strenuous efforts from the chief islanders of the Ægean—Chians, Rhodians, Keons, &c., to whom it was highly important that Philip should not become master of the great passage for imported corn into the Grecian seas. The large combined fleet thus assembled was fully sufficient to protect Byzantium. Comelled to abandon the siege of that city as well as of Perinthus, Philip was farther baffled in an attack on the Chersonese. Phokion not only maintained against him the full security of the Pro-

¹ Demosth. ad Philip. Epistol. p. 153; Diódor. xvi. 75; Pausanias, i. 20. 7. ² Plutarch, Phokion, c. 14; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 848-851. To this fleet of Phokion, Demosthenes contributed the outfit of a trireme, while the orator Hyperidès sailed with the fleet as trierarch. See Böckh, Urkunden über das Attische See-Wesen, p. 344, 442, 498. From that source the obscure chronology of the period now before us derives some light; since it becomes certain that the expedition of Charés began during the archonship of Nichomachidès; that is, in the year before Midsummer 340 B.C.; while the expedition of Phokion and Kephisophon began in the year following —after Midsummer 340 B.C.

² See some anecdotes respecting this siege of Byzantium by Philip, collected from later authors (Dionysius Byzantius, Hesychius Milesius and others) by the diligence of Böckh—Forschungen, p. 479 sqq.
These operations probably occupied the last six months of 840 B.C. They constituted the most important success gained by Athens, and the most serious reverse experienced by Philip, since the commencement of war between them. Coming as they did immediately after the liberation of Euboea in the previous year, they materially improved the position of Athens against Philip. Phokion and his fleet not only saved the citizens of Byzantium from all the misery of a capture by Macedonian soldiers, but checked privateering, and protected the tradeships so efficaciously, that corn became unusually abundant and cheap both at Athens and throughout Greece: and Demosthenes, as statesman and diplomatist, enjoyed the credit of having converted Euboea into a friendly and covering neighbour for Athens, instead of being a shelter for Philip’s marauding cruisers—as well as of bringing round Byzantium from the Macedonian alliance to that of Athens, and thus preventing both the Hellespont and the corn-trade from passing into Philip’s hands. The warmest votes of thanks, together with wreaths in token of gratitude, were decreed to Athens by the public assemblies of Byzantium, Perinthus, and the various towns of the Chersonese; while the Athenian public assembly also decreed and publicly proclaimed a similar vote of thanks and admiration to Demosthenes. The decree, moved by Aristonikus, was so unanimously popular at the time, that neither Aeschinest nor any of the other enemies of Demosthenes thought it safe to impeach the mover.

In the recent military operations, on so large a scale, against Byzantium and Perinthus, Philip had found himself in conflict not merely with Athens, but also with Chians, Rhodians and

1 Plutarch, Phokion, c. 14.
4 Demosth. De Corona, p. 255, 257. That these votes of thanks were passed, is authenticated by the words of the oration itself. Documents are inserted in the oration, purporting to be the decree of the Byzantines and Perinthians, and that of the Chersonesians.
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others; an unusually large muster of confederate Greeks. To break up this confederacy, he found it convenient to propose peace, and to abandon his designs against Byzantium and Perinthus—the point on which the alarm of the confederates chiefly turned. By withdrawing his forces from the Propontis, he was enabled to conclude peace with the Byzantines and most of the maritime Greeks who had joined in relieving them. The combination against him was thus dissolved, though with Athens¹ and her more intimate allies his naval war still continued. While he multiplied cruisers and privateers to make up by prizes his heavy outlay during the late sieges, he undertook with his land-force an enterprise, during the spring of 339 B.C., against the Scythian king Atheas; whose country, between Mount Haemus and the Danube, he invaded with success, bringing away as spoil a multitude of youthful slaves of both sexes, as well as cattle. On his return however across Mount Haemus, he was attacked on a sudden by the Thracian tribe Triballi, and sustained a defeat; losing all his accompanying captives, and being himself badly wounded through the thigh.² This expedition and its consequences occupied Philip during the spring and summer of 339 B.C.

Meanwhile the naval war of Athens against Philip was more effectively carried on, and her marine better organised, than ever it had been before. This was chiefly owing to an important reform proposed and carried by Demosthenes, immediately on the declaration of war against Philip in the summer of 340 B.C. Enjoying as he did, now after long public experience, the increased confidence of others; an unusually large muster of confederate Greeks. To

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¹ Diodorus (xvi. 77) mentions this peace; stating that Philip raised the sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus, and made peace ἠπὸ Αθηναίου καὶ τῶν ἐλλήνων ἔλληνας τῶν ἐναντιουμένους.

² Justin, ix. 2, 3. Aischines alludes to this expedition against the Scythians during the spring of the archon Theophratus, or 339 B.C. (Aischines, cont. Ktesiph. p. 71).
fidence of his fellow-citizens, and being named superintendent of the navy, he employed his influence not only in procuring energetic interference both as to Eubœa and Byzantium, but also in correcting deep-seated abuses which nullified the efficiency of the Athenian marine department.

The law of Periander (adopted in 357 B.C.) had distributed the burden of the trierarchy among the 1200 richest citizens on the taxable property-schedule, arranged in twenty fractions called Symmories, of sixty persons each. Among these men, the 300 richest, standing distinguished, as leaders of the Symmories, were invested with the direction and enforcement of all that concerned their collective agency and duties. The purpose of this law had been to transfer the cost of trierarchy—a sum of about 40, 50, or 60 minae for each trireme, defraying more or less of the outfit—which had originally been borne by a single rich man as his turn came round, and afterwards by two rich men in conjunction—to a partnership more or less numerous, consisting of five, six, or even fifteen or sixteen members of the same symmory. The number of such partners varied according to the number of triremes required by the state to be fitted out in any one year. If only few triremes were required, sixteen contributors might be allotted to defray collectively the trierarchic cost of each; if on the other hand many triremes were needed, a less number of partners, perhaps no more than five or six, could be allotted to each—since the total number of citizens whose turn it was to be assessed in that particular year was fixed. The assessment upon each partner was of course heavier, in proportion as the number of partners assigned to a trireme was smaller. Each member of the partnership, whether it consisted of five, of six, or of sixteen, contributed in equal proportion towards the cost. The richer members of the partnership thus paid no greater sum than

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1 Ἅρσινθος, Ktesiph. p. 85. c. 80. ἐπιστάτη τοῦ ναυτικοῦ.
2 Demosthen. De Coronā, p. 260–262. ἦν γὰρ αὐτοῖς (τοῖς ἡγεμόσι τῶν συμμορίων) ἐκ μὲν τῶν προτέρων νόμων συνεκκαιδέκα λειτουργεῖν — αὐτοῖς μὲν μικρὰ καὶ οὐδὲν ἀναλίσκουσίν, τοῖς δὲ ἀνάρους τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπιτρίβουσιν .... ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ νόμου τὸ γεγονόν κατὰ τὴν ὀσίαν ἑκατὸν τιτίναι καὶ διδοῖν symmories, at Athens, are subjects not perfectly known; the best expositions respecting them are to be found in Boeckh’s Public Economy of Athens (b. iv, ch. 11–13), and in his other work, Urkunden über das Attische Gewesen (ch. xi. xii. xiii.). Besides Parreidt, De Synonomis, part ii. p. 22, seq.
3 The fragment of Hyperides (cited by Harpokration v. Ἐμμορία), alluding to
and sometimes even evaded any payment of their own, by contracting with some one to discharge the duties of the post, on condition of a total sum not greater than that which they had themselves collected from those poorer members.

According to Demosthenes, the poorer members of these trierarchic symmories were sometimes pressed down almost to ruin by the sums demanded; so that they complained bitterly, and even planted themselves in the characteristic attitude of suppliants at Munychia or elsewhere in the city. When their liabilities to the state were not furnished in time, they became subject to imprisonment by the officers superintending the outfit of the armament. In addition to such private hardship, there arose great public mischief from the money not being at once forthcoming; the armament being delayed in its departure, and forced to leave Peireus either in bad condition or without its full numbers. Hence arose, in great part, the ill-success of Athens in her maritime enterprises against Philip, before the peace of 346 B.C.¹

The same influences, which had led originally to the introduction of such abuses, stood opposed to the orator in his attempted amendment. The body of Three Hundred, the richest men in the state—the leader or richest individual in each symmory, with those who stood second or third in order of wealth—employed every effort to throw out the proposition, and tendered large bribes to Demosthenes (if we may credit his assertion) as induce-

¹ There is a point in the earlier oration of Demosthenes De Symmoriis, illustrating the grievance which he now reformed. That grievance consisted, for one main portion, in the fact, that the richest citizen in a trierarchic partnership paid a sum no greater (sometimes even less) than the poorest. Now it is remarkable that this unfair apportionment of charge might have occurred, and is nowhere guarded against, in the symmories as proposed by Demosthenes himself. His symmories, each comprising sixty persons or sixth of the total active 1200, are directed to divide themselves into five fractions of twelve persons each, or sixth of the 1200. Each group of twelve is to comprise the richest alongside of the poorest members of the sixty (ἀντανακληται πρὸς τὸν ἐπιστρεφόντας τῶν ἀπορωτών, p. 182), so that each group would contain individuals very unequal in wealth, though the aggregate wealth of one group would be nearly equal to that of another. These twelve persons were to defray collectively the cost of trierarchy for one ship, two ships, or three ships, according to the number of ships which the state might require (p. 183). But Demosthenes nowhere points out in what proportions they were to share the expense among them; whether the richest citizens among the twelve were to pay only an equal sum with the poorest, or a sum greater in proportion to their wealth. There is nothing in his project to prevent the richer members from insisting that all should pay equally. This is the very abuse that he denounced afterwards (in 340 B.C.), as actually realized—and corrected by a new law. The oration of Demosthenes De Symmoriis, omitting as it does all positive determination as to proportions of payment, helps us to understand how the abuse grew up.
ments for dropping it. He was impeached moreover under the Graphé Paranomon, as mover of an unconstitutional or illegal decree. It required no small share of firmness and public spirit, combined with approved eloquence and an established name, to enable Demosthenês to contend against these mighty enemies.

His new law caused the charge of trierarchy to be levied upon all the members of the symmories, or upon all above a certain minimum of property, in proportion to their rated property; but it seems, if we rightly make out, to have somewhat heightened the minimum, so that the aggregate number of persons chargeable was diminished. Every citizen rated at ten talents was assessed singly for the charge of trierarchy belonging to one trireme; if rated at twenty talents, for the trierarchy of two; at thirty talents, for the trierarchy of three; if above thirty talents, for that of three triremes and a service boat—which was held to be the maximum payable by any single individual. Citizens rated at less than ten talents, were grouped together into ratings of ten talents in the aggregate, in order to bear collectively the trierarchy of one of a trireme; the contributions furnished by each person in the group being proportional to the sum for which he stood rated. This new proposition, while materially relieving the poorer citizens, made large addition to the assessments of the rich. A man rated at twenty talents, who had before been chargeable for only the sixteenth part of the expense of one trierarchy, along with partners much poorer than himself but equally assessed—now became chargeable with the entire expense of two trierarchies. All persons liable were assessed in fair proportion to the sum for which they stood rated in the schedule. When the impeachment against Demosthenês came to be tried before the Dikastery, he was acquitted by more than four-fifths of the Dikasts; so that the accuser was compelled to pay the established fine. And so animated was the temper of the public at that moment, in favour of vigorous measures for prosecuting the war just declared, that they went heartily along with him, and adopted the main features of his trierarchic reform. The resistance from the rich, however, though insufficient to throw out the measure, constrained him to modify it more than once, during the progress of the discussion; partly in consequence of

1 Æschines (adv. Ktesiph. p. 85) charges Demosthenês with "having stolen away from the city the trierarchs of 65 swift-sailing vessels." This implies, I imagine, that the new law diminished the total number of persons chargeable with trierarchy.

2 Deimarchus adv. Deinarch. p. 95. s. 43. Ἐν τοῖς τριακοσίων γεγενημένων, 59' o 2
the opposition of Δεσχίνης, whom he accuses of having been hired by the rich for the purpose. It is deeply to be regretted that the speeches of both of them—especially those of Demosthenes, which must have been numerous—have not been preserved.

Thus were the trierarchic symmories distributed and assessed anew upon each man in the ratio of his wealth, and therefore most largely upon the Three Hundred richest. How long the law remained unchanged, we do not know. But it was found to work admirably well; and Demosthenes boasts that during the entire war (that is, from the renewal of the war about August 340 B.C., to the battle of Chaeroneia in August 338 B.C.) all the trierarchies named under the law were ready in time without complaint or suffering; while the ships, well equipped and exempt from the previous causes of delay, were found prompt and effective for all exigences. Not one was either left behind, or lost at sea, throughout these two years.

Probably the first fruits of the Demosthenic reform in Athenian naval administration, was, the fleet equipped under Phokion, which acted so successfully at and near Byzantium. The operations of Athens at sea, though not known in detail, appear to have been better conducted and more...
prosperous in their general effect than they had ever been since the Social War.

But there arose now a grave and melancholy dispute in the interior of Greece, which threw her upon her defence by land. This new disturbing cause was nothing less than another Sacred War, declared by the Amphiktyonic assembly against the Lokrians of Ampissa. Kindled chiefly by the Athenian Æschinés, it more than compensated Philip for his repulse at Byzantium and his defeat by the Triballi; bringing, like the former Sacred War, aggrandisement to him alone, and ruin to Grecian liberty.

I have recounted, in an earlier portion of this work, the first Sacred War recorded in Grecian history (590-580 B.C.), about two centuries before the birth of Æschinés and Demosthenés. That war had been undertaken by the Amphiktyonic Greeks to punish, and ended by destroying, the flourishing sea-port of Kirrha, situated near the mouth of the river Pleistus, on the coast of the fertile plain stretching from the southern declivity of Delphi to the sea. Kirrha was originally the port of Delphi; and of the ancient Phokian town of Krissa, to which Delphi was once an annexed sanctuary. But in process of time Kirrha increased at the expense of both; through profits accumulated from the innumerable visitors by sea who landed there as the nearest access to the temple. The prosperous Kirrhaeans, inspiring jealousy at Delphi and Krissa, were accused of extortion in the tolls levied from visitors, as well as of other guilty or offensive proceedings. An Amphiktyonic war, wherein the Athenian Solon stood prominently forward, being declared against them, Kirrha was taken and destroyed. Its fertile plain was consecrated to the Delphian god, under an oath taken by all the Amphiktyonic members, with solemn pledges and formidable imprecations against all disturbers. The entire space between the temple and the sea now became, as the oracle had required, sacred property of the god; that is, incapable of being tilled, planted, or occupied in any permanent way, by man, and devoted only to spontaneous herbage with pasturing animals.

But though the Delphians thus procured the extirpation of their troublesome neighbours at Kirrha, it was indispensable that on or near the same spot there should exist a town and port, for the

1 Chap. XXVIII.
2 For the topography of the country round Delphi, see the instructive work of Ulrichs, Reisen und Forschungen in Griechenland (Bremen, 1840), chapters i. and ii. about Kirrha and Krissa.
accommodation of the guests who came from all quarters to Delphi; the more so, as such persons, not merely visitors, but also traders with goods to sell, now came in greater multitudes than ever, from the increased attractions imparted out of the rich spoils of Kirrha itself, to the Pythian festival. How this want was at first supplied, while the remembrance of the oath was yet fresh, we are not informed. But in process of time Kirrha became re-occupied and re-fortified by the western neighbours of Delphi—the Lokrians of Amphissa—on whose borders it stood, and for whom probably it served as a port not less than for Delphi. These new occupants received the guests coming to the temple, enriched themselves by the accompanying profit, and took into cultivation a certain portion of the plain around the town.  

At what period the occupation by the Lokrians had its origin, we are unable to say. So much however we make out—not merely from Demosthenes, but even from Æschines—that in their time it was an ancient and established occupation—not a recent intrusion or novelty. "The town was fortified; the space immediately adjacent being tilled and claimed by the Lokrians as their own." This indeed was a departure from the oath, sworn by Solon with his Amphiktyonic contemporaries, to consecrate Kirrha and its lands to the Delphian god. But if that oath had been literally carried out, the god himself, and the Delphians among whom he dwelt, would have been the principal losers; because the want of a convenient port would have been a serious discouragement, if not a positive barrier, against the arrival of visitors, most of whom came by sea. Accordingly the renovation of the town and port of Kirrha, doubtless on a modest scale, together with a space of adjacent land for tillage, was at least tolerated, if not encouraged. Much of the plain, indeed, still remained untilled and unplanted, as the property of Apollo; the boundaries being perhaps not accurately drawn.

While the Lokrians had thus been serviceable to the Delphian temple by occupying Kirrha, they had been still more valuable as its foremost auxiliaries and protectors against the Phokians,  

1 Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 69; compare Livy, xlii, 5; Pausanias x. 37, 4. The distance from Delphi to Kirrha is given by Pausanias at sixty stadia, or about seven English miles, by Strabo at eighty stadia.

2 Æschines, l. c.; Demosth. De Corn. p. 277, όψιν χώραν ἄν οἱ μὲν ἀμφισσεῖσσαι αὐτῶν ἔφασαν, ὁταν δὲ (Æschines) τὸν ἑραῖον χώρας ἔτησαν ἕτερον οὖν, κ. c.
their enemies of long standing. One of the first objects of Philomelus the Phokian, after defeating the Lokrian armed force, was to fortify the sacred precinct of Delphi on its western side, against their attacks; and we cannot doubt that their position in close neighbourhood to Delphi must have been one of positive suffering as well as of danger, during the years when the Phokian leaders, with their numerous mercenary bands, remained in victorious occupation of the temple, and probably of the harbour of Kirrha also. The subsequent turn of fortune—when Philip crushed the Phokians and when the Amphiktyonic assembly was reorganised, with him as its chief—must have found the Amphissian Lokrians among the warmest allies and sympathisers. Resuming possession of Kirrha, they may perhaps have been emboldened, in such a moment of triumphant reaction, to enlarge their occupancy round the walls to a greater extent than they had done before. Moreover they were animated with feelings attached to Thebes; and were hostile to Athens, as the ally and upholder of their enemies the Phokians.

Matters were in this condition when the spring meeting of the Amphiktyonic assembly (February or March 339 B.C.) was held at Delphi. Diognetus was named by the Athenians to attend it as Hieromucmon, or chief legate; with three Pylagore or vice-legates, Aeschinés, Meidias, and Thrasyklés. We need hardly believe Demosthenes, when he states that the name of Aeschinés was put up without foreknowledge on the part of any one; and that though it passed, yet not more than two or three hands were held up in his favour. Soon after they reached Delphi, Diognetus was seized with a fever, so that the task of speaking in the Amphiktyonic assembly was confided to Aeschinés.

There stood in the Delphian temple some golden or gilt shields dedicated as an offering out of the spoils taken at the battle of Platae, a century and a half before—with an inscription to this effect—Dedicated by the Athenians, out of the spoils of Persians and Thebans engaged in joint battle against the Greeks. It appears that these shields had recently been set up afresh (having been perhaps stript of their gilding by the Phokian plunderers) in a new cell or chapel, without the full customary forms

1 Diodor. xvi. 24; Thucyd. iii. 101. 2 Diodor. xvi. 25. 3 Aeschinés adv. Ktesiph. p. 69. 4 Demosthen. De Corona, p. 277.
of prayer or solemnities; which perhaps might be supposed unnecessary, as the offering was not now dedicated for the first time. The inscription, little noticed and perhaps obscured by the lapse of time on the original shields, would now stand forth brightly and conspicuously on the new gilding; reviving historical recollections highly offensive to the Thebans, and to the Amphiktyonic assembly, but were even preparing (if we are to believe Aéchinès) to accuse Athens of impiety; and to invoke against her a fine of fifty talents, for omission of the religious solemnities. But this is denied by Demosthenès; who states that the Lokrians could not bring any such accusation against Athens without sending a formal summons—which they never had sent. Demosthenès would be doubtless right as to the regular form, probably also as to the actual fact; though Æschinès accuses him of having received bribes to defend the iniquities of the Lokrians. Whether the Lokrians went so far as to invoke a penalty, or not—at any rate they spoke in terms of complaint against the proceeding. Such complaint was not without real foundation; since it was better for the common safety of Hellenic liberty against the Macedonian aggressor, that the treason of Thebes at the battle of Platea should stand as matter of past antiquity, rather than be republished in a new edition. But this was not the ground taken by the complainants, nor could they directly impeach the right of Athens to burnish up her old donatives. Accordingly they assailed the act on the allegation of impiety, as not having been preceded by the proper religious solemnities; whereby they obtained the opportunity of inveighing against Athens, as ally of the Phokians in their recent sacrilege, and enemy of Thebes the stedfast champion of the god.

“The Amphiktyons being assembled (I here give the main

1 This must have been an ἀποκατάστασις τῶν ἀναθημάτων (compare Plutarch, Demetrius, c. 13.), requiring to be preceded by solemn ceremonies, sometimes specially directed by the oracle.

2 How painfully the Thebans of the Demosthenic age felt the recollection of the alliance of their ancestors with the Persians at Platea, we may read in Demosthenès, De Symmoricis, p. 187.

It appears that the Thebans also had erected a new chapel at Delphi (after 346 B.C.) out of the spoils acquired from the conquered Phokians—ἐκ τῶν ἀπολεσμένων Φωκών, ἤ ἱδρύσαν Θηβαῖοι (Diodor. xvii. 10).

3 Æschinès adv. Ktesiph. p. 70. The words of his speech do not however give either a full or a clear account of the transaction; which I have endeavoured, as well as I can, to supply in the text.

4 Demosthen. De Coronis, p. 277.

recital, though not the exact words, of Æschinês), a friendly person came to acquaint us that the Amphissians were bringing on their accusation against Athens. My sick colleagues requested me immediately to enter the assembly and undertake her defence. I made haste to comply, and was just beginning to speak, when an Amphissian—of extreme rudeness and brutality—perhaps even under the influence of some misleading divine impulse—interrupted me, and exclaimed—'Do not hear him, men of Hellas! Do not permit the name of the Athenian people to be pronounced among you at this holy season! Turn them out of the sacred ground, like men under a curse.' With that he denounced us for our alliance with the Phokians, and poured out many other outrageous invectives against the city.

'To me (continues Æschinês) all this was intolerable to hear: I cannot even now think on it with calmness—and at the moment, I was provoked to anger such as I had never felt in my life before. The thought crossed me that I would retort upon the Amphissians for their impious invasion of the Kirrhæan land. That plain, lying immediately below the sacred precinct in which we were assembled, was visible throughout. 'You see, Amphiktyons (said I), that plain cultivated by the Amphissians, with buildings erected in it for farming and pottery! You have before your eyes the harbour, consecrated by the oath of your forefathers, now occupied and fortified. You know of yourselves, without needing witnesses to tell you, that these Amphissians have levied tolls and are taking profit out of the sacred harbour!' I then caused to be read publicly the ancient oracle, the oath, and the imprecations (pronounced after the first Sacred War, wherein Kirrhæa was destroyed). Then continuing, I said—'Here am I, ready to defend the god and the sacred property, according to the oath of our forefathers, with hand, foot, voice, and all the powers that I possess. I stand prepared to clear my own city of her obligations to the gods: do you take counsel forthwith for yourselves. You are here about to offer sacrifice and pray to the gods for good things, publicly and individually. Look well then—where will you find voice, or soul, or eyes, or courage, to pronounce such supplications if you permit these accursed Amphissians to remain unpunished, when they have come under the imprecations of the recorded oath? Recollect that the oath distinctly proclaims the sufferings awaiting all impious transgressors, and even menaces those who tolerate their proceedings, by declaring,—They who do not stand forward to
vindicate Apollo, Artonis, Latona, and Athéné Pronaia, may not sacrifice undefiled or with favourable acceptance."

Such is the graphic and impressive description, given by Æschines himself some years afterwards to the Athenian assembly, of his own address to the Amphiktyonic meeting in spring 339 B.C.; on the lofty site of the Delphian Pylea, with Kirrha and its plain spread out before his eyes, and with the ancient oath and all its fearful imprecations recorded on the brass plate hard by, readable by every one. His speech, received with loud shouts, roused violent passion in the bosoms of the Amphiktyons, as well as of the hearers assembled round. The audience at Delphi was not like that of Athens. Athenian citizens were accustomed to excellent oratory, and to the task of balancing opposite arguments: though susceptible of high-wrought intellectual excitement—admiration or repugnance as the case might be—they discharged it all in the final vote, and then went home to their private affairs. But to the comparatively rude men at Delphi, the speech of a first-rate Athenian orator was a rarity. When Æschines, with great rhetorical force, unexpectedly revived in their imaginations the ancient and terrific history of the curse of Kirrha—assisted by all the force of visible and local association—they were worked up to madness; while in such minds as theirs, the emotion raised would not pass off by simple voting, but required to be discharged by instant action.

How intense and ungovernable that emotion became, is shown by the monstrous proceedings which followed. The original charge of impiety brought against Athens, set forth by the Amphissian speaker coarsely and ineffectively, and indeed noway lending itself to rhetorical exaggeration—was now altogether forgotten in the more heinous impicty of which Æschines had accused the Amphissians themselves. About the necessity of punishing them, there was but one language. The Amphissian speakers appear to have fled—since even their persons would hardly have been safe amidst such an excitement. And if the day had not been already far advanced, the multitude would have rushed at once down from the scene of debate to Kirrha.

1 Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 70.
2 Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 277. ὡς λόγοις ἁμαρτημάτων, τῶν Ἀμφικτύων, πείθει ψηφίσασθαι, δε.
3 Æschin. adv. Ktesiph. p. 70.
On account of the lateness of the hour, a resolution was passed, which the herald formally proclaimed,—That on the morrow at daybreak, the whole Delphian population, of sixteen years and upwards, freemen as well as slaves, should muster at the sacrificing place, provided with spades and pickaxes; that the assembly of Amphiktyonic legates would there meet them, to act in defence of the god and the sacred property; that if there were any city whose deputies did not appear, it should be excluded from the temple, and proclaimed unholy and accursed.

At daybreak, accordingly, the muster took place. The Delphian multitude came with their implements for demolition:—the Amphiktyons with Ἄσχινῆς placed themselves at the head:—and all marched down to the port of Kirrha. Those there resident—probably astounded and terrified at so furious an inroad from an entire population, with whom, a few hours before, they had been on friendly terms—abandoned the place without resistance, and ran to acquaint their fellow-citizens at Amphissa. The Amphiktyons with their followers then entered Kirrha, demolished all the harbour-conveniences, and even set fire to the houses in the town. This Ἄσχινῆς himself tells us; and we may be very sure (though he does not tell us) that the multitude thus set on were not contented with simply demolishing, but plundered and carried away whatever they could lay hands on. Presently, however, the Amphissians, whose town was on the high ground about seven or eight miles west of Delphi, apprised of the destruction of their property and seeing their houses in flames, arrived in haste to the rescue, with their full-armed force. The Amphiktyons and the Delphian multitude were obliged in their turn to evacuate Kirrha, and hurry back to Delphi at their best speed. They were in the greatest personal danger. According to Demosthenēs, some were actually seized; but they must have been set at liberty almost immediately.1 None were put to death;
an escape—which they probably owed to the respect borne by the Amphissians, even under such exasperating circumstances, to the Amphiktyonic function.

On the morning after this narrow escape, the president, a Thessalian of Pharsalus named Kottythus, convoked a full Amphiktyonic Ekklesia; that is, not merely the Amphiktyons proper, or the legates and co-legates deputed from the various cities—but also, along with, them, the promiscuous multitude present for purpose of sacrifice and consultation of the oracle. Loud and indignant were the denunciations pronounced in this meeting against the Amphissians; while Athens was eulogised as having taken the lead in vindicating the rights of Apollo. It was finally resolved that the Amphissians should be punished as sinners against the god and the sacred domain, as well as against the Amphiktyons personally; that the legates should now go home, to consult each his respective city; and that as soon as some positive resolution for executory measures could be obtained, each should come to a special meeting, appointed at Thermopylae for a future day—seemingly not far distant, and certainly prior to the regular season of autumnal convocation.

Thus was the spark applied, and the flame kindled, of a second Amphiktyonic war, between six and seven years after the conclusion of the former in 346 B.C. What has been just recounted comes to us from Æschines, himself the witness as well as the incendiary. We here judge him, not from accusations preferred by his rival Demosthenes, but from his own depositions; and from facts which he details not simply without regret, but with a strong feeling of pride. It is impossible to read them without becoming sensible of the profound misfortune which had come over the Grecian world; since the unanimity or dissidence of its component portions were now determined, not by political congresses at Athens or Sparta, but by statement, it must be by design. But if the facts as stated by Æschines are at all near the truth, it is hardly possible that the two decrees cited in Demosthenes can have been the real decrees passed by the Amphiktyons. The substance of what was resolved, as given by Æschines, pp. 70, 71, is materially different from the first decree quoted in the oration of Demosthenes, p. 278. There is no mention, in the latter, of those vivid and prominent circumstances—the summoning of all the Delphians, freemen and slaves above 16 years of age, with spades and mattocks—the exclusion from the temple, and the curving, of any city which did not appear to take part. The compiler of those decrees appears to have had only Demosthenes before him, and to have known nothing of Æschines. Of the violent proceedings of the Amphiktyons, both provoked and described by Æschines, Demosthenes says nothing.
debates in the religious convocation at Delphi and Thermopylae. Here we have the political sentiment of the Amphissian Lokrians—their sympathy for Thebes, and dislike to Athens—dictating complaint and invective against the Athenians on the allegation of impiety. Against every one, it was commonly easy to find matter for such an allegation, if parties were on the look-out for it; while defence was difficult, and the fuel for kindling religious antipathy all at the command of the accuser. Accordingly Aeschines troubles himself little with the defence, but plants himself at once on the vantage-ground of the accuser, and retorts the like charge of impiety against the Amphissians, on totally different allegations. By superior oratory, as well as by the appeal to an ancient historical fact of a character peculiarly terror-striking, he exasperates the Amphiktyons to a pitch of religious ardour, in vindication of the god, such as to make them disdain alike the suggestions either of social justice or of political prudence. Demosthenes—giving credit to the Amphiktyons for something like the equity of procedure, familiar to Athenian ideas and practice—affirmed that no charge against Athens could have been made before them by the Lokrians, because no charge would be entertained without previous notice given to Athens. But Aeschines, when accusing the Lokrians,—on a matter of which he had given no notice, and which it first crossed his mind to mention at the moment when he made his speech¹—found these Amphiktyons so inflammable in their religious antipathies, that they forthwith call out and head the Delphian mob armed with pickaxes for demolition. To evoke, from a far-gone and half-forgotten past, the memory of that fierce religious feud, for the purpose of extruding established proprietors, friends and defenders of the temple, from an occupancy wherein they rendered essential service to the numerous visitors of Delphi—to execute this purpose with brutal violence, creating the maximum of exasperation in the sufferers, endangering the lives of the Amphiktyonic legates, and raising another Sacred War pregnant with calamitous results—this was an amount of mischief such as the bitterest enemy of Greece could hardly have surpassed. The prior imputations of irreligion, thrown out by the Lokrian orator against Athens, may have been futile and malicious; but the retort of Aeschines was far worse, extending as well as embittering the poison of pious discord, and plunging the Amphiktyonic assembly

¹ Aeschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 70. σίων περὶ τὴν γῆν τὴν ἱερὰν ἀσεβείας, ἔπηλθε οὖν μοι ἐπὶ τὴν γνώμην τῆς τῶν Ἀμφιτων.
in a contest from which there was no exit except by the sword of Philip.

Some comments on this proceeding appeared requisite, partly because it is the only distinct matter known to us, from an actual witness, respecting the Amphiktyonic council—partly from its ruinous consequences, which will presently appear. At first, indeed, these consequences did not manifest themselves; and when Aeschines returned to Athens, he told his story to the satisfaction of the people. We may presume that he reported the proceedings at the time in the same manner as he stated them afterwards, in the oration now preserved. The Athenians, indignant at the accusation brought by the Lokrians against Athens, were disposed to take part in that movement of pious enthusiasm which Aeschines had kindled on the subject of Kirrha, pursuant to the ancient oath sworn by their forefathers.1 So forcibly was the religious point of view of this question thrust upon the public mind, that the opposition of Demosthenes was hardly listened to. He laid open at once the consequences of what had happened, saying—"Aeschines, you are bringing war into Attica—an Amphiktyonic war." But his predictions were cried down as illusions or mere manifestations of party feeling against a rival.2 Aeschines denounced him openly as the hired agent of the impious Lokrians;3 a charge sufficiently refuted by the conduct of these Lokrians themselves, who are described by Aeschines as gratuitously insulting Athens.

But though the general feeling at Athens, immediately after the return of Aeschines, was favourable to his proceedings at Delphi, it did not long continue so. Nor is the change difficult to understand. The first mention of the old oath, and the original devastation of Kirrha, sanctioned by the name and authority of Solon, would naturally turn the Athenian mind into a strong feeling of pious sentiment against the tenants of that accursed spot. But farther information would tend to prove that the Lokrians were more sinned against than sinning; that the occupation of Kirrha as a harbour was a convenience to all Greeks, and most of all to the temple itself; lastly, that the imputations said to have been

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1 Aeschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 71. καὶ ἄμοσαν, οὖδὲ τῆς ἄρας οὐδὲ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ τὰς πράξεις ἡμῶν ἀποδεξαμένον τοῦ δήμου, μαντείας.
2 Demosth. De Corone, p. 275.
cast by the Lokrians upon Athens had either never been made at all (so we find Demosthenés affirming), or were nothing worse than an unauthorised burst of ill-temper from some rude individual. Though Ἀσχίνης had obtained at first a vote of approbation for his proceedings, yet when his proposition came to be made—that Athens should take part in the special Amphiktyonic meeting convened for punishing the Amphissians—the opposition of Demosthenés was found more effective. Both the Senate and the public assembly passed a resolution peremptorily forbidding all interference on the part of Athens at that special meeting. “The Hieromnemon and the Pylagore of Athens (so the decree prescribed) shall take no part, either in word or deed or resolution, with the persons assembled at that special meeting. They shall visit Delphi and Thermopylae at the regular times fixed by our forefathers.” This important decree marks the change of opinion at Athens. Ἀσχίνης indeed tells us that it was only procured by crafty manoeuvre, on the part of Demosthenés, being hurried through in a thin assembly, at the close of business, when most citizens (and Ἀσχίνης among them) had gone away. But there is nothing to confirm such insinuations; moreover Ἀσχίνης, if he had still retained the public sentiment in his favour, could easily have baffled the tricks of his rival.¹

The special meeting of Amphiktyons at Thermopylae accordingly took place, at some time between the two regular periods of spring and autumn. No legates attended from Athens, nor any from Thebes—a fact made known to us by Ἀσχίνης, and remarkable as evincing an incipient tendency towards concurrence, such as had never existed before, between these two important cities. The remaining legates met, determined to levy a joint force for the purpose of punishing the Amphissians, and chose the president Kottyphus general. According to Ἀσχίνης, this force was brought together, marched against the Lokrians, and reduced them to submission, but granted to them indulgent terms; requiring from them an incense to the Delphian god, payable at stated intervals—sentencing some of the Lokrian leaders to banishment as having instigated the encroachment on the sacred domain—and recalling others who had opposed it. But the Lokrians (he says), after the force had retired, broke faith, paid nothing, and brought back all the guilty leaders. Demo-

sthenés, on the contrary, states that Kottyphus summoned contingents from the various Amphiktyonic states; but some never came at all, while those who did come were lukewarm and inefficient; so that the purpose altogether miscarried. The account of Demosthenés is the more probable of the two; for we know from Aeschines himself that neither Athens nor Thebes took part in the proceeding, while Sparta had been excluded from the Amphiktyonic council in 346 B.C. There remained therefore only the secondary and smaller states. Of these, the Peloponnesians, even if inclined, could not easily come, since they could neither march by land through Boeotia, nor come with ease by sea while the Amphissians were masters of the port of Kirria; and the Thessalians and their neighbours were not likely to take so intense an interest in the enterprise as to carry it through without the rest. Moreover, the party who were only waiting for a pretext to invite the interference of Philip, would rather prefer to do nothing, in order to show how impossible it was to act without him. Hence we may fairly assume that what Aeschines represents as indulgent terms granted to the Lokrians and afterwards violated by them, was at best nothing more than a temporary accommodation, concluded because Kottyphus could not do anything—probably did not wish to do anything—without the intervention of Philip.

The next Pylaea, or the autumnal meeting of the Amphiktyons at Thermopylae, now arrived; yet the Lokrians were still unsubdued. Kottyphus and his party now made the formal proposition to invoke the aid of Philip. "If you do not consent (they told the Amphiktyons), you must come forward personally in force, subscribe ample funds, and fine all defaulters. Choose which you prefer." The determination of the Amphiktyons was taken to invoke the interference of Philip; appointing him commander of the combined force, and champion of the god, in the new Sacred War, as he had been in the former.

At the autumnal meeting, where this fatal measure of calling

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2 Demosth. De Coron., p. 277, 278.
3 The chronology of events here recounted has been differently conceived by different authors. According to my view, the first motion raised by Aeschines against the Amphissian Lokrians, occurred in the spring meeting of the Amphiktyons at Delphi in 339 B.C. (the year of the archon Theophrastus at Athens); next, there was held a special, or extraordinary meeting of the Amphiktyons, and a warlike manifestation against the Lokrians; after which came the regular autumnal meeting at Thermopylae (B.C. 339—September—the year of the archon Lysimachides at Athens), where the vote was passed to call in the military interference of Philip.

This chronology does not indeed agree with the two so-called decrees of
in Philip was adopted, legates from Athens were doubtless present (Æschines among them), according to usual custom; for the decree of Demosthenes had enacted that the usual custom should be followed, though it had forbidden the presence of legates at the special or extraordinary meeting. Æschines was not backward in advocating the application to Philip; nor indeed could he take any other course, consistently with what he had done at the preceding spring meeting. He himself only laments that Athens suffered herself to be deterred, by the corrupt suggestions of Demosthenes, from heading the crusade against Amphissa, when the gods themselves had singled her out for that pious duty. What part Thebes took in the nomination of Philip, or whether her legates attended at the autumnal Amphiktyonic meeting, we do not know. But it is to be remembered that one of the twelve Amphiktyonic double suffrages now belonged to the Macedonians themselves; while many of the remaining members had become dependent on Macedonia—the Thessalians, Phthiot Achabans, the Amphiktyons, and with the documentary statement—"Αρχον Τρίανθον ἐπὶ ἔτει ἑκατέρους ἑκτητῃ ἐπὶ δέκα---which we read as incorporated in the oration De Corona, p. 279. But I have already stated that I think these documents spurious.

The archon Mnosithheidēs (like all the other archons named in the documents recited in the oration De Corona) is a wrong name, and cannot have been quoted from any genuine document. Next, the first decree of the Amphiktyons is not in harmony with the statement of Aischines, himself the great innovator of what the Amphiktyons, really did. Lastly, the second decree plainly intimates that the person who composed the two decrees conceived the nomination of Philip to have taken place in the very same Amphiktyonic assembly as the first movement against the Lokrians. The same words, ἐπὶ Κλειναγόρου ἑαρινῆς πυλαίας---prefixed to both decrees, must be understood to indicate the same assembly. Mr. Clinton’s supposition that the first decree was passed at the spring meeting of 338 B.C.—and the second at the spring meeting of 337 B.C.—Kleinagoras being the Eponymus in both years—appears to me more probable. The special purpose and value of an Eponymus would disappear, if the same person served in that capacity for two successive years. Becker adopts the conjecture of Reiske, altering έαρινῆς πυλαίας in the second decree into βουραρίνης πυλαίας. This would bring the second decree into better harmony with chronology; but there is nothing in the state of the text to justify such an innovation. Bohmcke (Forsch, p. 498—501), adopts a supposition yet more improbable. He supposes that Aischines was chosen Pythagoras at the beginning of the Attic year 340—339 B.C., and that he attended first at Delphi at the autumnal meeting of the Amphiktyons 340 B.C.; that he there raised the violent storm which he himself describes in his speech; and that afterwards, at the subsequent spring meeting, came both the two decrees which we now read in the oration De Corona. But the first of those two decrees can never have come after the outrageous proceeding described by Aischines. I will add, that in the form of decree, the president Kottyphas is called an Arcadian, whereas Aischines designates him as a Phocian.

1 Demosth. De Corona, p. 278.

... τοῦ μὲν θεών τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῷ ἐνεστείλας ἄθιμα παραδοκώσαν, τῆς δὲ Δημοσθένου διαρκοκιάς ἐμποδίων γεγονημένης.

Mr. Clinton’s oration De Corona, p. 279.

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PERREHBIANS, DOLOPIANS, MAGNETES, &C. It was probably not very difficult for Kottyphus and Aeschiné to procure a vote investing Philip with the command. Even those who were not favourable might dread the charge of impiety if they opposed it.

During the spring and summer of this year 339 B.C. (the interval between the two Amphiktyonic meetings), Philip had been engaged in his expedition against the Scythians, and in his battle, while returning, against the Triballi, wherein he received the severe wound already mentioned. His recovery from this wound was completed, when the Amphiktyonic vote, conferring upon him the command, was passed. He readily accepted a mission which his partisans, and probably his bribes, had been mainly concerned in procuring. Immediately collecting his forces, he marched southward through Thermopylae, proclaiming his purpose of avenging the Delphian god upon the unholy Lokrians of Amphissa. The Amphiktyonic deputies, and the Amphiktyonic contingents, in greater or less numbers, accompanied his march. In passing through Thermopylae, he took Nikaea (one of the towns most essential to the security of the pass) from the Thebans, in whose hands it had remained since his conquest of Phokis in 346 B.C., though with a Macedonian garrison sharing in the occupation. Not being yet assured of the concurrence of the Thebans in his farther projects, he thought it safer to consign this important town to the Thesalians, who were thoroughly in his dependence.

His march from Thermopylae, whether to Delphi and Amphissa, or into Bœotia, lay through Phokis. That unfortunate territory still continued in the defenceless condition to which it had been condemned by the Amphiktyonic sentence of 346 B.C., without a single fortified town, occupied merely by small dispersed villages and by a population scanty as well as poor. On reaching Elateia, once the principal Phokian town, but now dismantled, Philip halted his army, and began forthwith to re-establish the walls, converting it into a strong place for permanent military occupation. He at the same time occupied Kythinia, the principal town in the little territory of Doris, in the upper portion of the valley of the river Ke-
Philip, situated in the short mountain road from Thermopylae to Amphiissa.

The seizure of Elateia by Philip, coupled with his operations for reconstituting it as a permanent military post, was an event of the gravest moment, exciting surprise and uneasiness throughout a large portion of the Grecian world. Hitherto he had proclaimed himself as general acting under the Amphiktyonic vote of nomination, and as on his march simply to vindicate the Delphian god against sacrilegious Lokrians. Had such been his real purpose, however, he would have had no occasion to halt at Elateia, much less to re-fortify and garrison it. Accordingly it now became evident that he meant something different, or at least something ulterior. He himself indeed no longer affected to conceal his real purposes. Sending envoys to Thebes, he announced that he had come to attack the Athenians, and earnestly invited her cooperation as his ally, against enemies odious to her as well as to himself. But if the Thebans, in spite of an excellent opportunity to crush an ancient foe, should still determine to stand aloof, he claimed of them at least a free passage through Boeotia, that he might invade Attica with his own forces.¹

The relations between Athens and Thebes at this moment were altogether unfriendly. There had indeed been no actual armed conflict between them since the conclusion of the Sacred War in 346 B.C.; yet the old sentiment of enmity and jealousy, dating from earlier days and aggravated during that war, still continued unabated. To soften this reciprocal dislike, and to bring about cooperation with Thebes, had always been the aim of some Athenian politicians — Eubulus — Aristophon — and Demosthenes himself, whom Aeschines tries to discredit as having been complimented and corrupted by the Thebans.² Nevertheless, in spite of various visits and embassies to Thebes, where a philo-Athenian minority also subsisted, nothing had ever been accomplished.³ The enmity still remained, and had been even artificially aggravated (if we are to believe Demosthenes') during

¹ Demosthen. De Corona, p. 293-299. Justin, ix. 3, "diu dissimulatum bello Atheniensibus infect." This expression is correct in the sense, that Philip, who had hitherto pretended to be on his march against Amphiissa, disclosed his real purpose to be against Athens, at the moment when he seized Elateia. Otherwise, he had been at open war with Athens, ever since the sieges of Byzantium and Perinthos in the preceding year.
² Aeschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46, 47.
⁴ Demosth. De Corona, p. 276, 281.
of the six months which elapsed since the breaking out of the Amphissian quarrel, by Ασκίνες and the partisans of Philip in both cities.

The ill-will subsisting between Athens and Thebes at the moment when Philip took possession of Elateia, was so acknowledged that he had good reason for looking upon confederacy of the two against him as impossible. 1 To enforce the request, that Thebes, already his ally, would continue to act as such at this critical juncture, he despatched thither envoys not merely Macedonian, but also Thessalian, Dolopian, Phthiot Αχαεία, Αἰτωλική, and Αμφικτύνικαι—the Amphiktyonic allies who were now accompanying his march. 2

If such were the hopes, and the reasonable hopes, of Philip, we may easily understand how intense was the alarm among the Athenians, when they first heard of the occupation of Elateia. Should the Thebans comply, Philip would be in three days on the frontier of Attica; and from the sentiment understood as well as felt to be prevalent, the Athenians could not but anticipate that free passage, and a Theban reinforcement besides, would be readily granted. Ten years before, Demosthenes himself (in his first Olynthiac) had asserted that the Thebans would gladly join Philip in an attack on Attica. 3 If such was then the alienation, it had been increasing rather than diminishing ever since. As the march of Philip had hitherto been not merely rapid, but also understood as directed towards Delphi and Amphissa, the Athenians had made no preparations for the defence of their frontier. Neither their families nor their moveable property had yet been carried within walls. Nevertheless they had now to expect, within little more than forty-eight hours, an invading army as formidable and desolating as any of those during the Peloponnesian war, under a commander far abler than Archdamus or Αgis. 4

284. "Αλλ᾽ ἐκεῖς ἐπάνειμι, ὅτι τὸν ἐν Ἰεροτειφήνῳ πόλεμον τοῦτον (Ἀσκίνες) μὲν ποιήσαντο, συμπερασμένοι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συνεργῶν αὐτοῦ τὴν πρὸς Θηβαίους ἐχθράν, συνεβη τοῦ Φίλιππος άλλοις ἐξ ἡμῶν, οὕτω μὲν ἕκαστον τὰς πόλεις ὑπάρχουσας συνεκρούν, ὥστε τοίνυν Φίλιππος τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν Ἑλάτειαν κατέλαβεν, ὡς ὃν ἂν εἴ ἔχων ἐκεῖνον κωλύειν ἐποίησεν, ὥστετοιμάσαντας ὑπὸ ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν Θηβαίων.

1 Demosth. De Corona—ἐκεῖν ἔχων (Philip) τὴν δυναμιν καὶ τὴν Ἐλάτειαν καταλεῖψε, ὡς ἂν ἐντὸς τούτων ἠμίσθος ἐκεῖνοι συμπερασμένοι ἦν ἡμῖν καὶ τῶν Θηβαίων.


3 Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 16. Ἐκεῖ ἔχων Φίλιππος λάβῃ, τίς αὐτὸν κωλύσει διὸν βαδίσει Θηβαίωι; Θηβαίωι; ὦ, ἐκ κηρυγμάτων τῶν συνειδησοντέων ἐτούτων.

4 Demosth De Corona, p. 304. Ἐκεῖνος ἔχων τοὺς Θηβαίους μετὰ Φίλιππος συμπερασμένοις ἐς τὴν χώραν, διὰ τὰ τιτανοτεῦχα μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν παραστατικοὺς ἐκείνους πολέμους ἐποίησεν, ὥστετοιμάσαντας ἐκεῖνοι συμπερασμένοις ἐς τὴν χώραν.
Though the general history of this important period can be made out only in outline, we are fortunate enough to obtain from Demosthenes a striking narrative, in some detail, of the proceedings at Athens immediately after the news of the capture of Elateia by Philip. It was evening when the messenger arrived, just at the time when the prytanes (or senators of the presiding tribe) were at supper in their official residence. Immediately breaking up their meal, some ran to call the generals whose duty it was to convoking the public assembly, with the trumpeter who gave public notice thereof; so that the Senate and assembly were convoked for the next morning at daybreak. Others bestirred themselves in clearing out the market-place, which was full of booths and stands for traders selling merchandise. They even set fire to these booths, in their hurry to get the space clear. Such was the excitement and terror throughout the city, that the public assembly was crowded at the earliest dawn, even before the Senate could go through their forms and present themselves for the opening ceremonies. At length the Senate joined the assembly, and the prytanes came forward to announce the news, producing the messenger with his public deposition. The herald then proclaimed the usual words—"Who wishes to speak?" Not a man came forward. He proclaimed the words again and again, yet still no one rose.

At length, after a considerable interval of silence, Demosthenes rose to speak. He addressed himself to that alarming conviction which beset the minds of all, though no one had yet given it utterance—that the Thebans were in hearty sympathy with Philip. "Suffer not yourselves (he said) to believe any such thing. If the fact had been so, Philip would have been already on your frontier, without halting at Elateia. He has a large body of partisans at Thebes, procured by fraud and corruption; but he has not the whole city. There is yet a considerable Theban party, adverse to him and favourable to you. It is for the purpose of emboldening his own partisans in Thebes, overawing his opponents, and thus extorting a positive declaration from the city in his favour, that he is making display of his force at Elateia. And in this he will succeed, unless you, Athenians, shall exert yourselves vigorously and prudently in counteraction. If you, acting on your old aversion towards Thebes, shall now hold aloof, Philip's partisans in the city will become all-powerful, so that the whole Theban force will march along with him against Attica. For your own security, you
must shake off these old feelings, however well grounded—and stand forward for the protection of Thebes, as being in greater danger than yourselves. March forth your entire military strength to the frontier, and thus embolden your partisans in Thebes to speak out openly against their philippising opponents, who rely upon the army at Elateia. Next, send ten envoys to Thebes; giving them full powers, in conjunction with the generals, to call in your military force whenever they think fit. Let your envoys demand neither concessions nor conditions from the Thebans; let them simply tender the full force of Athens to assist the Thebans in their present straits. If the offer be accepted, you will have secured an ally inestimable for your own safety, while acting with a generosity worthy of Athens; if it be refused, the Thebans will have themselves to blame, and you will at least stand unimpeached on the score of honour as well as of policy.”

The recommendation of Demosthenes, alike wise and generous, was embodied in a decree and adopted by the Athenians without opposition. Neither Aeschines, nor any one else, said a word against it. Demosthenes himself, being named chief of the ten envoys, proceeded forthwith to Thebes; while the military force of Attica was at the same time marched to the frontier.

1 Demosth. De Corona, p. 286, 287; Diodor. xvi. 84. I have given the substance, in brief, of what Demosthenes represents himself to have said.

This decree, or a document claiming to be such, is given verbatim in Demosthenes, De Corona, p. 289, 290. It bears date on the 16th of the month Skirrophorion (June), under the archonship of Nausikles. This archon is a wrong or pseud-eponymous archon: and the document, to say nothing of its verbosity, implies that Athens was now about to pass out of pacific relations with Philip, and to begin war against him—which is contrary to the real fact.

There also appear inserted, a few pages before, in the same speech (p. 282), four other documents, purporting to relate to the time immediately preceding the capture of Elateia by Philip. 1. A decree of the Athenians, dated in the month Elaphebolion of the archon Heropythus. 2. Another decree, in the mouth Mynychion of the same archon. 3. An answer addressed by Philip to the Athenians. 4. An answer addressed by Philip to the Thebans.

Here again, the archon called Heropythus is a wrong and unknown archon. Such manifest error of date would alone be enough to preclude me from trusting the document as genuine. Droysen is right, in my judgment, in rejecting all these five documents as spurious. The answer of Philip to the Athenians is adapted to the two decrees of the Athenians, and cannot be genuine if they are spurious.

These decrees, too, like that dated in Skirrophorion, are not consistent with the true relations between Athens and Philip. They imply that she was at peace with him, and that hostilities were first undertaken against him by her after his occupation of Elateia; whereas open war had been prevailing between them for more than a year, ever since the summer of 340 B.C., and the maritime operations against him in the Propontis. That the war was going on without interruption, during all this period—that Philip could not get near to Athens to strike a blow at her and close the war, except by bringing the Thebans and Thessalians into cooperation with him—and that
At Thebes they found the envoys of Philip and his allies, and the philippising Thebans full of triumph; while the friends of

for the attainment of this last purpose, he caused the Amphissian war to be kindled, through the corrupt agency of Ashinès—is the express statement of Demosthenès, De Corone, p. 275, 276. Hence I find it impossible to believe in the authenticity either of the four documents here quoted, or of this supposed very long decree of the Athenians, on forming their alliance with Thebes, bearing date on the 10th of the month Skirrophorion, and cited De Corona, p. 289. I will add, that the two decrees which we read in p. 282, profess themselves as having been passed in the months Elaphobolion and Munychion, and bear the name of the archon Herpython; while the decree cited, p. 289, bears date the 16th of Skirrophorion, and the name of a different archon, Nausilés. Now if the decrees were genuine, the events which are described in both must have happened under the same archon, at an interval of about six weeks between the last day of Munychion and the 16th of Skirrophorion. It is impossible to suppose an interval of one year and six weeks between them.

It appears to me, on reading attentively the words of Demosthenès himself, that the falsarius, or person who composed these four first documents, has not properly conceived what it was that Demosthenès caused to be read by the public secretary. The point which Demosthenès is here making is to show how ably he had managed, and how well he had deserved of his country, by bringing the Thebans into alliance with Athens immediately after Philip's capture of Hlateia, for this purpose he dwells upon the bad state of feeling between Athens and Thebes before that event, brought about by the secret instigations of Philip through corrupt partisans in both places, Now it is to illustrate this hostile feeling between Athens and Thebes, that he causes the secretary to read certain decrees and answers—ἐν οἷς δ᾽ ἦτε ἤδη τὰ τρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν ψηφισμάτων ἀκούσαντες καὶ τῶν ἀποκρίσεων εἴσεσθε, ἐν οἷς δ᾽ ἦτε ἤδη τὰ τρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν ψηφισμάτων ἀκούσαντες καὶ τῶν ἀποκρίσεων εἴσεσθε, Καί μοι λέγε ταῦτα λαβών... (9.28). The documents here announced to be read do not bear upon the relations between Athens and Thebes, which were those of active warfare, needing no illustration—but to the relation between Athens and Thebes. There had plainly been interchanges of bickering and ungracious feeling between the two cities, manifested in public decrees or public answers to complaints or remonstrances. Instead of which, the two Athenian decrees, which we now read as following, are addressed, not to the Thebans, but to Philip; the first of them does not mention Thebes at all, the second mentions Thebes only to recite as a ground of complaint against Philip, that he was trying to put the two cities at variance; and this too, among other grounds of complaint much more grave and imputing more hostile purposes. Then follow two answers—which are not answers between Athens and Thebes, as they ought to be—but answers from Philip, the first to the Athenians, the second to the Thebans. Neither the decrees, nor the answers, as they here stand, go to illustrate the point at which Demosthenès is aiming—the bad feeling and mutual provocations which had been exchanged a little before between Athens and Thebes. Neither the one nor the other justifies the words of the orator immediately after the documents have been read—Οὕτω διαβείς δ Φίλιππος τάς πόλεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας δία τοῦτων (through Ashinès and his supporters, καὶ τοῖς ἐπαρθένοις τοῖς ψηφισμάσι καὶ ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσις, ἡν ἐγὼ τὴν δίκους καὶ τὴν Ἑλάτειαν καταλαμβάνω, ὡς οὖν ἐν ἐν τα μενεταις ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ τῶν Θηβαίων)

Demosthenès describes Philip as acting upon Athens and Thebes through the agency of corrupt citizens in each; the author of these documents conceives Philip as acting by his own dispatches.

The decree of the 16th Skirrophorion enacts, not only that there shall be alliance with Thebes, but also that the right of intercourse between the two cities shall be established. Now at the moment when the decree was passed, the Thebans both had been, and still were, on bad terms with Athens, that it was doubtful whether they would entertain or reject the proposition; may, the chances even were, that they would reject it and join Philip. We can hardly believe it possible, that under such a state of pro-
Athens were so dispirited, that the first letters of Demosthenes, sent home immediately on reaching Thebes, were of a gloomy cast. According to Grecian custom, the two opposing legations were heard in turn before the Theban assembly. Amyntas and Klarchus were the Macedonian envoys, together with the eloquent Byzantine Python, as chief spokesman, and the Thessalians Daochus and Thrasylaus. Having the first word, as established allies of Thebes, these orators found it an easy theme to denounce Athens, and to support their case by the general tenor of past history since the battle of Leuktra. The Macedonian orator contrasted the perpetual hostility of Athens with the valuable aid furnished to Thebes by Philip, when he rescued her from the Phokians, and confirmed her ascendency over Boeotia. "If (said the orator) Philip had stipulated, before he assisted you against the Phokians, that you should grant him in return a free passage against Attica, you would have gladly acceded. Will you refuse it now, when he has rendered to you the service without stipulation? Either let us pass through to Attica—or join our march; whereby you will enrich yourself with the plunder of that country, instead of being impoverished by having Boeotia as the seat of war."

All these topics were so thoroughly in harmony with the previous sentiments of the Thebans, that they must have made a lively impression. How Demosthenes replied to them, we are not permitted to know. His powers of oratory must have been severely tasked; for the pre-established feeling was all adverse, and he had nothing to work upon, except fear, on the part of Thebes, of too near contact with the Macedonian arms—combined with her gratitude for the spontaneous and unconditional tender of Athens. And even as to fears, the Thebans had only to choose between admitting the Athenian army or that of Philip; a choice in which all presumption was in favour of the latter, as present ally and recent benefactor—against the former, as standing rival and enemy. Such was the result anticipated by the hopes of Philip as well as by the fears of Athens. Yet with all the chances thus against him, Demosthenes carried his point in the Theban
assembly; determining them to accept the offered alliance of Athens and to brave the hostility of Philip. He boasts, with good reason, of such a diplomatic and oratorical triumph; by which he not only obtained a powerful ally against Philip, but also—a benefit yet more important—rescued Attica from being overrun by a united Macedonian and Theban army. Justly does the contemporary historian Theopompus extol the unrivalled eloquence whereby Demosthenes kindled in the bosoms of the Thebans a generous flame of Pan-hellenic patriotism. But it was not simply by superior eloquence—that though that doubtless was an essential condition—that his triumph at Thebes was achieved. It was still more owing to the wise and generous offer which he carried with him, and which he had himself prevailed on the Athenians to make—of unconditional alliance without any reference to the jealousies and animosities of the past, and on terms even favourable to Thebes, as being more exposed than Athens in the war against Philip.

The answer brought back by Demosthenes was cheering. The important alliance, combining Athens and Thebes in defensive war against Philip, had been successfully brought about. The Athenian army, already mustered in Attica, was invited into Boeotia, and marched to Thebes without delay. While a portion of them joined the Theban force at the northern frontier of Boeotia to resist the approach of Philip, the rest were left in quarters at Thebes. And Demosthenes extols not only the kindness with which they were received in private houses, but also their correct and orderly behaviour amidst the families and properties of the Thebans; not a single complaint being preferred against them. The antipathy and jealousy between the two cities seemed effaced in cordial cooperation against the common enemy. Of the cost

2 Theopompus,' Frag. 239, ed. Didot; Plutarch, Demosth. c. 18.
3 We may here trust the more fully the boasts made by Demosthenes of his own statesmanship and oratory, since we possess the comments of Ischines, and therefore know the worst that can be said by an unfriendly critic. Ischines (adv. Ktesiph. p. 71, 74) says that the Thebans were induced to join Athens, not by the oratory of Demosthenes, but by their fear of Philip's near approach, and by their displeasure in consequence of having Nikaea taken from them. Demosthenes says in fact the same. Doubtless the ablest orator must be furnished with some suitable points to work up in his pleadings. But the orators on the other side would find in the history of the past a far more copious collection of matters, capable of being appealed to as causes of antipathy against Athens, and of favour to Philip; and against this superior case Demosthenes had to contend.
4 Demosth. De Corone, p. 299, 300.
of the joint operations, on land and sea, two-thirds were undertaken by Athens. The command was shared equally between the allies; and the centre of operations was constituted at Thebes.¹

In this as well as in other ways, the dangerous vicinity of Philip, giving increased ascendancy to Démosthenés, impressed upon the counsels of Athens a vigour long unknown. The orator prevailed upon his countrymen to suspend the expenditure going on upon the improvement of their docks and the construction of a new arsenal, in order that more money might be devoted to military operations. He also carried a farther point which he had long aimed at accomplishing by indirect means, but always in vain; the conversion of the Theoric Fund to military purposes.² So preponderant was the impression of danger at Athens, that Démosthenés was now able to propose this motion directly, and with success. Of course, he must first have moved to suspend the standing enactment, whereby it was made penal even to submit the motion.

To Philip, meanwhile, the new alliance was a severe disappointment and a serious obstacle. Having calculated on the continued adhesion of Thebes, to which he conceived himself entitled as a return for benefits conferred—and having been doubtless assured by his partisans in the city that they could promise him Theban coöperation against Athens, as soon as he should appear on the frontier with an overawing army—he was disconcerted at the sudden junction of these two powerful cities, unexpected alike by friends and enemies. Henceforward we shall find him hating Thebes, as guilty of desertion and ingratitude, worse than Athens, his manifest enemy.³ But having failed in inducing the Thebans to follow his lead against Athens, he thought it expedient again to resume his profession of acting on behalf of the Delphian god against Amphissa,—and to write to his allies in Peloponnesus to come and join him, for this specific purpose. His letters were pressing, often repeated, and implying much embarrassment, according to Démosthenés.⁴ As far as we can judge, they do

² Philochorus, Frag. 135, ed. Didot; Dion. Hal. ad Ammaæum, p. 742.
³ Eschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 73. Eschines remarks the fact—but perverts the inferences deducible from it.
⁴ Démosthen. De Coronâ, p. 279. Δῆ μοι τὴν ἐπιστολὴν, ἢν, ἣς ὄντα ὑπη- κονον οἱ Θηβαῖοι, πέμπει πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ συμμάχους ἐν Φίλιππος, ἦν ἐδηφε καὶ ἐκ τούτης σαφῶς ὅτι τὴν μὲν ἄλληθρον προφορὰν τῶν πραγμάτων, τὸ τούτον ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ τοὺς Θῆβαιον καὶ ὕμας πράττειν, ἄπεκρύπτετα, κοινὰ δὲ
not seem to have produced much effect; nor was it easy for the
Peloponnesians to join Philip—either by land, while Beroia was
hostile—or by sea while the Amphissians held Kirrha, and the
Athenians had a superior navy.

War was now carried on, in Phokis and on the frontiers of
Beroia, during the autumn and winter of 339-338 B.C. The
Athenians and Thebans not only maintained their ground
against Philip, but even gained some advantages
over him; especially in two engagements—called the
battle on the river, and the winter-battle—of which
Demosthenes finds room to boast, and, which called
forth manifestations of rejoicing and sacrifice, when
made known at Athens. To Demosthenes himself, as
the chief adviser of the Theban alliance, a wreath of
gold was proposed by Democletus and Hyperidus, and decreed
by the people; and though a citizen named Dionidas impeached the
mover for an illegal decree, yet he did not even obtain the fifth
part of the suffrages of the Dikastery, and therefore became liable
to the fine of 1000 drachms. Demosthenes was crowned with
public proclamation at the Dionysiac festival of March 338 B.C.

But the most memorable step taken by the Athenians and
Thebans, in this joint war against Philip, was that of re-
constituting the Phokians as an independent and self-
defending section of the Hellenic name. On the part
of the Thebans, hitherto the bitterest enemies of the town,
this proceeding evinced adoption of an improved and
generous policy, worthy of the Pan-hellenic cause in which they
had now embarked. In 346 B.C., the Phokians had been conquered
and ruined by the arms of Philip, under condemnation pronounced
by the laws of Beroia, ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστολῶν ἠκούσαν ἐπι-
θέσεις εἰς Πελοπόννησον ἐπιστέλλειν (p. 301, 302). Demosthenes causes the
letters to be read publicly, but no letters appear
proclamation. 1

Then follows a letter, purporting to be written by Philip to the Pelopon-
nesianas. I concur with Droysen in mistrusting its authenticity. I do not
rest any statements on its evidence. 2

The Macedonian month Lous does not appear to coincide with the Attic
Boedromion; nor is it probable that Philip, in writing to Pelopon-
nesianas, would allude at all to Attic months. Various
subsequent letters written by Philip to the Peloponnesians, and inti-
mating much embarrassment, are alluded to by Demosthenes, further on—

1 Demosth. De Coron., p. 300.
2 Demosth. De Coron., p. 302; Plu-
tarch, Vit. X. Orator., p. 848.
3 That Demosthenes was crowned at
the Dionysiac festival (March 338 B.c.)
is contended by Bohnecke (Forschun-
gen p. 541, 555); upon grounds which
seem sufficient, against the opinion of
Boeckh and Winiewski (Comment. ad
Demosth. De Coron., p. 291), who
think that he was not crowned until
the Panathenian festival, in the ensuing July.
by the Amphiktyons. Their cities had all been dismantled, and their population distributed in villages, impoverished, or driven into exile. These exiles, many of whom were at Athens, now returned, and the Phokian population were aided by the Athenians and Thebans in re-occupying and securing their towns. Some indeed of these towns were so small, such as Parapotamii and others, that it was thought inexpedient to re-constitute them. Their population was transferred to the others, as a means of increased strength. Ambrysus, in the south-western portion of Phokis, was re-fortified by the Athenians and Thebans with peculiar care and solidity. It was surrounded with a double circle of wall of the black stone of the country; each wall being fifteen feet high and nearly six feet in thickness, with an interval of six feet between the two. These walls were seen, five centuries afterwards, by the traveller Pausanias, who numbers them among the most solid defensive structures in the ancient world. Ambrysus was valuable to the Athenians and Thebans as a military position for the defence of Boeotia, as it lay on that rough southerly road near the sea, which the Lacedaemonian king Kleombrotus had forced when he marched from Phokis to the position of Leuktra; excluding Epaminondas and the main Theban force, who were posted to resist him on the more frequented road by Koroneia. Moreover, by occupying the south-western parts of Phokis on the Corinthian Gulf, they prevented the arrival of reinforcements to Philip by sea out of Peloponnesus.

The war in Phokis, prosecuted seemingly upon a large scale and with much activity, between Philip and his allies on one side, and the Athenians and Thebans with their allies on the other—ended with the fatal battle of Chaeroneia, fought in August 338 B.C.; having continued about ten months from the time when Philip, after being named general at the Amphiktyonic assembly (about the autumnal equinox), marched southward and occupied Elateia. But respecting the intermediate events, we are un-
fortunately without distinct information. We pick up only a few hints and allusions which do not enable us to understand what passed. We cannot make out either the auxiliaries engaged, or the total numbers in the field, on either side. Demosthenes boasts of having procured for Athens as allies, the Eubœans, Achaans, Corinthians, Thebans, Megarians, Leukadians, and Korkyraans—arraying along with the Athenian soldiers not less than 15,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry; and pecuniary contributions besides, to no inconsiderable amount, for the payment of mercenary troops. Whether all these troops fought either in Phokis or at Chaeroneia, we cannot determining; we verify the Achaans and the Corinthians. As far as we can trust Demosthenes, the autumn and winter of 339-338 B.C. was a season of advantages gained by the Athenians and Thebans over Philip, and of rejoicing in their two cities; not without much embarrassment to Philip, testified by his urgent

Demosthenes, though they are not precise or specific, will appear perfectly clear and consistent respecting the chronology of the period.

That the battle of Chaeroneia took place on the 7th of the Attic month Metageitnion (August) B.C. 338 (the second month of the archon Charonidas at Athens)—is affirmed by Plutarch (Camill. c. 19) and generally admitted.

The time when Philip first occupied Elateia has been stated by Mr. Clinton and most authors as the preceding month of Skirrophorion, fifty days or thereabouts earlier. But this rests exclusively on the evidence of the pretended decree, for alliance between Athens and Thebes, which appears in Demosthenes De Coroni, p. 284. Even those who defend the authenticity of the decree, can hardly confide in the truth of the month-date, when the name of the archon Nausikles is confessedly wrong. To me neither this document, nor the other so-called Athenian decrees professing to bear date in Munychion and Elaphebolion (p. 282), carry any evidence whatever.

The general statements both of Demosthenes and Aschinis, indicate the appointment of Philip as Amphiktyonic general to have been made in the autumnal convocation of Amphiktyons at Thermopyle. Shortly after this appointment, Philip marched his army into Greece with the professed purpose of acting upon it. In this march he came upon Elateia and began to fortify it; probably about the month of October 339 B.C. The Athenians, Thebans, and other Greeks carried on the war against him in Phokis for about ten months until the battle of Chaeroneia. That this war must have lasted as long as ten months, we may see by the facts mentioned in my last page—the re-establishment of the Phokians and their towns, and especially the elaborate fortification of Ambrysus. Bohmecke (Forschungen, p. 53.) points out justly (though I do not agree with his general arrangement of the events of the war) that this restoration of the Phokian towns implies a considerable interval between the occupation of Elateia and the battle of Chaeroneia. We have also two battles gained against Philip, one of them a μάχη χειμερινή, which perfectly suits with this arrangement.

1 Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 306; Plutarch, Demosth. c. 17. In the decree of the Athenian people (Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 530) passed after the death of Demosthenes, granting various honours and a statue to his memory—it is recorded that he brought in by his persuasions not only the allies enumerated in the text, but also the Lokrians and the Messenians; and that he procured from the allies a total contribution of above 500 talents. The Messenians, however, certainly did not fight at Chaeroneia; nor is it correct to say that Demosthenes induced the Amphissian Lokrians to become allies of Athens.

2 Strabo, ix. p. 414; Pausanias, vii. 6, 3.
requisitions of aid from his Peloponnesian allies, with which they did not comply. Demosthenes was the war-minister of the day, exercising greater influence than the generals—deliberating at Thebes in concert with the Boeotarchs—advising and swaying the Theban public assembly as well as the Athenian—and probably in mission to other cities also, for the purpose of pressing military efforts. The crown bestowed upon him at the Dionysiac festival (March 338 B.C.) marks the pinnacle of his glory and the meridian of his hopes, when there seemed a fair chance of successfully resisting the Macedonian invasion.

Philip had calculated on the positive aid of Thebes; at the very worst, upon her neutrality between himself and Athens. That she would cordially join Athens, neither he nor any one else imagined; nor could so improbable a result have been brought about, had not the game of Athens been played with unusual decision and judgement by Demosthenes. Accordingly, when opposed by the unexpected junction of the Theban and Athenian force, it is not wonderful that Philip should have been at first repulsed. Such disadvantages would hardly indeed drive him to send instant propositions of peace; but they would admonish him to bring up fresh forces, and to renew his invasion during the ensuing spring and summer with means adequate to the known resistance. It seems probable that the full strength of the Macedonian army, now brought to a high excellence of organisation after the continued improvements of his twenty years' reign—would be marched into Phokis during the summer of 338 B.C., to put down the most formidable combination of enemies that Philip had ever encountered. His youthful son Alexander, now eighteen years of age, came along with them.

It is among the accusations urged by Aeschines against Demosthenes, that in levying mercenary troops, he wrongfully took the public money to pay men who never appeared; and farther, that he placed at the disposal of the Amphissians a large body of 10,000 mercenary troops, thus withdrawing them from the main Athenian and Boeotian army; whereby Philip was enabled to cut to pieces the mercenaries separately, while the entire force, if kept together, could

1 Plutarch, Demosth. c. 18. Αἰσχίνης διὰ τὴν προσωπικὴν ἰσχύν τοῦ Δημοσθένη καὶ τῆς καλλιτέχνειας τῆς οἰκίας, ἡ τούτων τοῦ διά τίος ἐνδιαλέγεται. &c. It is possible that Philip may have tried to disunite the enemies assembled against him, by separate propositions addressed to some of them.
never have been defeated. Aeschines affirmsthat he himself strenuously opposed this separation of forces, the consequences of which were disastrous and discouraging to the whole cause. It would appear that Philip attacked and took Amphissa. We read of his having deceived the Athenians and Thebans by a false despatch intended to be intercepted; so as to induce them to abandon their guard of the road which led to that place. The sacred domain was restored, and the Amphissians, or at least such of them as had taken a leading part against Delphi, were banished.

It was on the seventh day of the month Metageitnion (the second month of the Attic year, corresponding nearly to August) that the allied Grecian army met Philip near Cheroneia; the last Boeotian town on the frontiers of Phokis. He seems to have been now strong enough to attempt to force his way into Boeotia, and is said to have drawn down the allies from a strong position into the plain, by laying waste the neighbouring fields. His numbers are stated by Diodorus at 30,000 foot and 2000 horse; he doubtless had with him Thessalians and other allies from Northern Greece; but not a single ally from Peloponnesus. Of the united Greeks opposed to him, the total is not known. We can therefore make no comparison as to numbers, though the superiority of the Macedonian army in organisation is incontestable. The largest Grecian contingents were those of Athens, under Lysikles and Charês—and of Thebes, commanded by Thengenês; there were, besides, Phokians, Achaeans, and Corinthians—probably also Euboeans and Megarians. The Lacedæmonians, Messenians, Arcadians, Eleians, and Argians, took no part in the war. All of them had doubtless been solicited on both sides; by Demosthenês as well as by the partisans of Philip. But jealousy and fear of Sparta led the last four states rather to look towards Philip as a protector against her—though on this occasion they took no positive part.

The command of the army was shared between the Athenians

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1 Aeschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 74. 2 Diod. x. 3, 6. 3 Polybios, iv. 2, 8. 4 Polybios, iv. 2, 14. 5 Diodorus affirms that Philip's army was superior in number: Justin states the reverse (Diodor. xvi. 85; Justin, iv. 3). 6 Pausanias, iv. 2, 82; v. 4, 5; viii. 6, 1.
and the Thebans, and its movements determined by the joint decision of their statesmen and generals. As to statesmen, the presence of Demosthenes at least ensured to them sound and patriotic counsel powerfully set forth; as to generals, not one of the three was fit for an emergency so grave and terrible. It was the sad fortune of Greece, that at this crisis of her liberty, when everything was staked on the issue of the campaign, neither an Epaminondas nor an Iphikrates was at hand. Phokion was absent as commander of the Athenian fleet in the Hellespont or the Aegean. Portents were said to have occurred—oracles, and prophecies, were in circulation—calculated to discourage the Greeks; but Demosthenes, animated by the sight of so numerous an army hearty and combined in defence of Grecian independence, treated all such stories with the same indifference as Epaminondas had shown before the battle of Leuktra, and accused the Delphian priestess of philippising. Nay, so confident was he in the result (according to the statement of Aeschines), that when Philip, himself apprehensive, was prepared to offer terms of peace, and the Boeotarchs inclined to accept them—Demosthenes alone stood out, denouncing as a traitor any one who should broach the proposition of peace, and boasting that if the Thebans were afraid, his countrymen the Athenians desired nothing better than a free passage through Boeotia to attack Philip single-handed. This is advanced as an accusation by Aeschines; who however himself furnishes the justification of his rival by intimating that the Boeotarchs were so eager for peace, that they proposed, even before the negotiations had begun, to send home the Athenian soldiers into Attica, in order that deliberations might be taken concerning the peace. We can hardly be surprised that Demosthenes "became out of his mind" (such is the expression of Aeschines) on hearing a proposition so fraught with imprudence. Philip would have gained his point even without a battle, if, by holding out the lure of negotiation for peace, he could have prevailed upon the allied army to disperse. To have united the full force of Athens and Thebes, with other subordinate states, in the same ranks and for the same purpose, was a rare good fortune,

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1 Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16.
3 Aeschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 74, 75. It is seemingly this disposition on the part of Philip to open negotiations which is alluded to by Plutarch as having been (Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16) favourably received by Phokion.
not likely to be reproduced, should it once slip away. And if Demosthenes, by warm or even passionate remonstrance, prevented such premature dispersion, he rendered the valuable service of ensuring to Grecian liberty a full trial of strength under circumstances not unpromising; and at the very worst, a catastrophic worthy and honourable.

In the field of battle near Chaeroneia, Philip himself commanded a chosen body of troops on the wing opposed to the Athenians; while his youthful son Alexander, aided by experienced officers, commanded against the Thebans on the other wing. Respecting the course of the battle, we are scarcely permitted to know anything. It is said to have been so obstinately contested, that for some time the result was doubtful. The Sacred Band of Thebes, who charged in one portion of the Theban phalanx, exhausted all their strength and energy in an unavailing attempt to bear down the stronger phalanx and multiplied pikes opposed to them. The youthful Alexander here first displayed his great military energy and ability. After a long and murderous struggle, the Theban Sacred Band were all overpowered and perished in their ranks, while the Theban phalanx was broken and pushed back. Philip on his side was still engaged in undecided conflict with the Athenians, whose first onset is said to have been so impetuous, as to put to flight some of the troops in his army; insomuch that the Athenian general exclaimed in triumph, "Let us pursue them even to Macedonia." It is farther said that Philip on his side simulated a retreat, for the purpose of inducing them to pursue and to break their order. We read another statement, more likely to be true—that the Athenian hoplites, though full of energy at the first shock, could not endure fatigue and prolonged struggle like the trained veterans in the opposite ranks. Having steadily repelled them for a considerable time, Philip became emulous on witnessing the success of his son, and redoubled his efforts; so as to break and disperse them. The whole Grecian army was thus put to flight with severe loss.

1 Diodor, xvi. 85. Alexander himself, after his vast conquests in Asia and shortly before his death, alludes briefly to his own presence at Chaeroneia, in a speech delivered to his army (Arr. vii. 9, 5). 2 Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 18. 3 Polyænus, iv. 1, 2. He mentions Stratokles as the Athenian general from whom this exclamation came. We know from Æschines (adv. Ktesiph. p. 74) that Stratokles was general of the Athenian troops at or near Thebes shortly after the alliance with the Thebans was formed. But it seems that Charés and Lysicles commanded at Chaeroneia. It is possible therefore that the anecdote reported by Polyænus may refer to one of the earlier battles fought, before that of Chaeroneia. 4 Polyænus, iv. 2, 7; Frontinus. 5 Diodor, xvi. 85, 86.
The Macedonian phalanx, as armed and organized by Philip, was sixteen deep; less deep than that of the Thebans either at Delium or at Leuktra. It had veteran soldiers of great strength and complete raining, in its front ranks; yet probably soldiers hardly superior to the Sacred Band, who formed the Theban front rank. But its great superiority was in the length of the Macedonian pike or sarissa—in the number of these weapons which projected in front of the foremost soldiers—and the long practice of the men to manage this impenetrable array of pikes in an efficient manner. The value of Philip's improved phalanx was attested by his victory at Chaeroneia.

But the victory was not gained by the phalanx alone. The military organization of Philip comprised an aggregate of many sorts of troops besides the phalanx; the body-guards, horse as well as foot—the hypaspistae, or light hoplites—the light cavalry, bowmen, slingers, &c. When we read the military operations of Alexander, three years afterwards, in the very first year of his reign, before he could have made any addition of his own to the force inherited from Philip; and when we see with what efficiency all these various descriptions of troops are employed in the field; we may feel assured that Philip both had them near him and employed them at the battle of Chaeroneia.

One thousand Athenian citizens perished in this disastrous field; two thousand more fell into the hands of Philip as prisoners. The Theban loss is said also to have been terrible, as well as the Achaean. But we do not know the numbers; nor have we any statement of the Macedonian loss. Demosthenes, himself present in the ranks of the hoplites, shared in the flight of his defeated countrymen. He is accused by his political enemies of having behaved with extreme and disgraceful cowardice; but we see plainly from the continued confidence and respect shown to him by the general body of his countrymen, that they cannot have credited the imputation. The two Athenian generals, Charis and Lysikles, both escaped from the field. The latter was afterwards publicly accused at Athens by the orator

1 Arrian, Exp. Alex. i. 2, 3, 10.
2 This is the statement of the contemporary orators—Demades (Frag. p. 179), Lykurgus (ap. Diodor. xvi. 85; adv. Leokratem, p. 236. c. 36), and Demosthenes (Do. Corou, p. 314).
Lykurgus—a citizen highly respected for his integrity and diligence in the management of the finances, and severe in arraigning political delinquents. Lysikles was condemned to death by the Dikastery. What there was to distinguish his conduct from that of his colleague Charès—who certainly was not condemned, and is not even stated to have been accused—we do not know. The memory of the Theban general Theagenès also, though he fell in the battle, was assailed by charges of treason.

Unspeakable was the agony at Athens, on the report of this disaster, with a multitude of citizens as yet unknown left on the field or prisoners, and a victorious enemy within three or four days' march of the city. The whole population, even old men, women, and children, were spread about the streets in all the violence of grief and terror, interchanging effusions of distress and sympathy, and questioning every fugitive as he arrived about the safety of their relatives in the battle. The flower of the citizens of military age had been engaged; and before the extent of loss had been ascertained, it was feared that none except the elders would be left to defend the city. At length the definite loss became known: severe indeed and terrible—yet not a total shipwreck, like that of the army of Nikias in Sicily.

As on that trying occasion, so now: amidst all the distress and alarm, it was not in the Athenian character to despair. The mass of citizens hastened unbidden to form a public assembly, wherein the most energetic resolutions were taken for defence. Decrees were passed enjoining every one to carry his family and property out of the open country of Attica into the various strongholds; directing the body of the senators, who by general rule were exempt from military service, to march down in arms to Peiræus, and put that harbour in condition to stand a siege; placing every man without exception at the disposal of the generals, as a soldier for defence, enfranchising all slaves fit for bearing arms, granting the citizenship to metics under the same circumstances, and restoring to the...

1 Diodor. xvi. 88.
4 Lykurg. adv. Leokrat. p. 146. Ἐγέρθημες γὰρ τῆς ἐν Χαρινείᾳ μάχης, καὶ συνωρακωτοι ἀπαρτὶς ὄμοι εἰς ἀνακατάλησιν ἐντὸς ἱδίως, παιδὸς μὲν καὶ γυναῖκας ἐκ τῶν ἄρματος ἐν τῇ τείχῳ κατα-καταλεῖν, &c.
full privileges of citizens those who had been disfranchised by judicial sentence. This last-mentioned decree was proposed by Hyperidēs; but several others were moved by Demosthenēs, who, notwithstanding the late misfortune of the Athenian arms, was listened to with undiminished respect and confidence. The general measures requisite for strengthening the walls, opening ditches, distributing military posts and constructing earthwork, were decreed on his motion; and he seems to have been named member of a special Board for superintending the fortifications.

Not only he, but also most of the conspicuous citizens and habitual speakers in the assembly, came forward with large private contributions to meet the pressing wants of the moment. Every man in the city lent a hand to make good the defective points in the fortification. Materials were obtained by felling the trees near the city, and even by taking stones from the adjacent sepulchres—as had been done after the Persian war when the walls were built under the contrivance of Themistoklēs. The temples were stripped of the arms suspended within them, for the purpose of equipping unarmed citizens. By such earnest and unanimous efforts, the defences of the city and of Peirēs were soon materially improved. At sea Athens had nothing to fear. Her powerful naval force was untouched, and her superiority to Philip on that element incontestable. Envoyas were sent to Trozen, Epidaurus, Andros, Keos, and other places, to solicit aid; in one or other of which embassies Demosthenēs served, after he had provided for the immediate exigences of defence.

What was the immediate result of these applications to other cities, we do not know. But the effect produced upon some of these Aegean islands by the reported prostration of Athens, is

1 Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 170. c.; Ἀριστοτ. hist. x. 87.
2 Thuc. i. 93.
3 Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. 1. c.
4 Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 171. c. 11; Ἀριστοτ. hist. x. 851.
6 Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. 1. c.
7 Lykurgus (adv. Leokrat. p. 171. c. 4) mentions these embassies; Demosth. de Ch. p. 100 affirms that Demosthenēs provided for himself an escape from the city as an envoy—ἀνδρόν ἐμπνευσάμην κατασκεύασα, ὡς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀποδράσαι, &c. Compare Ἀριστοτ. hist. x. 851.

The two hostile orators treat such temporary absence of Demosthenēs on the embassy to obtain aid, as if it were a cowardly desertion of his post. This is a construction altogether unjust.
remarkable. An Athenian citizen named Leokratēs, instead of staying at Athens to join in the defence, listened only to a disgraceful timidity, and fled forthwith from Peiraeus with his family and property. He hastened to Rhodes, where he circulated the false news that Athens was already taken and the Peiraeus under siege. Immediately on hearing this intelligence, and believing it to be true, the Rhodians with their triremes began a cruise to seize the merchant-vessels at sea. Hence we learn, indirectly, that the Athenian naval power constituted the standing protection for these merchant-vessels; insomuch that so soon as that protection was removed, armed cruisers began to prey upon them from various islands in the Aigean.

Such were the precautions taken at Athens after this fatal day. But Athens lay at a distance of three or four days' march from the field of Charoneia; while Thebes, being much nearer, bore the first attack of Philip. Of the behaviour of that prince after his victory, we have contradictory statements. According to one account, he indulged in the most insulting and licentious exultation on the field of battle, jesting especially on the oratory and motions of Demosthenēs; a temper, from which he was brought round by the courageous reproof of Demadeēs, then his prisoner as one of the Athenian hoplites. At first he even refused to grant permission to inter the slain, when the herald came from Lefkadia to make the customary demand. According to another account, the demeanour of Philip towards the defeated Athenians was gentle and forbearing. However the fact may have stood as to his first manifestations, it is certain that his positive measures were harsh towards Thebes and lenient towards Athens. He sold the Theban captives into slavery; he is said also to have exacted a price for the liberty granted to bury the Theban slain—which liberty,
according to Grecian custom, was never refused, and certainly never sold, by the victor. Whether Thebes made any farther resistance, or stood a siege, we do not know. But presently the city fell into Philip's power. He put to death several of the leading citizens, banished others, and confiscated the property of both. A council of Three Hundred—composed of philippising Thebans, for the most part just recalled from exile—was invested with the government of the city, and with powers of life and death over every one. 1 The state of Thebes became much the same as it had been when the Spartan Lacedaemon, in concert with the Theban party headed by Leontiadès, surprised the Kadmeia. A Macedonian garrison was now placed in the Kadmeia, as a Spartan garrison had been placed then. Supported by this garrison, the philippising Thebans were uncontrolled masters of the city; with full power, and no reluctance, to gratify their political antipathies. At the same time, Philip restored the minor Boeotian towns—Orchomenus and Platea, probably also Thespie and Koroneia—to the condition of free communities instead of subjection to Thebes. 2

At Athens also, the philippising orators raised their voices loudly and confidently, denouncing Demosthenès and his policy. New speakers, 3 who would hardly have come forward before, were now put up against him. The accusations however altogether failed; the people continued to trust him, omitting no measure of defence which he suggested. Æschinès, who had before disclaimed all connection with Philip, now altered his tone, and made boast of the ties of friendship and hospitality subsisting between that prince and himself. 4 He tendered his services to go as envoy to the Macedonian camp; whether he appears to have been sent, doubtless with others, perhaps with Xenokratès and Phokian. 5 Among them was Demadès also, having been just released from his captivity. Either by the persuasions of Demadès, or by a change in his own dispositions, Philip had now become inclined to treat with Athens on favourable terms. The bodies of the slain Athenians were

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1 Justin, ix. 4. Deinarch, cont. Demостh. s. 20, p. 92.
2 Pausanias, iv. 27, 5; ix. 1, 3.
3 Demosth. De Coroniæ, p. 310. οὗ δὲ ἐντῶν τῆς πυρών, ἀλλὰ δὲ ἐν μάλωθ᾽ ἐπέλαμβαν ἄργον ἔρημον, &c.
burned by the victors, and their ashes collected to be carried to Athens; though the formal application of the herald, to the same effect, had been previously refused. 1 Aeschines (according to the assertion of Demosthenes) took part as a sympathising guest in the banquet and festivities whereby Philip celebrated his triumph over Grecian liberty.2 • At length Demades with the other envoys returned to Athens, reporting the consent of Philip to conclude peace, to give back the numerous prisoners in his hands, and also to transfer Oropus from the Thebans to Athens.

Demades proposed the conclusion of peace to the Athenian assembly, by whom it was readily decreed. To escape invasion and siege by the Macedonian army, was doubtless an unspeakable relief; while the recovery of the 20,000 prisoners without ransom, was an acquisition of great importance, not merely to the city collectively, but to the sympathies of numerous relatives. Lastly, to regain Oropus—a possession which they had once enjoyed, and for which they had long wrangled with the Thebans—was a further cause of satisfaction. Such conditions were doubtless acceptable at Athens. But there was a submission to be made on the other side, which to the contemporaries of Pericles would have seemed intolerable, even as the price of averted invasion or recovered captives. The Athenians were required to acknowledge the exaltation of Philip to the headship of the Grecian world, and to promote the like acknowledgement by all other Greeks, in a congress to be speedily convened. They were to renounce all pretensions to headship, not only for themselves, but for every other Grecian state; to recognise not Sparta or Thebes, but the king of Macedon, as Pan-hellenic chief; to acquiesce in the transition of Greece from the position of a free, self-determining, political aggregate, into a provincial dependency of the kings of Pella and Aegae. It is not easy to conceive a more terrible shock to that traditional sentiment of pride and patriotism, inherited from forefathers, who, after repelling and worsting the Persians, had first organised the maritime Greeks into a confederacy running parallel with and supplementary to the non-maritime Greeks allied with Sparta; thus keeping out foreign

dominion and casting the Grecian world into a system founded on native sympathies and free government. Such traditional sentiment, though it no longer governed the character of the Athenians or impressed upon them motives of action, had still a strong hold upon their imagination and memory, where it had been constantly kept alive by the eloquence of Demosthenes and others. The peace of Demades, recognizing Philip as chief of Greece, was a renunciation of all this proud historical past, and the acceptance of a new and degraded position, for Athens as well as for Greece generally.

Polybius praises the generosity of Philip in granting such favourable terms, and even affirms, not very accurately, that he secured thereby the steady gratitude and attachment of the Athenians. But Philip would have gained nothing by killing his prisoners; not to mention that he would have provoked an implacable spirit of revenge among the Athenians. By selling his prisoners for slaves he would have gained something, but by the use actually made of them he gained more. The recognition of his Hellenic supremacy by Athens was the capital step for the prosecution of his objects. It insured him against dissentients among the remaining Grecian states, whose adhesion had not yet been made certain, and who might possibly have stood out against a proposition so novel and so anti-Hellenic, had Athens set them the example. Moreover, if Philip had not purchased the recognition of Athens in this way, he might have failed in trying to extort it by force. For though, being master of the field, he could lay waste Attica with impunity, and even establish a permanent fortress in it like Dekeleia—but the fleet of Athens was as strong as ever, and her preponderance at sea irresistible. Under these circumstances, Athens and Peiraeus might have been defended against him, as Byzantium and Perinthus had been, two years before; the Athenian fleet might have obstructed his operations in many ways; and the siege of Athens might have called forth a burst of Hellenic sympathy, such as to embarrass his farther progress. Thebes—an inland city, hated by the other Boeotian cities—was prostrated by the battle of Chaeroneia, and left without any means of successful defence. But the same blow was not absolutely mortal to Athens, united in her population throughout all the area of Attica, and superior at sea. We may see therefore that—with such difficulties before him if he pushed the Athenians to despair

1 Polybius, v. 19; xxii. 14; Diodor. Fragm. lib. xxxii.
Philip acted wisely in employing his victory and his prisoners to procure her recognition of his headship. His political game was well played, not as always; but to the praise of generosity bestowed by Polybius, he has little claim.

Besides the recognition of Philip as chief of Greece, the Athenians, on the motion of Demadês, passed various honorary and complimentary votes in his favour; of what precise nature we do not know. Immediate relief from danger, with the restoration of 2000 captive citizens, were sufficient to render the peace popular at the first moment; moreover, the Athenians, as of conscious of failing resolution and strength, were now entering upon that career of flattery to powerful kings, which we shall hereafter find them pushing to disgraceful extravagance. It was probably during the prevalence of this sentiment, which did not long continue, that the youthful Alexander of Macedon, accompanied by Antipater, paid a visit to Athens.

Meanwhile the respect enjoyed by Demosthenes among his countrymen was now no lessened. Though his political opponents thought the season favourable for bringing many impeachments against him, none of them proved successful. And when the time came for electing a public orator to deliver the funeral discourse at the obsequies celebrated for the slain at Chaeroneia—he was invested with that solemn duty, not only in preference to Aeschines, who was put up in competition, but also to Demadês the recent mover of the peace. He was farther honoured with strong marks of esteem and sympathy from the surviving relatives of these gallant citizens. Moreover it appears that Demosthenes was continued in an important financial post as one of the joint managers of the Theoric Fund, and as member of a Board for purchasing corn; he was also shortly afterwards appointed superintendent of the walls and defences of the city. The orator Hyperides, the political coadjutor of Demosthenes, was impeached by Aristogeiton under the Graphé Paranomon, for his illegal and unconstitutional decree (proposed under the immediate terror of the defeat at Chaeroneia), to grant manumission to the slaves, citizenship tometics, and restoration of citizenship to those who had been disfranchised by judicial sentence. The occurrence of peace had
removed all necessity for acting upon this decree; nevertheless an impeachment was entered and brought against its mover. Hyperides, unable to deny its illegality, placed his defence on the true and obvious ground—"The Macedonian arms (he said) darkened my vision. It was not I who moved the decree; it was the battle of Chaeronia." The substantive defence was admitted by the Dikastery; while the bold oratorical turn attracted notice from rhetorical critics.

Having thus subjugated and garrisoned Thebes—having reconstituted the anti-Theban cities in Boeotia—having constrained Athens to submission and dependent alliance—and having established a garrison in Ambrakia, at the same time mastering Akarnania, and banishing the leading Akarnanians who were opposed to him—Philip next proceeded to carry his arms into Peloponnesus. He found little positive resistance anywhere, except in the territory of Sparta. The Corinthians, Argicians, Messenians, Eleians, and many Arcadians, all submitted to his dominion; some even courted his alliance, from fear and antipathy against Sparta. Philip invaded Laconia with an army too powerful for the Spartans to resist in the field. He laid waste the country, and took some detached posts; but he did not take, nor do we know that he even attacked, Sparta itself. The Spartans could not resist; yet would they neither submit, nor ask for peace. It appears that Philip cut down their territory and narrowed their boundaries on all the three sides; towards Argos, Messene, and Megalopolis. We have no precise account of the details of his proceedings; but it is clear that he did just what seemed to him good, and that the governments of all the Peloponnesian cities came into the hands of his partisans. Sparta was the only city which stood out against him; maintaining her ancient freedom and dignity, under circumstances of feebleness and humiliation, with more unshaken resolution than Athens.

Philip next proceeded to convene a congress of Grecian cities at Corinth. He here announced himself as resolved on an expedition against the Persian king, for the purpose both of liberating the Asiatic Greeks, and avenging the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. The general vote of the congress nominated him leader of the united Greeks for this

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1 Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 849.
2 Polybius, ix, 28, 33, xvii, 14; Tacitus, Annal. iv. 47; Strabo, viii. p. 301; Pausanias, ii. 20, 1. viii. 7, 4. viii. 27, 8. From Diodorus xvii, 3, we see how much this adhesion to Philip was obtained under the pressure of necessity.
purpose, and decreed a Grecian force to join him, to be formed of contingents furnished by the various cities. The total of the force promised is stated only by Justin, who gives it at 200,000 foot, and 15,000 horse; an army which Greece certainly could not have furnished, and which we can hardly believe to have been even promised. The Spartans stood aloof from the congress, continuing to refuse all recognition of the headship of Philip. The Athenians attended and concurred in the vote; which was in fact the next step to carry out the peace made by Demades. They were required to furnish a well-equipped fleet to serve under Philip; and they were at the same time divested of their dignity of chiefs of a maritime confederacy, the islands being enrolled as maritime dependencies of Philip, instead of continuing to send deputies to a synod meeting at Athens. It appears that Samos was still recognised as belonging to them—or at least such portion of the island as was occupied by the numerous Athenian kleruchs or outsettlers, first established in the island after the conquest by Timotheus in 365 B.C., and afterwards reinforced. For several years afterwards, the naval force in the dockyards of Athens still continued large and powerful; but her maritime ascendency henceforward disappears.

The Athenians, deeply mortified by such humiliation, were reminded by Phokion that it was a necessary result of the peace which they had accepted on the motion of Demades, and that it was now too late to murmur. We cannot wonder at their feelings. Together with the other free cities of Greece, they were enrolled as contributory appendages of the king of Macedon; a revolution, to them more galling than to the rest, since they passed at once, not merely from simple autonomy, but from a condition of superior dignity, into the common dependence. Athens had only to sanction the scheme dictated by Philip and to furnish her quota towards the execution. Moreover, this scheme—the invasion of Persia—had ceased to be an object of genuine aspiration throughout the Grecian world. The Great King, no longer inspiring terror to Greece collectively, might now be regarded as

1 Justin, ix. 5.
2 Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16; Pausanius, i. 23, 3. Τά μὲν δὲ πολλὰς Φίλιππου τῶν πόλεων ἔλεγεν. Αθηναῖος δὲ λόγοι συνθέσεως, ἐργον ἐφασ μᾶλλα ἐκάκων, νίμιος τε ἐσόλλους καὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ νεότερα πάλιντα ἀρχῆς. Τὰ δὲ πόλλας Φίλιππου τῶν πόλεων ἔλεγεν. Αθηναίος δὲ λόγοι
4 Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16.
likely to lend protection against Macedonian oppression. To emancipate the Asiatic Greeks from Persian dominion would be in itself an enterprise grateful to Grecian feeling, though all such wishes must have been gradually dying out since the peace of Antalkidas. But emancipation, accomplished by Philip, would be only a transfer of the Asiatic Greeks from Persian dominion to his. The synod of Corinth served no purpose except to harness the Greeks to his car, for a distant enterprise lucrative to his soldiers and suited to his insatiable ambition.

It was in 337 B.C. that this Persian expedition was concerted and resolved. During that year preparations were made of sufficient magnitude to exhaust the finances of Philip; who was at the same time engaged in military operations, and fought a severe battle against the Illyrian king Pleurias. In the spring of 336 B.C., a portion of the Macedonian army under Parmenio and Attalus, was sent across to Asia to commence military operations; Philip himself intending speedily to follow.

Such however was not the fate reserved for him. Not long before, he had taken the resolution of repudiating, on the allegation of infidelity, his wife Olympias; who is said to have become repugnant to him, from the furious and savage impulses of her character. He had successively married several wives, the last of whom was Kleopatra, niece of the Macedonian Attalus. It was at her instance that he is said to have repudiated Olympias; who retired to her brother Alexander of Epirus. This step provoked violent dissensions among the partisans of the two queens, and even between Philip and his son Alexander, who expressed a strong resentment at the repudiation of his mother. Amidst the intoxication of the marriage banquet, Attalus proposed a toast and prayer, that there might speedily appear a legitimate son, from Philip and Kleopatra, to succeed to the Macedonian throne. Upon which Alexander exclaimed in wrath—"Do you then proclaim me as a bastard?"—at the same time hurling a goblet at him. Incensed at this proceeding, Philip started up, drew his sword, and made furiously at his son; but fell to the ground from passion and intoxication. This accident alone preserved the life of Alexander; who retorted—"Here is a man, preparing to cross from Europe

1 Arrian, vii. 9, 5. 4 Athenaeus, xiii. p. 557; Justin, ix.
2 Diodor. xvi. 93. 7
3 Justin, ix. 5; Diodor. xvi. 91.
into Asia—who yet cannot step surely from one couch to another."1 After this violent quarrel the father and son separated. Alexander conducted his mother into Epirus, and then went himself to the Illyrian king. Some months afterwards, at the instance of the Corinthian Demaratus, Philip sent for him back, and became reconciled to him; but another cause of displeasure soon arose, because Alexander had opened a negotiation for marriage with the daughter of the satrap of Karia. Rejecting such an alliance as unworthy, Philip sharply reproved his son, and banished from Macedonia several courtiers whom he suspected as intimate with Alexander; 2 while the friends of Attalus stood high in favour.

Such were the animosities distracting the court and family of Philip. A son had just been born to him from his new wife Kleopatra.3 His expedition against Persia, resolved and prepared during the preceding year, had been actually commenced; Parmenio and Attalus having been sent across to Asia with the first division, to be followed presently by himself with the remaining army. But Philip foresaw that during his absence danger might arise from the furious Olympias, bitterly exasperated by the recent events, and instigating her brother Alexander king of Epirus, with whom she was now residing. Philip indeed held a Macedonian garrison in Ambrahia, the chief Grecian city on the Epirotic border; and he had also contributed much to establish Alexander as prince. But he now deemed it essential to conciliate him still farther, by a special tie of alliance; giving to him in marriage Kleopatra, his daughter by Olympias. 4 For this marriage, celebrated at Aegae in Macedonia in August 336 B.C., Philip provided festivals of the utmost cost and splendour, com-

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1 Plutarch, Alex. 9; Justin, ix. 7; Diodor. xvi. 91-93.
2 Plutarch, Alex. c. 19; Arrian, iii. 6, 5.
3 Pausanias (viii. 7, 5) mentions a son born to Philip by Kleopatra; Diodorus (xvii. 2) also notices a son, Justin in one place (ix. 7) mentions a daughter, and in another place (xi. 2) a son named Caranus; Satyrus (ap. Athenaeum, xiii. p. 557) states that a daughter named Eurydice was born to him by Kleopatra.
4 Diodor. xvi. 7.
5 Thus Kleopatra—daughter of Philip, sister of Alexander the Great, and bearing the same name as Philip's last wife—was thus niece of the Epirotic Alexander, her husband. Alliances of that degree of kindred were then neither disreputable nor unfrequent.
memorating at the same time the recent birth of his son by Kleopatra. Banquets, munificent presents, gymnastic and musical matches, tragic exhibitions, among which Neoptolemus the actor performed in the tragedy of Kinyras, &c. with every species of attraction known to the age—were accumulated, in order to reconcile the dissentient parties in Macedonia, and to render the effect imposing on the minds of the Greeks; who, from every city, sent deputies for congratulation. Statues of the twelve great gods, admirably executed, were carried in solemn procession into the theatre; immediately after them, the statue of Philip himself as a thirteenth god.

Amidst this festive multitude, however, there were not wanting discontented partisans of Olympias and Alexander, to both of whom the young queen with her new-born child threatened a formidable rivalry. There was also a malcontent yet more dangerous—Pausanias, one of the royal body-guards, a noble youth born in the district called Orestis in Upper Macedonia; who, from causes of offence peculiar to himself, nourished a deadly hatred against Philip. The provocation which he had received is one which we can neither conveniently transcribe, nor indeed accurately make out, amidst discrepancies of statement. It was Attalus, the uncle of the new queen Kleopatra, who had given the provocation, by inflicting upon Pausanias an outrage of the most brutal and revolting character. Even for so monstrous an act, no regular justice could be had in Macedonia against a powerful man. Pausanias complained to Philip in person. According to one account, Philip put aside the complaint with evasions, and even treated it with ridicule; according to another account, he expressed his displeasure at the act, and tried to console Pausanias by pecuniary presents. But he granted neither redress nor satisfaction to the sentiment of an outraged man. Accordingly Pausanias determined to take revenge for himself. Instead of revenging himself on Attalus—who indeed was out of his reach, being at the head of the Macedonian troops in Asia—his wrath fixed upon Philip himself, by whom the demand for redress had been refused. It appears that this turn of sentiment, diverting the appetite for

1 Diodor. xvii. 2.  
3 Diodor. xvi. 92.  
4 Aristot. Polit. v. 8, 10. Ἡ Φιλίππη ἐπίθεσις ὑπὸ Παυσανίου, διὰ τὸ τῶν ἑδροφυτέων αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ Ἄτταλον, &c. Justin, ix. 6; Diodor. xvi. 93.
revenge away from the real criminal, was not wholly spontaneous on the part of Pausanias, but was artfully instigated by various party conspirators who wished to destroy Philip. The enemies of Attalus and queen Cleopatra (who herself is said to have treated Pausanias with insult) —being of course also partisans of Olympias and Alexander—were well disposed to make use of the maddened Pausanias as an instrument, and to direct his exasperation against the king. He had poured forth his complaints both to Olympias and to Alexander; the former is said to have worked him up vehemently against her late husband—and even the latter repeated to him a verse out of Euripides, wherein the fierce Medea, deserted by her husband Jason who had married the daughter of the Corinthian king Creon, vows to include in her revenge the king himself, together with her husband and his new wife. That the vindictive Olympias would positively spur on Pausanias to assassinate Philip, is highly probable. Respecting Alexander, though he also was accused, there is no sufficient evidence to warrant a similar assertion; but that some among his partisans—men eager to consult his feelings and to ensure his succession—lent their encouragements, appears tolerably well established. A Greek sophist named Hermokrates is also said to have contributed to the deed, though seemingly without intention, by his conversation; and the Persian king (an improbable report) by his gold.

Unconscious of the plot, Philip was about to enter the theatre, already crowded with spectators. As he approached the door, clothed in a white robe, he felt so exalted with impressions of his own dignity, and so confident in the admiring sympathy of the surrounding multitude, that he advanced both unarmed and unprotected, directing his guards to hold back. At this moment Pausanias, standing near with a Gallic sword concealed under his garment, rushed upon him, thrust the weapon through his body, and killed him. Having accomplished his purpose, the assassin immediately ran off, and tried to reach the gates, where he had previously caused horses to be stationed. Being strong and active, he might have succeeded in effecting his escape—like most of the assassins of Jason of Pherae under circumstances very similar—had not his foot stumbled amidst some vine-stocks. The guards and friends of Philip were at first paralysed with astonishment and consternation. At length however some hastened to assist the dying king; while

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1 Plutarch, Alex. c. 10. 8 Arrian, Exp. Alex. ii. 14, 10. 2 Plutarch, Alex. c. 10. 4 Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4, 32.
others rushed in pursuit of Pausanias. Leonnatus and Perdikkas overtook him and slew him immediately. 1  

In what way, or to what extent, the accomplices of Pausanias lent him aid, we are not permitted to know. It is possible that they may have posted themselves artfully so as to obstruct pursuit, and favour his chance of escape; which would appear extremely small, after a deed of such unmeasured audacity. Three only of the reputed accomplices are known to us by name—three brothers from the Lynkestian district of Upper Macedonia—Alexander, Heromenés, and Arrhihæus, sons of Aëropus; 2 but it seems that there were others besides. The Lynkestian Alexander—whose father-in-law Antipater was one of the most conspicuous and confidential officers in the service of Philip—belonged to a good family in Macedonia, perhaps even descendants from the ancient family of the princes of Lynkestis. 3 It was he who, immediately after Pausanias had assassinated Philip, hastened to salute the prince Alexander as king, helped him to put on his armour, and marched as one of his guards to take possession of the regal palace. 4  

This “prima vox” 5 was not simply an omen or presage to Alexander of empire to come, but essentially serviceable to him as a real determining cause or condition. The succession to the Macedonian throne was often disturbed by feud or bloodshed among the members of the regal family; and under the latter circumstances of Philip's reign, such disturbance was peculiarly probable. He had been on bad terms with Alexander, and on still worse terms with Olympias. While banishing persons attached to Alexander, he had lent his ear to Attalus with the partisans of the new queen Kleopatra. Had these latter got the first start after the assassination, they would have organised an opposition to Alexander in favour of the infant prince; which opposition might have had some chances of success, since they had been in favour with the deceased king, and were

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1 Diodor. xvi. 94; Justin, ix. 7; Plutarch, Alex. c. 10.  
2 Arrian, Exp. Alex. i. 25, 1.  
3 Justin, xii. 14; Quintus Curtius, vii. 1, 5, with the note of Mitzel.  
4 Arrian, i. 25, 2; Justin, xi. 2.  
5 Tacitus, Hist. ii. 80.  
6 Diodor. xvi. 94; Justin, ix. 7; Plutarch, Alex. c. 10.  
7 Arrian, Exp. Alex. i. 25, 1.  
8 Justin, xii. 14; Quintus Curtius, vii. 1, 5, with the note of Mitzel.  
9 Arrian, i. 25, 2; Justin, xi. 2.  
10 “Soli Alexandre Lyncestarum fratris peperecit, servans in eo auspiciem dignitatis suae; nam regem eum primus salutaverat.”  
11 Tacitus, Hist. ii. 80.  
"Dum quaeritar tempus locumque, quodcumque in regali diffidentiam est, prima vox; dum animo spes, timor, ratio, causas observat; egressum eundem Vespasiam, pauci militibus solito admittedes ordine, Imperadores salutaverit. Tum euteri succurrere, Caesarum, et Augustum, et omnia principatus vocabula cumulare, rei aucta ad fortunam transferat.”
therefore in possession of many important posts. But the deed of Pausanias took them unprepared, and for the moment paralysed them; while, before they could recover or take concert, one of the accomplices of the assassin ran to put Alexander in motion without delay. A decisive initiatory movement from him and his friends, at this critical juncture, determined waverers and forestalled opposition. We need not wonder therefore that Alexander, when king, testified extraordinary gratitude, and esteemed for his Lynkesian namesake; not simply exempting him from the punishment of death inflicted on the other accomplices, but also promoting him to great honours and important military commands. Neither Alexander and Olympias on the one side, nor Attalus and Kleopatra on the other, were personally safe, except by acquiring the succession. It was one of the earliest proceedings of Alexander to send over a special officer to Asia, for the purpose of bringing home Attalus prisoner, or of putting him to death; the last of which was done, seemingly through the cooperation of Parmenio (who was in joint command with Attalus) and his son Philotas. The unfortunate Kleopatra and her child were both put to death shortly afterwards. Other persons also were slain, of whom I shall speak farther in describing the reign of Alexander.

We could have wished to learn from some person actually present, the immediate effect produced upon the great miscellaneous crowd in the theatre, when the sudden manifestation of Philip first became known. Among the all the Greeks present, there were doubtless many who welcomed it with silent satisfaction, as seeming to reopen for them the door of freedom. One person alone dared to manifest satisfaction; and that one was Olympias.

Thus perished the destroyer of freedom and independence in the

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1 Quintus Curtius, vii. 1, 3; Diodorus, xvii. 2, 5. Compare Justin, xi. 5.
2 Justin. ix. 7; xi. 2. Pausanias, viii. 7, 5; Plutarch, Alex. c. 10. According to Pausanias, Olympias caused Kleopatra and her infant boy to perish by a horrible death; being roasted or baked on a brazen vessel surrounded by fire. According to Justin, Olympias first slew the daughter of Kleopatra on her mother's bosom, and then caused Kleopatra herself to be hanged; while Alexander put to death Caranus, the infant son of Kleopatra. Plutarch says nothing about this; but states that the cruel treatment of Kleopatra was inflicted by order of Olympias during the absence of Alexander, and that he was much displeased at it. The main fact, that Kleopatra and her infant child were despatched by violence, seems not open to reasonable doubt; though we cannot verify the details.
3 After the solemn funeral of Philip, Olympias took down and burned the body of Pausanias (which had been crucified), providing for him a sepulchral monument and an annual commemoration. Justin, ix. 7.
Hellenic world, at the age of forty-six or forty-seven, after a reign of twenty-three years. Our information about him is signally defective. Neither his means, nor his plans, nor the difficulties which he overcame, nor his interior government, are known to us with exactness or upon contemporary historical authority. But the great results of his reign, and the main lines of his character, stand out incontrovertibly. At his accession, the Macedonian kingdom was a narrow territory round Pella, excluded partially, by independent and powerful Grecian cities, even from the neighbouring sea-coast. At his death, Macedonian ascendency was established from the coasts of the Propontis to those of the Ionian Sea, and the Ambrakian, Messenian, and Saronic Gulls. Within these boundaries, all the cities recognised the supremacy of Philip; except only Sparta, and mountaineers like the Aetolians and others, defended by a rugged home. Good fortune had waited on Philip's steps, with a few rare interruptions, but it was good fortune crowning the efforts of a rare talent, political and military. Indeed the restless ambition, the indefatigable personal activity and endurance, and the adventurous courage, of Philip, were such as, in a king, suffice almost of themselves to guarantee success, even with abilities much inferior to his. That among the causes of Philip's conquests, one was corruption, employed abundantly to foment discord and purchase partisans among neighbours and enemies—that with winning and agreeable manners, he combined recklessness in false promises, deceit and extortion even towards allies, and unscrupulous perjury when it suited his purpose—this we find affirmed, and there is no reason for disbelieving it. Such dissolving forces smoothed the way for an efficient and admirable army, organized, and usually commanded, by himself. Its organization adopted and enlarged the best processes of scientific warfare employed by Epaminondas and Iphikratès.\footnote{1} Begun as well as

\footnote{1} Justin (ix. 3) calls Philip 47 years of age; Pausanius (viii. 7, 4) speaks of him as 46. See Mr. Clinton's Fast. Hellen. Appen. 4. p. 227.

\footnote{2} Theopompus, Fragm. 249; Theopompus ap. Polybius, viii, 11. ἀδικώ-τατον δὲ καὶ κακοπραγμονίστατον πιμή-τα τῶν φίλων καὶ συμμάχων κατα-σκευάς, πλεύτας δὲ πόλεις ἐξισοποιοῦ-\mnvo καὶ πεταρακτηκότα μετὰ δόλου καὶ βιας, &c.

\footnote{3} Theopompus, Fragm. 249; Theopompus ap. Polybius, viii, 11. 

\footnote{4} A striking passage occurs, too long to cite, in the third Philippic of Demo-
completed by Philip, and bequeathed as an engine ready-made for the conquests of Alexander, it constitutes an epoch in military history. But the more we extol the genius of Philip as a conqueror, formed for successful encroachment and aggrandizement at the expense of all his neighbours—the less can we find room for that mildness and moderation which some authors discover in his character. If, on some occasions of his life, such attributes may fairly be recognised, we have to set against them the destruction of the thirty-two Greek cities in Chalkidike and the wholesale transportation of reluctant and miserable families from one in habitation to another.

Besides his skill as a general and politician, Philip was no mean proficient in the Grecian accomplishments of rhetoric and letters. The testimony of Aeschines as to his effective powers of speaking, though requiring some allowance, is not to be rejected. Isocrates addresses him as a friend of letters and philosophy; a reputation which his choice of Aristotle as instructor of his son Alexander, tends to bear out. Yet in Philip, as in the two Dionysii of Syracuse and other despots, these tastes were not found inconsistent either with the crimes of ambition, or the licenses of inordinate appetite. The contemporary historian Theopompus, a warm admirer of Philip's genius, stigmatises not only the perfidy of his public dealings, but also the drunkenness, gambling, and excesses of all kinds in which he indulged—encouraging the like in those around him. His Macedonian and Grecian body-guard, 800 in number, was a troop in which no decent man could live; distinguished indeed for military bravery and aptitude, but sated with plunder, and stained with such shameless treachery, sanguinary rapacity, and unbridled lust, as befitted only Centaurs and Lestrygones.

The number of Philip's mistresses and wives was almost


Polybius (viii. 11) censures Theopompus for self-contradiction, in ascribing both unprincipled means and intemperate habits, and yet extolling his ability and energy as a king. But I see no contradiction between the two. The love of enjoyment was not suffered to stand in the way of Philip's military and political schemes, either in himself or his officers. The master-passion overpowered all appetites; but when that passion did not require effort, intemperance was the habitual relaxation. Polybius neither produces any sufficient facts, nor cites any contemporary authority, to refute Theopompus. It is to be observed that the statements of Theopompus, respecting both
on an Oriental scale; and the dissensions thus introduced into his court through his offspring by different mothers, were fraught with mischievous consequences.

In appreciating the genius of Philip, we have to appreciate also the parties to whom he stood opposed. His good fortune was nowhere more conspicuous than in the fact, that he fell upon those days of disunion and backwardness in Greece (indicated in the last sentence of Xenophon's Hellenica) when there was neither leading city prepared to keep watch, nor leading general to take command, nor citizen-soldiers willing and ready to endure the hardships of steady service. Philip combated no opponents like Epaminondas, or Agesilaus, or Iphikratēs. How different might have been his career, had Epaminondas survived the victory of Mantinea, gained only two years before Philip's accession! To oppose Philip, there needed a man like himself, competent not only to advise and project, but to command in person, to stimulate the zeal of citizen-soldiers, and to set the example of braving danger and fatigue. Unfortunately for Greece, no such leader stood forward. In counsel and speech Demosthenēs sufficed for the emergency. Twice before the battle of Chaeroneia—at Byzantium and at Thebes—did he signally frustrate Philip's combinations. But he was not formed to take the lead in action, nor was there any one near him to supply the defect. In the field, Philip encountered only that public inefficiency, at Athens and elsewhere in Greece, of which even Ἐσchinēs complains; and to this decay of Grecian energy, not less than to his own distinguished attributes, the unparalleled success of his reign was owing. We shall find, during the reign of his son Alexander, the like genius and vigour exhibited on a still larger scale, and achieving still more wonderful results; while the once stirring politics of Greece, after one feeble effort, sink yet lower, into the nullity of a subject province.

the public and private conduct of Philip, are as disparaging as anything in Demo-

Ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος ἀεὶ κατὰ πόλεμον ἐγάμει, τοιούτων ῥητόρων ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ δήμου γνώμας ἐπιγραφυμένων;
CHAPTER XCI.

FIRST PERIOD OF THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT—SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF THEBES.

My last preceding chapter ended with the assassination of Philip of Macedon, and the accession of his son Alexander the Great, then twenty years of age.

It demonstrates the altered complexion of Grecian history, that we are now obliged to seek for marking events in the succession to the Macedonian crown, or in the ordinances of Macedonian kings. In fact, the Hellenic world has ceased to be autonomous. In Sicily, indeed, the free and constitutional march, revived by Timoleon, is still destined to continue for a few years longer; but all the Grecian cities south of Mount Olympus have descended into dependents of Macedonia. Such dependence, established as a fact by the battle of Charronea and by the subsequent victorious march of Philip over Peloponnesus, was acknowledged in form by the vote of the Grecian synod at Corinth. While even the Athenians had been compelled to concur in submission, Sparta alone, braving all consequences, continued inflexible in her refusal. The adherence of Thebes was not trusted to the word of the Thebans, but ensured by the Macedonian garrison established in her citadel, called the Kadmeia. Each Hellenic city, small and great—maritime, inland, and insular—(with the single exception of Sparta), was thus enrolled as a separate unit in the list of subject-allies attached to the imperial headship of Philip.

Under these circumstances, the history of conquered Greece loses its separate course, and becomes merged in that of conquering Macedonia. Nevertheless, there are particular reasons which constrain the historian of Greece to carry on the two together for a few years longer. First, conquered Greece exercised a powerful action on her conqueror—"Gracie capta ferum victorem cepit." The Macedonians, though speaking a language of their own, had neither language for communicating with others, nor literature, nor phi-
losophy, except Grecian and derived from Greeks. Philip, while causing himself to be chosen chief of Hellas, was himself not only partially hellenised, but an eager candidate for Hellenic admiration. He demanded the headship under the declared pretence of satisfying the old antipathy against Persia. Next, the conquests of Alexander, though essentially Macedonian, operated indirectly as the initiatory step of a series of events, diffusing Hellenic language (with some tinge of Hellenic literature) over a large breadth of Asia—opening that territory to the better observation, in some degree even to the superintendence, of intelligent Greeks—and thus producing consequences important in many ways to the history of mankind. Lastly, the generation of free Greeks upon whom the battle of Chaeroneia fell, were not disposed to lie quiet if any opportunity occurred for shaking off their Macedonian masters. In the succeeding chapters will be recorded the unavailing efforts made for this purpose, in which Demosthenes and most of the other leaders perished.

Alexander (born in July 356 B.C.), like his father Philip, was not a Greek, but a Macedonian and Epirot, partially imbued with Grecian sentiment and intelligence. It is true that his ancestors, some centuries before, had been emigrants from Argos; but the kings of Macedonia had long lost all trace of any such peculiarity as might originally have distinguished them from their subjects. The basis of Philip's character was Macedonian, not Greek: it was the self-will of a barbarian prince, not the ingenium civile, or sense of reciprocal obligation and right in society with others, which marked more or less even the most powerful members of a Grecian city, whether oligarchical or democratical. If this was true of Philip, it was still more true of Alexander, who inherited the violent temperament and headstrong will of his furious Epirotic mother Olympias.

A kinsman of Olympias, named Leonidas, and an Akarnanian named Lysimachus, are mentioned as the chief tutors to whom Alexander's childhood was entrusted. Of course the Iliad of Homer was among the first things which he learnt as a boy. Throughout most of his life, he retained a strong interest in this poem, a copy of which, said to have been corrected by Aristotle, he carried with him in his military campaigns. We are not told, nor is it probable, that he felt any similar attachment for the less warlike Odyssey. Even as a child, he learnt to identify himself in sympathy with Achille, his ancestor by the mother's

1 Plutarch, Alexand. c. 5, 6.
side, according to the Aakid pedigree. The tutor Lysimachus won his heart by calling himself Phoenix—Alexander, Achilles—and Philip, by the name of Peleus. Of Alexander's boyish poetical recitations, one anecdote remains, both curious and of unquestionable authenticity. He was ten years old when the Athenian legation, including both Aeschines and Demosthenes, came to Pella to treat about peace. While Philip entertained them at table, in his usual agreeable and convivial manner, the boy Alexander recited for their amusement certain passages of poetry which he had learnt; and delivered, in response with another boy, a dialogue out of one of the Grecian dramas.

At the age of thirteen, Alexander was placed under the instruction of Aristotle, whom Philip expressly invited for the purpose, and whose father Nikomachus had been both friend and physician of Philip's father Amyntas. What course of study Alexander was made to go through, we unfortunately cannot state. He received instruction from Aristotle. He enjoyed the teaching of Aristotle for at least three years, and we are told that he devoted himself to it with ardour, contracting a strong attachment to his preceptor. His powers of addressing an audience, though not so well attested as those of his father, were always found sufficient for his purpose: moreover, he retained, even in the midst of his fatiguing Asiatic campaigns, an interest in Greek literature and poetry.

At what precise moment, during the lifetime of his father, Alexander first took part in active service, we do not know. It is said that once, when quite a youth, he received the companionship of some Persian envoys during the absence of his father; and that he surprised them by the maturity of his demeanour, as well as by the political bearing and pertinence of his questions. Though only sixteen years of age, in 340 B.C., he was left at home as regent while Philip was engaged in the sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus. He put down a revolt of the neighbouring Thracian tribe called Mædi, took one of their towns, and founded it anew under the title of Mesandiias, the earliest town which bore that name, afterwards applied to various other towns planted by him and by his successors. In the march of Philip into Greece (338 B.C.), Alexander took part, commanded one of the wings at the battle of Chaeroneia, and is said to have first gained the advantage on his side over the Theban sacred band.

1 Aeschines cont. Timarch. p. 167. Alexander was the companion of his father during part of the war in Thrace (ix. 1).

2 Plutarch, Alex. 5.

3 Plutarch, Alex. 9. Justin says that
Yet notwithstanding such marks of confidence and coöperation, other incidents occurred producing bitter animosity between the father and the son. By his wife Olympias, Philip had as offspring Alexander and Kleopatra: by a Thessalian mistress named Philinna, he had a son named Aridæus (afterwards called Philip Arideus): he had also daughters named Kynna (or Kynanë) and Thessalonikë. Olympias, a woman of sanguinary and implacable disposition, had rendered herself so obdurate to him that he repudiated her, and married a new wife named Kleopatra. I have recounted in my ninetieth chapter the indignation felt by Alexander at this proceeding, and the violent altercation which occurred during the conviviality of the marriage banquet; where Philip actually snatched his sword, threatened his son’s life, and was only prevented from executing the threat by falling down through intoxication. After this quarrel, Alexander retired from Macedonia, conducting his mother to her brother Alexander king of Epirus. A son was born to Philip by Kleopatra. Her brother or uncle Attalus acquired high favour. Her kinsmen and partisans generally were also promoted, while Ptolemy, Nearchus, and other persons attached to Alexander, were banished.¹

The prospects of Alexander were thus full of uncertainty and peril, up to the very day of Philip’s assassination. The succession to the Macedonian crown, though transmitted in the same family, was by no means assured as to individual members; moreover, in the regal house of Macedonia² (as among the kings called Diadochi, who acquired domi-

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¹ Plutarch, Alex. 10. Arrian, iii. 6, 8.
² See the third chapter of Plutarch’s life of Demetrius Poliorcítès; which presents a vivid description of the feelings prevalent between members of regal families in those ages. Demetrius, coming home from the chase with his hunting javelins in his hand, goes up to his father Antigonus, salutes him, and sits down by his side without disarming. This is extolled as an unparalleled proof of the confidence and affection subsisting between the father and the son. In the families of all the other Diadochi (says Plutarch) murders of sons, mothers, and wives, were frequent — murders of brothers were even common, assumed to be precautions necessary for security. Οὖν ἡ διαδόξα χωρίς τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ γιου, ὡς εἰπεῖν, δὲ καὶ Μέγας δὲ καὶ ἔχοντας µαραθίσαν οὖν τοῖς αὐτῶν ἀνυπόκτως καὶ ἀνοικτά, ὅταν δὲ ἀνείπεν τό τελός τοῦ ἀπειθείας οὕτως ἐξαιτήθη τὸν μὲν γιον, τοῦ ἀπειθείας οὖν τόν τελός τοῦ καθαρτικοῦ. Ἐντός τινος πρᾶτης γεγονότος τῷ πατρῷ ἀνατέναι, ὡς εἰπεῖν, δὲ καὶ Μέγας δὲ καὶ Μέγας δὲ καὶ ἔχοντας µαραθίσαν οὖν τοῖς αὐτῶν ἀνυπόκτως καὶ ἀνοικτά, ὅταν δὲ ἀνείπεν τό τελός τοῦ ἀπειθείας οὕτως ἐξαιτήθη τὸν μὲν γιον, τοῦ ἀπειθείας οὖν τόν τελός τοῦ καθαρτικοῦ.
nion after the death of Alexander the Great), violent feuds and standing mistrust between father, sons, and brethren, were ordinary phenomena, to which the family of the Antigonids formed an honourable exception. Between Alexander and Olympias on the one side, and Kleopatra with her son and Attalus on the other, a murderous contest was sure to arise. Kleopatra was at this time in the ascendent; Olympias was violent and mischievous; and Philip was only forty-seven years of age. Hence the future threatened nothing but aggravated dissension and difficulties for Alexander. Moreover his strong will and imperious temper, eminently suitable for supreme command, disqualified him from playing a subordinate part even to his own father. The prudence of Philip, when about to depart on his Asiatic expedition, induced him to attempt to heal these family dissensions by giving his daughter Kleopatra in marriage to her uncle Alexander of Epirus, brother of Olympias. It was during the splendid marriage festival, then celebrated at Aegae, that he was assassinated—Olympias, Kleopatra, and Alexander, being all present, while Attalus was in Asia, commanding the Macedonian division sent forward in advance, jointly with Parmenio. Had Philip escaped this catastrophe, he would doubtless have carried on the war in Asia Minor with quite as much energy and skill as it was afterwards prosecuted by Alexander; though we may doubt whether the father would have stretched out to those ulterior undertakings which, gigantic and far-reaching as they were, fell short of the insatiable ambition of the son. But successful as Philip might have been in Asia, he would hardly have escaped gloomy family feuds; with Alexander as a mutinous son, under the instigations of Olympias,—and with Kleopatra on the other side, feeling that her own safety depended upon the removal of regal or quasi-regal competitors.

From such formidable perils, visible in the distance, if not immediately impending, the sword of Pausanias guaranteed both Alexander and the Macedonian kingdom. But at the moment when the blow was struck, and when the Lynkestian Alexander, one of those privy to it, ran to forestall resistance and place the crown on the head of Alexander the Great1—no one knew what to expect from the young prince thus suddenly exalted at the age of twenty years. The sudden death of Philip in the fulness of glory and ambitious hopes, must

1 Arrian, i. 25, 2; Justin, xi. 2. See preceding chapter, p. 240.
have produced the strongest impression, first upon the festive crowd assembled,—next throughout Macedonia,—lastly, upon the foreigners whom he had reduced to dependence, from the Danube to the borders of Paeonia. All these dependencies were held only by the fear of Macedonian force. It remained to be proved whether the youthful son of Philip was capable of putting down opposition and upholding the powerful organisation created by his father. Moreover Perdikkas, the elder brother and predecessor of Philip, had left a son named Amyntas, now at least twenty-four years of age, to whom many looked as the proper successor.

But Alexander, present, and proclaimed at once by his friends, showed himself, both in word and deed, perfectly competent to the emergency. He mustered, caressed, and conciliated, the divisions of the Macedonian army and the chief officers. His addresses were judicious and energetic, engaging that the dignity of the kingdom should be maintained unimpaired, and that even the Asiatic projects already proclaimed should be prosecuted with as much vigour as if Philip still lived.

It was one of the first measures of Alexander to celebrate with magnificent solemnities the funeral of his deceased father. While the preparations for it were going on, he instituted researches to find out and punish the accomplices of Pausanius. Of these indeed, the most illustrious person mentioned to us—Olympias—was not only protected by her position from punishment, but retained great ascendancy over her son to the end of his life. Three other persons are mentioned by name as accomplices,—brothers and persons of good family from the district of Upper Macedonia called Lynkestis—Alexander, Heromenês, and Arrhabæus, sons of Aëropus. The two latter were put to death, but the first of the three was spared, and even promoted to important charges as a reward for his useful forwardness in instantly saluting Alexander king. Others also, we know not how many, were executed; and Alexander seems to have imagined that there still remained some undetected. The Persian

1 Arrian, De Rebus post Alexandrum, Fragm. ap. Photium, cod. 92. Alexander son of Aëropus was son-in-law of Antipater. The case of this and of Olympias—afforded a certain basis to those who said

2 Arrian, i. 25, 2; Curtius, vii. 1, 6. xvii. 51; Justin, xi. 11.
king boasted in public letters, with how much truth we cannot say, that he too had been among the instigators of Pausanias.

Among the persons slain about this time by Alexander, we may number his first cousin and brother-in-law Amyntas—son of Perdikkas (the elder brother of the deceased Philip): Amyntas was a boy when his father Perdikkas died. Though having a preferable claim to the succession, according to usage, he had been put aside by his uncle Philip, on the ground of his age and of the strenuous efforts required on commencing a new reign. Philip had however given in marriage to this Amyntas his daughter (by an Illyrian mother) Kynna. Nevertheless, Alexander now put him to death, on accusation of conspiracy: under what precise circumstances does not appear—but probably Amyntas (who besides being the son of Philip's elder brother, was at least twenty-four years of age, while Alexander was only twenty) conceived himself as having a better right to the succession, and was so conceived by many others. The infant son of Kleopatra by Philip is said to have been killed by Alexander, as a rival in the succession; Kleopatra herself was afterwards put to death by Olympias during his absence, and to his regret. Attalus, also, uncle of Kleopatra and joint commander of the Macedonian army in Asia, was assassinated under the private orders of Alexander, by Hekataeus and Philotas. Another Amyntas, son of Antiochus (there seem to have been several Macedonians named Amyntas), fled for safety into Asia: probably others, who felt themselves to be objects of suspicion, did the like—since by the Macedonian custom, not merely a person convicted of high treason, but all his kindred along with him, were put to death.

1 Arrian, ii. 14, 10.
2 Curtius, vi. 9, 17. vi. 10, 24. Arrian mentioned this Amyntas son of Perdikkas (as well as the fact of his having been put to death by Alexander before the Asiatic expedition), in the lost work ἡ Υπ' Ακαβάνδου—see Photius, cod. 92, p. 250. But Arrian, in his account of Alexander's expedition, does not mention the fact; which shows that his silence is not to be assumed as a conclusive reason for discrediting allegations of others.
3 Compare Polyannus, viii. 60; and Plutarch, Fort. Alex. Magn. p. 327.
4 It was during his expedition into Thrace and Illyria, about eight months after his accession, that Alexander promised to give his sister Kynna in marriage to Langaran prince of the Agis (Arrian, Exp. Al. M. i. 5, 7). Langaras died of sickness soon after; so that this marriage never took place. But when the promise was made, Kynna must have been a widow. Her husband Amyntas must therefore have been put to death during the first months of Alexander's reign.
5 Arrian, i. 17, 10; Plutarch, Alex. 29; Curtius, iii. 28, 18.
6 Curtius, vi. 42, 20. Compare with this custom, a passage in the Ajax of Sophokles, v. 725.
By unequivocal manifestations of energy and address, and by despatching rivals or dangerous malcontents, Alexander thus speedily fortified his position on the throne at home. But from the foreign dependents of Macedonia—Greeks, Thracians, and Illyrians—the like acknowledgment was not so easily obtained. Most of them were disposed to throw off the yoke; yet none dared to take the initiative of moving, and the suddenness of Philip's death found them altogether unprepared for combination. By that event the Greeks were discharged from all engagement, since the vote of the confederacy had elected him personally as Imperator. They were now at liberty, in so far as there was any liberty at all in the proceeding, to elect any one else, or to abstain from re-electing at all, and even to let the confederacy expire. Now it was only under constraint and intimidation, as was well known both in Greece and in Macedonia, that they had conferred this dignity even on Philip, who had earned it by splendid exploits, and had proved himself the ablest captain and politician of the age. They were by no means inclined to transfer it to a youth like Alexander, until he had shown himself capable of bringing the like coercion to bear, and extorting the same submission. The wish to break loose from Macedonia, widely spread throughout the Grecian cities, found open expression from Demosthenes and others in the assembly at Athens. That orator (if we are to believe his rival Aeschines), having received private intelligence of the assassination of Philip, through certain spies of Charidemus, before it was publicly known to others, pretended to have had it revealed to him in a dream by the gods. Appearing in the assembly with his gayest attire, he congratulated his countrymen on the death of their greatest enemy, and pronounced high encomiums on the brave tyrannicide of Pausanias, which he would probably compare to that of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. He deprecated the abilities of Alexander, calling him Margites (the name of a silly character in one of the Iliadic poems), and intimating that he would be too much distracted with embarrassments and ceremonial duties at home, to have leisure for a foreign march. Such, according to Aeschines, was the language of Demosthenes on the first news of Philip's death. We cannot doubt that the public of Athens, as well as Demosthenes, felt great joy at an event which seemed to open to them fresh chances of
freedom, and that the motion for a sacrifice of thanksgiving, in spite of Rhokion’s opposition, was readily adopted. But though the manifestation of sentiment at Athens was thus anti-Macedonian, exhibiting aversion to the renewal of that obedience which had been recently promised to Philip, Demosthenes did not go so far as to declare any positive hostility. He tried to open communication with the Persians in Asia Minor, and also, if we may believe Diodorus, with the Macedonian commander in Asia Minor, Attalus. But neither of the two missions was successful. Attalus sent his letter to Alexander; while the Persian king, probably relieved by the death of Philip from immediate fear of the Macedonian power, despatched a peremptory refusal to Athens, intimating that he would furnish no more money.

Not merely in Athens, but in other Grecian states also, the death of Philip excited aspirations for freedom. The Lacedaemonians, who, though unsupported, had stood out inflexibly against any obedience to him, were now on the watch for new allies; while the Arcadians, Argeians, and Eelians, manifested sentiments adverse to Macedonia. The Ambrakiots expelled the garrison placed by Philip in their city; the Aetolians passed a vote to assist in restoring those A Carian exiles whom he had banished. On the other hand, the Thessalians manifested unshaken adherence to Macedonia. But the Macedonian garrison at Thebes, and the macedonising Thelians who now governed that city, were probably the main obstacles to any combined manifestation in favour of Hellenic autonomy.

Apprised of these impulses prevalent throughout the Grecian world, Alexander felt the necessity of checking them by a demonstration immediate, as well as intimidating. The energy and
rapidity of his proceedings speedily overawed all those who had speculated on his youth, or had adopted the epithets applied to him by Demosthenes. Having surmounted, in a shorter time than was supposed possible, the difficulties of his newly-acquired position at home, he marched into Greece at the head of a formidable army, seemingly about two months after the death of Philip. He was favourably received by the Thessalians, who passed a vote constituting Alexander head of Greece in place of his father Philip; which vote was speedily confirmed by the Amphiktyonic assembly, convoked at Thermopylae. Alexander next advanced to Thebes, and from thence over the isthmus of Corinth into Peloponnesus. The details of his march we do not know; but his great force, probably not inferior to that which had conquered at Chaeronea, spread terror everywhere, silencing all except his partisans. Nowhere was the alarm greater than at Athens. The Athenians, recollecting both the speeches of their orators and the votes of their assembly,—offensive at least, if not hostile, to the Macedonians—trembled lest the march of Alexander should be directed against their city, and accordingly made preparation for standing a siege. All citizens were enjoined to bring in their families and properties from the country, insomuch that the space within the walls was full both of fugitives and of cattle. At the same time, the assembly adopted, on the motion of Demades, a resolution of apology and full submission to Alexander: they not only recognized him as chief of Greece, but conferred upon him divine honours, in terms even more emphatic than those bestowed on Philip. The mover, with other legates, carried the resolution to Alexander, whom they found at Thebes, and who accepted their submission. A young speaker named Pytheas is said to have opposed the vote in the Athenian assembly. Whether Demosthenes did the like—or whether, under the feeling of disappointed anticipations and overwhelming Macedonian force, he condemned himself to silence,—we cannot say. That he did not go with Demades on the mission to Alexander, seems a matter of course, though he is said to have been appointed by public vote to do so, and to have declined the duty. He accompanied the legation as far as Mount Kithaeron, on the frontier, and then returned to Athens. We read with astonishment that Aeschinus and his other enemies

1 Demades Fragment. ὑπὲρ τῆς διους δικαστείας, p. 180.
2 Aristot., i. 1, 4.
denounced this step as a cowardly desertion. No envoy could be so odious to Alexander, or so likely to provoke refusal for the proposition which he carried, as Demosthenes. To employ him in such a mission would have been absurd; except for the purpose probably intended by his enemies, that he might be either detained by the conqueror as an expiatory victim, or sent back as a pardoned and humiliated prisoner.

After displaying his force in various portions of Peloponnesus, Alexander returned to Corinth, where he convened deputies from the Grecian cities generally. The list of those cities which obeyed the summons is not before us, but probably it included nearly all the cities of Central Greece. We know only that the Lacedaemonians continued to stand aloof, refusing all concurrence. Alexander asked from the assembled deputies the same appointment which the victorious Philip had required and obtained two years before—the hegemony or headship of the Greeks collectively for the purpose of prosecuting war against Persia. To the request of a prince at the head of an irresistible army, one answer only was admissible. He was nominated Imperator with full powers, by land and sea. Overawed by the presence and sentiment of Macedonian force, all acquiesced in this vote except the Lacedaemonians.

The convention sanctioned by Alexander was probably the same as that settled by and with his father Philip. Its grand and significant feature was, that it recognized Hellas as a confederacy under the Macedonian prince as imperator, president, or executive head and arm. It crowned him with a legal sanction as keeper of the peace within

52 (Plutarch, Demosth. c. xiii. 4), Plutarch, Demosth. c. xiii. 4. (Plutarch confounds the proceedings of this year with those of the succeeding year.) Demades, in the fragment of his oration remaining to us, makes no allusion to this proceeding of Demosthenes.

This decree, naming Demosthenes among the envoys, is likely enough to have been passed chiefly by the votes of his enemies. It was always open to an Athenian citizen to accept or decline such an appointment.

Several years afterwards, Demades himself was put to death by Antipater, to whom he had been sent as envoy from Athens (Diodor. xvi. 48).

Arrian, i. 1, 2, 3, 4. αὖτε πάντες οἱ άυτών τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν Πέρσων στρα- τείας, ἢ τὴν καταστάσει τῶν Πέρσων ἡγεμονία τοῖς Πέρσας στρα- τείας, ἢ τοῖς Πέρσων ἡγεμονία τοῖς Πέρσων στρα- τείας, ἢ τοῖς Πέρσων ἡγεμονία τοῖς Πέρσων στρα- τείας, ἢ τοῖς Πέρσων ἡγεμονία τοῖς Πέρσων στρα- 
Arrian speaks as if this request had been addressed only to the Greeks within Peloponnesus; moreover he mentions no assembly at Corinth, which is noticed (though with some confusion) by Diodorus, Justin, and Plutarch. Cities out of Peloponnesus, as well as within it, must have been included; unless we suppose that the resolution of the Amphiktyonic assembly, which had been previously passed, was held to comprehend all the extra-Peloponnesian cities, which seems not probable.
Greece, and conqueror abroad in the name of Greece. Of its other conditions, some are made known to us by subsequent complaints; such conditions as, being equitable and tutelary towards the members generally, the Macedonian chief found it inconvenient to observe, and speedily began to violate. Each Hellenic city was pronounced, by the first article of the convention, to be free and autonomous. In each, the existing political constitution was recognised as it stood; all other cities were forbidden to interfere with it, or to second any attack by its hostile exiles. No new despot was to be established; no dispossessed despot was to be restored. Each city became bound to discourage in every other, as far as possible, all illegal violence—such as political executions, confiscation, spoliation, re-division of land or abolition of debts, factional manumission of slaves, &c. To each was guaranteed freedom of navigation; maritime capture was prohibited, on pain of enmity from all. Each was forbidden to send armed vessels into the harbour of any other, or to build vessels or engage seamen there. By each, an oath was taken to observe these conditions, to declare war against all who violated them, and to keep them inscribed on a commemorative column. Provision seems to have been made for admitting any additional city on its subsequent application, though it might not have been a party to the original contract. Moreover, it appears that a standing military force, under Macedonian orders, was provided to enforce observance of the convention; and that the synod of deputies was contemplated as likely to meet periodically.

1 Demosthenes (or Pseudo-Demosthenes), Orat. xvii, De Fudere Alexandrino, p. 213, 214. ἐπιτάττει ἡ συνθήκη εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ, ἐλευθέρους εἶναι καὶ αὐτονόμους τοὺς Ἑλλήνας — Ἐστὶ γὰρ γεγραμμένον, ἐὰν τινες τὰς πολιτείας τὰς παρ᾽ ἑκάστοις οὔσας, ὅτε τοὺς ὄρκους τοὺς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης ὀρμᾶναι, καταλῦσαι, πολεμίους εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς τῆς εἰρήνης μετέχουσι...  

2 Demosthen. Orat. de Fadere Alex. p. 213.  

3 Demosth. ib. p. 215. ἐστὶ γὰρ δὴ ποιῶν ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις, ὥθηθαι τὸ πλεῖον τοὺς μετέχοντας τῆς εἰρήνης, καὶ μηδὲνα κομίζειν αὐτοὺς μὴ δὲ λάμπει, καταγαίνειν πλοίον μηδὲνος τοῦτων — ἐὰν δὲ τις παρὰ τῶν τῶν τούτων πολέμων εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς τῆς εἰρήνης μετέχουσι...  

4 Demosthen. ib. p. 218, 219. Ehmke, in his instructive comments on this convention (Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Attischen Redner, p. 623), has treated the prohibition here mentioned as if it were one specially binding the Macedonians not to sail with armed ships into the Piraeus. This undoubtedly is the particular case on which the orator insists; but I conceive it to have been only a particular case under a general prohibitory rule.  

5 Arrian, ii. 1, 7; ii. 2, 4. Demosth. de Fod. Alex. p. 213. Thucydides, Mitylene, Antissa, and Eresos, can hardly have been members of the convention when first sworn.  

Such was the convention, in so far as we know its terms, agreed to by the Grecian deputies at Corinth with Alexander; but with Alexander at the head of an irresistible army. He proclaimed it as the "public statute of the Greeks," constituting a paramount obligation, of which he was the enforcer, binding on all, and authorising him to treat all transgressors as rebels. It was set forth as counterpart of, and substitute for, the convention of Antalkidas, which we shall presently see the officers of Darius trying to revive against him—the headship of Persia against that of Macedonia. Such is the melancholy degradation of the Grecian world, that its cities have no alternative except to choose between these two foreign potentates—or to invite the help of Darius, the most distant and least dangerous, whose headship could hardly be more than nominal, against a neighbour sure to be domineering and compressive, and likely enough to be tyrannical. Of the once powerful Hellenic chiefs and competitors—Sparta, Athens, Thebes—under each of whom the Grecian world had been upheld as an independent and self-determining aggregate, admitting the free play of native sentiment and character under circumstances more or less advantageous—the two last are now confounded as common units (one even held under garrison) among the subject allies of Alexander; while Sparta preserves only the dignity of an isolated independence.

It appears that during the nine months which succeeded the swearing of the convention, Alexander and his officers (after his return to Macedonia) were active, both by armed force and by mission of envoys, in procuring new adhesions and in remodelling the governments of various cities suitably to their own views. Complaints of such aggressions were raised in the public assembly of Athens, the only place in Greece where any liberty of discussion still survived. An oration, pronounced by Demosthenes,...
Hyperídes, or one of the contemporary anti-Macedonian politicians (about the spring or early summer of 335 B.C.), imparts to us some idea both of the Macedonian interventions steadily going on, and of the unavailing remonstrances raised against them by individual Athenian citizens. At the time of this oration, such remonstrances had already been often repeated. They were always met by the macedonizing Athenians with peremptory declarations that the convention must be observed. But in reply, the remonstrants urged, that it was unfair to call upon Athens for strict observance of the convention, while the Macedonians and their partisans in the various cities were perpetually violating it for their own profit. Alexander and his officers (affirms this orator) had never once laid down their arms since the convention was settled. They had been perpetually tampering with the governments of the various cities, to promote their own partisans to power. In Messène, Sikyon, and Pelléne, they had subverted the popular constitutions, banished many citizens, and established friends of their own as despots. The Macedonian force, destined as a public guarantee to enforce the observance of the convention, had been employed only to overrule its best conditions, and to arm the hands of factious partisans. Thus Alexander, in his capacity of Imperator, disregarding all the restraints of the convention, acted as chief despot for the maintenance of subordinate despots in the separate cities. Even at Athens, this imperial

the Grecian mercenaries who had been serving with that prince, were highly criminal for having contravened the general vote of the Greeks (παρὰ τὰ δόγματα τὰ Ἑλλήνων), except such as had taken service before that vote was passed, and except the Sinopeans, whom Alexander considered as subjects of Persia and not partakers τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Ἑλλήνων (Arvan, ii. 23, i.; iii. 24, 9). 1

1 This is the oration περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἐλλήνων συμβάσεων already more than once alluded to above. Though standing among the Demosthenic works, it is supposed by Libanius as well as by most modern critics not to be the production of Demosthenes—upon internal grounds of style, which are certainly forcible. Libanius says that it bears much resemblance to the style of Hyperídes. At any rate, there seems no reason to doubt that it is a genuine oration of one of the contemporary orators. I agree with Böhmecke (For-
authority had rescinded sentences of the Dikastery, and compelled
the adoption of measures contrary to the laws and constitution.1

At sea, the wrongful aggressions of Alexander or his officers
had been not less manifest than on land. The convention,

Vi...
vessels might be built there for Macedonian account. This was offensive to a large proportion of Athenians, not only as violating the convention, but as a manifest step towards employing the nautical equipments and seamen of Athens for the augmentation of the Macedonian navy.

"Let those speakers who are perpetually admonishing us to observe the convention (the orator contends), prevail on the imperial chief to set the example of observing it on his part. I too impress upon you the like observance. To a democracy nothing is more essential than scrupulous regard to equity and justice. But the convention itself enjoins all its members to make war against transgressors; and pursuant to this article you ought to make war against Macedon. Be assured that all Greeks will see that the war is neither directed against them nor brought on by your fault. At this juncture, such a step for the maintenance of your own freedom as well as Hellenic freedom generally, will be not less opportune and advantageous than it is just. The time is coming for shaking off your disgraceful submission to others, and your oblivion of our own past dignity. If you encourage me, I am prepared to make a formal motion—To declare war against the violators of the convention, as the convention itself directs."

A formal motion for declaring war would have brought upon the mover a prosecution under the Graphé Paranomon. Accordingly, though intimating clearly that he thought the actual juncture (what it was we do not know) suitable, he declined to incur such responsibility without seeing beforehand a manifestation of public sentiment sufficient to give him hopes of a favourable verdict from the Dikastery. The motion was probably not made. But a

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1 Demosth. (or Pseudo-Demosth.) Orat. De Fide Alex. p. 219.
2 Demosth. ib. p. 211. εἰμί γὰρ εἰσὶν ὧν ὑπὸ τούτων δημοκρατομένων πρέπειν, ὡς περὶ τὸ τῶν καὶ τὸ δικαίων συνδέσειν.
3 Demosth. ib. p. 214. νυνὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶν τὰ δίκαια ἡμᾶς καὶ τὸ δικαίων συνεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μήδεμις ἢ ἔρωσι τῶν ἑαυτῶν ἀναμνησθῆναι.
5 Demosth. ib. p. 217, osde ἡμῶν ἐγκαλέσατο ποτὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐς ἦ δὲ παραβιάσατε τι τῶν κοινής ὁμολογηθέντων, ἀλλὰ καὶ χάριν ἐξουσίαν ὑπὸ τοὺς ἐξηλέγεσθαι ταῦτα ταῦτα ποιοῦντα, &c.
6 Demosth. ib. p. 214. νυνὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶν τὰ δίκαια ἡμᾶς καὶ τὸ δικαίων συνεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μήδεμις ἢ ἔρωσι τῶν ἑαυτῶν ἀναμνησθῆναι.
7 Demosth. ib. p. 217, osde ἡμῶν ἐγκαλέσατο ποτὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐς ἦ δὲ παραβιάσατε τι τῶν κοινής ὁμολογηθέντων.
speech so bold, even though not followed up by a motion, is in itself significant of the state of feeling in Greece during the months immediately following the Alexandrine convention. This harangue is only one among many delivered in the Athenian assembly, complaining of Macedonian supremacy as exercised under the convention. It is plain that the acts of Macedonian officers were such as to furnish ample ground for complaint; and the detention of all the trading ships coming out of the Euxine, shows us that even the subsistence of Athens and the islands had become more or less endangered. Though the Athenians resorted to no armed interference, their assembly at least afforded a theatre where public protest could be raised and public sympathy manifested.

It is probable too that at this time Demosthenes and the other anti-Macedonian speakers were encouraged by assurances and subsidies from Persia. Though the death of Philip, and the accession of an untried youth of twenty, had led Darius to believe for the moment that all danger of Asiatic invasion was passed, yet his apprehensions were now revived by Alexander's manifested energy, and by the renewal of the Grecian league under his supremacy. It was apparently during the spring of 335 B.C., that Darius sent money to sustain the anti-Macedonian party at Athens and elsewhere. Aeschines affirms, and Deinarchus afterwards repeats (both of them orators hostile to Demosthenes) — That about this time, Darius sent to Athens 300 talents which the Athenian people refused, but which Demosthenes took, reserving however 70 talents out of the sum for his own private purse: That public inquiry was afterwards instituted on the subject. Yet nothing is alleged as having been made out; at least Demosthenes was neither condemned, nor even brought (as far as appears) to any formal trial. Out of such data we can elicit no specific fact. But they warrant the general conclusion, that Darius, or the satraps in Asia Minor, sent money to Athens in the spring of 335 B.C., and letters or emissaries to excite hostilities against Alexander.

That Demosthenes, and probably other leading orators, received

1 Diodorus, xvii. 7.
Aeschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 63; Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 11-16, p. 9-14. It is Aeschines who states that the 300 talents were sent to the Athenian people, and refused by them.

Three years later, after the battle of Issus, Alexander in his letter to Darius accuses that prince of having sent both letters and money into Greece, for the purpose of exciting war against him. Alexander states that the Lacedaemonians accepted the money, but that all the other Grecian cities refused it (Arr. ii. 14, 9). There is no reason to doubt these facts; but I find nothing identifying the precise point of time to which Alexander alludes.
such remittances from Persia, is no evidence of that personal cor-
ruption which is imputed to them by their enemies. It is noway proved that Demosthenes applied the money
to his own private purposes. To receive and expend it in trying to organize combinations for the enfranchise-
ment of Greece, was a proceeding which he would aver as not only legitimate, but patriotic. It was aid obtained from one foreign prince to enable Hellas to throw off the worse dominion of another. At this moment, the political interest of Persia coinci-
cided with that of all Greeks who aspired to freedom. Darius had no chance of becoming master of Greece; but his own security prescribed to him to protect her from being made an appendage of the Macedonian kingdom, and his means of doing so were at this moment ample, had they been efficaciously put forth. Now the purpose of a Greek patriot would be to preserve the integrity and autonomy of the Hellenic world against all foreign interference. To invoke the aid of Persia against Hellenic enemies—as Sparta had done both in the Peloponnesian war and at the peace of Antalkidas, and as Thebes and Athens had followed her example in doing afterwards—was an unwarrantable proceeding: but to invoke the same aid against the dominion of another foreigner, at once nearer and more formidable, was open to no blame on the score either of patriotism or policy. Demosthenes had vainly urged his countrymen to act with energy against Philip, at a time when they might by their own efforts have upheld the existing autonomy both for Athens and for Greece generally. He now seconded or invited Darius, at a time when Greece single-handed had become incompetent to the struggle against Alexander, the common enemy both of Grecian liberty and of the Persian empire. Unfortunately for Athens as well as for himself, Darius, with full means of resistance in his hands, played his game against Alex-
ander even with more stupidity and improvidence than Athens had played hers against Philip.

While such were the aggressions of Macedonian officers in the exercise of their new imperial authority, throughout Greece and the islands—and such the growing manifesta-
tions of repugnance to it at Athens—Alexander had re-
turned home to push the preparations for his Persian campaign. He did not however think it prudent to transport his main force into Asia, until he had made his power and personal ascendency felt by the Macedonian de-
cendencies, westward, northward, and north-eastward of Pella—
Hlyrians, Peconians, and Thracians. Under these general names were comprised a number of distinct tribes, or nations, warlike and for the most part predatory. Having remained unconquered until the victories of Philip, they were not kept in subjection even by him without difficulty: nor were they at all likely to obey his youthful successor, until they had seen some sensible evidence of his personal energy.

Accordingly, in the spring, Alexander put himself at the head of a large force, and marched in an easterly direction from Amphipolis, through the narrow Sapean pass between Philippi and the sea. In ten days' march he reached the difficult mountain path over which alone he could cross Mount Haemus (Balkan). Here he found a body of the free Thracians and of armed merchants of the country assembled to oppose his progress, posted on the high ground with waggons in their front, which it was their purpose to roll down the steep declivity against the advancing ranks of the Macedonians. Alexander eluded this danger by ordering his soldiers either to open their ranks, so as to let the waggons go through freely—or where there was no room for such loose array, to throw themselves on the ground with their shields closely packed together and slanting over their bodies; so that the waggons, dashing down the steep and coming against the shields, were carried off the ground, and made to bound over the bodies of the men to the space below. All the waggons rolled down without killing a single man. The Thracians, badly armed, were then easily dispersed by the Macedonian attack, with the loss of 1500 men killed, and all their women and children made prisoners. The captives and plunder were sent back under an escort to be sold at the seaports.

Having thus forced the mountain road, Alexander led his army over the chain of Mount Haemus, and marched against the Triballi; a powerful Thracian tribe,—extending (as far as can be determined) from the plain of Kossovo in modern Servia

1 Strabo speaks of the Thracian ethny as twenty-two in number, capable of sending out 200,000 foot, and 15,000 horse (Strabo, vii. Fragm. Vatic. 48). 2 Strabo, vii. p. 331 (Fragm. 1); Arrian, i. 1, 6; Appian, Bell. Civil. iv. 87, 105, 106. Appian gives (iv. 103) a good general description of the almost impenetrable and trackless country to the north and north-east of Philippi.

3 Arrian, i. 1, 12, 17. The precise locality of that steep road whereby Alexander crossed the Balkan, cannot be determined. Baron von Moltke, in his account of the Russian campaign in Bulgaria (1878-1879), gives an enumeration of four roads, passable by an army, crossing this chain from north to south (see chap. i. of that work). But whether Alexander passed by any one of these four, or by some other road still
northward towards the Danube,—whom Philip had conquered, yet not without considerable resistance and even occasional defeat. Their prince Syrmus had already retired with the women and children of the tribe into an island of the Danube called Peuké, where many other Thracians had also sought shelter. The main force of the Triballi took post in woody ground on the banks of the river Zygium, about three days' march from the Danube. Being tempted, however, by an annoyance from the Macedonian light-armed, to emerge from their covered position into the open plain, they were here attacked by Alexander with his cavalry and infantry, in close combat, and completely defeated. Three thousand of them were slain, but the rest mostly eluded pursuit by means of the wood, so that they lost few prisoners. The loss of the Macedonians was only eleven horsemen and forty foot slain, according to the statement of Ptolemy, son of Lagus, then one of Alexander's confidential officers, and afterwards founder of the dynasty of Greco-Egyptian kings.\(^1\)

Three days' march, from the scene of action, brought Alexander to the Danube, where he found some armed ships which had been previously ordered to sail (probably with stores of provision) from Byzantium bound by the Euxine and up the river. He first employed these ships in trying to land a body of troops on the island of Peuké; but his attempt was frustrated by the steep banks, the rapid stream, and the resolute front of the defenders on shore. To compensate for this disappointment, Alexander resolved to make a display of his strength by crossing the Danube and attacking the Getae, tribes, chiefly horsemen armed with bows,\(^2\) analogous to the Thracians in habits and language. They occupied the left bank of the river, from which their town was about four miles distant. The terror of the Macedonian successes had brought together a body of 4000 Getae, visible from the opposite shore, to resist any crossing. Accordingly Alexander got together a quantity of the rude boats (hollowed out of a single trunk) employed for transport on the river, and caused the tent-skins of the army to be stuffed with hay in order to support rafts. He then put himself on shipboard during the night, and contrived to carry across the river a body of 4000 infantry, and 1500 cavalry, landing on a part of the bank where there was high standing wheat and no enemy's post. The Getae, intimidated not less by this successful passage than by the excellent array of Alexander's army, hardly stayed to sustain a charge of cavalry, but

\(^{1}\) Arrian, i. 2.  
Caapp, XCL CROSSING OF THE DANUBE. 265

hastened to abandon their poorly fortified town and retire farther away from the river. Entering the town without resistance, he destroyed it, carried away such moveables as he found, and then returned to the river without delay. Before he quitted the northern bank, he offered sacrifice to Zeus the Preserver—to Herakles—and to the God Ister (Danube) himself, whom he thanked for having shown himself not impassable. On the very same day, he recrossed the river to his camp; after an empty demonstration of force, intended to prove that he could do what neither his father nor any Grecian army had ever yet done, and what every one deemed impossible—crossing the greatest of all known rivers without a bridge and in the face of an enemy. 1

1 Arrian, i. 4, 2-7.

2 Neither the point where Alexander crossed the Danube,—nor the situation of the island called Peuké,—nor the identity of the river Lygmos, nor the part of Mount Hemus which Alexander forced his way over—can be determined. The data given by Arrian are too brief and too meagre, to make out with assurance any part of his march after he crossed the Nestus. The facts reported by the historian represent only a small portion of what Alexander really did in this expedition.

It seems clear however that the main purpose of Alexander was to attack and humble the Triballi. Their locality is known generally as the region where the modern Servia joins Bulgaria. They reached eastward (in the times of Thucydides, ii. 36) as far as the river Oïkios or Isker, which crosses the chain of Hemus from south to north, passes by the modern city of Sophia, and falls into the Danube. Now Alexander, in order to conduct his army from the eastern bank of the river Nestus, near its mouth, to the country of the Triballi, would naturally pass through Philippopolis, which city appears to have been founded by his father Philip, and therefore probably had a regular road of communication to the maritime regions. (See Stephanius Byz. v. Φιλιππόπολις.) Alexander would cross Mount Hemus, then, somewhere north-west of Philippopolis. We read in the year 376 B.C. (Diodor, xv, 36) of an invasion of Abdéra by the Triballi; which shows that there was a road, not unfit for an army, from their territory to the eastern side of the mouth of the river Nestus, where Abdéra was situated. This was the road which Alexander is likely to have followed. But he must probably have made a considerable circuit to the eastward; for the route which Paul Lucas describes himself as having taken direct from Philippopolis to Drama, can hardly have been fit for an army.

The river Lygmos may perhaps be the modern Isker, but this is not certain. The island called Peuké is still more perplexing. Strabo speaks of it as if it were near the mouth of the Danube (vii. p. 301-305). But it seems impossible that either the range of the Triballi, or the march of Alexander, can have extended so far eastward. Since Strabo (as well as Arrian) copied Alexander's march from Ptolemy, whose authority is very good, we are compelled to suppose that there was a second island called Peuké higher up the river.

The geography of Thrace is so little known, that we cannot wonder at our inability to identify these places. We are acquainted, and that but imperfectly, with the two high roads, both starting from Byzantium or Constantinople. 1. The one (called the King's Road, from having been in part the march of Xerxes in his invasion of Greece, Livy, xxxix. 27; Herod. vii. 115) crossing the Hebrus and the Nestus, touching the northern coast of the Ægean Sea at Neapolis, a little south of Philippi; then crossing the Strymon at Amphipolis, and stretching through Pella across Inner Macedonia and Illyria to Dyrrachium (the Via Egnatia). 2. The other, taking a more northerly course, passing along the upper valley of the Hebrus from Adrianople to Philippopolis, then through Sardica (Sophia) and Naissus
The terror spread by Alexander’s military operations was so great, that not only the Triballi, but the other autonomous Thracians around, sent envoys tendering presents or tribute, and soliciting peace. Alexander granted their request. His mind being bent upon war with Asia, he was satisfied with having intimidated these tribes so as to deter them from rising during his absence. What conditions he imposed, we do not know, but he accepted the presents.

While these applications from the Thracians were under debate, envoys arrived from a tribe of Gauls occupying a distant mountainous region westward toward the Ionie Gulf. Though strangers to Alexander, they had heard so much of the recent exploits, that they came with demands to be admitted to his friendship. They were distinguished both for tall stature and for boastful language. Alexander readily exchanged with them assurances of alliance. Entertaining them at a feast, he asked, in the course of conversation, what it was that they were most afraid of, among human contingencies? They replied, that they feared no man, nor any danger, except only, lest the heaven should fall upon them. Their answer disappointed Alexander, who had expected that they would name him, as the person of whom they were most afraid; so prodigious was his conceit of his own exploits. He observed to his friends that these Gauls were swaggerers. Yet if we attend to the sentiment rather than the language, we shall see that such an epithet applies with equal or greater propriety to Alexander himself. The anecdote is chiefly interesting as it proves at how early an age the exorbitant self-esteem, which we shall hereafter see to have been the distinguishing characteristic of Alexander, was manifest.

(Nisch), to the Danube, near Belgrade; the high road now followed from Constantinople to Belgrade.

But apart from these two roads, scarcely anything whatever is known of the country. Especially the mountainous region of Rhodope, bounded on the west by the Strymon, on the north and east by the Hebrus, and on the south by the Igeean, is a Terra Incognita, except the few Grecian colonies on the coast. Very few travellers have passed along or described the southern or King’s Road, while the region in the interior, apart from the high road, was absolutely unexplored until the visit of M. Viqesnel in 1847, under scientific mission from the French government. The brief, but interesting account, composed by M. Viqesnel, of this rugged and impracticable district, is contained in the “Archives des Missions Scientifiques et Littéraires” for 1850, published at Paris. Unfortunately, the map intended to accompany that account has not yet been prepared; but the published data, as far as they go, have been employed by Kiepert in constructing his recent map of Turkey in Europe; the best map of these regions now existing, though still very imperfect. The Illustrations (Erlauterungen) annexed by Kiepert to his map of Turkey, show the defective data on which the chartography of this country is founded. Until the survey of M. Viqesnel, the higher part of the course of the Strymon, and nearly all the course of the Nestus, may be said to have been wholly unknown.

1 Arrian, i. 4, 5; Strabo, vii, p. 301.
after find him manifesting, began. That after the battle of Issus he should fancy himself superhuman, we can hardly be astonished; but he was as yet only in the first year of his reign, and had accomplished nothing beyond his march into Thrace and his victory over the Triballi.

After arranging these matters, he marched in a south-westerly direction into the territory of the Agrianes and the other Pannonias, between the rivers Strymon and Axios in the highest portion of their course. Here he was met by a body of Agrianes under their prince Langarus, who had already contracted a personal friendship for him at Pella before Philip's death. News came that the Illyrian Kleitus, son of Bardylis, who had been subdued by Philip, had revolted at Pelion (a strong post south of lake Lycheuidus, on the west side of the chain of Skardus and Pindus, near the place where that chain is broken by the cleft called the Klissura of Tsangon or Devol)—and that the western Illyrians, called Taulantii, under their prince Glaukias, were on the march to assist him. Accordingly Alexander proceeded thither forthwith, leaving Langarus to deal with the Illyrian tribe Autariata, who had threatened to oppose his progress. He marched along the bank and up the course of the Erigon, from a point near where it joins the Axios. On approaching Pelion, he found the Illyrians posted in front of the town and on the heights around, awaiting the arrival of Glaukias their promised ally. While Alexander was making his dispositions for attack, they offered their sacrifices to the gods; the victims being three boys, three girls, and three black rams. At first they stepped boldly forward to meet him, but before coming to close quarters, they turned and fled into the town with such haste that the slain victims were left below Kuprili. Here he would be among the Pannonians and Agrianes, on the east—and the Dardani and Autariata, seemingly on the northwest. If he then followed the course of the Erigon, he would pass through the portions of Macedonia then called Deuripia and Pelagonia; he would go between the ridges of mountains, through which the Ergon breaks, called Nidje on the south, and Babuna on the north. He would pass afterwards to Florina, and not to Bitolia. See Kiepert's map of these regions—a portion of his recent map of Turkey in Europe—and Grisebach's description of the general track.

For the situation of Pelion, compare Livy, xxxi. 33, 34, and the remarks of Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii. ch. 28, p. 310-324.

2 Assuming Alexander to have been in the territory of the Triballi, the modern Servia, he would in this march follow mainly the road which is now frequented between Belgrade and Bitolia; through the plains of Kostorna, Presina, Ratschamik (rounding on the north-eastern side the Ljusubria, the north-eastern promontory terminating the chain of Skardus), Uschub, Kuprili, along the higher course of the Axios or Vardar until the point where the Ergon or Tscherna joins that river.
lying on the spot. 1 Having thus driven in the defenders, Alexander was preparing to draw a wall of circumvallation round the Pelion, when he was interrupted by the arrival of Glaukias with so large a force as to compel him to abandon the project. A body of cavalry, sent out from the Macedonian camp under Philotas to forage, were in danger of being cut off by Glaukias, and were only rescued by the arrival of Alexander himself with a reinforcement. In the face of this superior force, it was necessary to bring off the Macedonian army, through a narrow line of road along the river Eordaikus, where in some places there was only room for four abreast, with hill or marsh everywhere around. 2 By a series of bold and skilful manœuvres, and by effective employment of his battering-train or projectile machines to protect the rear-guard, Alexander completely baffled the enemy, and brought off his army without loss. 3 Moreover these Illyrians, who had not known how to make use of such advantages of position, abandoned themselves to disorder as soon as their enemy had retreated, neglecting all precautions for the safety of their camp. Apprised of this carelessness, Alexander made a forced night-march back, at the head of his Agrianian division and light troops supported by the remaining army. He surprised the Illyrians in their camp before daylight. The success of this attack against a sleeping and unguarded army was so complete, that the Illyrians fled at once without resistance. Many were slain or taken prisoners; the rest, throwing away their arms, hurried away homeward, pursued by Alexander for a considerable distance. The Illyrian prince Kleitus was forced to evacuate Pelion, which place he burned, and then retired into the territory of Glaukias. 4

Just as Alexander had completed this victory over Kleitus and the Taulantian auxiliaries, and before he had returned home, news reached him of a menacing character. The Thebans had declared themselves independent of him, and were besieging his garrison in the Kadmeia.

Of this event, alike important and disastrous to those who stood forward, the immediate antecedents are very imperfectly known to us. It has already been remarked that the vote of submission on the part of the Greeks to Alexander as Imperator, during the preceding autumn, had been passed only under the intimidation of a present Macedonian force. Though the Spartans alone had courage to proclaim their

1 Arrian, i. 5, 12.  
2 Arrian, i. 6, 3-18.  
3 Arrian, i. 6, 19-22.
dissent, the Athenians, Arcadians, Aetolians, and others, were well known even to Alexander himself, as ready to do the like on any serious reverse to the Macedonian arms. Moreover the energy and ability displayed by Alexander had taught the Persian king that all danger to himself was not removed by the death of Philip, and induced him either to send, or to promise, pecuniary aid to the anti-Macedonian Greeks. We have already noticed the manifestation of anti-Macedonian sentiment at Athens—proclaimed by several of the most eminent orators—Demosthenes, Lykurgus, Hyperides, and others; as well as by active military men like Charidemus and Ephialtes, who probably spoke out more boldly when Alexander was absent on the Danube. In other cities, the same sentiment doubtless found advocates, though less distinguished; but at Thebes, where it could not be openly proclaimed, it prevailed with the greatest force. The Thebans suffered an oppression from which most of the other cities were free—the presence of a Macedonian garrison in their citadel; just as they had endured, fifty years before, the curb of a Spartan garrison after the fraud of Phobidas and Leontidas. In this case, as in the former, the effect was to arm the macedonising leaders with absolute power over their fellow-citizens, and to inflict upon the latter not merely the public mischief of extinguishing all free speech, but also multiplied individual insults and injuries, prompted by the lust and rapacity of rulers, foreign as well as domestic. A number of Theban citizens, among them the freest and boldest spirits, were in exile at Athens, receiving from the public indeed nothing beyond a safe home, but secretly encouraged to hope for better things by Demosthenes and the other anti-Macedonian leaders. In like manner fifty years before, it was at Athens, and from private Athenian citizens, that the Thebans Pelopidas and Mellon had found that sympathy which enabled them to organise their daring conspiracy for rescuing Thebes from the Spartans. That enter-

1 Arrian, i. 7, 5.
2 Athen. V. xii. 57.
3 Demades, περὶ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, n. 14, Ἐθναιδιοῦ δὲ μεγάτου εἰσὶν διεμφέροντα καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων φρουρῶν, ὡς ὑδ ὑπὸ μοῦν τὰ χείρα συνεδέσθησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν παρῆσιαν ἀπφέρασε....
4 The Thebans, in setting forth their complaints to the Arcadians, stated—ὅπις ὑπὸ τὴν πρὸς τῶν Ἐλλήνων πάροικον Ἐθναιδιοῦ διαλαμάθανε βοουδόδων, τ土耳 πάγυμα ἐπτησίσθησαν, ὡς ἐκάνων τῷ Ἐλλήνῳ σύντοις πράξεωις, ἀλλὰ τὰ παρά τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων εὖ τῇ πίλει γενόμενα φέρειν ὡς κεῖται δυνάμενοι. οὐδὲ τὴν δοῦλειαν ὑπομείνειν, οὐδὲ τὰς ὑβρισεῖς ὁρὰς εἰς τὰ ἐλευθεραί σώματα γείομενα.
5 The Thebans, in setting forth their complaints to the Arcadians, stated—ὅτι οὐ τὴν πρὸς τῶν Ἑλλήνων φιλίαν Ἐθναιδιοῦ διαλαμάθανε βοουδόδων, τ土耳 πάγυμα ἐπτησίσθησαν, ὡς ἐκάνων τῷ Ἐλλήνῳ σύντοις πράξεωις, ἀλλὰ τὰ παρά τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων εὖ τῇ πίλει γενόμενα φέρειν ὡς κεῖται δυνάμενοι. οὐδὲ τὴν δοῦλειαν ὑπομείνειν, οὐδὲ τὰς ὑβρισεῖς ὁρὰς εἰς τὰ ἐλευθεραί σώματα γείομενα.
6 See Demades περὶ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, n. 13, the speech of Cleadas, Justin, x1. 4; and (Demarchus cont. Demosth., s. 20) compare Livy, xxxiv. 27—about the working of the Macedonian garrison at Maroneia, in the time of Philip son of Demetrius.
7 Demades περὶ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, Fragment ad fin.
prise, admired throughout Greece as alike adventurous, skilful, and heroic, was the model present to the imagination of the Theban exiles, to be copied if any tolerable opportunity occurred.

Such was the feeling in Greece, during the long absence of Alexander on his march into Thrace and Illyria; a period of four or five months, ending at August 335 B.C. Not only was Alexander thus long absent, but he sent home no reports of his proceedings. Couriers were likely enough to be intercepted among the mountains and robbers of Thrace; and even if they reached Pella, their despatches were not publicly read, as such communications would have been read to the Athenian assembly. Accordingly we are not surprised to hear that rumours arose of his having been defeated and slain. Among these reports, both multiplied and confident, one was even certified by a liar who pretended to have just arrived from Thrace, to have been an eye-witness of the fact, and to have himself wounded in the action against the Triballi, where Alexander had perished.\(^1\) This welcome news, not fabricated, but too hastily credited, by Demosthenes and Lykurgus,\(^2\) was announced to the Athenian assembly. In spite of doubts expressed by Demades and Phokion, it was believed not only by the Athenians and the Theban exiles there present, but also by the Arcadians, Eleians, Aitolians and other Greeks. For a considerable time, through the absence of Alexander, it remained uncontradicted, which increased the confidence in its truth.

It was upon the full belief in this rumour, of Alexander’s defeat and death, that the Grecian cities proceeded. The event severed by itself their connexion with Macedonia. There was neither son nor adult brother to succeed to the throne: so that not merely the foreign ascendency, but even the intestine unity, of Macedonia, was likely to be broken.

\(^1\) Arrian, i. 7, 3. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ πολὺ δὲ λέγως (of the death of Alexander) καὶ παρὰ πολλῶν ἐφοίτα, ὅτι τε χρόνον ἀπήν ὡς ἔλεγαν καὶ ὅτι εὐθεία ἀγγελία παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἐφώσκε, &c.

\(^2\) Demades περὶ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, &c. οὐκ ὄλγον καὶ ὅτι οὐδεμία ἀγγελία παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἀφῆκτο, δα. dum egresso Pisone, occisam in castris. 

Justian, xi, 2. "Demosthenem oratorem, qui Macedonum deletas omnes cum rege copias à Triballius affirmaverit, pro-duce in concionem auctore, qui in eo praebio, in quo rex excidit, se quaque vulneratum dicerat."

Compare Tacitus, Histor. i. 34, "Vix dum egresso Pisone, occisum in castris Othonem, vagus primum et incertus rumor, mox, ut in nonus mendacia, inter- fusisse se speravit, et vidisse effrenandum, cre-dula fama inter gularium et incertosos . . . . Obvius in palatio Julius Atticus, spectaculor, cruentum gladium ostentaverat, occium a se Othonem exclamavit."

"It is stated that Alexander was really wounded in the head by a stone, in the action with the Illyrians (Plutarch, Fortun. Alex. p. 227)."
up. In regard to Athens, Arcadia, Elis, Aetolia, &c., the anti-Macedonian sentiment was doubtless vehemently manifested, but no special action was called for. It was otherwise in regard to Thebes. Phoenix, Prochytés, and other Theban exiles at Athens, immediately laid their plan for liberating their city and expelling the Macedonian garrison from the Kadmeia. Assisted with arms and money by Demosthenés and other Athenian citizens, and invited by their partizans at Thebes, they suddenly entered that city in arms. Though unable to entry the Kadmeia by surprise, they seized in the city, and put to death, Amyntas, a principal Macedonian officer, with Timolaus, one of the leading macedonizing Thebans. They then immediately convoked a general assembly of the Thebans, to whom they earnestly appealed for a vigorous effort to expel the Macedonians, and reconquer the ancient freedom of the city. Expiating upon the misdeeds of the garrison and upon the oppressions of those Thebans who governed by means of the garrison, they proclaimed that the happy moment of liberation had now arrived, through the recent death of Alexander. They doubtless recalled the memory of Pelopidas, and the glorious enterprise, cherished by all Theban patriots, whereby he had rescued the city from Spartan occupation, forty-six years before. To this appeal the Thebans cordially responded. The assembly passed a vote, declaring severance from Macedonia, and autonomy of Thebes—and naming as Boeotarchs some of the returned exiles, with others of the same party, for the purpose of energetic measures against the garrison in the Kadmeia.

Unfortunately for Thebes, none of these new Boeotarchs were men of the stamp of Epaminondas, probably not even of Pelopidas. Yet their scheme, though from its melancholy result it is generally denounced as insane, really promised better at first than that of the anti-Spartan conspirators in 380 B.C. The Kadmeia was instantly summoned; hopes being perhaps indulged, that the Macedonian commander would surrender it with as little resistance as the Spartan harmost had done. But such hopes were not realized. Philip had probably caused the citadel to be both strengthened and provisioned. The garrison defied the Theban leaders, who did not, feel themselves strong enough to give orders for an assault, as Pelopidas in his time was
prepared to do, if surrender had been denied. They contented
themselves with drawing and guarding a double line of circum-
vallation round the Kadmeia, so as to prevent both sallies from
within and supplies from without. They then sent envoys in the
melancholy equipment of suppliants, to the Arcadians and others,
representing that their recent movement was directed, not against
Hellenic union, but against Macedonian oppression and outrage,
which pressed upon them with intolerable bitterness. As Greeks
and freemen they entreated aid to rescue them from such a
calamity. They obtained much favourable sympathy, with some
promise and even half-performance. Many of the leading orators
at Athens—Demosthenes, Lykurgus, Hyperides, and others—
together with the military men Charidemus and Ephialtes—
strongly urged their countrymen to declare in favour of Thebes
and send aid against the Kadmeia. But the citizens generally,
following Demades and Phokion, waited to be better assured both
of Alexander’s death and of its consequences, before they would
incur the hazard of open hostility against Macedonia, though they
seem to have declared sympathy with the Theban revolution.
Demosthenes farther went as envoy into Peloponnesus, while the
Macedonian Antipater also sent round urgent applications to the
Peloponnesian cities, requiring their contingents, as members of
the confederacy under Alexander, to act against Thebes. The
elocution of Demosthenes, backed by his money, or by Persian
money administered through him, prevailed on the Peloponnesians
to refuse compliance with Antipater, and to send no contingents
against Thebes. The Eleians and Arcadians held out general
assurances favourable to the revolution at Thebes, while the
Arcadians even went so far as to send out some troops to second
it, though they did not advance beyond the isthmus.

Here was a crisis in Grecian affairs, opening new possibilities
for the recovery of freedom. Had the Arcadians and
other Greeks lent decisive aid to Thebes—had Athens
acted even with as much energy as she did twelve years

1 Xenoph. Hellen. v. 4, 11. See Ch. LXXVII. of this History.
2 Arrian, i. 7. 14.
3 Dio-Ior. xvii. 8.
5 Arrian, i. 10. 2; Ἀσκινής adv.
6 Κτεισίφοντ. p. 634.
afterwards during the Lamian war, occupying Thermopylae with an army and a fleet—the gates of Greece might well have been barred against a new Macedonian force, even with Alexander alive and at its head. That the struggle of Thebes was not regarded at the time, even by macedonising Greeks, as hopeless, is shown by the subsequent observations both of Aeschines and Deinarchus at Athens. Aeschines (delivering five years afterwards his oration against Ktesiphon) accuses Demosthenes of having by his perverse backwardness brought about the ruin of Thebes. The foreign mercenaries forming part of the garrison of the Kadmeia were ready (Aeschines affirms) to deliver up that fortress, on receiving five talents: the Arcadian generals would have brought up their troops to the aid of Thebes, if nine or ten talents had been paid to them—having repudiated the solicitations of Antipater. Demosthenes (say these two orators) having in his possession 300 talents from the Persian king, to instigate anti-Macedonian movements in Greece, was supplicated by the Theban envoys to furnish money for these purposes, but refused the request, kept the money for himself, and thus prevented both the surrender of the Kadmeia and the onward march of the Arcadians. The charge here advanced against Demosthenes appears utterly incredible. To suppose that anti-Macedonian movements counted for so little in his eyes, is an hypothesis belied by his whole history. But the fact that such allegations were made by Aeschines only five years afterwards, proves the reports and the feelings of the time—that the chances of successful resistance to Macedonia on the part of the Thebans were not deemed unfavourable. And when the Athenians, following the counsels of Demades and Phokion, refused to aid Thebes or occupy Thermopylae—they perhaps consulted the safety of Athens separately, but they needed from the generous and Pan-hellenic patriotism which had animated their ancestors against Xerxes and Mardonius.\footnote{1 Aeschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 634; Deinarch. adv. Demosth. p. 15, 16. s. 19-22. See Herod. viii. 143. Demosthenes in his orations frequently insists on the different rank and position of Athens, as compared with those of the smaller Greek states—and on the higher and more arduous obligations consequent thereupon. This is one grand point of distinction between his policy and that of Phokion. See a striking passage in the speech De Corona, p. 245. s. 77; and Orat. De Republ. Ordinand. p. 173. s. 37. Isokrates holds the same language touching the obligations of Sparta,—in the speech which he puts into the mouth of Archidamus. “No one will quarrel with Ephialtians and Phila- strians, for looking only how they can get through and keep themselves in being. But for Lacedaemonians, it is impossible to aim simply at preservation and nothing beyond—by any means, whatever they may be. If we cannot preserve VOL. VIII.}
The Thebans, though left in this ungenerous isolation, pressed the blockade of the Kadmeia, and would presently have reduced the Macedonian garrison, had they not been surprised by the awe-striking event—Alexander arriving in person at Ochæstus in Boeotia, at the head of his victorious army. The first news of his being alive was furnished by his arrival at Ochæstus. No one could at first believe the fact. The Theban leaders contended that it was another Alexander, the son of Atropus, at the head of a Macedonian army of relief.

In this incident we may note two features, which characterized Alexander to the end of his life; matchless celerity of movement, and no less remarkable favour of fortune. Had news of the Theban rising first reached him while on the Danube or among the distant Triballi,—or even when embarrassed in the difficult region round Pelion,—he could hardly by any effort have arrived in time to save the Kadmeia. But he learnt it just when he had vanquished Kleitus and Glaukias, so that his hands were perfectly free—and also when he was in a position peculiarly near and convenient for a straight march into Greece without going back to Pella. From the pass of Tschangon (or of the river Devol), near which Alexander’s last victories were gained, his road lay southward, following downwards in part the higher course of the river Haliakmon, through Upper Macedonia or the regions called Eordwa and Elymeia which lay on his left, while the heights of Pindus and the upper course of the river Aous, occupied by the Epirots called Tympheai and Parauaei, were on the right. On the seventh day of march, crossing the lower ridges of the Cambonian mountains (which separate Olympus from Pindus and Upper Macedonia from Thessaly), Alexander reached the Thessalian town of Pelinma. Six days more brought him to the Boeotian Ochæstus. He was already within Thermopylae, before any Greeks were aware that he was in march, or even that he was alive. The question about occupying Thermopylae by a Grecian force was thus set aside. The difficulty of forcing that pass, and the necessity of forestalling Athens in it by stratagem or ourselves with honour, we ought to prefer a glorious death,” (Isokratés, Orat. vi. Archid. s. 106.) The backward and narrow policy, which Isokratés here proclaims as fit for Epidaurus and Phlius, but not for Sparta—is precisely what Phokion always recommended for Athens, even while Philip’s power was yet nascent and unsettled. 1 Arrian, i. 7, 9. 2 Arrian, i. 7, 6. See, respecting this region, Colonel Leake’s Travels in Northern Greece, ch. vi. p. 300–304; ch. xxviii. p. 303–305, &c.; and for Alexander’s line of march, the map at the end of the volume.
celerity, was present to the mind of Alexander, as it had been to that of Philip in his expedition of 346 B.C. against the Phokians.

His arrival, in itself a most formidable event, told with double force on the Greeks from its extreme suddenness. We can hardly doubt that both Athenians and Thebans had communications at Pella—that they looked upon any Macedonian invasion as likely to come from thence—and that they expected Alexander himself (assuming him to be still living, contrary to their belief) back in his capital before he began any new enterprise. Upon this hypothesis—in itself probable, and such as would have been realised if Alexander had not already advanced so far southward at the moment when he received the news 1—they would at least have known beforehand of his approach, and would have had the option of a defensive combination open. As it happened, his unexpected appearance in the heart of Greece precluded all combinations, and checked all idea of resistance.

Two days after his arrival in Boeotia, he marched his army round Thebes, so as to encamp on the south side of the city; whereby he both intercepted the communication of the Thebans with Athens, and exhibited his force more visibly to the garrison in the Kadmeia. The Thebans, though alone and without hope of succour, maintained their courage unshaken. Alexander deferred the attack for a day or two, in hopes that they would submit; he wished to avoid an assault which might cost the lives of many of his soldiers, whom he required for his Asiatic schemes. He even made public proclamation, 2 demanding the surrender of the anti-Macedonian leaders Phoenix and Prochytés, but offering to any other Theban who chose to quit the city, permission to come and join him on the terms of the convention sworn in the preceding autumn. A general assembly being convened, the macedonising Thebans enforced the prudence of submission to an irresistible force. But the leaders recently returned from exile, who had headed the rising, warmly opposed this proposition, contending for resistance to the death. In them, such resolution may not be wonderful, since (as Arrian 3 remarks) they had gone too far to hope for lenity. As it appears however that the mass of citizens deliberately adopted the same resolution, in spite of strong persuasion to the contrary, 4 we see plainly that they had already felt

1 Diodorus (xvii. 9) incorrectly says that Alexander came back unexpectedly from Thrace. Had this been the fact, he would have come by Pella.
2 Diodor. xvii. 9; Plutarch, Alexand.
3 Arrian, i. 7, 16.
4 Diodor, xvii. 9.
the bitterness of Macedonian dominion, and that sooner than endure a renewal of it, sure to be yet worse, coupled with the dishonour of surrendering their leaders—they had made up their minds to perish with the freedom of their city. At a time when the sentiment of Hellas as an autonomous system was passing away, and when Grecian courage was degenerating into a mere instrument for the aggrandisement of Macedonian chiefs, these countrymen of Epaminondas and Pelopidas set an example of devoted self-sacrifice in the cause of Grecian liberty, not less honourable than that of Leonidas at Thermopylae, and only less esteemed because it proved infructuous.

In reply to the proclamation of Alexander, the Thebans made from their walls a counter-proclamation, demanding the surrender of his officers Antipater and Philotas, and inviting every one to join them, who desired, in concert with the Persian king and the Thebans, to liberate the Greeks and put down the despot of Hellas. Such a haughty defiance and retort incensed Alexander to the quick. He brought up his battering engines and prepared everything for storming the town. Of the murderous assault which followed, we find different accounts, not agreeing with each other, yet not wholly irreconcilable. It appears that the Thebans had erected, probably in connexion with their operations against the Kadmeia, an outwork defended by a double palisade. Their walls were guarded by the least effective soldiers, metics and liberated slaves; while their best troops were bold enough to go forth in front of the gates and give battle. Alexander divided his army into three divisions; one under Perdikkas and Amyntas, against the outwork—a second, destined to combat the Thebans who sallied out—and a third, held in reserve. Between the second of these three divisions, and the Thebans in front of the gates, the battle was so obstinately contested, that success at one time seemed doubtful, and Alexander was forced to order up his reserve. The first Macedonian success was gained by Perdikkas, who, aided by the division of Amyntas, according to Ptolemy and Arrian, therefore, the storming of Thebes took place both without the orders, and against the wishes, of Alexander; the capture moreover was effected rapidly with little trouble to the besieging army (ἡ ἁλωσις δι᾽ ὀλίγον τε καὶ οὐ ξὺν πόνῳ τῶν ἑλόντων ξυνενεχθεῖσα, Arr. i. 9, 9): the bloodshed and pilage were committed by the vindictive

1 Diodor. xvii. 9.
2 The attack of Perdikcas was represented by Ptolemy, from whom Arrian copies (i. 8, 1), not only as being the first and only attack made by the Macedonian army on Thebes, but also as made by Perdikcas without orders from Alexander, who was forced to support it in order to preserve Perdikcas from being overwhelmed by the Thebans,
and also by the Agrianian regiment and the bowmen, carried the first of the two outworks, as well as a postern gate which had been left unguarded. His troops also stormed the second outwork, though he himself was severely wounded and borne away to the camp. Here the Theban defenders fled back into the city, along the hollow way which led to the temple of Héraklès, pursued by the light troops, in advance of the rest. Upon these men, however, the Thebans presently turned, repelling them with the loss of Eurybotas their commanding officer and seventy men slain. In pursuing these bowmen, the ranks of the Thebans became somewhat disordered, so that they were unable to resist the steady charge of the Macedonian guards and heavy infantry coming up in support. They were broken, and pushed back into the city;

sentiment of the Boeotian allies.

Diodorus had before him a very different account. He affirms that Alexander both combined and ordered the assault— that the Thebans behaved like bold and desperate men, resisting obstinately and for a long time—that the slaughter afterwards was committed by the general body of the assailants; the Boeotian allies being doubtless conspicuous among them. Diodorus gives this account at some length, and with his customary rhetorical amplifications. Plutarch and Justin are more brief; but coincide in the same general view, and not in that of Arrian. Polyænus again (iv. 3, 12) gives something different from all.

To me it appears that the narrative of Diodorus is (in its basis, and striking off rhetorical amplifications) more credible than that of Arrian. Admitting the attack made by Perdikkas, I conceive it to have been a portion of the general plan of Alexander. I cannot think it probable that Perdikkas attacked without orders, or that Thebes was captured with little resistance. It was captured by one assault (Aeschines adv. Ktesiphon p. 524), but an assault well combined and stoutly contested—not by one begun without preparation or order, and successful after hardly any resistance. Alexander, after having offered what he thought liberal terms, was not the man to shrink from carrying his point by force; nor would the Thebans have refused those terms, unless their minds had been made up for strenuous and desperate defence, without hope of ultimate success.

What authority Diodorus followed, we do not know. He may have followed Kleisthenes, a contemporary and an Eolian, who must have had good means of information respecting such an event as the capture of Thebes (see Geier, Alexandri M. Historiarum Scriptores theatae supersyn, Leips. 1844, p. 6152; and Vossius, De Historiæ Graecæ, i. p. 90, ed. Westermann). I have due respect for the authority of Ptolemy, but I cannot go along with Geier and other critics who set aside all other witnesses, even contemporary, respecting Alexander, as worthy of little credit, unless where such witnesses are confirmed by Ptolemy or Aristobulus. We must remember that Ptolemy did not compose his book until after he became king of Egypt, in 306 B.C.; nor indeed until after the battle of Ipsus in 301, according to Geier (p. 1); at least twenty-nine years after the sack of Thebes. Moreover, Ptolemy was not ashamed of what Geier calls (p. 11) the "pious fraud" of announcing, that two speaking serpents conducted the army of Alexander to the holy precinct of Zeus Ammon (Arrian, iii. 3). Lastly, it will be seen that the depositions which are found in other historians, but not in Ptolemy and Aristobulus, relate principally to matters discreditable to Alexander. That Ptolemy and Aristobulus forged or omitted, is in my judgment far more probable, than that other historians invented. Adorning biographers would easily excuse themselves for refusing to proclaim to the world such acts as the massacre of the Brachidice, or the dragging of the wounded Bates at Gaza.
their rout being rendered still more complete by a sally of the Macedonian garrison out of the Kadmeia. The assailants being victorious on this side, the Thebans who were maintaining the combat without the gates were compelled to retreat, and the advancing Macedonians forced their way into the town along with them. Within the town, however, the fighting still continued; the Thebans resisting in organised bodies as long as they could; and when broken, still resisting even single-handed. None of the military population sued for mercy; most of them were slain in the streets; but a few cavalry and infantry cut their way out into the plain and escaped. The fight now degenerated into a carnage. The Macedonians with their Paeonian contingents were incensed with the obstinate resistance; while various Greeks serving as auxiliaries—Phokians, Orchomenians, Thespians, Platæans,—had to avenge ancient and grievous injuries endured from Thebes. Such furious feelings were satiated by an indiscriminate massacre of all who came in their way, without distinction of age or sex—old men, women, and children, in houses and even in temples. This wholesale slaughter was accompanied of course by all the plunder and manifold outrage with which victorious assailants usually reward themselves.¹

More than five hundred Macedonians are asserted to have been slain, and six thousand Thebans. Thirty thousand captives were collected.² The final destiny of these captives, and of Thebes itself, was submitted by Alexander to the Orchomenians, Platæans, Phokians, and other Grecian auxiliaries in the assault. He must have known well beforehand what the sentence of such judges would be. They pronounced, that the city of Thebes should be razed to the ground: that the Kadmeia alone should be maintained, as a military post with Macedonian garrison: that the Theban territory should be distributed among the allies themselves: that Orchomenus and Platæa should be rebuilt and fortified: that all the captive Thebans, men, women, and children, should be sold as slaves—excepting only priests and priestesses, and such as were connected by recognised ties of hospitality with Philip or Alexander, or such as had been proxeni of the Macedonians: that the Thebans who had escaped should be proclaimed outlaws, liable to arrest and death, wherever they were found; and that every Grecian city should be interdicted from harbouring them.³

¹ Arrian, i. 8; Diodor. xvii. 12, 13. of 6000 and 30,000.
² Diodorus (xvii. 14) and Plutarch agree in giving the totals
³ Arrian, i. 9; Diodor. xvii. 14. (Alexand. 11)
This overwhelming sentence, in spite of an appeal for leniency by a Theban named Kleadas, was passed by the Grecian auxiliaries of Alexander, and executed by Alexander himself, who made but one addition to the excepting clauses. He left the house of Pindar standing, and spared the descendants of the poet. With these reserves, Thebes was effaced from the earth. The Theban territory was partitioned among the reconstituted cities of Orchomenus and Plataea. Nothing, except the Macedonian military post at the Kadmeia, remained to mark the place where the chief of the Boeotian confederacy had once stood. The captives were all sold, and are said to have yielded 440 talents; large prices being offered by bidders from feelings of hostility towards the city. Diodorus tells us that this sentence was passed by the general synod of Greeks. But we are not called upon to believe that this synod, subservient though it was sure to be when called upon to deliberate under the armed force of Alexander, could be brought to sanction such a ruin upon one of the first and most ancient Hellenic cities. For we learn from Arrian that the question was discussed and settled only by the Grecian auxiliaries who had taken part with Alexander; and that the sentence therefore represents the bitter antipathies of the Orchomoneans, Plataeans, &c. Without doubt, these cities had sustained harsh and cruel treatment from Thebes. In so far as they were concerned, the retribution upon the Thebans was merited. Those persons, however, who (as Arrian tells us) pronounced the catastrophe to be a divine judgement upon Thebes for having joined Xerxes against Greece a century and a half before,—must have forgotten that not only the Orchomoneans, but even Alexander of Macedon, the namesake and predecessor of the destroying conqueror, had served in the army of Xerxes along with the Thebans.

Arrian vainly endeavours to transfer from Alexander to the minor Boeotian towns the odium of this cruel destruction, unparalleled in Grecian history (as he himself says), when we look to the magnitude of the city; yet surpassed in the aggregate by the subversion, under the arms of Philip, of no less than thirty-two free Chalkidic cities.
cities, thirteen years before. The known antipathy of these Boeotians was invoked by Alexander to colour an infliction which satisfied at once his sentiment, by destroying an enemy who defied him—and his policy, by serving as a terrific example to keep down other Greeks. 1 But though such were the views which governed him at the moment, he came afterwards to look back upon the proceeding with shame and sorrow. The shock to Hellenic feeling, when a city was subverted, arose not merely from the violent extinction of life, property, liberty, and social or political institutions—but also from the obliteration of legends and the suppression of religious observances, thus wronging and provoking the local Gods and heroes. We shall presently find Alexander himself sacrificing at Ilium, 2 in order to appease the wrath of Priam, still subsisting and efficacious, against himself and his race, as being descended from Neoptolemus the slayer of Priam. "By his harsh treatment of Thebes, he incurred the displeasure of Dionysus, the god of wine, said to have been born in that city, and one of the principal figures in Theban legend. It was to inspirations of the offended Dionysus that Alexander believed himself to owe that ungovernable drunken passion under which he afterwards killed Kleitus, as well as the refusal of his Macedonian soldiers to follow him farther into India. 3 If Alexander in after days thus repented of his own act, we may be sure that the like repugnance was felt still more strongly by others; and we can understand the septi-

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1 Plutarch, Alex. 11. "ἡ μὲν πόλις ἠλώ καὶ διαρπασθεῖσα κατεσκάφη, τὸ μὲν ἄλλων προδόκωσαντος αὐτοῦ πόλος ἔπεσεν πάθει τηλικούτῳ ἐμπθαγέντας καὶ πτήξαντας ἀτρεμήσειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ καλλωπισαμένου χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς τῶν συμμάχων ἔγκλημασιν."

2 Arrian, 11, 13. "Illustrate farther the feeling of the Greeks, respecting the wrath of the Gods arising from the discontinuance of worship where it had been long continued. I transcribe a passage from Colonel Sleeman's work respecting the Hindoos, whose religious feelings are on so many points analogous to those of the Hellenes:" Human sacrifices were certainly offered in the city of Saugor during the whole Mahratta government, up to the year 1800—when they were put a stop to by the local governor, Assa Sahib, a very humane man. I once heard a learned Brahmin priest say, that he thought the decline of his (Assa Sahib's) family and government arises from this innovation. "There is (said he) no sin in not offering human sacrifices to the Gods, where none have been offered; but where the Gods have been accustomed to them, they are very naturally annoyed when the rite is abolished, and visit the place and people with all kinds of calamity." The priest did not seem to think that there was anything singular in this mode of reasoning: perhaps three Brahmin priests out of four would have reasoned in the same manner." (Sleeman, Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official, vol. i. ch. xv. p. 130.)

3 Plutarch, Alex. 13: compare Justin, xi. 4; and Isokrates ad Philipp. (Or. v. 8. 35), where he recommends Thebes to Philip on the ground of pre-eminent worship towards Herakles.

It deserves notice, that while Alexander himself repented of the destruction of Thebes, the Macedonising orator at Athens describes it as a just, though deplorable penalty, brought by the Thebans upon themselves by reckless insanity of conduct (Euschilis adv. Ktesiph. p. 324).
ment under which, a few years after his decease, the Macedonian Kassander, son of Antipater, restored the destroyed city.

At the time, however, the effect produced by the destruction of Thebes was one of unmitigated terror throughout the Grecian cities. All of them sought to make their peace with the conqueror. The Arcadian contingent not only returned home from the Isthmus, but even condemned their leaders to death. The Eleians recalled their chief macedonising citizens out of exile into ascendency at home. Each tribe of Epirotes sent envoys to Alexander, entreating forgiveness for their manifestations against him. At Athens, we read with surprise, that on the very day when Thebes was assaulted and taken, the great festival of Eleusinian Déméter, with its multitudinous procession of votaries from Athens to Eleusis, was actually taking place, at a distance of two days’ march from the besieged city. Most Theban fugitives who contrived to escape, fled to Attica as the nearest place of refuge, communicating to the Athenians their own distress and terror. The festival was forthwith suspended. Every one hurried within the walls of Athens, carrying with him his moveable property into a state of security. Under the general alarm prevalent, that the conqueror would march directly into Attica, and under the hurry of preparation for defence, the persons both most alarmed and most in real danger were, of course, Demosthenes, Lykurgus, Charidemus, and those others who had been loudest in speech against Macedonia, and had tried to prevail on the Athenians to espouse openly the cause of Thebes. Yet notwithstanding such terror of consequences to themselves, the Athenians afforded shelter and sympathy to the miserable Theban fugitives. They continued to do this even when they must have known that they were contravening the edict of proscription just sanctioned by Alexander.

Shortly afterwards, envoys arrived from that monarch with a menacing letter, formally demanding the surrender of eight or ten leading citizens of Athens—Demosthenes, Lykurgus, Hyperidès, Polyeuktus, Mêrokliès, Diotimus, Ephialtès, and Charidemus. Of these the first four were eminent orators, the last two military men; all strenuous advocates of an anti-Macedonian policy. Alexander in his letter denounced the ten as the causes of the battle of Chaeroneia, of the offensive resolutions which had been

1 Arrian, i. 10, 4. by Arrian (i. 10, 6), but not by Plu-
2 The name of Diotimus is mentioned tarch; who names Demon instead of
adopted at Athens after the death of Philip, and even of the recent hostile proceedings of the Thebans. This momentous summons, involving the right of free speech and public debate at Athens, was submitted to the assembly. A similar demand had just been made upon the Thebans, and the consequences of refusal were to be read no less plainly in the destruction of their city than in the threats of the conqueror. That even under such trying circumstances, neither orators nor people failed in courage—we know as a general fact; though we have not the advantage (as Livy had in his time) of reading the speeches made in the debate. Demosthenes, insisting that the fate of the citizens generally could not be severed from that of the specific victims, is said to have recounted in the course of his speech, the old fable—the wolf requiring the sheep to make over to him their protecting dogs, as a condition of peace—and then devouring the unprotected sheep forthwith. He, and those demanded along with him, claimed the protection of the people, in whose cause alone they had incurred the wrath of the conqueror. Phokion on the other hand—silent at first, and rising only under constraint by special calls from the popular voice—contended that there was not force enough to resist Alexander, and that the persons in question must be given up. He even made appeal to themselves individually, reminding them of the self-devotion of the daughters of Erechtheus, memorable in Attic legend—and calling on them to surrender themselves voluntarily for the purpose of averting public calamity. He added, that he (Phokion) would rejoice to offer up either himself, or his best friend, if by such sacrifice he could save the city. Lykurgus, one of the orators whose extradition was required, answered this speech of Phokion with vehemence and bitterness; and the public sentiment went along with him, indignantly repudiating Phokion’s advice. By a resolute patriotism highly honourable at this trying juncture, it was decreed that the persons demanded should not be surrendered.
On the motion of Demadés, an embassy was sent to Alexander, deprecating his wrath against the ten, and engaging to punish them by judicial sentence, if any crime could be proved against them. Demadés, who is said to have received from Demosthenes a bribe of five talents, undertook this mission. But Alexander was at first inexorable; refusing even to hear the envoys, and persisting in his requisition. It was only by the intervention of a second embassy, headed by Phokion, that a remission of terms was obtained. Alexander was persuaded to withdraw his requisition, and to be satisfied with the banishment of Charedemus and Ephialtés, the two anti-Macedonian military leaders. Both of them accordingly, and seemingly other Athenians with them, passed into Asia, where they took service under Darius.

It was indeed no part of Alexander's plan to undertake a siege of Athens, which might prove long and difficult, since the Athenians had a superior naval force, with the sea open to them, and the chance of effective support from Persia. When therefore he saw that his demand for the ten orators would be firmly resisted, considerations of policy gradually overcame his wrath, and induced him to relax.

Phokion returned to Athens as the bearer of Alexander's concessions, thus relieving the Athenians from extreme anxiety and peril. His influence—already great and of long standing, since for years past he had been perpetually re-elected general—became greater than ever, while that of Demosthenes and the other anti-Macedonian leaders decreased. It was indeed no part of Alexander's plan to undertake a siege of Athens, which might prove long and difficult, since the Athenians had a superior naval force, with the sea open to them, and the chance of effective support from Persia. When therefore he saw that his demand for the ten orators would be firmly resisted, considerations of policy gradually overcame his wrath, and induced him to relax.

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Donian orators must have been lowered. It was no mean advantage to Alexander, victorious as he was, to secure the incorruptible Phokion as leader of the macedonising party at Athens. His projects against Persia were mainly exposed to failure from the possibility of opposition being raised against him in Greece by the agency of Persian money and ships. To keep Athens out of such combinations, he had to rely upon the personal influence and party of Phokion, whom he knew to have always dissuaded her from resistance to the ever-growing aggrandisement of his father Philip. In his conversation with Phokion on the intended Asiatic expedition, Alexander took some pains to flatter the pride of Athens by describing her as second only to himself, and as entitled to the headship of Greece, in case anything should happen to him. Such compliments were suitable to be repeated in the Athenian assembly; indeed the Macedonian prince might naturally prefer the idea of Athenian headship to that of Spartan, seeing that Sparta stood aloof from him, an open recusant.

The animosity of Alexander being appeased, Athens resumed her position as a member of the confederacy under his imperial authority. Without visiting Attica, he now marched to the Isthmus of Corinth, where he probably received from various Grecian cities deputations deprecating his displeasure, and proclaiming their submission to his imperial authority. He also probably presided at a meeting of the Grecian synod, where he would dictate the contingents required for his intended Asiatic expedition in the ensuing spring. To the universal deference and submission which greeted him, one exception was found—the Cynic philosopher Diogenés, who resided at Corinth, satisfied with a tub for shelter, and with the coarsest and most self-denying existence. Alexander approached him with a numerous suite, and asked him if he wished for anything; upon which Diogenés is said to have replied,—“Nothing, except that you would stand a little out of my sunshine.” Both the philosopher and his reply provoked laughter from the bystanders, but Alexander himself was so impressed with the independent and self-sufficing character manifested, that he exclaimed,—“If I were not Alexander, I would be Diogenés.”

Having visited the oracle of Delphi, and received or extorted from the priestess an answer bearing favourable promise for his Asiatic schemes, he returned to Macedonia before the winter. The

1 Plutarch, Phokion, 17; Plutarch, Alexand, 13.
2 Plutarch, Alex. 14.
3 Plutarch, Alex. 14.
most important permanent effect of his stay in Greece was the reconstitution of Boeotia; that is, the destruction of Thebes, and the reconstitution of Orchomenus, Thespiae, and Plataea, dividing between them the Theban territory; all guarded and controlled by a Macedonian garrison in the Kadmeia. It would have been interesting to learn some details about this process of destruction and restitution of the Boeotian towns; a process not only calling forth strong manifestations of sentiment, but also involving important and difficult questions to settle. But unfortunately we are not permitted to know anything beyond the general fact.

Alexander left Greece for Pella in the autumn of 335 B.C., and never saw it again.

It appears, that during this summer, while he was occupied in his Illyrian and Theban operations, the Macedonian force under Parmenio in Asia had had to contend against a Persian army, or Greek mercenaries, commanded by Memnon the Rhodian. Parmenio, marching into Pholis, besieged and took Gryinium; after which he attacked Pitané, but was compelled by Memnon to raise the siege. Memnon even gained a victory over the Macedonian force under Kallas in the Troad, compelling them to retire to Rhoeum. But he failed in an attempt to surprise Kyzikus, and was obliged to content himself with plundering the adjoining territory. It is affirmed that Darius was engaged this summer in making large preparations, naval as well as military, to resist the intended expedition of Alexander. Yet all that we hear of what was actually done implies nothing beyond a moderate force.

1 Diodor, xvi. 7.
A year and some months had sufficed for Alexander to make a first display of his energy and military skill, destined for achievements yet greater; and to crush the growing aspirations for freedom among Greeks on the south, as well as among Thracians on the north, of Macedonia. The ensuing winter was employed in completing his preparations; so that early in the spring of 334 B.C., his army destined for the conquest of Asia was mustered between Pella and Amphipolis, while his fleet was at hand to lend support.

The whole of Alexander's remaining life—from his crossing the Hellespont in March or April 334 B.C. to his death at Babylon in June 323 B.C., eleven years and two or three months—was passed in Asia, amidst unceasing military operations, and ever-multiplied conquests. He never lived to revisit Macedonia; but his achievements were on so transcendent a scale, his acquisitions of territory so unmeasured, and his thirst for farther aggrandisement still so insatiate, that Macedonia sinks into insignificance in the list of his possessions. Much more do the Grecian cities dwindle into outlying appendages of a newly-grown Oriental empire. During all these eleven years, the history of Greece is almost a blank, except here and there a few scattered events. It is only at the death of Alexander that the Grecian cities again awaken into active movement.

The Asiatic conquests of Alexander do not belong directly and literally to the province of an historian of Greece. They were achieved by armies of which the general, the principal officers, and most part of the soldiers, were Macedonian. The Greeks who served with him were only auxiliaries, along with the Thracians and Paeonians. Though more numerous than all the other auxiliaries, they did not constitute, like the Ten Thousand Greeks in the army of the younger Cyrus, the force on which he mainly relied for victory. His chief-secretary, Eumenés of Kardia, was a Greek, and pro-
bably most of the civil and intellectual functions connected with the service were also performed by Greeks. Many Greeks also served in the army of Persia against him, and composed indeed a larger proportion of the real force (disregarding mere numbers) in the army of Darius than in that of Alexander. Hence the expedition becomes indirectly incorporated with the stream of Grecian history by the powerful auxiliary agency of Greeks on both sides—and still more, by its connexion with previous projects, dreams, and legends long antecedent to the aggrandisement of Macedon—as well as by the character which Alexander thought fit to assume. To take revenge on Persia for the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, and to liberate the Asiatic Greeks, had been the scheme of the Spartan Agesilaus, and of the Thracian Jason; with hopes grounded on the memorable expedition and safe return of the Ten Thousand. It had been recommended by the rhetor Isokrates, first to the combined force of Greece, while yet Grecian cities were free, under the joint headship of Athens and Sparta—next, to Philip of Macedon as the chief of united Greece, when his victorious arms had extorted a recognition of headship, setting aside both Athens and Sparta. The enterprising ambition of Philip was well pleased to be nominated chief of Greece for the execution of this project. From him it passed to his yet more ambitious son.

Though really a scheme of Macedonian appetite and for Macedonian aggrandisement, the expedition against Asia thus becomes thrust into the series of Grecian events, under the Pan-hellenic pretence of retaliation for the long-past insults of Xerxes. I call it a pretence, because it had ceased to be a real Hellenic feeling, and served now two different purposes; first, to ennoble the undertaking in the eyes of Alexander himself, whose mind was very accessible to religious and legendary sentiment, and who willingly identified himself with Agamemnon or Achilles, immortalised as executors of the collective vengeance of Greece for Asiatic insult—next, to assist in keeping the Greeks quiet during his absence. He was himself aware that the real sympathies of the Greeks were rather adverse than favourable to his success.

Apart from this body of extinct sentiment, ostentatiously rekindled for Alexander’s purposes, the position of the Greeks in reference to his Asiatic conquests was very much the same as that of the German contingents, especially those of the Confederation of the Rhine, who served in the grand army with which
the Emperor Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812. They had no public interest in the victory of the invader, which could end only by reducing them to still greater prostration.

They were likely to adhere to their leader as long as his power continued unimpaired, but no longer. Yet Napoleon thought himself entitled to reckon upon them as if they had been Frenchmen, and to denounce the Germans in the service of Russia as traitors who had forfeited the allegiance which they owed to him. We find him drawing the same pointed distinction between the Russian and the German prisoners taken, as Alexander made between Asiatic and Greek prisoners. These Greek prisoners the Macedonian prince reproached as guilty of treason against the proclaimed statute of collective Hellas, whereby he had been declared general and the Persian king a public enemy.¹

Hellas, as a political aggregate, has now ceased to exist, except in so far as Alexander employs the name for his own purposes. Its component members are annexed as appendages, doubtless of considerable value, to the Macedonian kingdom. Fourteen years before Alexander's accession, Demosthenes, while instigating the Athenians to uphold Olynthus against Philip, had told them²—"The Macedonian

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¹ Arrian, i. 16, 10; i. 29, 9, about the Greek prisoners taken at the victory of the Ipsikus—δους δ' αὐτῶν αἰχμαλώτους ἢλαθε, τούτους δ' ἔδησα ἐν πέδαις, τις Μακεδονίαν ἀπερείσκει, ἣν παρὰ τὰ κοινὰ δόξαν πολίτες ἔλαβε. τούτους δὲ δῆσα τῆς Ἑλλάδος, Ἑλληνες ὡςτε, ἔναντι τῇ Ἑλλάδι ὑπὲρ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐμαυξήθη. Also iii. 28, 15, about the Greek soldiers serving with the Persians, and made prisoners in Hyrcania—'Δυναμείως γὰρ μέγαλα (said Alexander) τῶν στρατευομένων ἐν πέδαις, τῆς Ἑλλάδος παρὰ τῶν βαρβάρων παρὰ τὰ δύγματα τῶν Ἑλλήνων.

power, considered as an appendage, is of no mean value; but by itself, it is weak and full of embarrassments.” Inverting the position of the parties, these words represent exactly what Greece herself had become, in reference to Macedonia and Persia, at the time of Alexander’s accession. Had the Persians played their game with tolerable prudence and vigour, his success would have been measured by the degree to which he could appropriate Grecian force to himself, and withhold it from his enemy.

Alexander’s memorable and illustrious manifestations, on which we are now entering, are those, not of the ruler or politician, but of the general and the soldier. In this character his appearance forms a sort of historical epoch. It is not merely in soldierlike qualities—in the most forward and even adventurous bravery—in indefatigable personal activity, and in endurance as to hardship and fatigue,—that he stands preëminent; though these qualities alone, when found in a king, act so powerfully on those under his command, that they suffice to produce great achievements, even when combined with generalship not surpassing the average of his age. But in generalship, Alexander was yet more above the level of his contemporaries. His strategic combinations, his employment of different descriptions of force conspiring towards one end, his long-sighted plans for the prosecution of campaigns, his constant foresight and resource against new difficulties, together with rapidity of movement even in the worst country—all on a scale of prodigious magnitude—are without parallel in ancient history. They carry the art of systematic and scientific warfare to a degree of efficiency, such as even successors trained in his school were unable to keep up unimpaired.

We must recollect however that Alexander found the Macedonian military system built up by Philip, and had only to apply and enlarge it. As transmitted to him, it embodied the accumulated result and matured fruit of a series of successive improvements, applied by Grecian tacticians to the primitive Hellenic arrangements. During the sixty years before the accession of Alexander, the art of war had been conspicuously progressive—to the sad detriment of Grecian political freedom. “Everything around us (says Demosthenes addressing the people of Athens in 342 B.C.) has been in advance for some years past—nothing is like what it was formerly—but nowhere is the alteration and enlargement more conspicuous than in the affairs of war.” Formerly, the
Lacedemonians as well as other Greeks did nothing more than invade each other's territory, during the four or five summer months, with their native force of citizen hoplites: in winter they stayed at home. But now we see Philip in constant action, winter as well as summer, attacking all around him, not merely with Macedonian hoplites, but with cavalry, light infantry, bowmen, foreigners of all descriptions, and siege batteries."

I have in several preceding chapters dyelt upon this progressive change in the character of Grecian soldiership. At Athens, and in most other parts of Greece, the burghers had become averse to hard and active military service. The use of arms had passed mainly to professional soldiers, who, without any feeling of citizenship, served wherever good pay was offered, and became immensely multiplied, to the detriment and danger of Grecian society. Many of these mercenaries were lightly armed—peltasts served in combination with the hoplites. Iphikratés greatly improved and partly re-armed the peltasts; whom he employed conjointly with hoplites so effectively as to astonish his contemporaries. His innovation was further developed by the great military genius of Epaminondas; who not only made infantry and cavalry, light-armed and heavy-armed, conspire to one scheme of operations, but also completely altered the received principles of battle-manoeuvring, by concentrating an irresistible force of attack on one point of the enemy's line, and keeping the rest of his own line more on the defensive. Besides these important improvements, realised by generals in actual practice, intelligent officers like Xenophon embodied the results of their military experience in valuable published criticisms. Such were the lessons which the Macedonian

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1 Demosth. Philipp. iii, p. 123, 124: compare Olynth. ii, p. 22. I give here the substance of what is said by the orator, not strictly adhering to his words.

2 Isokratés, in several of his discourses, notes the gradual increase of those mercenaries—men without regular means of subsistence, or fixed residence, or civic obligations. Or. iv. (Panegyr.), s. 195; Or. v. (Philippus), s. 112-142; Or. viii. (De Pace), s. 31-56.

3 Xenoph. Magist. Equit. ix. 4. Οἶδα δ᾽ ἐγὼ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις τὸ ἱππικὸν ἀρξάμενον εὐδοκιμεῖν, ἐπεὶ ξένου ἱππέας προυσέλαβον' καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι πανταχοῦ τὰ ξενικὰ ἑυδοκιμοῦντα.

4 For an explanation of the improved arming of peltasts introduced by Iphikratés, see Chap. LXXV. of this History. Respecting these improvements, the statements both of Diodorus (xv. 44) and of Nepos are obscure. MM. Rustow and Kochly (in their valuable work, Geschichte des Griechischen Kriegswesens, Aarau, 1852, B. ii, p. 104) have interpreted the statements in a sense to which I cannot subscribe. They think that Iphikratés altered not only the arming of peltasts, but also that of hoplites; a supposition, which I see nothing to justify.

5 Besides the many scattered remarks in the Anabasis, the Cyropedia is full of discussion and criticism on military phenomena. It is remarkable to what
Philip learnt and applied to the enslavement of those Greeks, especially of the Thebans, from whom they were derived. In his youth, as a hostage at Thebes, he had probably conversed with Epaminondas, and must certainly have become familiar with the Theban military arrangements. He had every motive, not merely from ambition of conquest, but even from the necessities of defence, to turn them to account; and he brought to the task military genius and aptitude of the highest order. In arms, in evolutions, in engines, in regimenting, in war-office arrangements, he introduced important novelties; bequeathing to his successors the Macedonian military system, which, with improvements by his son, lasted until the conquest of the country by Rome, near two centuries afterwards.

The military force of Macedonia, in the times anterior to Philip, appears to have consisted, like that of Thessaly, in a well-armed and well-mounted cavalry, formed from the substantial proprietors of the country—and in a numerous assemblage of peltasts or light infantry (somewhat analogous to the Thessalian Penesta): these latter were the rural population, shepherds or cultivators, who tended sheep and cattle, or tilled the earth, among the spacious mountains and valleys of Upper Macedonia. The Grecian towns near the coast, and the few Macedonian towns in the interior, had citizen-hoplites better armed; but foot service was not in honour among the natives, and the Macedonian infantry in their general character were hardly more than a rabble. At the period of Philip's accession, they were armed with nothing better than rusty swords and wicker shields, noway sufficient to make head against the inroads of their Thracian and Illyrian neighbours; before whom they were constantly compelled to flee for refuge up to the mountains.  

An extent Xenophon had present to his mind all the exigences of war, and the different ways of meeting them. See an example, Cyropæd. vi. 2; ii. 1.

The work on sieges, by Æneas (Poliorcetica), is certainly anterior to the military improvements of Philip of Macedonia; probably about the beginning of his reign. See the preface to it by Rustow and Kichly, p. 8, in their edition of Die Griechischen Kriegschriftsteller, Leipzig, 1853. In this work, allusion is made to several others, now lost, by the same author—Piropæd., &c. 1

1 See the striking speech addressed by Alexander to the discontented Macedonian soldiers, a few months before his death, at Opis or Susa (Arrian, vii. 9).
Their condition was that of poor herdsmen, half-naked or covered only with hides, and eating from wooden platters; not much different from that of the population of Upper Macedonia three centuries before, when first visited by Perdikkas the ancestor of the Macedonian kings, and when the wife of the native prince baked bread with her own hands. On the other hand, though the Macedonian infantry was thus indifferent, the cavalry of the country was excellent, both in the Peloponnesian war, and in the war carried on by Sparta against Olynthus more than twenty years afterwards. These horsemen, like the Thessalians, charged in compact order, carrying as their principal weapon of offence, not javelins to be hurled, but the short thrusting-pike for close combat. Thus defective was the military organization which Philip found. Under his auspice it was cast altogether anew. The poor and hardy Landwehr of Macedonia, constantly on the defensive against predatory neighbours, formed an excellent material for soldiers, and proved not intractable to the innovations of a warlike prince. They were placed under constant training in the regular rank and file of heavy infantry: they were moreover brought to adopt a new description of arm, not only in itself very difficult to manage, but also comparatively useless to the soldier when fighting single-handed, and only available by a body of men in close order, trained to move or stand together. The new weapon, of which we first hear the name in the army of Philip, was the sarissa—the Macedonian pike or lance. The sarissa was used both by the infantry of his phalanx, and by particular regiments of his cavalry; in both cases it was long, though that of the phalanx was much the longer of the two. The regiments of cavalry called Sarissophori or Lancers were a sort of light-horse, carrying a long lance, and distinguished from the heavier cavalry intended for the shock of hand combat, who carried the xyston or short pike. The sarissa of this cavalry may have been fourteen feet in length, as long as the Cossack pike now is; that of the infantry in phalanx was not less than twenty-one feet long. This dimension is so prodigious...
and so unwieldy, that we should hardly believe it, if it did not come attested by the distinct assertion of an historian like Polybius.

The extraordinary reach of the sarissa or pike constituted the prominent attribute and force of the Macedonian phalanx. The phalangites were drawn up in files generally of sixteen deep, each called a Lochus; with an interval of three feet between each two soldiers from front to rear. In front stood the lochagman, a man of superior strength, and of tried military experience. The second and third men in the file, as well as the rearmost man who brought up the whole, were also picked soldiers, receiving larger pay than the rest. Now the sarissa, when in horizontal position, was held with both hands (distinguished in this respect from the pike of the Grecian hoplite, which occupied only one hand, the other being required for the shield), and so held that it projected fifteen feet before the body of the pikeman; while the hinder portion of six feet was so weighted as to make the pressure convenient in such division. Hence, the sarissa of the man standing second in the file, projected twelve feet beyond the front rank; that of the third man, nine feet; those of the fourth and fifth ranks respectively six feet and three feet. There was thus presented a quintuple series of pikes by each file to meet an advancing enemy. Of these five, the three first would be decidedly of greater projection, and even the fourth of not less projection, than the pikes of Grecian hoplites coming up as enemies to the charge. The ranks behind the fifth, while serving to sustain and press onward the front, did not carry the sarissa in a horizontal position, but slanted it over the shoulders of those before them, so as to break the force of any darts or arrows which might be shot over head from the rear ranks of the enemy.  

The phalangite (soldier of the phalanx) was farther provided with a short sword, a circular shield of rather more than two feet in diameter, a breast-piece, leggins, and a kansia or broad-brimmed hat—the head-covering common in the Macedonian army. But the long pikes were in truth the main weapons of defence as well as of offence. They were destined to contend against the charge of Grecian hoplites with the one-handed pike and heavy shield; especially against the most formidable manifestation of that force, the deep Theban column organised by Epaminondas. This was

1 Respecting the length of the pike of the Macedonian phalanx, see Appendix to this Chapter.
what Philip had to deal with, at his accession, as the irresistible infantry of Greece, bearing down every thing before it by thrust of pike and propulsion of shield. He provided the means of vanquishing it, by training his poor Macedonian infantry to the systematic use of the long two-handed pike. The Theban column, charging a phalanx so armed, found themselves unable to break into the array of pretended pikes, or to come to push of shield. We are told that at the battle of Charoncia, the front rank Theban soldiers, the chosen men of the city, all perished on the ground; and this is not wonderful, when we conceive them as rushing, by their own courage as well as by the pressure upon them from behind, upon a wall of pikes double the length of their own. We must look at Philip's phalanx with reference to the enemies before him, not with reference to the later Roman organization, which Polybius brings into comparison. It answered perfectly the purposes of Philip, who wanted it mainly to stand the shock in front, thus overpowering Grecian hoplites in their own mode of attack. Now Polybius informs us, that the phalanx was never once beaten, in front and on ground suitable for it; and wherever the ground was fit for hoplites, it was also fit for the phalanx. The inconveniences of Philip's array, and of the long pikes, arose from the incapacity of the phalanx to change its front or keep its order on unequal ground; but such inconveniences were hardly less felt by Grecian hoplites. 1

The Macedonian phalanx, denominated the Pezetæri or Foot Companions of the King, comprised the general body of native infantry, as distinguished from special corpus d' armée. The largest division of it which we find mentioned under Alexander, and which appears under the command of a general of division, is called a Taxis. How

1 The impression of admiration, and even terror, with which the Roman general Paulus Emilius was seized, on first seeing the Macedonian phalanx in battle array at Pydna—has been recorded by Polybius (Polybius, Fragment. xxix. 6, 11; Livy, xlv. 40).
2 Harpokration and Photius, v. Πεζέταριον. But Demosthenes, ii. p. 23; Arrian, iv. 23, 1. τῶν πεζεταίρων κάλουμένων τὰς Τάξεις, and ii. 28, 2, &c. Since we know from Demosthenes that the pezetæri date from the time of Philip, it is probable that the passage of Anaximenes (as cited by Harpokration and Photius) which refers them to Alexander, has ascribed to the son what really belongs to the father. The term τάξεως, in reference to the kings of Macedonia, first appears in Plutarch, Pelopæae, 27, in reference to Ptolemæus, before the time of Philip: see Otto Abel, Makedonien vor König Philip, p. 129 (the passage of Zenan referred to by him seems of little moment). The term Companions or Comrades had under Philip a meaning purely military, designating foreigners as well as Macedonians serving in his army: see Theopompus, Fragment. 249. The term, originally applied only to a select few, was by degrees extended to the corps generally.
many of these Taxeis there were in all, we do not know; the original Asiatic army of Alexander (apart from what he left at home) included six of them, coinciding apparently with the provincial allotments of the country: Orestes, Lynkesta, Elimotae, Tymphaei, &c. The writers on tactics give us a systematic scale of distribution (ascending from the lowest unit, the Lochus of sixteen men, by successive multiples of two, up to the quadruple phalanx of 16,384 men) as pervading the Macedonian army. Among these divisions, that which stands out as most fundamental and constant, is the Syntagma, which contained sixteen Lochi. Forming thus a square of sixteen men in front and depth, or 256 men, it was at the same time a distinct aggregate or permanent battalion, having attached to it five supernumeraries, an ensign, a rear-man, a trumpeter, a herald, and an attendant or orderly. Two of these Syntagmas composed a body of 512 men, called a Peutakosiarchy, which in Philip's time is said to have been the ordinary regiment, acting together under a separate command; but several of these were doubled by Alexander when he reorganized his army at Susa, so as to form regiments of 1024 men, each under his Chiliarch, and each comprising four Syntagmas. All this systematic distribution of the Macedonian military force when at home, appears to have been arranged by the genius of Philip. On actual foreign service, no numerical precision could be observed; a regiment or a division could not always contain the same fixed number of men. But as to the array, a depth of sixteen, for the files of the phalangites, appears to have been regarded as important and characteristic, perhaps essential to impart a feeling of confidence to the troops. It was a depth much greater than was common with Grecian hoplites, and never surpassed by any Greeks except the Thebans.

But the phalanx, though an essential item, was yet only one

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1 Arrian, i. 16, 16; Dio- dor. xvii. 57. Compare the note of Schmieder on the above passage of Arrian; also Droysen, Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen, p. 95, 96, and the elaborate note of Mitzel on Curtius, v. 2, 7, p. 460.

2 Arrian, Tactic. c. 10; Arrian, Tactic. c. 9.

3 Curtius, v. 2, 3.

4 This is to be seen in the arrangements made by Alexander a short time before his death, when he incorporated Macedonian and Persian soldiers in the same lochus; the normal depth of sixteen was retained; all the front ranks or privileged men being Macedonians. The Macedonians were much hurt at losing their native regimental array shared with Asiatics (Arrian, vii. 11, 5 vii. 23, 4-8).
among many, in the varied military organization introduced by Philip. It was neither intended, nor fit, to act alone; being clumsy in changing front to protect itself either in flank or rear, and unable to adapt itself to uneven ground. There was another description of infantry organized by Philip called the Hypaspists—shield-bearers or Guards; originally few in number, and employed for personal defence of the prince—but afterwards enlarged into several, distinct corps d'armée. These Hypaspists or Guards were light infantry of the line; they were hoplites, keeping regular array and intended for close combat, but more lightly armed, and more fit for diversities of circumstance and position than the phalanx. They seem to have fought with the one-handed pike and shield, like the Greeks; and not to have carried the two-handed phalangite pike or sarissa. They occupied a sort of intermediate place between the heavy infantry of the phalanx properly so called—and the peltasts and light troops generally. Alexander in his later campaigns had them distributed into Chiliarchies (how the distribution stood earlier, we have no distinct information), at least three in number, and probably more.\(^1\) We find them employed by him in forward and aggressive movements; first his light troops and cavalry begin the attack; next the hypaspists come to follow it up; lastly, the phalanx is brought up to support them. The hypaspists are used also for assault of walled places, and for rapid night marches.\(^4\) What was the total number of them we do not know.\(^5\)

Besides the phalanx, and the hypaspists or Guards, the Macedonian army, as employed by Philip and Alexander, included a numerous assemblage of desultory or irregular troops, partly native Macedonians, partly foreigners, Thracians, Paeonians, &c. They were of different descriptions; peltasts, darters, and bowmen. The best of them appear to have been the Agrianes, a Paeonian tribe expert in the use of the javelin. All of them were kept in vigorous movement by Alex-

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1. The proper meaning of ὑπασπισταὶ, as guards or personal attendants on the prince, appears in Arrian, i, 5, 3; vii. 8, 6. Noopectolemus, as ἀρχιὑπασπιστὴς to Alexander, carried the shield and lance of the latter on formal occasions (Plutarch, Eumenes, 1).

2. Arrian, ii. 4, 3, 4; ii. 20, 5.

3. Arrian, iv. 30, 11; v. 23, 11.

4. Arrian, ii. 20, 5; ii. 23, 6; iii. 18, 8.

5. Droysen and Schmieder give the number of hypaspists in Alexander's army at Issus, as 6000. That this opinion rests on no sufficient evidence, has been shown by Muizel (ad Curtius, v. 2, 3, p. 398). But that the number of hypaspists left by Philip at his death was 6000 seems not improbable.
Companion Cavalry.

The distribution of the cavalry into squadrons was that which Alexander found at his accession; but he altered it, when he re-

1 See Arrian, v. 14, 1; v. 16, 45; Curtius, vi. 9, 22. "Equitatui, optimis cavitis parti," &c.

2 We are told that Philip, after his expedition against the Scythians about three years before his death, exacted and sent into Macedonia 20,000 chosen mares, in order to improve the breed of Macedonian horses. The regal haras were in the neighbourhood of Pella (Justin, ix. 2; Strabo, xvi. p. 752, in which passage of Strabo, the details apply to the haras of Seleukus Nikator at Apameia, not to that of Philip at Pella).

3 Arrian, i. 2, 8, 9 (where we also find mentioned τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἄνωθεν Μακεδονίας ἱππέας); i. 12, 12; ii. 9, 6; iii. 11, 12.

4 Arrian, iii. 11, 11; iii. 13, 13; iii. 18, 8. In the first of these passages, we have ἰλαῳ βασιλικαὶ in the plural (iii. 11, 12). It seems too that the different ἰλαὶ alternated with each other in the foremost position, or ἱππεῖα, for particular days (Arrian, i. 14, 9).
modelled the arrangements of his army (in 330 B.C.) at Susa, so as to subdivide the squadron into two Lochi, and to establish the Lochus for the elementary division of cavalry, as it had always been of infantry. His reforms went thus to cut down the primary body of cavalry from the squadron to the half-squadron or Lochus, while they tended to bring the infantry together into larger bodies—from cohorts of 500 each to cohorts of 1000 men each.

Among the Hypaspists or Guards, also, we find an Agêma or chosen cohort which was called upon often more than the rest to begin the fight. A still more select corps were, the Body-Guards; a small company of tried and confidential men, individually known to Alexander, always attached to his person, and acting as adjutants or as commanders for special service. These Body-Guards appear to have been chosen persons promoted out of the Royal Youths or Pages; an institution first established by Philip, and evincing the pains taken by him to bring the leading Macedonians into military organization as well as into dependence on his own person. The Royal Youths, sons of the chief persons throughout Macedonia, were taken by Philip into service, and kept in permanent residence around him for purposes of domestic attendance and companionship. They maintained perpetual guard of his palace, alternating among themselves the hours of daily and nightly watch: they received his horse from the grooms, assisted him to mount, and accompanied him if he went to the chase: they introduced persons who came to solicit interviews, and admitted his mistresses by night through a special door. They enjoyed the privilege of sitting down to dinner with him, as well as that of never being flogged except by his special order. The precise number of the company we do not know; but

1 Arrian, iii. 16, 19.
2 Arrian, iv. 13, 1. 'Ex filiis leon hê katastêse, tûn èn elaii Macedônov toûs padas, ësai ës hèlêian hêmâpêkastov, kataleîthi ès ëx thêrakelov toû vassalov. Ta ðê per thûn thûn diásum toûs ëmôvov ëkamóvov vassalov, koi koonówen philâsticov, toutais ekêntéstato kai ekptêÎêlou vassalov, toûs ëmoumê toûs èk perinomôn dikàmou ëkamîÎou proýgan, kai anûcalon ëmou vassalov thûn Phereîcav trônos, kai thûn ët thûra philîstíÎas vassalov koonów ëmou ësas, ès.

Curtius, viii. 6, 1. "Mos erat principibus Macedonum adulteris liberos regibus tradere, sed munia haud multum servilibus ministerius abhorrentia. Excolabant servatis nocturni vicibus praemium foribus ejus colvis, in quod rex accipieccepit. Per hos pellices introducibantur, ait adducere quam arnati obedient. Iride acceptos ab aga-sominbus equos, quum rex ascensurus esset, admovebant; cumtabunturque et venantem, et in prallis, omnibus artibus studiorum liberalium excult, pretiosus honor habebatur, quod licet sedenti vesci cum rege. Castigandi eos verberibus multos potestas prater ipsum erat. Hae cohors velut seminarium duorum prefectorumque apud Macedonas fuit; hinc habuerunt posteri reges, quorum stipulis post multas
it must have been not small, since fifty of these youths were brought out from Macedonia at once by Amyntas to join Alexander, and to be added to the company at Babylon. At the same time the mortality among them was probably considerable; since, in accompanying Alexander, they endured even more than the prodigious fatigues which he imposed upon himself. The training in this corps was a preparation first for becoming Body-Guards of Alexander; next, for appointment to the great and important military commands. Accordingly, it had been the first stage of advancement to most of the Diadochi, or great officers of Alexander, who after his death carved kingdoms for themselves out of his conquests.

It was thus that the native Macedonian force was enlarged and diversified by Philip, including at his death:—1. The phalax, Foot-companions, or general mass of heavy infantry, drilled to the use of the long two-handed pike or sarissa—2. The Hypaspists, or lighter-armed corps of foot-guards—3. The Companions, or heavy cavalry, the ancient indigenous force consisting of the more opulent or substantial Macedonians—4. The lighter cavalry, lancers, or Sarissophori. With these were joined foreign auxiliaries of great value. The Thessalians, whom Philip had partly subjugated and partly gained over, furnished him with a body of heavy cavalry not inferior to the native Macedonian. From various parts of Greece he derived hoplites, volunteers taken into his pay, armed with the full-sized shield and one-handed pike. From the warlike tribes of Thracians, Paeonians, Illyrians, &c., whom he had subdued around him, he levied contingents of light troops of various descriptions, peltasts, bowmen, darters, &c., all excellent in their way, and eminently serviceable to his combinations, in conjunction with the heavier masses. Lastly, Philip had completed his military arrangements by organising what may be called an effective siege-train for sieges as well as for battles; a stock of projectile and battering machines, superior to anything at that time extant. We find this

\[\text{states Romani opes ademerunt.}\]

Comparison Curtius v. 6, 42; and Ellian. V. H. xiv. 49.

This information is interesting, as an illustration of Macedonian manners and customs, which are very little known to us. In the last hours of the Macedonian monarchy, after the defeat at Pydna (168 B.C.), the \emph{paei regii} followed the defeated king Perseus to the sanctuary at Samothrace, and never quitted him until the moment when he surrendered himself to the Romans (Livy, xiv. 5).

As an illustration of the scourging, applied as a punishment to these young Macedonians of rank, see the case of Dostamichus, handed over by king Archelaus to Eurybiades, to be flogged (Aristotle, Polit. v. 8, 13).

1 Curtius, v. 6, 42; Diodor. xvii. 65.

2 We read this about the youthful Philippus, brother of Lysimachus (Curtius, VIII. 2, 36).
artillery used by Alexander in the very first year of his reign, in his campaign against the Illyrians. Even in his most distant Indian marches, he either carried it with him, or had the means of constructing new engines for the occasion. There was no part of his military equipment more essential to his conquests. The victorious sieges of Alexander are among his most memorable exploits.

To all this large, multifarious and systematised array of actual force, are to be added the civil establishments, the depots, magazines of arms, provision for remounts, drill officers and adjutants, &c., indispensable for maintaining it in constant training and efficiency. At the time of Philip's accession, Pella was an unimportant place; at his death, it was not only strong as a fortification and place of deposit for regal treasure, but also the permanent centre, war-office, and training quarters, of the greatest military force then known. The military registers as well as the traditions of Macedonian discipline were preserved there until the fall of the monarchy. Philip had employed his life in organising this powerful instrument of dominion. His revenues, large as they were, both from mines and from tributary conquests, had been exhausted in the work, so that he had left at his decease a debt of 500 talents. But his son Alexander found the instrument ready-made, with excellent officers, and trained veterans for the front ranks of his phalanx.

This scientific organization of military force, on a large scale and with all the varieties of arming and equipment made to cooperate for one end, is the great fact of purely Macedonian history. Nothing of the same kind and magnitude had ever before been seen. The Macedonians, like Epirots and Aitolians, had no other aptitude or marking quality except those of soldiership. Their rude and scattered tribes manifest no definite political institutions and little sentiment of national brotherhood; their union was mainly that of occasional fellowship in arms under the king as chief. Philip the son of Amyntas was the first to organise this military union into a system permanently and efficaciously opera-

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1 Arrian, i. 6, 17.  2 Demosthenës, De Coronû, p. 247.  3 Livy, xili. 51; xlv. 46, also the comparison in Strabo, xvi. p. 752, between the military establishments of Seleukus Nikator at Apameia in Syria, and those of Philip at Pella in Macedonia.

4 Justin, xi. 6. About the debt of 500 talents left by Philip, see the words of Alexander, Arrian, vii. 9, 10. Diodorus affirms (xvi. 8) that Philip's annual return from the gold mines was 1000 talents; a total not much to be trusted.
tive, achieving by means of it conquests such as to create in the Macedonians a common pride of superiority in arms, which served as substitute for political institutions or nationality. Such pride was still farther exalted by the really superhuman career of Alexander. The Macedonian kingdom was nothing but a well-combined military machine, illustrating the irresistible superiority of the rudest men, trained in arms and conducted by an able general, not merely over undisciplined multitudes, but also over free, courageous, and disciplined citizenship, with highly gifted intelligence.

During the winter of 335-334 B.C. after the destruction of Thebes and the return of Alexander from Greece to Pella, his final preparations were made for the Asiatic expedition. The Macedonian army, with the auxiliary contingents destined for this enterprise, were brought together early in the spring. Antipater, one of the oldest and ablest officers of Philip, was appointed to act as vice-roy of Macedonia during the king's absence. A military force, stated at 12,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry, was left with him to keep down the cities of Greece, to resist aggressions from the Persian fleet, and to repress discontent at home. Such discontent was likely to be instigated by leading Macedonians or pretenders to the throne, especially as Alexander had no direct heir: and we are told that Antipater and Parmenio advised postponement of the expedition until the young king could leave behind him an heir of his own lineage. Alexander overruled these representations, yet he did not disdain to lessen the perils at home by putting to death such men as he principally feared or mistrusted, especially the kinsmen of Philip's last wife Kleopatra. Of the dependent tribes

1 Diodor, xvii. 17.
2 Justin, xi. 5. "Proficiscens ad Persicum bellum, annus noveræ sua cognatos, quos Philippus in excelsiorum dignitatum locum provehens imperis præfecerat, interfecit. Sed nec suis, qui apti regno videbantur, percipit; ne qua materia seditionis procul se agentis in Macedonid remaneret." Compare also xii. 6, where the Pausanias mentioned as having been put to death by Alexander is not the assassin of Philip. Pausanias was a common Macedonian name (see Diodor, xvi. 53).

I see no reason for distrust ing the general fact here asserted by Justin. We know from Arrian (who mentioned the fact incidentally in his work τὰ μετὰ ᾿Αλέξανδρον, though he says nothing about it in his account of the expedition of Alexander—see Photius, Cod. 92. p. 220) that Alexander put to death, in the early period of his reign, his first cousin and brother-in-law Amyntas. Much less would he scruple to kill the friends or relatives of Kleopatra. Neither Alexander nor Antipater would account such proceeding anything else than a reasonable measure of prudential policy. By the Macedonian common law, when a man was found guilty of treason, all his relatives were condemned to die along with him (Curtius, vi. 11, 20).

Plutarch (De Fortunâ Alex. Magn. p.
around, the most energetic chiefs accompanied his army into Asia, either by their own preference or at his requisition. After these precautions, the tranquillity of Macedonia was entrusted to the prudence and fidelity of Antipater, which were still farther ensured by the fact that three of his sons accompanied the king’s army and person. Though unpopular in his deportment, Antipater discharged the duties of his very responsible position with zeal and ability; notwithstanding the dangerous enmity of Olympias, against whom he sent many complaints to Alexander when in Asia, while she on her side wrote frequent but unavailing letters with a view to ruin him in the esteem of her son. After a long period of unabated confidence, Alexander began during the last years of his life to dislike and mistrust Antipater. He always treated Olympias with the greatest respect; trying however to restrain her from meddling with political affairs, and complaining sometimes of her imperious exigences and violence.

The army intended for Asia, having been assembled at Pella, was conducted by Alexander himself first to Amphipolis, where it crossed the Strymon; next along the road near the coast to the river Nestus and to the towns of Abderea and Maroncia; then through Thrace across the rivers Hebrus and Melas; Lastly, through the Thracian Chersonese to Sestos. Here it was met by his fleet, consisting of 160 triremes, with a number of trading vessels besides, made up in large proportions from contingents furnished by Athens and Greek cities. The passage of the whole army—in infancy, cavalry, and machines, on ships, across the strait from Sestos in Europe to Abydos in Asia—was superintended by Parmenio, and accomplished without either difficulty or resistance. But Alexander himself, separating from the army at Sestos, went down to Eleaus at

342) has a general allusion to these precautionary executions ordered by Alexander. Fortune (he says) imposed upon Alexander δεινὴν πρὸς ἄνδρας ὁμοφύλους καὶ συγγενεῖς διὰ φόνου καὶ σιδήρου καὶ πυρὸς ἀνάγκην ἀμύνης, ἀτερπέστατον τέλος ἔχουσαν.

1 Kassander commanded a corps of Thracians and Peonians; Iollas and Philippus were attached to the king’s person (Arrian, vii. 27, 2; Justin, xii. 14; Diodor, xvii. 17).


3 Plutarch, Alexand. 25-39; Arrian, vii. 12, 13. He was wont to say, that his mother exacted from him a heavy house-rent for his domicile of ten months.

4 Kleopatra also (sister of Alexander and daughter of Olympias) exercised considerable influence in the government. Dionysius, despot of the Pontic Herakleia, maintained himself against opposition in his government, during Alexander’s life, mainly by paying assiduous court to her (Mennon, Heracl. c. 4. ap. Photium, Cod. 224).

5 The Athenians furnished twenty ships of war, Diodor. xvii. 22.
the southern extremity of the Chersonese. Here stood the chapel and sacred precinct of the hero Protesilaus, who was slain by Hektor; having been the first Greek (according to the legend of the Trojan war) who touched the shore of Troy. Alexander, whose imagination was then full of Homeric reminiscences, offered sacrifice to the hero, praying that his own disembarkation might terminate more auspiciously.

He then sailed across in the admiral’s trireme, steering with his own hand, to the landing-place near Ilion called the Visit of Harbour of the Achaeans. At mid-channel of the strait, he sacrificed a bull, with libations out of a golden goblet, to Poseidon and the Nereids. Himself too in full armour, he was the first (like Protesilaus) to tread the Asiatic shore; but he found no enemy like Hektor to meet him. From hence, mounting the hill on which Ilion was placed, he sacrificed to the patron-goddess Athéné; and deposited in her temple his own panoply, taking in exchange some of the arms said to have been worn by the heroes in the Trojan war, which he caused to be carried by guards along with him in his subsequent battles. Among other real or supposed monuments of this interesting legend, the Ilians showed to him the residence of Priam with its altar of Zeus Herakleios, where that unhappy old king was alleged to have been slain by Neoptolemus. Numbering Neoptolemus among his ancestors, Alexander felt himself to be the object of Priam’s yet unappeased wrath; and accordingly offered sacrifice to him at the same altar, for the purpose of expiation and reconciliation. On the tomb and monumental column of Achilles, father of Neoptolemus, he not only placed a decorative garland, but also went through the customary ceremony of anointing himself with oil and running naked up to it: exclaiming how much he envied the lot of Achilles, who had been blest during life with a faithful friend, and after death with a great poet to celebrate his exploits. Lastly, to commemorate his crossing, Alexander erected permanent altars in honour of Zeus, Athéné, and Héraklés; both on the point of Europe which his army had quitted, and on that of Asia where it had landed.¹

¹ Arrian, i. 11; Plutarch, Alexand. 15; Justin, xi. 5. The ceremony of running up to the column of Achilles still subsisted in the time of Plutarch — ἀλέιψαμεν λίπα καὶ μετὰ τῶν υπάρχον συναναμορφώμενοι γυμνοί, ἐπὶ τὸν θόσο ἐπὶ τελεα, &c. The words here seem to imply that this monumental column was placed on an eminence, and that it was used as a goal for runners to run up to in matches at the festivals. Philostratus, five centuries after Alexander, conveys a vivid picture of the numerous legendary and religious associations connected with the plain of Troy and with the tomb of Protesilaus at Eleus, and of the many rites and ceremonies performed there even...
The proceedings of Alexander, on the ever-memorable site of Ilium, are interesting as they reveal one side of his imposing character—the vein of legendary sympathy and religious sentiment wherein alone consisted his analogy with the Greeks. The young Macedonian prince had nothing of that sense of correlative right and obligation which characterised the free Greeks of the city community. But he was in many points a reproduction of the heroic Greeks; his warlike ancestors in legend, Achilles and Neoptolemus, and others of that Αἰακιδ race, unparalleled in the attributes of force—a man of violent impulse in all directions, sometimes generous, often vindictive—ardent in his individual affections both of love and hatred, but devoted especially by an inextinguishable pugnacity, appetite for conquest, and thirst for establishing at all cost his superiority of force over others—"Jura negat sibi nata, nihil non arrogat armis"—taking pride, not simply in victorious generalship and direction of the arms of soldiers, but also in the personal forwardness of an Homeric chief, the foremost to encounter both danger and hardship. To dispositions resembling those of Achilles, Alexander indeed added one attribute of a far higher order. As a general, he surpassed his age in provident and even long-sighted combinations. With all his exuberant courage and sanguine temper, nothing was ever omitted in the way of systematic military precaution. Thus much he borrowed, though with many improvements of his own, from Grecian intelligence as applied to soldiership. But the character and dispositions, which he took with him to Asia, had the features, both striking and repulsive, of Achilles, rather than those of Agesilaus or Epaminondas.

in his time (Philostrat. Heroica, xix. 14, 15, p. 742; ed. Thearius—δρόμοις, δ’ ἐῤῥυθμισμένοις συνήλαλαζον, ἀνακαλοῦντες τὸν Ἀχιλλέα, &c., and the pages preceding and following). Dikæarchus (Fragm. 19, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæum, xiii. p. 602) had treated Βριθὺς ὁπλιτοπάλας, δαίος ἀντιπάλοις... in a special work about the sacrifices offered to Athéné at Ilium (Περὶ τῆς ᾿Αἰακιδῆς, &c.) by Alexander, and by many others before him; by Xerxes (Herodot, vii. 41), who offered up 1000 oxen—by Mindarus (Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 4, &c.). In describing the proceedings of Alexander at Ilium, Dikæarchus appears to have dwelt much on the warm sympathy which that prince exhibited for the affection between Achilles and Patroklos; which sympathy Dikæarchus illustrated by characterising Alexander as φιλόσωφος ἐκμαχήνων, and by recounting his public admiration for the eunuch Bagdæus; compare Curtius, x. i. 25—about Bagdæus.

"Ἀκρη μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκεν ᾿Ολύμπιος ᾿Αἰακίδισι, Νοῦν δ᾽ ᾿Αμυθαοίδαις, πλοῦτον δ᾽ ἔπορ᾽ ᾿Ατρείδῃσιν..."

(Plutarch, Fort. Al. M. ii. p. 334. Βριθὺς ὁπλιτοπάλας, δαίος ἀντιπάλοις... ταύτῃ ἔχων τέχνην προγονικὴν ἀπ᾽ Ἀιωνιόντως, &c.)
The army, when reviewed on the Asiatic shore after its crossing, presented a total of 80,000 infantry, and 4500 cavalry, thus distributed:

### Infantry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macedonian phalanx and hypaspists</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allies</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercenaries</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under the command of Parmenio</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odrysians, Triballi (both Thracians), and Illyrians</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrinius and archers</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Infantry:** 80,000

### Cavalry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macedonian heavy—under Philotas son of Parmenio</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thessalian (also heavy)—under Kallas</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Grecian—under Epiphanes</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thracian and Paeonian (light)—under Kassander</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total cavalry:** 4,500

Such seems the most trustworthy enumeration of Alexander’s first invading army. There were however other accounts, the highest of which stated as much as 43,000 infantry with 4000 cavalry. Besides these troops, also, there must have been an effective train of projectile machines and engines, for battles and sieges, which we shall soon find in operation. As to money, the military chest of Alexander, exhausted in part by profuse donatives to his Macedonian officers, was as poorly furnished as that of Napoleon Buonaparte on first entering Italy for his brilliant campaign of 1796. According to Aristobulus, he had with him only seventy talents; according to another authority, no more than the means of maintaining his army for thirty days. Nor had he even been

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1 Diodor. xvi. 17, Plutarch (Alexander, 15) says that the highest numbers which he had read of were,—43,000 infantry with 5000 cavalry, the lowest numbers, 30,000 infantry with 4000 cavalry (assuming the correction of Sintenis, πεντακισχιλίους in place of πεντακισχιλίους, to be well founded, as it probably is—compare Plutarch, Fort. Alex. M. I. p. 327).

According to Plutarch (Fort. Al. M. p. 327), both Ptolemy and Aristobulus stated the numbers of infantry to be 30,000; but Ptolemy gave the cavalry as 5000, Aristobulus, as only 4000. Nevertheless Arrian—who professes to follow mainly Ptolemy and Aristobulus whenever they agree—states the number of infantry as “not much more than 30,000; the cavalry as more than 5000.” (Ex. Al. i. 11, 4). Anaxandridas alleged 45,000 infantry, with 5000 cavalry. Kallisthenes (ap. Polybius, xii. 19) stated 40,000 infantry, with 4500 cavalry. Justin (xi. 6) gives 35,000 infantry, with 4500 cavalry.

My statement in the text follows Diodorus, who stands distinguished, by recounting not merely the total, but the component items besides. In regard to the total of infantry, he agrees with Ptolemy and Aristobulus: as to cavalry, his statement is a mean between the two.

2 Plutarch, Alexander. 15,
able to bring together his auxiliaries, or complete the outfit of his army, without incurring a debt of 800 talents, in addition to that of 500 talents contracted by his father Philip. 1 Though Plutarch 2 wonders at the smallness of the force with which Alexander contemplated the execution of such great projects, yet the fact is, that in infantry he was far above any force which the Persians had to oppose him; 3 not to speak of comparative discipline and organization, surpassing even that of the Grecian mercenaries, who formed the only good infantry in the Persian service; while his cavalry, though inferior as to number, was superior in quality and in the shock of close combat.

Most of the officers exercising important command in Alexander's army were native Macedonians. His intimate personal friend Hephaestion, as well as his body-guards Leonnatus and Lysimachus, were natives of Pella: Ptolemy the son of Lagus, and Pithon, were Eordians from Upper Macedonia; Kraterus and Perdikkas, from the district of Upper Macedonia called Orestis; 4 Antipater with his son Kassander, Kleitus son of Drôpidés, Parmenio with his two sons Philotas and Nikanor, Seleukus, Koenus, Amyntas, Philippus (these two last names were borne by more than one person), Antigonus, Neoptolemus, 5 Meleager, Peukéstes, &c., all these seem to have been native Macedonians. All or most of them had been trained to war under Philip, in whose service Parmenio and Antipater, especially, had occupied a high rank.

Of the many Greeks in Alexander's service, we hear of few in important station. Medius, a Thessalian from Larissa, was among his familiar companions; but the ablest and most distinguished of all was Eumenés, a native of Kardia in the Thracian Chersonese. Eumenés, combining an excellent Grecian education with bodily activity and enterprise, had attracted when a young man the notice of Philip, and had been appointed as his secretary. After discharging these duties for seven years until the death of Philip, he was continued by Alexander in the post of chief secretary during the whole of that king's life. 6 He conducted

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1 Arrian, vii. 9, 10—the speech which he puts in the mouth of Alexander himself—and Curtius, x. 2, 24.
2 Onesikritus stated that Alexander owed at this time a debt of 200 talents (Plutarch, Alex. 15).
3 Plutarch, Fort. Alex. M. i. p. 327; Justin, xii. 6.
4 Arrian, i. 13, 4.
5 Arrian, vi. 26, 6; Arrian, Indica, 18; Justin, i. 27, 9.
6 Plutarch, Eumenés, c. 1; Cornelius Nepos, Eumenés, c. 1.
most of Alexander's correspondence, and the daily record of his proceedings, which was kept under the name of the Royal Ephemerides. But though his special duties were thus of a civil character, he was not less eminent as an officer in the field. Occasionally entrusted with high military command, he received from Alexander signal recompenses and tokens of esteem. In spite of these great qualities—or perhaps in consequence of them—he was the object of marked jealousy and dislike on the part of the Macedonians,—from Hephaestion the friend, and Neoptolemus the chief armour-bearer, of Alexander, down to the principal soldiers of the phalanx. Neoptolemus despised Eumenes as an unwarlike penman. The contemptuous pride with which Macedonians had now come to look down on Greeks, is a notable characteristic of the victorious army of Alexander, as well as a new feature in history; retorting the ancient Hellenic sentiment, in which Demosthenes, a few years before, had indulged towards the Macedonians.²

Though Alexander had been allowed to land in Asia unopposed, an army was already assembled under the Persian satraps within a few days' march of Abydos. Since the reconquest of Egypt and Phenicia, about eight or nine years before, by the Persian king Ochus, the power of that empire had been restored to a point equal to any anterior epoch since the repulse of Xerxes from Greece. The Persian successes in Egypt had been achieved mainly by the arms of Greek mercenaries, under the conduct and through the craft of the Rhodian general Mentor; who, being seconded by the preponderant influence of the eunuch Bagoas, confidential minister of Ochus, obtained not only ample presents, but also the appointment of military commander on the Hellespont and the Asiatic seaboard.³ He procured the recall of his brother Memnon, who with his brother-in-law Artabazus had been obliged to leave Asia from unsuccessful revolt against the Persians, and had found shelter with Philip.⁴ He farther subdued, by force or by fraud, various Greek and Asiatic chieftains on the Asiatic coast; among them, the distinguished

1 Arrian, vii. 13, 1; Plutarch, Eum. 2, 3, 8, 10.
² Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 119, respecting Philip—οὐ μόνον οὐχ Ἑλλήνως ἔτος, οὐδὲ προπήκοτος οὐδέν τοῖς Ἑλλήνως, ἀλλὰ ὁμοίως ἐπέδωκαν τῶν καλῶς ἐπέτευχον χων μὲν εἰπερ, ἀλλὰ ἔλεβον Μακεδόνας, τὸν χων οὐδὲ αὐτοῦ καλῶς ἐπέτευχον συνδεδον οὐδέν ἔργῳ προτέρων πλασάμενος. Compare this with the exclamations of the Macedonian soldiers (called Argyrospotes) against their distinguished chief Eumenes, calling him Χερρονησίτης ἔλεος (Plutarch, Eumenes, 18).³ See, in reference to these incidents, Chap. XC. ⁴ Diodor, vii. 52; Curtius, vi. 4, 25; vi. 5, 2. Curtius mentions also Mampis, another Persian exile, who had fled from Ochus to Philip.
Hermias, friend of Aristotle, and master of the strong post of Atarneus. These successes of Mentor seem to have occurred about 343 B.C. He, and his brother Memnon after him, upheld vigorously the authority of the Persian king in the regions near the Hellespont. It was probably by them that troops were sent across the strait both to rescue the besieged town of Perinthus from Philip, and to act against that prince in other parts of Thrace; that an Asiatic chief, who was intriguing to facilitate Philip's intended invasion of Asia, was seized and sent prisoner to the Persian court; and that envoys from Athens, soliciting aid against Philip, were forwarded to the same place.

Ochus, though successful in regaining the full extent of Persian dominion, was a sanguinary tyrant, who shed by wholesale the blood of his family and courtiers. About the year 338 B.C., he died poisoned by the eunuch Bagoas, who placed upon the throne Arses, one of the king's sons, killing all the rest. After two years, however, Bagoas conceived mistrust of Arses, and put him to death also, together with all his children: thus leaving no direct descendant of the regal family alive. He then exalted to the throne one of his friends named Darius Codomannus (descended from one of the brothers of Artaxerxes Mnemon), who had acquired glory, in a recent war against the Kadusians, by killing in single combat a formidable champion of the enemy's army. Presently, however, Bagoas attempted to poison Darius also; but the latter, detecting the snare, forced him to drink the deadly draught himself. In spite of such murders and change in the line of succession, which Alexander afterwards reproached to Darius, the authority of Darius seems to have been recognised, without any material opposition, throughout all the Persian empire.

Succeeding to the throne in the early part of 336, when Philip was organising the projected invasion of Persia, and when the first Macedonian division under Parmenio and Attalus was already making war in Asia—Darius prepared measures of defence at home, and tried to encourage anti-Persian feeling.

1 Diodor. xvi. 52. About the strength of the fortress of Atarneus, see Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 2, 11; Diodor. xiii. 65. It had been held in defiance of the Persians, even before the time of Hermias—Isokrates. Compare also Isokrates, Or. iv. (Panegyr.) s. 167.
2 Demosthenes, Philippic, iv. p. 130, 140; Epistolae Philippi apud Demosthen. p. 163.
3 Diodor. xvii. 5; Justin, x. 3; Curtius, x. 5, 22.
4 Arrian, ii. 14, 7. Other troops sent by the Persians into Thrace (besides those despatched to the relief of Perinthus), are here alluded to.
5 Arrian, ii. 14, 10.
Macedonian movements in Greece. On the assassination of Philip by Pausanias, the Persian king publicly proclaimed himself (probably untruly) as having instigated the deed, and alluded in contemptuous terms to the youthful Alexander. Conceiving the danger from Macedonia to be past, he imprudently slackened his efforts and withheld his supplies during the first months of Alexander’s reign, when the latter might have been seriously embarrassed in Greece and in Europe by the effective employment of Persian ships and money. But the recent successes of Alexander in Thrace, Illyria, and Boeotia, satisfied Darius that the danger was not past, so that he resumed his preparations for defence. The Phenician fleet was ordered to be equipped; the satraps in Phrygia and Lydia got together a considerable force, consisting in part of Grecian mercenaries; while Memnon, on the seaboard, was furnished with the means of taking 5000 of these mercenaries under his separate command.

We cannot trace with any exactness the course of these events, during the nineteen months between Alexander’s accession and his landing in Asia (August 336 B.C. to March or April 334 B.C.). We learn generally that Memnon was active and even aggressive on the north-eastern coast of the Aegean. Marching northward from his own territory (the region of Assus or Atarneus skirting the Gulf of Adramyttium) across the range of Mount Ida, he came suddenly upon the town of Kyzikus on the Propontis. He failed, however, though only by a little, in his attempt to surprise it, and was forced to content himself with a rich booty from the district around. The Macedonian generals Parmenio and Kallas had crossed into Asia with bodies of troops. Parmenio, acting in Æolis, took Grynium, but was compelled by Memnon to raise the siege of Pitanä; while Kallas, in the Troad, was attacked, defeated, and compelled to retire to Rhoteum.

We thus see that during the season preceding the landing of Alexander, the Persians were in considerable force, and Memnon both active and successful even against the Macedonian generals, on the region north-east of the Aegean. This may help to explain that fatal imprudence, whereby the Persians permitted Alexander to carry over without opposition his grand army into Asia,
in the spring of 334 B.C. They possessed ample means of guarding the Hellespont, had they chosen to bring up their fleet, which, comprising as it did the force of the Phenician towns, was decidedly superior to any naval armament at the disposal of Alexander. The Persian fleet actually came into the Aegean a few weeks afterwards. Now Alexander’s designs, preparations, and even intended time of march, must have been well known not merely to Memnon, but to the Persian satraps in Asia Minor, who had got together troops to oppose him. These satraps unfortunately supposed themselves to be a match for him in the field, disregarding the pronounced opinion of Memnon to the contrary, and even overruling his prudent advice by mistrustful and calumnious imputations.

At the time of Alexander’s landing, a powerful Persian force was already assembled near Zeleia in the Hellespontine Phrygia, under command of Arsitès the Phrygian satrap, supported by several other leading Persians—Spithridatès (satrap of Lydia and Ionia), Pharnakès, Atizyès, Mithridatès, Rheomithrēs, Niphatès, Petinis, &c. Forty of these men were of high rank (denominated kinsmen of Darius), and distinguished for personal valour. The greater number of the army consisted of cavalry, including Medes, Baktrians, Hyrkanians, Kappadokians, Paphlagonians, &c. In cavalry they greatly outnumbered Alexander; but their infantry was much inferior in number, composed however, in large proportion, of Grecian mercenaries. The Persian total is given by Arrian as 20,000 cavalry, and nearly 20,000 mercenary foot; by Diodorus as 10,000 cavalry, and 100,000 infantry; by Justin even at 600,000. The numbers of Arrian are the more credible; in those of Diodorus, the total of infantry is certainly much above the truth—that of cavalry probably below it.

Memnon, who was present with his sons and with his own division, earnestly dissuaded the Persian leaders from hazarding a battle. Reminding them that the Macedonians were not only much superior in infantry, but also encouraged by the leadership of Alexander—he enforced the necessity of employing their numerous cavalry to destroy the forage and provisions, and if necessary, even towns themselves—in order to render any considerable advance of the invading force impracticable. While keeping strictly on the defensive in Asia, he recommended that aggressive war should be

1 Diodor, xvii. 18, 19; Arrian, i. 12, 14; i. 18, 5.
2 Arrian, i. 12, 16; i. 13, 4.
carried into Macedonia; that the fleet should be brought up, a powerful land-force put aboard, and strenuous efforts made, not only to attack the vulnerable points of Alexander at home, but also to encourage active hostility against him from the Greeks and other neighbours.

Had this plan been energetically executed by Persian arms and money, we can hardly doubt that Antipater in Macedonia would speedily have found himself pressed by serious dangers and embarrassments, and that Alexander would have been forced to come back and protect his own dominions; perhaps prevented by the Persian fleet from bringing back his whole army. At any rate, his schemes of Asiatic invasion must for the time have been suspended. But he was rescued from this dilemma by the ignorance, pride, and pecuniary interests of the Persian leaders. Unable to appreciate Alexander's military superiority, and conscious at the same time of their own personal bravery, they repudiated the proposition of retreat as dishonourable, insinuating that Memnon desired to prolong the war in order to exalt his own importance in the eyes of Darius. This sentiment of military dignity was further strengthened by the fact, that the Persian military leaders, deriving all their revenues from the land, would have been impoverished by destroying the landed produce. Aristeas, in whose territory the army stood, and upon whom the scheme would first take effect, hastily announced that he would not permit a single house in it to be burnt. Occupying the same satrapy as Pharnabazus had possessed sixty years before, he felt that he would be reduced to the same straits as Pharnabazus under the pressure of Agesilaus—"of not being able to procure a

1 Compare the policy recommended by Memnon, as set forth in Arrian (i. 12, 16), and in Diodorus (xvii. 18). The superiority of Diodorus is here incontestable. He proclaims distinctly both the defensive and the offensive side of Memnon's policy; which, when taken together, form a scheme of operations no less effective than prudent, but Arrian omits all notice of the offensive policy, and mentions only the defensive—the retreat and destruction of the country; which, if adopted alone, could hardly have been reckoned upon for success, in starving out Alexander, and might reasonably be called in question by the Persian generals. Moreover, we should form but a poor idea of Memnon's ability, if in this emergency he neglected to avail himself of the irresistible Persian fleet.

I notice the rather this point of superiority of Diodorus, because recent critics have manifested a tendency to place too exclusive a confidence in Arrian, and to discredit almost all allegations respecting Alexander except such as Arrian either certifies or countenances. Arrian is a very valuable historian; he has the merit of giving us plain narrative without rhetoric, which contrasts favourably both with Diodorus and with Curtius; but he must not be set up as the only trustworthy witness.

2 Arrian, i. 12, 18.
dinner in his own country." The proposition of Memnon was rejected, and it was resolved to await the arrival of Alexander on the banks of the river Granikus.

This unimportant stream, commemorated in the Iliad, and immortalised by its association with the name of Alexander, takes its rise from one of the heights of Mount Ida near Sképsis, and flows northward into the Propontis, which it reaches at a point somewhat east of the Greek town of Parium. It is of no great depth; near the point where the Persians encamped, it seems to have been fordable in many places; but its right bank was somewhat high and steep, thus offering obstruction to an enemy's attack. The Persians, marching forward from Zéleia, took up a position near the eastern side of the Granikus, where the last declivities of Mount Ida descend into the plain of Adrasteia, a Greek city situated between Priapus and Parium.

Meanwhile Alexander marched onward towards this position, from Arisbé (where he had reviewed his army)—on the first day to Perkótê, on the second to the river Praktius, on the third to Hermóutês; receiving on his way the spontaneous surrender of the town of Priapus. Aware that the enemy was not far distant, he threw out in advance a body of scouts under Amyntas, consisting of four squadrons of light cavalry and one of the heavy Macedonian (Companion) cavalry. From Hermóutês (the fourth day from Arisbé) he marched direct towards the Granikus, in careful order, with his main phalanx in double files, his cavalry on each wing, and the baggage in the rear. On approaching the river, he made his dispositions for immediate attack, though Parmenio advised waiting until the next morning. Knowing well, like Memnon on the other side, that the chances of a pitched battle were all against the Persians, he resolved to leave them no opportunity of decamping during the night.

In Alexander's array, the phalanx or heavy infantry formed the central body. The six Taxcis or divisions, of which it consisted, were commanded (reckoning from right to left) by Perdikkas, Kénonus, Amyntas son of Androménês, Philippus, Meleager, and Kraterus. Immediately on the right of the phalanx,
were the hypaspistae, or light infantry, under Nikanor son of Parmenio—then the light horse or lancers, the Paeonians, and the Apolloniatae squadron of Companion-cavalry commanded by the Arch Sosocrates, all under Anyutas son of Arrhiboeus—lastly the full body of Companion-cavalry, the bowmen, and the Aegrianian darters, all under Philotas (son of Parmenio), whose division formed the extreme right. The left flank of the phalanx was in like manner protected by three distinct divisions of cavalry or lighter troops—first, by the Thracians, under Agathon—next, by the cavalry of the allies, under Philippus son of Mencelas—lastly, by the Thessalian cavalry, under Kallas, whose division formed the extreme left. Alexander himself took the command of the right, giving that of the left to Parmenio; by right and left are meant the two halves of the army, each of them including three Taxeis or divisions of the phalanx with the cavalry on its flank—for there was no recognized centre under a distinct command. On the other side of the Granikus, the Persian cavalry lined the bank. The Medes and Baktrians were on their right, under Rhoemilathres—the Paphlagonians and Hyrcaniae in the centre, under Aristeus and Spithridates—on the left were Menmon and Arsames, with their divisions. The Persian infantry, both Asiatic and Grecian, were kept back in reserve; the cavalry alone being relied upon to dispute the passage of the river.

In this array, both parties remained for some time, watching each other in anxious silence. There being no firing or smoke, as with modern armies, all the details on each side were clearly visible to the other; so that the Persians easily recognized Alexander himself on the Macedonian right from the splendour of his armour and military costume, as well as from the respectful demeanour of those around him. Their principal leaders accordingly thronged to their own left, which they reinforced with the main strength of their cavalry, in order to oppose him per-proposed. The words ἔστε ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τῆς ἵμαρας τάξεως seem to prove that there were three τάξεις of the phalanx (Kraterus, Meleager, and Philippus) included in the left half of the army—and three others (Perdikkas, Kanus, and Anyutas) in the right half; while the words ἐπὶ δὲ ἡ Κρατέρου τοῦ Ἀλέξανδρου appear wrongly inserted. There is no good reason for admitting two distinguished officers, each named Kraterus. The name of Philippus and his τάξις is repeated twice; once in counting from the right of the τάξεις,—once again in counting from the left.
sonally. Presently he addressed a few words of encouragement to the troops, and gave the order for advance. He directed the first attack to be made by the squadron of Companion-cavalry whose turn it was on that day to take the lead—(the squadron of Apolonia, of which Sokratés was captain—commanded on this day by Ptolemaeus son of Philippus) supported by the light horse or Lancers, the Paeonian darters (infantry), and one division of regularly armed infantry, seemingly hypaspistae. He then himself entered the river, at the head of the right half of the army, cavalry and infantry, which advanced under sound of trumpets and with the usual war-shouts. As the occasional depths of water prevented a straightforward march with one uniform line, the Macedonians slanted their course suitably to the fordable spaces; keeping their front extended so as to approach the opposite bank as much as possible in line, and not in separate columns with flanks exposed to the Persian cavalry. Not merely the right under Alexander, but also the left under Parmenio, advanced and crossed in the same movement and under the like precautions.

The foremost detachment under Ptolemy and Amyntas, on reaching the opposite bank, encountered a strenuous resistance, concentrated as it was here upon one point. They found Memnon and his sons with the best of the Persian cavalry immediately in their front; some on the summit of the bank, from whence they hurled down their javelins—others down at the water’s edge, so as to come to closer quarters. The Macedonians tried every effort to make good their landing, and push their way by main force through the Persian horse, but in vain. Having both lower ground and insecure footing, they could make no impression, but were thrust back with some loss, and retired upon the main body which Alexander was now bringing across. On his approaching the shore, the same struggle was renewed around his person with increased fervour on both sides. He was himself among the foremost, and all near him were animated by his example. The

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1 Arrian, i, 14, 9. τοὺς προδρόμους ἵππες mean the same cavalry as those who are called (in i. 14, 2) σαρισσοφόρους ἵππες, under Amyntas son of Arribas, apparently, this passage λοξὴν ἀεὶ παρατείνων τὴν τάξιν, ἢ παρεῖλκε τὸ ῥεῦμα, Λοξὴν ἀεὶ παρατείνων τὴν τάξιν ἢ παρεῖλκε τὸ ῥεῦμα, ἵνα δὴ μὴ ἐκβαίνοντι αὐτῷ of Πέρσαι κατὰ κέραν προσπίπτοιεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς, ὥς εἰσπράττοι, τῇ φάλαγγι προσβείται αὐτοῖς. 2 Apparently, this passage λοξὴν ἀεὶ παρατείνων τὴν τάξιν, ἢ παρεῖλκε τὸ ῥεῦμα, ἵνα δὴ μὴ ἐκβαίνοντι αὐτῷ of Πέρσαι κατὰ κέραν προσπίπτοιεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς, ὥς εἰσπράττοι, τῇ φάλαγγι προσβείται αὐτοῖς.
horsemen on both sides became jammed together, and the contest was one of physical force and pressure by man and horse; but the Macedonians had a great advantage in being accustomed to the use of the strong close-fighting pike, while the Persian weapon was the missile javelin. At length the resistance was surmounted; and Alexander, with those around him, gradually thrusting back the defenders, made their way up the high bank to the level ground. At other points the resistance was not equally vigorous. The left and centre of the Macedonians, crossing at the same time on all practicable spaces along the whole line, overpowered the Persians stationed on the slope, and got up to the level ground with comparative facility. Indeed no cavalry could possibly stand on the bank to offer opposition to the phalanx with its array of long pikes, wherever this could reach the ascent in any continuous front. The easy crossing of the Macedonians at other points helped to constrain those Persians, who were contending with Alexander himself on the slope, to recede to the level ground above.

Here again, as at the water's edge, Alexander was foremost in personal conflict. His pike having been broken, he turned to a soldier near him—Aretis, one of the horseguards who generally aided him in mounting his horse—and asked for another. But this man, having broken his pike also, showed the fragment to Alexander, requesting him to ask some one else; upon which the Corinthian Demaratus, one of the Companion-cavalry close at hand, gave him his weapon instead. Thus armed anew, Alexander spurred his horse forward against Mithridates (son-in-law of Darius), who was bringing up a column of cavalry to attack him, but was himself considerably in advance of it. Alexander thrust his pike into the face of Mithridates, and laid him prostrate on the ground: he then turned to another of the Persian leaders, Rhysakes, who struck him a blow on the head with his scimitar, knocked off a portion of his helmet, but did not penetrate beyond; Alexander avenged this blow by thrusting Rhysakes through the body with his pike. 

1 Arrian, i. 15, 5. Καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν (Alexander himself) ἐκεῖστηκε μάχη καρπερὰ, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἐλλαλεῖ ἐν ἐλλαῖς τῶν τάξεων τοῖς Μακεδονίσι διέβαινον οὐ κατεύθυν ὅτι. 

These words deserve attention, because they show how incomplete Arrian's description of the battle had been. Dwelling almost exclusively upon the personal presence and achievements of Alexander, he had said little even about the right half of the army, and nothing at all about the left half of it under Parmenio. We discover from these words that all the tâxes of the phalanx (not only the three in Alexander's half, but also the three in Parmenio's half) passed the river nearly at the same time, and for the most part with little or no resistance. 

2 Arrian, i. 15, 6-12; Diodor, xvi. 20;
Meanwhile a third Persian leader, Spithridatés, was actually close behind Alexander, with hand and scimitar uplifted to cut him down. At this critical moment, Kleitus son of Dropidés—one of the ancient officers of Philip, high in the Macedonian service—struck with full force at the uplifted arm of Spithridatés and severed it from the body, thus preserving Alexander’s life. Other leading Persians, kinsmen of Spithridatés, rushed desperately on Alexander, who received many blows on his armour, and was in much danger. But the efforts of his companions near were redoubled, both to defend his person and to second his adventurous daring. It was on that point that the Persian cavalry was first broken. On the left of the Macedonian line, the Thessalian cavalry also fought with vigour and success; and the light-armed foot, intermingled with Alexander’s cavalry generally, did great damage to the enemy. The rout of the Persian cavalry, once begun, speedily became general. They fled in all directions, pursued by the Macedonians.

But Alexander and his officers soon checked this ardour of pursuit, calling back their cavalry to complete his victory. The Persian infantry, Asiatics as well as Greeks, had remained without movement or orders, looking on the cavalry battle which had just disastrously terminated. To them Alexander immediately turned his attention. He brought up his phalanx and hypaspiste to attack them in front, while his cavalry assailed on all sides their unprotected flanks and rear; he himself charged with the cavalry, and had a horse killed under him. His infantry alone was more numerous than they, so that against such odds the result could hardly be doubtful. The greater part of these mercenaries, after a valiant resistance, were cut to pieces on the field. We are told that none escaped, except 2000 made prisoners, and some who remained concealed in the field among the dead bodies.

In this complete and signal defeat, the loss of the Persian cavalry was not very serious in mere number—for only 1000 of them were slain. But the slaughter of the leading Persians, who had exposed themselves with extreme bravery in the personal conflict against Alex-

Plutarch, Alex. 16. These authors differ in the details. I follow Arrian.

1 Diodor. xvii. 21.
2 Arrian, i. 16, 1. Plutarch says that the infantry, on seeing the cavalry routed, demanded to capitulate on terms with Alexander; but this seems hardly probable.
3 Arrian, i. 10, 4; Diodor. xvii. 21. Diodorus says that on the part of the Persians more than 10,000 foot were killed, with 2000 cavalry; and that more than 20,000 men were made prisoners.
nder, was terrible. There were slain not only Mithridatés, Rhesakês, and Spithridatés, whose names have been already mentioned,—but also Pharnakês, brother-in-law of Darius, Mithrobarzanês satrap of Kappadokia, Atizyês, Niphatês, Petinês, and others; all Persians of rank and consequence. Arsîtês, the satrap of Phrygia, whose rashness had mainly caused the rejection of Memnon’s advice, escaped from the field, but died shortly afterwards by his own hand, from anguish and humiliation. The Persian or Perso-Grecian infantry, though probably more of them individually escaped than is implied in Arrian’s account, was as a body irretrievably ruined. No force was either left in the field, or could be afterwards re-assembled in Asia Minor.

The loss on the side of Alexander is said to have been very small. Twenty-five of the Companion-cavalry, belonging to the division under Ptolemy and Amyntas, were slain in the first unsuccessful attempt to pass the river. Of the other cavalry, sixty in all were slain; of the infantry, thirty. This is given to us as the entire loss on the side of Alexander. It is only the number of killed; that of the wounded is not stated; but assuming it to be ten times the number of killed, the total of both together will be 1265. If this be correct, the resistance of the Persian cavalry, except near that point where Alexander himself and the Persian chiefs came into conflict, cannot have been either serious or long protracted. But when we add farther the contest with the infantry, the smallness of the total assigned for Macedonian killed and wounded will appear still more surprising. The total of the Persian infantry is stated at nearly 20,000, most part of them Greek mercenaries. Of these only 2000 were made prisoners; nearly all the rest (according to Arrian) were slain. Now the Greek mercenaries were well armed, and not likely to let themselves be slain with impunity; moreover Plutarch expressly affirms that they resisted with desperate valour, and that most of the Macedonian loss was incurred in the conflict against them.

It is not easy therefore to comprehend how the total number of slain can be brought within the statement of Arrian.

1 Arrian, i. 16, 5, 6. 2 Arrian, i. 16, 7, 8. 3 Arrian, in describing another battle, considers that the proportion of twelve to one, between wounded and killed, is above what could have been expected (v. 24, 8). Rustow and Kochly (p. 271) state that in modern battles, the ordinary proportion of wounded to killed is from 8:1 to 10:1.

4 Arrian, i. 16, 8; Plutarch, Alexander, 16. Aristobulus (apud Plutarch, l. c.) said that there were slain among the companions of Alexander (τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον) thirty-four persons, of whom nine were infantry. This coincides with Arrian’s statement about the twenty-five companions of the cavalry, slain.
After the victory, Alexander manifested the greatest solicitude for his wounded soldiers, whom he visited and comforted in person. Of the twenty-five Companions slain, he caused brazen statues, by Lysippus, to be erected at Dium in Macedonia, where they were still standing in the time of Arrian. To the surviving relatives of all the slain he also granted immunity from taxation and from personal service. The dead bodies were honourably buried, those of the enemy as well as of his own soldiers. The two thousand Greeks in the Persian service who had become his prisoners, were put in chains, and transported to Macedonia there to work as slaves; to which treatment Alexander condemned them on the ground that they had taken arms on behalf of the foreigner against Greece, in contravention of the general vote passed by the synod at Corinth. At the same time, he sent to Athens three hundred panoplies selected from the spoil, to be dedicated to Athéné in the acropolis with this inscription—"Alexander son of Philip, and the Greeks except the Lacedaemonians (present these offerings), out of the spoils of the foreigners inhabiting Asia." Though the vote to which Alexander appealed represented no existing Grecian aspiration, and granted only a sanction which could not be safely refused, yet he found satisfaction in clothing his own self-aggrandizing impulse under the name of a supposed Pan-hellenic purpose: which was at the same time useful as strengthening his hold upon the Greeks, who were the only persons competent, either as officers or soldiers, to uphold the Persian empire against him. His conquests were the extinction of genuine Hellenism, though they diffused an exterior varnish of it, and especially the Greek language, over much of the Oriental world. True Grecian interests lay more on the side of Darius than of Alexander.

The battle of the Granicus, brought on by Arsites and the other satraps contrary to the advice of Memnon, was moreover so unskilfully fought by them, that the gallantry of their infantry, the most formidable corps of Greeks that had ever been in the Persian service, was rendered of little use. The battle, properly speaking, was fought only by the Persian cavalry; the infantry was left to be surrounded and destroyed afterwards.

No victory could be more decisive or terror-striking than that

1 Arrian, i. 16, 10, 11.
2 Arrian usually calls the battle of the Granicus an ἱππομαχία (i. 17, 10, and elsewhere).
of Alexander. There remained no force in the field to oppose him. The impression made by so great a public catastrophe was enhanced by two accompanying circumstances; first, by the number of Persian grandees who perished, realising almost the wailings of Atossa, Xerxes, and the Chorus, in the Persæ of Aeschylus,\(^1\) after the battle of Salamis—next, by the chivalrous and successful prowess of Alexander himself, who, emulating the Homeric Achilles, not only rushed foremost into the mêlée, but killed two of these grandees with his own hand. Such exploits, impressive even when we read of them now, must at the moment when they occurred have acted most powerfully upon the imagination of contemporaries.

Several of the neighbouring Mysian mountaineers, though mutinous subjects towards Persia, came down to make submission to him, and were permitted to occupy their lands under the same tribute as they had paid before. The inhabitants of the neighbouring Grecian city of Zelaia, whose troops had served with the Persians, surrendered and obtained their pardon; Alexander admitting the plea that they had served only under constraint. He then sent Parmenio to attack Daskylium, the stronghold and chief residence of the satrap of Phrygia. Even this place was evacuated by the garrison and surrendered, doubtless with a considerable treasure therein. The whole satrapy of Phrygia thus fell into Alexander’s power, and was appointed to be administered by Kallas for his behalf, levying the same amount of tribute as had been paid before.\(^2\) He himself then marched, with his main force, in a southerly direction towards Sardis—the chief town of Lydia, and the main station of the Persians in Asia Minor. The citadel of Sardis—situated on a lofty and steep rock projecting from Mount Tmolus, fortified by a triple wall with an adequate garrison—was accounted impregnable, and at any rate could hardly have been taken by anything less than a long blockade,\(^3\) which would have allowed time for the arrival of the fleet and the operations of Memnon. Yet such was the terror which now accompanied the Macedonian conqueror, that when he arrived within eight miles of Sardis, he met not only a deputation of the chief citizens, but also the Persian governor of the citadel, Mithrinés. The town, citadel,

\(^1\) Aeschylus, Pers. 950 seqq.

\(^2\) Arrian, i. 17, 1, 2.

\(^3\) About the almost impregnable fortifications and position of Sardis, see Polybius, vii. 15–18; Herod. i. 84. It held out for nearly two years against Antiochus III. (p.c. 210), and was taken at last only by the extreme carelessness of the defenders; even then, the citadel was still held.
garrison, and treasure were delivered up to him without a blow. Fortunately for Alexander, there was not in Asia any Persian governors of courage and fidelity such as had been displayed by Maskanes and Boges after the repulse of Xerxes from Greece. Alexander treated Mithridates with courtesy and honour, granted freedom to the Sardians and to the other Lydians generally, with the use of their own Lydian laws. The betrayal of Sardis by Mithridates was a signal good fortune to Alexander. On going up to the citadel, he contemplated with astonishment its prodigious strength; congratulating himself on so easy an acquisition, and giving directions to build there a temple of Olympian Zeus, on the spot where the old palace of the kings of Lydia had been situated. He named Pausanias governor of the citadel, with a garrison of Peloponnesians from Argos; Asander, satrap of the country; and Nikias, collector of tribute. The freedom granted to the Lydians, whatever it may have amounted to, did not exonerate them from paying the usual tribute.

From Sardis, he ordered Kallas, the new satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia—and Alexander son of Aropecus, who had been promoted in place of Kallas to the command of the Thessalian cavalry—to attack Atarneus and the district belonging to Memnon, on the Asiatic coast opposite Lesbos. Meanwhile he himself directed his march to Ephesus, which he reached on the fourth day. Both at Ephesus and at Miletus—the two principal strongholds of the Persians on the coast, as Sardis was in the interior—the sudden catastrophe at the Granicus had struck unspeakable terror. Hegesistratus, governor of the Persian garrison (Greek mercenaries) at Miletus, sent letters to Alexander offering to surrender the town on his approach; while the garrison at Ephesus, with the Macedonian exile Amyntas, got on board two triremes in the harbour and fled. It appears that there had been recently a political revolution in the town, conducted by Syphax and other leaders, who had established an oligarchical government. These men, banishing their political opponents, had committed depredations on the temple of Artemis, overthrown the statue of Philip of Macedon dedicated therein, and destroyed the sepulchre of Heropythus the liberator in the agora.

1 Herodot. vii. 106, 107.
2 Arrian, i. 17, 5-9; Diodot. xvii. 21.
3 Arrian, i. 17, 12. Respecting these commotions at Ephesus, which had preceded the expedition of Alexander, we have no information: nor are we told who Heropythus was, or under what circumstances he had liberated Ephesus. It would have been interesting to know these facts, as illustrating the condition of the Asiatic Greeks previous to Alexander's invasion.
Some of the party, though abandoned by their garrison, were still trying to invoke aid from Memnon, who however was yet at a distance. Alexander entered the town without resistance, restored the exiles, established a democratical constitution, and directed that the tribute heretofore paid to the Persians should now be paid to the Ephesian Artemis. Syrphax and his family sought refuge in the temple, from whence they were dragged by the people and stoned to death. More of the same party would have been despatched, had not the popular vengeance been restrained by Alexander; who displayed an honourable and prudent moderation.

Thus master of Ephesus, Alexander found himself in communication with his fleet, under the command of Nikanor; and received propositions of surrender from the two neighbouring inland cities, Magnesia and Tralleis. To occupy these cities, he despatched Parmenio with 5000 foot (half of them Macedonians) and 200 of the Companion-cavalry; while he at the same time sent Autimachus with an equal force in a northerly direction, to liberate the various cities of Eolic and Ionic Greeks. This officer was instructed to put down in each of them the ruling oligarchy, which acted with a mercenary garrison as an instrument of Persian supremacy—to place the government in the hands of the citizens—and to abolish all payment of tribute. He himself—after taking part in a solemn festival and procession to the temple of Ephesian Artemis, with his whole army in battle-array—marched southward towards Miletus; his fleet under Nikanor proceeding thither by sea. He expected probably to enter Miletus with as little resistance as Ephesus. But his hopes were disappointed: Hegesistratus, commander of the garrison in that town, though under the immediate terror of the defeat at the Granikus he had written to offer submission, had now altered his tone, and determined to hold out. The formidable Persian fleet, four hundred sail of Phoenician and Cyprian ships of war with well-trained seamen, was approaching.

This naval force, which a few weeks earlier would have prevented Alexander from crossing into Asia, now afforded the only hope of arresting the rapidity and ease of his conquests. What steps had been taken by the Persian officers since the defeat at the Granikus, we do not hear. Many of them had fled, along with Memnon, to Miletus;
and they were probably disposed, under the present desperate circumstances, to accept the command of Memnon as their only hope of safety, though they had despised his counsel on the day of the battle. Whether the towns in Memnon’s principality of Atarneus had attempted any resistance against the Macedonians, we do not know. His interests however were so closely identified with those of Persia, that he had sent up his wife and children as hostages, to induce Darius to entrust him with the supreme conduct of the war. Orders to this effect were presently sent down by that prince; but at the first arrival of the fleet, it seems not to have been under the command of Memnon, who was however probably on board.

It came too late to aid in the defence of Miletus. Three days before its arrival, Nikanor the Macedonian admiral, with his fleet of one hundred and sixty ships, had occupied the island of Ladê, which commanded the harbour of that city. Alexander found the outer portion of Miletus evacuated, and took it without resistance. He was making preparations to besiege the inner city, and had already transported 1000 troops across to the island of Ladê, when the powerful Persian fleet came in sight, but found itself excluded from Miletus, and obliged to take moorings under the neighbouring promontory of Mykalê. Unwilling to abandon without a battle the command of the sea, Parmenio advised Alexander to fight this fleet, offering himself to share the hazard aboard. But Alexander disapproved the proposition, affirming that his fleet was inferior not less in skill than in numbers; that the high training of the Macedonians would tell for nothing on shipboard; and that a naval defeat would be the signal for insurrection in Greece. Besides debating such prudential reasons, Alexander and Parmenio also differed about the religious promise of the case. On the sea-shore, near the stern of the Macedonian ships, Parmenio had seen an eagle, which filled him with confidence that the ships would prove victorious. But Alexander contended that this interpretation was incorrect. Though the eagle doubtless promised to him victory, yet it had been seen on land—and therefore his victories would be on land: hence the result signified was, that he would overcome the Persian fleet, by means of land operations. This part of the debate, between two practical military men of ability, is not the least interesting of the whole; illustrating as it does, not only the

1 Diodor. xvii. 23.  
2 Arrian, i. 18, 9-15; i. 20, 2.
religious susceptibilities of the age, but also the pliancy of the interpretative process, lending itself equally well to inferences totally opposite. The difference between a sagacious and a dull-witted prophet, accommodating ambiguous omens to useful or mischievous conclusions, was one of very material importance in the ancient world.

Alexander now prepared vigorously to assault Miletus, repudiating with disdain an offer brought to him by a Milesian citizen named Glaukippus—that the city should be neutral and open to him as well as to the Persians. His fleet under Nikanor occupied the harbour, blocked up its narrow mouth against the Persians, and made threatening demonstrations from the water's edge; while he himself brought up his battering-engines against the walls, shook or overthrew them in several places, and then stormed the city. The Milesians, with the Grecian mercenary garrison, made a brave defence, but were overpowered by the impetuosity of the assault. A large number of them were slain, and there was no way of escape except by jumping into little boats, or swimming off upon the hollow of the shield. Even of these fugitives, most part were killed by the seamen of the Macedonian triremes; but a division of 300 Grecian mercenaries got on to an isolated rock near the mouth of the harbour, and there prepared to sell their lives dearly. Alexander, as soon as his soldiers were thoroughly masters of the city, went himself on shipboard to attack the mercenaries on the rock, taking with him ladders in order to effect a landing upon it. But when he saw that they were resolved on a desperate defence, he preferred admitting them to terms of capitulation, and received them into his own service. To the surviving Milesian citizens he granted the condition of a free city, while he caused all the remaining prisoners to be sold as slaves.

The powerful Persian fleet, from the neighbouring promontory of Mykalé, was compelled to witness, without being able to prevent, the capture of Miletus, and was presently withdrawn to Halikarnassus. At the same time Alexander came to the resolution of disbANDING his own fleet; which, while costing more than he could then afford, was nevertheless unfit to cope with the enemy in open sea. He calculated that by concentrating all his efforts on land operations, especially against the cities on the coast, he should exclude the Persian fleet from all effective hold on Asia Minor, and

1 Arrian, i. 19; Diodor. xvii. 22.
ensure that country to himself. He therefore paid off all the ships, retaining only a moderate squadron for the purposes of transport.

Before this time, probably, the whole Asiatic coast northward of Miletus—including the Ionic and Æolic cities and the principality of Memon—had either accepted willingly the dominion of Alexander, or had been reduced by his detachments. Accordingly he now directed his march southward from Miletus, towards Karia, and especially towards Halikarnassus, the principal city of that territory. On entering Karia, he was met by Ada, a member of the Karian princely family, who tendered to him her town of Alinda and her other possessions, adopting him as her son, and entreaty ing his protection. Not many years earlier, under Mausolus and Artemisia, the powerful princes of this family had been formidable to all the Grecian islands. It was the custom of Karia that brothers and sisters of the reigning family intermarried with each other: Mausolus and his wife Artemisia were succeeded by Idricus and his wife Ada, all four being brothers and sisters, sons and daughters of Hekatomnus. On the death of Idricus, his widow Ada was expelled from Halikarnassus and other parts of Karia by her surviving brother Pixodarus; though she still retained some strong towns, which proved a welcome addition to the conquests of Alexander. Pixodarus, on the contrary, who had given his daughter in marriage to a leading Persian named Orontobates, warmly espoused the Persian cause, and made Halikarnassus a capital point of resistance against the invader.

But it was not by him alone that this city was defended. The Persian fleet had repaired thither from Miletus; Memon, now invested by Darius with supreme command on the Asiatic coast and the Ægean, was there in person. There was not only Orontobates with many other Asiatics, but also a large garrison of mercenary Greeks, commanded by Ephialtés, a brave Athenian exile. The city, strong both by nature and by art, with a surrounding ditch forty-five feet broad and twenty-two feet deep, had been still farther strengthened

1 Arrian, i. 20, 1-4; Diodor. xvii. 22. At the same time, the statement of Diodorus can hardly be correct (xvii. 24), that Alexander sent his battering engines from Miletus to Halikarnassus by sea. This would only have exposed them to be captured by the Persian fleet.

2 Arrian, i. 23, 11, 12; Diodor. xvii. 24; Strabo, xiv. p. 657.

3 Arrian, i. 20, 13.
under the prolonged superintendence of Memnon; lastly, there were two citadels, a fortified harbour with its entrance fronting the south, abundant magazines of arms, and good provision of defensive engines. The siege of Halikarnassus was the most arduous enterprise which Alexander had yet undertaken. Instead of attacking it by land and sea at once, as at Miletus, he could make his approaches only from the land, while the defenders were powerfully aided from seaward by the Persian ships with their numerous crews.

His first efforts, directed against the gate on the north or north-east of the city, which led towards Mylasa, were interrupted by frequent sallies and discharges from the engines on the walls. After a few days thus spent without much avail, he passed with a large section of his army to the western side of the town, towards the outlying portion of the projecting tongue of land, on which Halikarnassus and Myndus (the latter farther westward) were situated. While making demonstrations on this side of Halikarnassus, he at the same time attempted a night attack on Myndus, but was obliged to retire after some hours of fruitless effort. He then confined himself to the siege of Halikarnassus. His soldiers, protected from missiles by moveable penthouses (called Tortoises), gradually filled up the wide and deep ditch round the town, so as to open a level road for his engines (rolling towers of wood) to come up close to the walls. The engines being brought up close, the work of demolition was successfully prosecuted; notwithstanding vigorous sallies from the garrison, repulsed, though not without loss and difficulty, by the Macedonians. Presently the shock of the battering-engines had overthrown two towers of the city-wall, together with two intermediate breadth of wall; and a third tower was beginning to totter. The besieged were employed in erecting an inner wall of brick to cover the open space, and a wooden tower of the great height of 140 feet for the purpose of casting projectiles. It appears that Alexander waited for the full demolition of the third tower, before he thought the breach wide enough to be stormed; but an assault was prematurely brought on by two adventurous soldiers from the division of Perdikkas. These men, elate with wine, rushed up singlehanded to

1 Arrian, i, 20, 5. εἰκονιάρια ταύτα νεκρούς τα τάντα παρον ἐκ τοὺς παρο- σκευασμον, &c.
2 Compare Arrian, i, 21, 7, 8; Diodor. xvii, 25, 26.
3 Both Arrian (i, 21, 5) and Diodorus (xvii, 25) mention this proceeding of the two soldiers of Perdikkas, though Diodorus says that it occurred at night, which cannot well be true.
attack the Mylascan gate, and slew the foremost of the defenders who came out to oppose them, until at length, reinforcements arriving successively on both sides, a general combat took place at a short distance from the wall. In the end, the Macedonians were victorious, and drove the besieged back into the city. Such was the confusion, that the city might then have been assaulted and taken, had measures been prepared for it beforehand. The third tower was speedily overthrown; nevertheless, before this could be accomplished, the besieged had already completed their half-moon within, against which accordingly, on the next day, Alexander pushed forward his engines. In this advanced position, however, being as it were within the circle of the city-wall, the Macedonians were exposed to discharges not only from engines in their front, but also from the towers yet standing on each side of them. Moreover, at night, a fresh sally was made with so much impetuosity, that some of the covering wicker-work of the engines, and even the main woodwork of one of them, was burnt. It was not without difficulty that Philotas and Hellanikus, the officers on guard, preserved the remainder; nor were the besieged finally driven in, until Alexander himself appeared with reinforcements.1

Though his troops had been victors in these successive combats, yet he could not carry off his dead, who lay close to the walls, without soliciting a truce for burial. Such request usually counted as a confession of defeat: nevertheless Alexander solicited the truce, which was evanted by Memnon, in spite of the contrary opinion of Ephialtēs.2

After a few days of interval, for burying his dead and repairing the engines, Alexander recommenced attack upon the half-moon, under his own personal superintendence. Among the leaders within, a conviction gained ground that the place could not long hold out. Ephialtēs especially, resolved not to survive the capture, and seeing that the only chance of preservation consisted in destroying the besieging engines, obtained permission from Memnon to put himself at the head of a last desperate sally.3 He took imme-

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1 Arrian, i. 21, 7-12.
2 Diod. xvii. 25.
3 The last desperate struggle of the besieged, is, what stands described in i. 22 of Arrian, and in xvii. 26, 27 of Diodorus; though the two descriptions are very different. Arrian does not name Ephialtēs at Halikarnassus. He follows the Macedonian authors, Ptolemy and Aristobulus; who probably dwelt only on Memnon and the Persians as their real enemies, treating the Greeks in general as a portion of the hostile force. On the other hand, Diodorus and Curtius appear to have followed, in great part, Grecian authors; in whose view, eminent Athenian exiles, like Ephialtēs and Charidemus, counted for much more.

The fact here mentioned by Diodorus,
diately near him 2000 chosen troops, half to encounter the enemy, half with torches to burn the engines. At daybreak, all the gates being suddenly and simultaneously thrown open, sallying parties rushed out from each against the besiegers; the engines from within supporting them by multiplied discharges of missiles. Ephialtés with his division, marching straight against the Macedonians on guard at the main point of attack, assailed them impetuously, while his torch-bearers tried to set the engines on fire. Himself distinguished no less for personal strength than for valour, he occupied the front rank, and was so well seconded by the courage and good array of his soldiers charging in deep column, that for a time he gained advantage. Some of the engines were successfully fired, and the advanced guard of the Macedonian troops, consisting of young troops, gave way and fled. They were rallied partly by the efforts of Alexander, but still more by the older Macedonian soldiers, companions in all Philip's campaigns; who, standing exempt from night-watches, were encamped more in the rear. These veterans, among whom one Atharrias was the most conspicuous, upbraiding the cowardice of their comrades, cast themselves into their accustomed phalanx-array, and thus both withstood and repulsed the charge of the victorious enemy. Ephialtés, foremost among the combatants, was slain, the rest were driven back to the city, and the burning engines were saved with some damage. During this same time, an obstinate conflict had also taken place at the gate called Tripylon, where the besieged had made another sally, over a narrow bridge thrown across the ditch. Here the Macedonians were under the command of Ptolemy (not the son of Lagus) one of the king's body-guards. He, with two or three other conspicuous officers, perished in the severe struggle which ensued, but the sallying party were at length repulsed and driven into the city. The loss of the besieged was severe, in trying to get again within the walls, under vigorous pursuit from the Macedonians. 1

1 Diodor. xvi. 27; Curtius, v. i. viii. 2...οἱ γὰρ πρεσβύτατοι τῶν Μακεδόνων, διὰ μὲν τὴν ἡλικίαν ἀπολελυμένοι τῶν κινδύνων, συνεστρατευμένοι δὲ Φιλίππῳ πικρῶς ὠνείδισαν τὴν ἀνανδρίαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ συναθροισθέντες καὶ συνασπίσαντες, ὑπέστησαν τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἤδη νενικηκέναι... 2 Arrian, i. 22.5.
By this last unsuccessful effort, the defensive force of Halikarnassus was broken. Memnon and Orontobates, satisfied that no longer defence of the town was practicable, took advantage of the night to set fire to their wooden projectile engines and towers, as well as to their magazines of arms, with the houses near the exterior wall, while they carried away the troops, stores, and inhabitants, partly to the citadel called Salmakis—partly to the neighbouring islet called Arkomnesus—partly to the island of Kos. Though thus evacuating the town, however, they still kept good garrisons well provisioned in the two citadels belonging to it. The conflagration, stimulated by a strong wind, spread widely. It was only extinguished by the orders of Alexander, when he entered the town, and put to death all those whom he found with firebrands. He directed that the Halikarnassians found in the houses should be spared, but that the city itself should be demolished. He assigned the whole of Karia to Ada, as a principality, doubtless under condition of tribute. As the citadels still occupied by the enemy were strong enough to require a long siege, he did not think it necessary to remain in person for the purpose of reducing them; but surrounding them with a wall of blockade, he left Ptolemy and 8000 men to guard it.

Having concluded the siege of Halikarnassus, Alexander sent back his artillery to Tralles, ordering Parmenio, with a large portion of the cavalry, the allied infantry, and the baggage wagons, to Sardis.

The ensuing winter months he employed in the conquest of Lykia, Pamphylia, and Pisidia. All this southern coast of Asia Minor is mountainous; the range of Mount Taurus descending nearly to the sea, so as to leave little or no intervening breadth of plain. In spite of great strength of situation, such was the terror of Alexander's arms, that all the Lykian towns—Hyparna, Telmissus, Pinara, Xanthus, Patara, and thirty others—submitted to him without a blow. One alone among them, called Marmareis, resisted to desperation. On reaching the territory called Milyas, the Phrygian frontier of Lykia, Alexander received the surrender of the Greek maritime city, Phaselis. He assisted the Phaselites in destroying a mountain fort erected and garrisoned against them.
by the neighbouring Pisidian mountaineers, and paid a public compliment to the sepulchre of their deceased townsman, the rhetorician Theodectes.1

After this brief halt at Phaselis, Alexander directed his course to Pergæ in Pamphylia. The ordinary mountain road, by which he sent most of his army, was so difficult as to require some leveling by Thracian light troops sent in advance for the purpose. But the king himself, with a select detachment, took a road more difficult still, called Klimax, under the mountains by the brink of the sea. When the wind blew from the south, this road was covered by such a depth of water as to be impracticable; for some time before he reached the spot, the wind had blown strong from the south—but as he came near, the special providence of the Gods (so he and his friends conceived it) brought on a change to the north, so that the sea receded and left an available passage, though his soldiers had the water up to their waists.2 From Pergæ he marched on to Side, receiving on his way envoys from Aspendus, who offered to surrender their city, but deprecated the entrance of a garrison; which they were allowed to buy off by promising fifty talents in money, together with the horses which they were bringing up as tribute for the Persian king. Having left a garrison at Side, he advanced onward to a strong place called Syllium, defended by brave natives with a body of mercenaries to aid them. These men held out, and even repulsed a first assault; which Alexander could not stay to repeat, being apprised that the Aspendians had refused to execute the conditions imposed, and had put their city in a state of defence. Returning rapidly, he constrained them to submission, and then marched back to Pergæ; from whence he directed his course towards the greater Phrygia,3 through the difficult mountains, and almost indomitable population, of Pisidia.

After remaining in the Pisidian mountains long enough to reduce several towns or strong posts, Alexander proceeded northward into Phrygia, passing by the salt lake called Askanius to the steep and impregnable fortress of Kelaena, garrisoned by 1000 Karians, and 100 mercenary Greeks. These men, having no hope of relief from the

1 Arrian, i, 24, 11; Plutarch, Alexander, 17.
2 Arrian, i, 26, 4. οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ θείου, ὡς αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι αὐτὸν ἐξηγοῦντο, &c. Strabo, xiv. p. 606; Curtius, v. 3, 22.
3 Plutarch's words (Alexander, 17) must be taken to mean that Alexander did not boast so much of this special favour from the Gods, as some of his panegyrists boasted for him.

1 Arrian, i, 27, 1-8.
Persians, offered to deliver up the fortress, unless such relief should arrive before the sixtieth day. Alexander accepted the propositions, remained ten days at Kelana, and left there Antigonus (afterwards the most powerful among his successors) as satrap of Phrygia, with 1500 men. He then marched northward to Gordium on the river Sangarius, where Parmenio was directed to meet him, and where his winter-campaign was concluded.

1 Curtius, iii. 1, 8. 2 Arrian, i. 23, 1–5.

APPENDIX

ON THE LENGTH OF THE MACEDONIAN SARISSA OR PIKE.

The statements here given about the length of the sarissa carried by the phalanxite, are taken from Polybius, whose description is on all points both clear and consistent with itself. "The sarissa (he says) is sixteen cubits long, according to the original theory; and fourteen cubits, as adapted to actual practice." \(\texttt{\textcopyright} \text{Polybius, xvii. 12} \)

The difference here indicated by Polybius between the length in theory, and that in practice, may probably be understood to mean, that the phalanxites, when in exercise, used pikes of the greater length; when on service, of the smaller: just as the Roman soldiers were trained in exercises to use arms heavier than they employed against an enemy.

Of the later Tactic writers, Leo (Tact. vi. 39) and Constantine Porphyrogenitus, repeat the double measurement of the sarissa as given by Polybius. Arrian (Tact. c. 13) and Ptolemy (ii. 29, 2) state its length at sixteen cubits—Aelian (Tact. c. 14) gives fourteen cubits. All these authors follow either Polybius, or some other authority concurrent with him. None of them contradict him, though none state the case so clearly as he does.

Messrs. Rustow and Köchly (Ueber, des Griech. Kriegswesens, p. 238), authors of the best work that I know respecting ancient military matters, reject the authority of Polybius as it here stands. They maintain that the passage must be corrupt; and that Polybius must have meant to say that the sarissa was sixteen feet in length—not sixteen cubits. I cannot subscribe to their opinion, nor do I think that their criticism on Polybius is a just one.

First, they reason as if Polybius had said that the sarissa of actual service was sixteen cubits long. Computing the weight of such a weapon from the thickness required in the shaft, they pronounce that it would be unmanageable. But Polybius gives the actual length as only fourteen cubits: a very material difference. If we accept the hypothesis of these authors—that corruption of the text has made us read cubits where we ought to have read feet,—it will follow that the length of
the sarissa, as given by Polybius, would be fourteen feet, not sixteen feet. Now this length is not sufficient to justify various passages in which its prodigious length is set forth.

Next, they impute to Polybius a contradiction in saying that the Roman soldier occupied a space of three feet, equal to that occupied by a Macedonian soldier—and yet that in the fight, he had two Macedonian soldiers and ten pikes, opposed to him (xvii. 13). But there is here no contradiction at all: for Polybius expressly says that the Roman, though occupying three feet when the legion was drawn up in order, required, when fighting, an expansion of the ranks and an increased interval to the extent of three feet behind him and on each side of him (χαλάσμα καὶ διάστασιν ἄλληνς ἔχειν δεχεί τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐλάχιστον τρεῖς πόδας κατ’ ἐρυδικάς καὶ παραστάσεις) in order to allow full play for his sword and shield. It is therefore perfectly true that each Roman soldier, when actually marching up to attack the phalanx, occupied as much ground as two phalangites, and had ten pikes to deal with.

Further, it is impossible to suppose that Polybius, in speaking of ranks, really meant feet: because (cap. 12) he speaks of three feet as the interval between each rank in the file, and these three feet are clearly made equal to three cubits. His computation will not come right, if in place of cubits you substitute feet. We must therefore take the assertion of Polybius as we find it; that the pike of the phalangite was fourteen cubits or twenty-one feet in length. Now Polybius had every means of being well informed on such a point. He was above thirty years of age at the time of the last war of the Romans against the Macedonian king Perseus, in which war he himself served. He was intimately acquainted with Scipio, the son of Paulus Emilius, who gained the battle of Pydna. Lastly, he had paid great attention to tactics, and had even written an express work on the subject.

It might indeed be imagined, that the statement of Polybius, though true as to his own time, was not true as to the time of Philip and Alexander. But there is nothing to countenance such a suspicion—which moreover is expressly disclaimed by Ristow and Kockly.

Doubtless twenty-one feet is a prodigious length, unmanageable except by men properly trained, and inconvenient for all evolutions. But these are just the terms under which the pike of the phalangite is always spoken of. So Livy, xxxi. 39, "Eunt plebsque silvestria circa, incommoda phalanx maximae Macedonii; quae, non mihi partibus lustri velit vallum ante clypes objectum (quod ut sit, libero campo oppidum esse, nullius admodum usum esse)." Compare also Livy, xlix, 40, 41, where, among other intimations of the immense length of the pike, we find, "Si carpitum aggeriendum, circumagere omnem hunc lineam cum gravitate sustinere cogas, confusa strue impeditur;" also xxxviii. 8, 9.

Xenophon tells us that the Ten Thousand Greeks in their retreat had to fight their way across the territory of the Chalybes, who carried a pike fifteen cubits long, together with a short sword; he does not mention a shield, but they wore greaves and helmets (Anab. iv. 7, 15). This is a length greater than what Polybius ascribes to the pike of the Macedonian phalangite. The Mosynoeki defended their citadel "with pikes so long and thick that a man could hardly carry them" (Anabas. v. 4, 25). In the Iliad, when the Trojans are pressing hard upon the Greek ships, and seeking to set them on fire, Ajax is described as planting himself upon the poop, and keeping off the assailants with a thrusting-pike of twenty-two cubits or thirty-three feet in length (ξυστὸν χαλάσην ἐν παλάμῃσι—δυωκαιεικοσί-πῆχυ, Iliad, xx, 678). The spear of Hektor is ten cubits, or eleven cubits, in length—intended to be hurled (Iliad, vii. 3194, viii. 49)—the reading is not settled, whether ἔγχος ἔχει ἐνδεκάπηχυ, or ἔγχος ἔχει δεκακατόσχολον.

The Swiss infantry, and the German Landsknechte, in the sixteenth century,
were in many respects a reproduction of the Macedonian phalanx: close ranks, deep files, long pikes, and the three or four first ranks composed of the strongest and bravest men in the regiment—either officers, or picked soldiers receiving double pay. The length and impenetrable array of their pikes enabled them to resist the charge of the heavy cavalry or men at arms: they were irresistible in front, unless an enemy could find means to break in among the pikes, which was sometimes, though rarely, done. Their great confidence was in the length of the pike—Macciavelli says of them (Ritretti dell’ Alamagna, Opere, t. iv. p. 150; and Dell’ Arte della Guerra, p. 232-236), “Dicono tenere tale ordine, che non è possibile entrare tra loro, né accostarseli, quanto è la picca lunga. Sono ottimo genti in campagna, a far giornata; ma per espugnare terre non vagliono, e poco nel difenderlo; ed universalmente, dove non possano tenere l’ordine loro della milizia, non vagliono.”
CHAPTER XCIII.

SECOND AND THIRD ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER—
BATTLE OF ISSUS—SIEGE OF TYRE.

It was about February or March 333 B.C., when Alexander reached Gordium; where he appears to have halted for some time, giving to the troops who had been with him in Pisidia a repose doubtless needful. While at Gordium, he performed the memorable exploit familiarly known as the cutting of the Gordian knot. There was preserved in the citadel an ancient waggon of rude structure, said by the legend to have once belonged to the peasant Gordius and his son Midas—the primitive rustic kings of Phrygia, designated as such by the Gods, and chosen by the people. The cord (composed of fibres from the bark of the cornel tree), attaching the yoke of this waggon to the pole, was so twisted and entangled as to form a knot of singular complexity, which no one had ever been able to untie. An oracle had pronounced, that to the person who should untie it the empire of Asia was destined. When Alexander went up to see this ancient relic, the surrounding multitude, Phrygian as well as Macedonian, were full of expectation that the conqueror of the Granikus and of Halikarnassus would overcome the difficulties of the knot and acquire the promised empire. But Alexander, on inspecting the knot, was as much perplexed as others had been before him, until at length, in a fit of impatience, he drew his sword and severed the cord in two. By every one this was accepted as a solution of the problem, thus making good his title to the empire of Asia; a belief which the Gods ratified by a storm of thunder and lightning during the ensuing night.¹

At Gordium, Alexander was visited by envoys from Athens, entreating the liberation of the Athenian prisoners taken at the Granikus, who were now at work chained in the Macedonian mines. But he refused this prayer until a more convenient season. Aware that the Greeks were held attached to him only by their fears, and that, if opportunity occurred,

¹ Arrian, ii, 3; Curtius, iii. 2, 17; Plutarch, Alex. 18; Justin, xi. 7.
a large fraction of them would take part with the Persians, he did not think it prudent to relax his hold upon their conduct.1

Such opportunity seemed now not unlikely to occur. Memnon, excluded from efficacious action on the continent since the loss of Halikarnassus, was employed among the islands of the Aegæan (during the first half of 333 B.C.), with the purpose of carrying war into Greece and Macedonia. Invested with the most ample command, he had a large Phenician fleet and a considerable body of Grecian mercenaries, together with his nephew Pharnabazus and the Persian Autophradates. Having acquired the important island of Chios, through the co-operation of a part of its inhabitants, he next landed on Lesbos, where four out of the five cities, either from fear or preference, declared in his favour; while Mitylenë, the greatest of the five, already occupied by a Macedonian garrison, stood out against him. Memnon accordingly disembarked his troops and commenced the blockade of the city both by sea and land, surrounding it with a double palisade wall from sea to sea. In the midst of this operation he died of sickness; but his nephew Pharnabazus, to whom he had consigned the command provisionally, until the pleasure of Darius could be known, prosecuted his measures vigorously, and brought the city to a capitulation. It was stipulated that the garrison introduced by Alexander should be dismissed; that the column, recording alliance with him, should be demolished; that the Mityleneans should become allies of Darius, upon the terms of the old convention called by the name of Antalkidas; and that the citizens in banishment should be recalled, with restitution of half their property. But Pharnabazus, as soon as admitted, violated the capitulation at once. He not only extorted contributions, but introduced a garrison under Lykomédès, and established a returned exile named Diogenës as despot.2 Such breach of faith was ill-calculated to assist the farther extension of Persian influence in Greece.

Had the Persian fleet been equally active a year earlier, Alexander's army could never have landed in Asia. Nevertheless, the acquisitions of Chios and Lesbos, late as they were in coming, were highly important as promising future progress. Several of the Cycladës islands sent to tender their adhesion to the Persian cause; the fleet was expected in Eubœa, and the Spartans began to count

1 Arrian, i. 29, 8. 2 Arrian, ii. 1, 4–9.
upon aid for an anti-Macedonian movement. But all these hopes were destroyed by the unexpected decease of Memnon.

It was not merely the superior ability of Memnon, but also his established reputation both with Greeks and Persians, which rendered his death a fatal blow to the interests of Darius. The Persians had with them other Greek officers—brave and able—probably some not unfit to execute the full Memnonian schemes. But none of them had gone through the same experience in the art of exercising command among Orientals—none of them had acquired the confidence of Darius to the same extent, so as to be invested with the real guidance of operations, and upheld against court-calumnies. Though Alexander had now become master of Asia Minor, yet the Persians had ample means, if effectively used, of defending all that yet remained, and even of seriously disturbing him at home. But with Memnon vanished the last chance of employing these means with wisdom or energy. The full value of his loss was better appreciated by the intelligent enemy whom he opposed, than by the feeble master whom he served. The death of Memnon, lessening the efficiency of the Persians at sea, allowed full leisure to re-organize the Macedonian fleet, and to employ the undivided land-force for farther inland conquest.

If Alexander was a gainer in respect to his own operations by the death of this eminent Rhodian, he was yet more a gainer by the change of policy which that event induced Darius to adopt. The Persian king resolved to renounce the defensive schemes of Memnon, and to take the offensive against the Macedonians on land. His troops, already summoned from the various parts of the empire, had partially arrived, and were still coming in. Their numbers became greater and greater, amounting at length to a vast and multitudinous host, the total of which is given by some as 600,000 men—by others as 400,000 infantry and 100,000 cavalry. The spectacle of this showy and imposing mass, in every variety of arms, costume, and language, filled the mind of Darius with confidence; especially as there were among them between 20,000 and

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1 Diodor. xvii. 29.  
2 Arrian, ii. 2, 6; Curtius, iii. 3, 19; iii. 4, 8. "Nondam enim Memnonem vità excessisse cognoverat (Alexander)—satis gnarus, cuncta in expedito fore, si nihil ab eo moveretur."  
3 Diodor. xvi. 31.  
4 Diodor. xvii. 30, 31. Diodorus represents the Persian king as having begun to issue letters of convocation for the troops, after he heard the death of Memnon; which cannot be true. The letters must have been sent out before.
30,000 Grecian mercenaries. The Persian courtiers, themselves elate and sanguine, stimulated and exaggerated the same feeling in the king himself, who became confirmed in his persuasion that his enemies could never resist him. From Sogdiana, Bactria, and India, the contingents had not yet had time to arrive; but most of those between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian sea had come in—Persians, Medes, Armenians, Derbikes, Barkanians, Hyrkanians, Kardakes, &c.; all of whom, mustered in the plains of Mesopotamia, are said to have been counted, like the troops of Xerxes in the plain of Doriskus, by paling off a space capable of containing exactly 10,000 men, and passing all the soldiers through it in succession. Neither Darius himself, nor any of those around him, had ever before seen so overwhelming a manifestation of the Persian imperial force. To an Oriental eye, incapable of appreciating the real conditions of military preponderance,—accustomed only to the gross and visible computation of numbers and physical strength,—the king who marched forth at the head of such an army appeared like a God on earth, certain to trample down all before him—just as most Greeks had conceived respecting Xerxes, and by stronger reason Xerxes respecting himself, a century and a half before. Because all this turned out a ruinous mistake, the description of the feeling, given in Curtius and Diodorus, is often mistrusted as baseless rhetoric. Yet it is in reality the self-suggested illusion of untutored men, as opposed to trained and scientific judgement.

But though such was the persuasion of Orientals, it found no response in the bosom of an intelligent Athenian. Among the Greeks now near Darius, was the Athenian exile Charidemus; who having incurred the implacable enmity of Alexander, had been forced to quit Athens after the Macedonian capture of Thebes, and had fled together with Ephialtes to the Persians. Darius, elate with the apparent omnipotence of his army under review, and hearing but one voice of devoted concurrence from the courtiers around him, asked the opinion of Charidemus, in full expectation of receiving an affirmative reply. So completely were the hopes of Charidemus

Curtius, iii. 2.
2 Herodot. vii, 56—and the colloquy between Xerxes and Darius, vii. 103, 104—where the language put by Herodotus into the mouth of Xerxes is natural and instructive. On the other hand, the superior penetration of Cyrus the younger expresses supreme contempt for the military inefficiency of an Asiatic multitude—Xenophon, Anabas. 1. 7, 4. Compare the blunt language of the Arcadian Antiochus—Xen. Hellen. vii. 1. 38; and Cyropaedia. viii. 8, 20.
bound up with the success of Darius, that he would not suppress his convictions, however unpalatable, at a moment when there was yet a possibility that they might prove useful. He replied (with the same frankness as Demaratus had once employed towards Xerxes), that the vast multitude now before him were unfit to cope with the comparatively small number of the invaders. He advised Darius to place no reliance on Asiaties, but to employ his immense treasures in subsidizing an increased army of Grecian mercenaries. He tendered his own hearty services either to assist or to command. To Darius, what he said was alike surprising and offensive; in the Persian courtiers, it provoked intolerable wrath. Intoxicated as they all were with the spectacle of their immense muster, it seemed to them a combination of insult with absurdity, to pronounce Asiaties worthless as compared with Macedonians, and to teach the king that his empire could be defended by none but Greeks. They denounced Charidémus as a traitor who wished to acquire the king's confidence in order to betray him to Alexander. Darius, himself stung with the reply, and still farther exasperated by the clamours of his courtiers, seized with his own hands the girdle of Charidémus, and consigned him to the guards for execution. "You will discover too late (exclaimed the Athenian) the truth of what I have said. My avenger will soon be upon you." 1

Filled as he now was with certain anticipations of success and glory, Darius resolved to assume in person the command of his army, and march down to overwhelm Alexander. From this moment, his land-army became the really important and aggressive force, with which he himself was to act. Herein we note his distinct abandonment of Memnon's plans—the turning-point of his future fortune. He abandoned them, too, at the precise moment when they might have been most safely and completely executed. For at the time of the battle of the Granikus, when Memnon's counsel was originally given, the defensive part of it was not easy to act upon; since the Persians had no very strong or commanding position. But now, in the spring of 333 B.C., they had a line of defence as good as they could possibly desire; advantages, indeed, scarcely to be paralleled elsewhere. In the first place, there was the line of Mount Taurus, barring the entrance of Alexander into Kilikia; a line of defence (as will presently appear) nearly inexpugnable. Next, even if Alexander had succeeded in forcing this line and mastering Kilikia, there would yet remain the

1 Curtius, iii. 2, 10-20; Diodor. xvii. 30.
narrow road between Mount Amanus and the sea, called the Amanian Gates, and the Gates of Kilikia and Assyria—and after that, the passes over Mount Amanus itself—all indispensable for Alexander to pass through, and capable of being held, with proper precautions, against the strongest force of attack. A better opportunity for executing the defensive part of Memnon’s scheme could not present itself; and he himself must doubtless have reckoned that such advantages would not be thrown away.

The momentous change of policy, on the part of the Persian king, was manifested by the order which he sent to the fleet after receiving intelligence of the death of Memnon. Confirming the appointment of Pharnabazus (made provisionally by the dying Memnon) as admiral, he at the same time despatched Thymodes (son of Mentor and nephew of Memnon) to bring away from the fleet the Grecian mercenaries who served aboard, to be incorporated with the main Persian army. Here was a clear proof that the main stress of offensive operations was henceforward to be transferred from the sea to the land.

It is the more important to note such desertion of policy, on the part of Darius, as the critical turning-point in the Greco-
Persian drama—because Arrian and the other historians leave it out of sight, and set before us little except secondary points in the case. Thus, for example, they condemn the imprudence of Darius, for coming to fight Alexander within the narrow space near Issus, instead of waiting for him on the spacious plains beyond Mount Amanus. Now, unquestionably, granting that a general battle was inevitable, this step augmented the chances in favour of the Macedonians. But it was a step upon which no material consequences turned; for the Persian army under Darius was hardly less unfit for a pitched battle in the open plain; as was afterwards proved at Arbela. The real imprudence—the neglect of the Memnonian warning—consisted in fighting the battle at all. Mountains and defiles were the real strength of the Persians, to be held as posts of defence against the invader. If Darius erred, it was not so much in relinquishing the open plain of Sochi, as in originally preferring that plain with a pitched battle, to the strong lines of defence offered by Taurus and Amanus.

The narrative of Arrian, exact perhaps in what it affirms, is not

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1 Arrian, ii. 2, 1; ii. 13, 3. Curtius, iii. 3, 1.
only brief and incomplete, but even omits on various occasions to put in relief the really important and determining points.

While halting at Gordium, Alexander was joined by those newly-married Macedonians whom he had sent home to winter, and who now came back with reinforcements to the number of 3000 infantry and 300 cavalry, together with 200 Thessalian cavalry, and 150 Eleians. As soon as his troops had been sufficiently rested, he marched (probably about the latter half of May) towards Paphlagonia and Kappadokia. At Ankyra he was met by a deputation from the Paphlagonians, who submitted themselves to his discretion, only entreating that he would not conduct his army into their country. Accepting these terms, he placed them under the government of Kallas, his satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. Advancing farther, he subdued the whole of Kappadokia, even to a considerable extent beyond the Halys, leaving therein Sabiktaas as satrap.

Having established security in his rear, Alexander marched southward towards Mount Taurus. He reached a post called the Camp of Cyrus, at the northern foot of that mountain, near the pass Tauri-pylas, or Kilikian Gates, which forms the regular communication between Kappadokia on the north side, and Kilikia on the south, of this great chain. The long road ascending and descending was generally narrow, winding, and rugged, sometimes between two steep and high banks; and it included, near its southern termination, one spot particularly obstructed and difficult. From ancient times, down to the present, the main road from Asia Minor into Kilikia and Syria has run through this pass. During the Roman empire, it must doubtless have received many improvements, so as to render the traffic comparatively easier. Yet the description given of it by modern travellers represents it to be as difficult as any road ever traversed by an army. Seventy years before Alexander, it had been traversed by the younger Cyrus with the 10,000 Greeks.

1 Arrian, i. 29, 6. 2 Arrian, ii. 4, 2. Curtius, iii. 1, 22. Plutarch, Alex. 18.

Respecting this pass, see Chap. LXXIX. of the present History. There are now two passes over Taurus, from Breich on the north side of the mountain—one the easternmost, descending upon Adana in Kilikia—the other, the westernmost, upon Tarsus. In the war (1832), between the Turks and Ibrahim Pacha, the Turkish commander left the westernmost pass undefended, so that Ibrahim Pacha passed from Tarsus along it without opposition. The Turkish troops occupied the easternmost pass, but defended themselves badly, so that the passage was forced by the Egyptians (Histoire de la Guerre de Mahomed Ali, par Cadalvène et Barrault, p. 248). Alexander crossed Taurus by the easternmost of the two passes.
in his march up to attack his brother Artaxerxes; and Xenophon, who then went through it, pronounces it absolutely impracticable for an army, if opposed by any occupying force. So thoroughly persuaded was Cyrus himself of this fact, that he had prepared a fleet, in case he found the pass occupied, to land troops by sea in Kilikia in the rear of the defenders; and great indeed was his astonishment to discover that the habitual recklessness of Persian management had left the defile unguarded. The narrowest part, while hardly sufficient to contain four armed men abreast, was shut in by precipitous rock on each side. Here, if anywhere, was the spot in which the defensive policy of Memnon might have been made sure. To Alexander, inferior as he was by sea, the resource employed by the younger Cyrus was not open.

Yet Arsamés, the Persian satrap commanding at Tarsus in Kilikia, having received seemingly from his master no instructions, or worse than none, acted as if ignorant of the existence of his enterprising enemy north of Mount Taurus. On the first approach of Alexander, the few Persian soldiers occupying the pass fled without striking a blow, being seemingly unprepared for any enemy more formidable than mountain-robbers. Alexander thus became master of this almost insuperable barrier without the loss of a man. On the ensuing day he marched his whole army over it into Kilikia, and arriving in a few hours at Tarsus, found the town already evacuated by Arsamés.

At Tarsus Alexander made a long halt; much longer than he intended. Either from excessive fatigue, or from bathing while hot in the chilly water of the river Kydnus, he was seized with a violent fever, which presently increased to so dangerous a pitch that his life was despaired of. Amidst the grief and alarm with which this misfortune filled the army, none of the physicians would venture to administer remedies, from fear of being held responsible for what threatened to be a fatal result. One alone among them, an

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1 Xenoph. Anabas. i. 2, 21; Diodor. xiv. 20.
2 Curtius, iii. 4. 11. "Contemplatus locorum situm (Alexander) non abiktur magis admiratus esse felicitatem suaum," &c.
3 Curtius, i. 4, 11. "ὁ Contemplatus locorum situm (Alexander) non abiktur magis admiratus esse felicitatem suaum," &c.
4 Arrian, ii. 4. 3-8; Curtius, iii. 4.
5 When Hephestion died of fever at Ecbatana, nine years afterwards, Alex-
Akarnanian named Philippus, long known and trusted by Alexander, engaged to cure him by a violent purgative draught. Alexander directed him to prepare it; but before the time for taking it arrived, he received a confidential letter from Parmenio, entreating him to beware of Philippus, who had been bribed by Darius to poison him. After reading the letter, he put it under his pillow. Presently came Philippus with the medicine, which Alexander accepted and swallowed without remark, at the same time giving Philippus the letter to read, and watching the expression of his countenance. The look, words, and gesture of the physician were such as completely to reassure him. Philippus, indignantly repudiating the calumny, repeated his full confidence in the medicine, and pledged himself to abide the result. At first it operated so violently as to make Alexander seemingly worse, and even to bring him to death's door; but after a certain interval, its healing effects became manifest. The fever was subdued, and Alexander was pronounced out of danger, to the delight of the whole army. A reasonable time sufficed to restore him to his former health and vigour.

It was his first operation, after recovery, to send forward Parmenio, at the head of the Greeks, Thessalians, and Thracians, in his army, for the purpose of clearing the forward route and of securing the pass called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria. This narrow road, bounded by the range of Mount Amanus on the east and by the sea on the west, had been once barred by a double cross-wall with gates for passage, marking the original boundaries of Kilikia and Syria. The Gates, about six days' march beyond Tarsus, were found guarded, but the guard fled with little resistance. At the same time, Alexander himself, conducting the Macedonian troops in a south-westerly direction from Tarsus, employed some time in mastering and regulating the towns of Anchialus and Soli, as well as the Kilikian mountaineers. Then, returning to Tarsus, and recommencing his

1 This interesting anecdote is recounted, with more or less of rhetoric and amplification, in all the historians—Arrian, ii, 4; Diodor, xvii. 31; Plutarch, Alexander, 72; Arrian, vii. 14.

2 Arrian, ii. 5, 1; Diodor, xvii. 32; Curtius, iii. 5; Justin, xi. 8.

It is one mark of the difference produced in the character of Alexander, by superhuman successes continued for four years—to contrast the generous confidence which he here displayed towards Philippus, with his cruel pre-judgement and torture of Philétas four years afterwards.

2 Arrian, ii. 5, 1; Diodor, xvii. 32; Curtius, iii. 5, 6.

Cyrus the younger was five days in marching from Tarsus to Issus, and one day more from Issus to the Gates of Kilikia and Syria.—Xenoph. Anab. i, 4, 1; Chap. LXIX. of this History.
forward march, he advanced with the infantry and with his chosen squadron of cavalry, first to Magarsus near the mouth of the river Pyramus, next to Mallus; the general body of cavalry, under Philotas, being sent by a more direct route across the Aléian plain. Mallus, sacred to the prophet Amphilocthus as patron-hero, was said to be a colony from Argos; on both these grounds Alexander was disposed to treat it with peculiar respect. He offered solemn sacrifice to Amphilocthus, exempted Mallus from tribute, and appeased some troublesome discord among the citizens.

It was at Mallus that he received the first distinct communication respecting Darius and the main Persian army; which was said to be encamped at Sochi in Syria, on the eastern side of Mount Amanus, about two days' march from the mountain pass now called Beylan. That pass, traversing the Amanian range, forms the continuance of the main road from Asia Minor into Syria, after having passed first over Taurus, and next through the difficult point of ground above specified (called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria), between Mount Amanus and the sea. Assembling his principal officers, Alexander communicated to them the position of Darius, now encamped in a spacious plain with prodigious superiority of numbers, especially of cavalry. Though the locality was thus rather favourable to the enemy, yet the Macedonians, full of hopes and courage, called upon Alexander to lead them forthwith against him. Accordingly Alexander, well pleased with their alacrity, began his forward march on the following morning. He passed through Issus, where he left some sick and wounded under a moderate guard—then through the Gates of Kilikia and Syria. At the second day's march from those Gates, he reached the seaport Myriandrus, the first town of Syria or Phenicia.

Here, having been detained in his camp one day by a dreadful storm, he received intelligence which altogether changed his plans. The Persian army had been marched away from Sochi, and was now in Kilikia, following in his rear. It had already got possession of Issus.

Darius had marched out of the interior his vast and miscellaneous host, stated at 600,000 men. His mother, his wife, his harem, his children, his personal attendants of every description, accompanied him, to witness what was anticipated as a certain triumph. All the apparatus of ostentation and luxury was provided in abundance, for

1 Arrian, ii. 5, 11. 2 Arrian, ii. 6.
the king and for his Persian grandees. The baggage was enormous: of gold and silver alone, we are told that there was enough to furnish load for 600 mules and 300 camels. A temporary bridge being thrown over the Euphrates, five days were required to enable the whole army to cross. Much of the treasure and baggage, however, was not allowed to follow the army to the vicinity of Mount Amanus, but was sent under a guard to Damascus in Syria.

At the head of such an overwhelming host, Darius was eager to bring on at once a general battle. It was not sufficient for him simply to keep back an enemy, whom, when once in presence, he calculated on crushing altogether. Accordingly, he had given no orders (as we have just seen) to defend the line of the Taurus; he had admitted Alexander unopposed into Kilikia, and he intended to let him enter in like manner through the remaining strong passes—first, the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, between Mount Amanus and the sea—next, the pass, now called Beylan, across Amanus itself. He both expected and wished that his enemy should come into the plain to fight, there to be trodden down by the countless horsemen of Persia.

But such anticipation was not at once realized. The movements of Alexander, hitherto so rapid and unremitting, seemed suspended. We have already noticed the dangerous fever which threatened his life, occasioning not only a long halt, but much uneasiness among the Macedonian army. All was doubtless reported to the Persians, with abundant exaggerations; and when Alexander, immediately after recovery, instead of marching forward towards them, turned away from them to subdue the western portion of Kilikia, this again was construed by Darius as an evidence of hesitation and fear. It is even asserted that Parmenio wished to await the attack of the Persians in Kilikia, and that Alexander at first consented to do so. At any rate, Darius, after a certain interval, contracted the persuasion, and was assured by his Asiatic councillors and courtiers, that the Macedonians, though audacious and triumphant against frontier satraps, now hung back intimidated by the approaching majesty and full muster of the empire, and that they would not stand to resist his attack. Under this impression Darius resolved upon an advance into Kilikia with all his army. Thymódes indeed, and other intelligent Grecian ad-

1 Curtius, iii. 3, 24. 2 Curtius, iii. 7, 1. 3 Curtius, iii. 7, 8.
visers—together with the Macedonian exile Amyntas—deprecated his new resolution, entreating him to persevere in his original purpose. They pledged themselves that Alexander would come forth to attack him wherever he was, and that too, speedily. They dwelt on the imprudence of fighting in the narrow defiles of Kilikia, where his numbers, and especially his vast cavalry, would be useless. Their advice, however, was not only disregarded by Darius, but denounced by the Persian councillors as traitorous. Even some of the Greeks in the camp shared, and transmitted in their letters to Athens, the blind confidence of the monarch. The order was forthwith given for the whole army to quit the plains of Syria and march across Mount Amanus into Kilikia. To cross, by any pass, over such a range as that of Mount Amanus, with a numerous army, heavy baggage, and ostentatious train (including all the suite necessary for the regal family), must have been a work of no inconsiderable time; and the only two passes over this mountain were, both of them, narrow and easily defensible. Darius followed the northernmost of the two, which brought him into the rear of the enemy.

Thus at the same time that the Macedonians were marching southward to cross Mount Amanus by the southern pass, and attack Darius in the plain—Darius was coming over into Kilikia by the northern pass to drive them before him back into Macedonia. Reaching Issus, seemingly about two days after they had left it, he became master of their sick and wounded left in the town. With odious brutality, his grandees impelled him to inflict upon these poor men either death or amputation of hands and arms. He then marched forward—

1 From Aeschines (cont. Ktesiphont. p. 552) it seems that Demosthenes, and the anti-Macedonian statesmen at Athens, received letters at this moment written in high spirits, intimating that Alexander was "caught and pinned up" in Kilikia. Demosthenes (if we may believe Aeschines) went about showing these letters, and boasting of the good news which was at hand. Josephus (Ant. Jud. xi. 8, 3) also reports the confident anticipations of Persian success, entertained by Sanballat at Samaria, as well as by all the Asiatics around.

2 Arrian, ii. 6; Curtius, iii. 8, 2; Diodor, xvii. 32.

3 Cicero, Epist. ad Famil. xvi. 4. See the instructive commentary of Mützel ad Curtium, iii. 8. p. 106, 104. I have given, in an Appendix to this Volume, a Plan of the ground near Issus, together with some explanatory comments.

4 Plutarch (Alexand. 20) states this general fact correctly; but he is mistaken in saying that the two armies missed one another in the night, &c.

5 Arrian, ii. 7, 2; Curtius, iii. 8, 14. I have mentioned, a few pages back, that about a fortnight before, Alexander had sent Parmenio forward from Tarsus to secure the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, while he himself marched backward to Soi and Archelaus. He and Parmenio must have been separated at this time by a distance not less than eight days of ordinary march. If, during this interval, Darius had arrived at Issus, he would have been just between them, and
along the same road by the shore of the Gulf which had already been followed by Alexander—and encamped on the banks of the river Pinarus.

The fugitives from Issus hastened to inform Alexander, whom they overtook at Myriandrus. So astonished was he that he refused to believe the news until it had been confirmed by some officers whom he sent northward along the coast of the Gulf in a small galley, and to whom the vast Persian multitude on the shore was distinctly visible. Then, assembling the chief officers, he communicated to them the near approach of the enemy, expatiating on the favourable auspices under which a battle would now take place. His address was hailed with acclamation by his hearers, who demanded only to be led against the enemy.

His distance from the Persian position may have been about eighteen miles. By an evening march, after supper, he reached at midnight the narrow defile (between Mount Amanus and the sea) called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, through which he had marched two days before. Again master of that important position, he rested there the last portion of the night, and advanced forward at daybreak northward towards Darius. At first the breadth of practicable road was so confined as to admit only a narrow column of march, with the cavalry following the infantry; presently it widened, enabling Alexander to enlarge his front by bringing up successively the divisions of the phalanx. On approaching near to the river Pinarus (which flowed across the pass), he adopted his order of battle. On the extreme right he placed the hypaspists, or light division of hoplites; next (reckoning from right to left), five Taxeis or divisions of the phalanx, under Kænus, Perdikkas, Meleager, Ptolemy, and Amyntas. Of these three last or left divisions, Kraterus had the general command; himself subject to the orders of Parmenio, who commanded the entire left half of the army. The breadth of plain between the mountains on the right, and the sea on the left, is said to have been not more than fourteen stadia, or somewhat

would have cut them off one from the other. It was Alexander's good luck that so grave an embarrassment did not occur.

1 Arrian, ii. 7, 8.
2 Arrian, ii. 7; Curtius, iii. 10; Dio- dor, xvii. 33.
3 Kallisthenes called the distance 100 stadia (ap. Polyb. xii. 19). This seems likely to be under the truth.

Polybius criticises severely the description given by Kallisthenes of the march of Alexander. Not having before us the words of Kallisthenes himself, we are hardly in a condition to appreciate the goodness of the criticism; which in some points is certainly overstrained.
more than one English mile and a half. From fear of being outflanked by the superior numbers of the Persians, he gave strict orders to Parmenio to keep close to the sea. His Macedonian cavalry, the Companions, together with the Thessalians, were placed on his right flank; as were also the Agrianês, and the principal portion of the light infantry. The Peloponnesian and allied cavalry, with the Thracian and Kretan light infantry, were sent on the left flank to Parmenio. 

Darius, informed that Alexander was approaching, resolved to fight where he was encamped, behind the river Pharus. He, however, threw across the river a force of 30,000 cavalry, and 20,000 infantry, to ensure the undisturbed formation of his main force behind the river. He composed his phalanx, or main line of battle, of 90,000 hoplites; 80,000 Greek hoplites in the centre, and 30,000 Asiatics armed as hoplites (called Kardakês), on each side of these Greeks. These men—not distributed into separate divisions, but grouped in one body or multitude—filled the breadth between the mountains and the sea. On the mountains to his left, he placed a body of 20,000 men, intended to act against the right flank and rear of Alexander. But for the great numerical mass of his vast host, he could find no room to act; accordingly they remained useless in the rear of his Greek and Asiatic hoplites; yet not formed into any body of reserve, or kept disposable for assisting in case of need. When his line was thoroughly formed, he recalled to the right bank of

Position of the Persian army north of the Pharus.

The depth of this single phalanx is not given, nor do we know the exact width of the ground which it occupied. Assuming a depth of sixteen, and one pace in breadth to each soldier, 4000 men would stand in the breadth of a stadium of 250 paces; and therefore 80,000 men in a breadth of twenty stadia (see the calculation of Rüster and Köchly (p. 280) about the Macedonian line). Assuming a depth of twenty-six, 6500 men would stand in the breadth of the stadium, and therefore 90,000 in a total breadth of 14 stadia, which is that given by Kallisthenês. But there must have been intervals left, greater or less, we know not how many; the covering detachments, which had been thrown out before the river Pharus, must have found some means of passing through to the rear, when recalled.

Mr. Kinneir states that the breadth between Mount Amamis and the sea varies between one mile and a half (English) and three miles. The fourteen stadia of Kallisthenês are equivalent to nearly one English mile and three quarters.

Neither in ancient nor in modern times have Oriental armies ever been trained, by native officers, to regularity of march or array—see Malcolm, Hist. of Persia, ch. xxiii. vol. ii, p. 498; Voilney, Travels in Egypt and Syria, vol. i, p. 124.
the Pinarus the 30,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry which he had sent across as a protecting force. A part of this cavalry were sent to his extreme left wing, but the mountain ground was found unsuitable for them to act, so that they were forced to cross to the right wing, where accordingly the great mass of the Persian cavalry became assembled. Darius himself in his chariot was in the centre of the line, behind the Grecian hoplites. In the front of his whole line was the river or rivulet Pinarus; the banks of which, in many parts naturally steep, he obstructed in some places by embankments.

As soon as Alexander, by the retirement of the Persian covering detachment, was enabled to perceive the final dispositions of Darius, he made some alteration in his own, transferring his Thessalian cavalry by a rear movement from his right to his left wing, and bringing forward the lancer-cavalry or sarissophori, as well as the light infantry, Paeonians and archers, to the front of his right. The Agrianians, together with some cavalry and another body of archers, were detached from the general line to form an oblique front against the 20,000 Persians posted on the hill to outflank him. As these 20,000 men came near enough to threaten his flank, Alexander directed the Agrianians to attack them, and to drive them farther away on the hills. They manifested so little firmness, and gave way so easily, that he felt no dread of any serious aggressive movement from them. He therefore contented himself with holding back in reserve against them a body of 300 heavy cavalry; while he placed the Agrianians and the rest on the right of his main line, in order to make his front equal to that of his enemies.

Having thus formed his array, after giving the troops a certain halt after their march, he advanced at a very slow pace, anxious to maintain his own front even, and anticipating that the enemy might cross the Pinarus to meet him. But as they did not move, he continued his advance, preserving the uniformity of the front, until he arrived within bowshot, when he himself, at the head of his cavalry, hypaspists, and divisions of the phalanx on the right, accelerated his pace, crossed the river at a quick step, and fell upon

1 Arrian, ii, 10, 2. Kallisthenès appears to have reckoned the mercenaries composing the Persian phalanx at 30,000—and the cavalry at 30,000. He does not seem to have taken account of the Kardakés. Yet Polybius in his criticism tries to make out that there was not room for an array of even 60,000; while Arrian enumerates 90,000; 9, 11. 2 Arrian, ii, 9; Kallisthenès ap. Polyb. xii, 18. The slackness of this Persian corps on the flank, and the ease with which Alexander drove them back—a material point in reference to the battle—are noticed also by Curtius, iii, 9, 11.
the Kardakês or Asiatic hoplites on the Persian left. Unprepared for the suddenness and vehemence of this attack, these Kardakês scarcely resisted a moment, but gave way as soon as they came to close quarters, and fled, vigorously pressed by the Macedonian right. Darius, who was in his chariot in the centre, perceived that this untoward desertion exposed his person from the left flank. Seized with panic, he caused his chariot to be turned round, and fled with all speed among the foremost fugitives. He kept to his chariot as long as the ground permitted, but quitted it on reaching some rugged ravines, and mounted on horseback to make sure of escape; in such terror that he cast away his bow, his shield, and his regal mantle. He does not seem to have given a single order, nor to have made the smallest effort to repair a first misfortune. The flight of the king was the signal for all who observed it to flee also; so that the vast host in the rear were quickly to be seen trampling one another down, in their efforts to get through the difficult ground out of the reach of the enemy. Darius was himself not merely the centre of union for all the miscellaneous contingents composing the army, but also the sole commander; so that after his flight there was no one left to give any general order.

This great battle—we might rather say, that which ought to have been a great battle—was thus lost,—through the giving way of the Asiatic hoplites on the Persian left, and the immediate flight of Darius,—within a few minutes after its commencement. But the centre and right of the

1 Arrian, ii, 11, 6. εὐθὺς, ὡς εἶχεν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἅρματος, σὺν τοῖς πρῶτοι ἔφευγε, &c. This simple statement of Arrian is far more credible than the highly wrought details given by Diodorus (xvii, 34) and Curtius (iii, 11, 9) about a direct charge of Alexander upon the chariot of Darius, and a murderous combat immediately round that chariot, in which the horses became wounded and unmanageable, so as to be on the point of overturning it. Chirès even went so far as to affirm that Alexander had come into personal conflict with Darius, from whom he had received his wound in the thigh (Plutarch, Alex. 20). Plutarch had seen the letter addressed by Alexander to Antipater, simply intimating that he had received a slight wound in the thigh.

In respect to this point, as to so many others, Diodorus and Curtius have copied the same authority. Kallisthenês (ap. Polyb, xii. 22) stated that Alexander had laid his plan of attack with a view to bear upon the person of Darius, which is not improbable (compare Xenoph. Anab. i. 22), and was in fact realized, since the first successful charge of the Macedonians came so near to Darius as to alarm him for the safety of his own person. To the question put by Polybius—How did Alexander know in what part of the army Darius was?—we may reply, that the chariot and person of Darius would doubtless be conspicuous; moreover, the Persian kings were habitually in the centre—and Cyrus the younger, at the battle of Kunaxa, directed the attack to be made exactly against the person of his brother Artaxerxes. After the battle of Kunaxa, Artaxerxes assumed to himself the honour of having slain Cyrus with his own hand, and put to death those who had really done the deed, because they boasted of it (Plutarch, Artax. 10).
Persians, not yet apprised of these misfortunes, behaved with gallantry. When Alexander made his rapid dash forward with the right, under his own immediate command, the phalanx in his left centre (which was under Kraterus and Parmenio) either did not receive the same accelerating order, or found itself both retarded and disordered by greater steepness in the banks of the Pinarus. Here it was charged by the Grecian mercenaries, the best troops in the Persian service. The combat which took place was obstinate, and the Macedonian loss not inconsiderable; the general of division, Ptolemy son of Seleukus, with 20 of the front-rank men or choice phalangites, being slain. But presently Alexander, having completed the rout on the enemies' left, brought back his victorious troops from the pursuit, attacked the Grecian mercenaries in flank, and gave decisive superiority to their enemies. These Grecian mercenaries were beaten and forced to retire. On finding that Darius himself had fled, they got away from the field as well as they could, yet seemingly in good order. There is even reason to suppose that a part of them forced their way up the mountains or through the Macedonian line, and made their escape southward.1

Meanwhile on the Persian right, towards the sea, the heavy-armed Persian cavalry had shown much bravery. They were bold enough to cross the Pinarus2 and vigorously to charge the Thessalians; with whom they maintained a close contest, until the news spread that Darius had disappeared, and that the left of the army was routed. They then turned their Jocks and fled, sustaining terrible damage from their enemies in the retreat. Of the Kardakês on the right flank of the Grecian hoplites in the Persian line, we hear nothing, nor of the Macedonian infantry opposed to them. Perhaps these Kardakês came little into action, since the cavalry on their part of the field were so severely engaged. At any rate they took part in the general flight of the Persians, as soon as Darius was known to have left the field.3

1 This is the supposition of Mr. Williams, and it appears to me probable, though Mr. Ainsworth calls it in question, in consequence of the difficulties of the ground southward of Myriandrus towards the sea. [See Mr. Ainsworth's Essay on the Cilician and Syrian Gates, Journal of the Geographical Society, 1838, p. 194.] These Greeks, being merely fugitives with arms in their hands—with neither cavalry nor baggage—could make their way over very difficult ground.

2 Arrian, ii, 11, 3; Curtius, iii. 11, 13. Kallisthenès stated the same thing as Arrian—that this Persian cavalry had crossed the Pinarus, and charged the Thessalians with bravery. Polybius censures him for it, as if he had affirmed something false and absurd (xii, 18). This shows that the criticisms of Polybius are not to be accepted without reserve. He reasons as if the Macedonian phalanx could not cross the Pinarus—converting a difficulty into an impossibility (xii, 22).

3 Arrian, ii, 11; Curtius, iii, 11.
The rout of the Persians being completed, Alexander began a vigorous pursuit. The destruction and slaughter of the fugitives were prodigious. Amidst so small a breadth of practicable ground, narrowed sometimes into a defile and broken by frequent watercourses, their vast numbers found no room, and trod one another down. As many perished in this way as by the sword of the conquerors; insomuch that Ptolemy (afterwards king of Egypt, the companion and historian of Alexander) recounts that he himself in the pursuit came to a ravine choked up with dead bodies, of which he made a bridge to pass over it. The pursuit was continued as long as the light of a November day allowed; but the battle had not begun till a late hour. The camp of Darius was taken, together with his mother, his wife, his sister, his infant son, and two daughters. His chariot, his shield, and his bow also fell into the power of the conquerors; and a sum of 3000 talents in money was found, though much of the treasure had been sent to Damascus. The total loss of the Persians is said to have amounted to 10,000 horse and 100,000 foot; among the slain moreover were several eminent Persian grandees—Arsamès, Rheomithrés, and Atizyès, who had commanded at the Granikus—Sabakès, satrap of Egypt. Of the Macedonians we are told that 800 foot and 150 horse were killed, Alexander himself was slightly wounded in the thigh by a sword.

The mother, wife, and family of Darius, who became captives, were treated by Alexander’s order with the utmost consideration and respect. When Alexander returned at night from the pursuit, he found the Persian regal tent reserved and prepared for him. In an inner compartment of it he heard the tears and wailings of women. He was informed that the mourners were the mother and wife of Darius, who had learnt that the bow and shield of Darius had been taken, and were giving loose to their grief under the belief that Darius himself was killed. Alexander immediately sent Leonnatus to assure them that Darius was still living, and to promise further that they should be allowed to preserve the regal title and state—his war against Darius being undertaken not from any feelings of hatred, but as a fair contest for the empire of Asia. Besides this anec-
dote, which depends on good authority, many others, uncertified or untrue, were recounted about his kind behaviour to these princesses; and Alexander himself, shortly after the battle, seems to have heard fictions about it, which he thought it necessary to contradict in a letter. It is certain (from the extract now remaining of this letter) that he never saw, nor ever entertained the idea of seeing, the captive wife of Darius, said to be the most beautiful woman in Asia; moreover he even declined to hear encomiums upon her beauty.

How this vast host of fugitives got out of the narrow limits of Kilikia, or how many of them quitted that country by the same pass over Mount Amanus as that by which they had entered it—we cannot make out. It is probable that many, and Darius himself among the number, made their escape across the mountain by various subordinate roads and by-paths; which, though unfit for a regular army with baggage, would be found a welcome resource by scattered companies. Darius managed to get together 4000 of the fugitives, with whom he hastened to Thapsakus, and there recrossed the Euphrates. The only remnant of force, still in a position of defence after the battle, consisted of 8000 of the Greek mercenaries under Amyntas and Thymodès. These men, fighting their way out of Kilikia (seemingly towards the south, by or near Myriandrus), marched to Tripolis on the coast of Phenicia, where they still found the same vessels in which they had themselves been brought from the armament of Lesbos. Seizing sufficient means of transport, and destroying the rest to prevent pursuit, they immediately crossed over to Cyprus, and from thence to Egypt. With this single exception, the enormous Persian host disappears with the battle of Issus. We hear of no attempt to rally or re-form, nor of any fresh Persian force afoot until two years afterwards. The booty acquired by the victors was immense, not merely in gold and silver, but also in captives for the slave-merchant. On the morrow of the battle, Alexander offered a solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving, with three altars erected on the banks of the Pinarus; while he at the same time buried the dead, consoled the wounded, and rewarded or complimented all who had distinguished themselves.

1 Plutarch, Alex. 22. ἐγὼ γὰρ (Alexander) οὐχ ὅτι ἑωρακὼς ἂν εὑρεθέιην τὴν Δαρείου γυναῖκα ἢ βεβουλευμένος ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τῶν λεγόντων περὶ τῆς εὐμορφίας αὐτῆς προσδεδεμένος τὸν λόγον.
2 Curtius says that these Greeks got away by by-paths across the mountains (Amanus)—which may be true (Curtius, iii, 11, 19).
3 Arrian, ii, 12, 1; Curtius, iii, 12, 27; Diodor. xvii. 40. The "Are Alexandri, in radicibus Amanii," are men-
No victory recorded in history was ever more complete in itself, or more far-stretching in its consequences, than that of Issus. Not only was the Persian force destroyed or dispersed, but the efforts of Darius for recovery were paralysed by the capture of his family. Portions of the dissipated army of Issus may be traced, reappearing in different places for operations of detail, but we shall find no farther resistance to Alexander, during almost two years, except from the brave freemen of two fortified cities. Everywhere an overwhelming sentiment of admiration and terror was spread abroad, towards the force, skill, or good fortune of Alexander, by whichever name it might be called—together with contempt for the real value of a Persian army, in spite of so much imposing pomp and numerical show; a contempt not new to intelligent Greeks, but now communicated even to vulgar minds by the recent unparalleled catastrophe. Both as general and as soldier, indeed, the consummate excellence of Alexander stood conspicuous, not less than the signal deficiency of Darius. The fault in the latter, upon which most remark is usually made, was, that of fighting the battle, not in an open plain, but in a narrow valley, whereby his superiority of number was rendered unprofitable. But this (as I have already observed) was only one among many mistakes, and by no means the most serious. The result would have been the same, had the battle been fought in the plains to the eastward of Mount Amanus. Superior numbers are of little avail on any ground, unless there be a general who knows how to make use of them; unless they be distributed into separate divisions ready to combine for offensive action on many points at once, or at any rate to lend support to each other in defence, so that a defeat of one fraction is not a defeat of the whole. The faith of Darius in simple multitude was altogether blind and childish; nay, that faith, though overweening beforehand, disappeared at once when he found his enemies did not run away, but faced him boldly—as was seen by his attitude on the banks of the Pinarus, where he stood to be attacked instead of executing his threat of treading down the handful opposed to him. But it was not merely as a general, that Darius acted in such a manner.
as to render the loss of the battle certain. Had his dispositions been ever so skilful, his personal cowardice, in quitting the field and thinking only of his own safety, would have suffered to nullify their effect. 1 Though the Persian grandees are generally conspicuous for personal courage, yet we shall find Darius hereafter again exhibiting the like melancholy timidity, and the like incompetence for using numbers with effect, at the battle of Arbela, though fought in a spacious plain chosen by himself.

Happy was it for Memnon that he did not live to see the renunciation of his schemes, and the ruin consequent upon it! The fleet in the Ægean, which had been transferred at his death to Phonabazus, though weakened by the loss of those mercenaries whom Darius had recalled to Issus, and disheartened by a serious defeat which the Persian Orontobates had received from the Macedonians in Karia, 2 was nevertheless not inactive in trying to organize an anti-Macedonian manifestation in Greece. While Phonabazus was at the island of Siphnos with his 100 triremes, he was visited by the Lacedaemonian king Agis, who pressed him to embark for Peloponnesus as large a force as he could spare, to second a movement projected by the Spartans. But such aggressive plans were at once crushed by the terror-striking news of the battle of Issus. Apprehending a revolt in the island of Chios, as the result of this news, Phonabazus immediately sailed thither with a large detachment. Agis, obtaining nothing more than a subsidy of thirty talents and a squadron of ten triremes, was obliged to renounce his projects in Peloponnesus, and to content himself with directing some operations in Crete, to be conducted by his brother Agesilaus; while he himself remained among the islands, and ultimately accompanied the Persian Autophradates to Halikarnassus. 3 It appears, however, that he afterwards went to conduct the operations in Crete, and that he had considerable success in that island, bringing several Kretan towns to join the Persians. 4 On the whole, however, the victory of Issus overawed all free spirit throughout Greece, and formed a guarantee to Alexander for at least a temporary quiescence. The philo-Macedonian synod,

1 Immediately before the battle of Kunaxa, Cyrus the younger was asked by some of the Greek officers, whether he thought that his brother Artaxerxes (who had as yet made no resistance) would fight—"To be sure he will" (was the reply); if he is the son of Darius and Parysatis, and my brother, I shall not obtain the crown without fighting." Personal cowardice, in a king of Persia at the head of his army, seemed inconceivable (Xenoph. Anab. i, 5, 8).
2 Arrian, ii. 5, 8.
3 Arrian, ii. 13, 4–8.
4 Diodor, xvii. 48.
assembled at Corinth during the period of the Isthmian festival, manifested their joy by sending to him an embassy of congratulation and a wreath of gold.\footnote{Diodor. xvii. 48; Curtius, iv. 5, 11. Curtius seems to mention this event later, but it must evidently have been passed at the first Isthmian festival after the battle of Issus.}

With little delay after his victory, Alexander marched through Koele-Syria to the Phenician coast, detaching Parmenio in his way to attack Damascus, whither Darius, before the battle, had sent most part of his treasure with many confidential officers, Persian women of rank, and envoys. Though the place might have held out a considerable siege, it was surrendered without resistance by the treason or cowardice of the governor; who made a feast of trying to convey away the treasure, but took care that it should fall into the hands of the enemy.\footnote{Arrian, ii. 11, 13; Curtius, iii. 13. The words of Arrian (ii. 11, 1) – ὁπίσω κομίσαντα ἐς Ἀσάμενδον – confirm the statement of Curtius, that this treasure was captured by Parmenio, not in the town, but in the hands of fugitives who were conveying it away from the town.} There was captured a large treasure—with a prodigious number and variety of attendants and ministers of luxury; belonging to the court and the grandees.\footnote{A fragment of the letter from Parmenio to Alexander is preserved, giving a detailed list of the articles of booty (Athenaeus, xiii, p. 607).} Moreover the prisoners made were so numerous, that most of the great Persian families had to deplore the loss of some relative, male or female. There were among them the widow and daughters of king Ochus, the predecessor of Darius—the daughter of Darius's brother Oxathres—the wives of Artabazus, and of Pharnabazus—the three daughters of Mentor, and Barsine, widow of the deceased Memnon with her child, sent up by Memnon to serve as an hostage for his fidelity. There were also several eminent Grecian exiles, Theban, Lacedemonian and Athenian, who had fled to Darius, and whom he had thought fit to send to Damascus, instead of allowing them to use their pikes with the army at Issus. The Theban and Athenian exiles were at once released by Alexander; the Lacedemonians were for the time put under arrest, but not detained long. Among the Athenian exiles was a person of noble name and parentage—Iphikratês, son of the great Athenian officer of that name.\footnote{Arrian, ii. 15, 3; Curtius, iii. 13, 13–16. There is some discrepancy between the two (compare Arrian, ii. 24, 7) as to the names of the Lacedemonian envoys.} The captive Iphikratês not only received his liberty, but was induced by courteous and honourable treatment to remain with Alexander. He died however shortly afterwards.
from sickness, and his ashes were then collected, by order of
Alexander, to be sent to his family at Athens.

I have already stated in a former chapter¹ that the elder Iphi-
kratès had been adopted by Alexander's grandfather
into the regal family of Macedonia, as the saviour of their throne. Probably this was the circumstance which
determined the superior favour shown to the son, rather
than any sentiment either towards Athens or towards
the military genius of the father. The difference of
position, between Iphikratès the father and, Iphikratès the son, is
one among the painful evidences of the downward march of
Hellenism. The father, a distinguished officer moving amidst a
circle of freemen, sustaining by arms the security and dignity of
his own fellow-citizens, and even interfering for the rescue of the
Macedonian regal family; the son, condemned to witness the
degradation of his native city by Macedonian arms, and deprived
of all other means of reviving or rescuing her, except such as could
be found in the service of an Oriental prince, whose stupidity and
cowardice threw away at once his own security and the freedom of
Greece.

Master of Damascus and of Kæle-Syria, Alexander advanced
onward to Phenicia. The first Phenician town which he
approached was Marathus, on the mainland opposite the
islet of Aradus, forming, along with that islet and some
other neighbouring towns, the domain of the Aradian
prince Gerostratus. That prince was himself now serving
with his naval contingent among the Persian fleet in the
Ægean; but his son Strato, acting as viceroy at home, despatched
to Alexander his homage with a golden wreath, and made over to
him at once Aradus with the neighbouring towns included in its
domain. The example of Strato was followed, first by the in-
habitants of Byblus, the next Phenician city in a southerly direc-
tion; next, by the great city of Sidon, the queen and parent of
all Phenician prosperity. The Sidonians even sent envoys to meet
him and invite his approach.² Their sentiments were unfavourable
to the Persians, from remembrance of the bloody and perfidious
proceedings which (about eighteen years before) had marked the
recapture of their city by the armies of Ochus.³ Nevertheless,

¹ See above, in this History, Chaps. LXXVII, LXXXIX; and Αeschines, Fals.
² Arrian, ii. 14, 11; ii. 15, 8.
³ Diodor. xvi. 45.

2 A 2
the naval contingents both of Byblus and of Sidon (as well as that of Aradus), were at this moment sailing in the Ægean with the Persian admiral Autophradatês, and formed a large proportion of his entire fleet.¹

While Alexander was still at Marathus, however, previous to his onward march, he received both envoys and a letter from Darius, asking for the restitution of his mother, wife, and children—and tendering friendship and alliance, as from one king to another. Darius farther attempted to show, that the Macedonian Philip had begun the wrong against Persia—that Alexander had continued it—and that he himself (Darius) had acted merely in self-defence. In reply, Alexander wrote a letter, wherein he set forth his own case against Darius, proclaiming himself the appointed leader of the Greeks, to avenge the ancient invasion of Greece by Xerxes. He then alleged various complaints against Darius, whom he accused of having instigated the assassination of Philip as well as the hostilities of the anti-Macedonian cities in Greece. “Now (continued he), by the grace of the Gods, I have been victorious, first over your satraps, next over yourself. I have taken care of all who submit to me, and made them satisfied with their lot. Come yourself to me also, as to the master of all Asia. Come without fear of suffering harm; ask me, and you shall receive back your mother and wife, and anything else which you please. When next you write to me, however, address me not as an equal, but as lord of Asia and of all that belongs to you; otherwise I shall deal with you as a wrong-doer. If you intend to contest the kingdom with me, stand and fight for it, and do not run away. I shall march forward against you, wherever you may be.”²

This memorable correspondence, which led to no result, is of importance only as it marks the character of Alexander, with whom fighting and conquering were both the business and the luxury of life, and to whom all assumption of equality and independence with himself, even on the part of other kings—every thing short of submission and obedience—appeared in the light of wrong and insult to be avenged. The recital of comparative injuries, on each side, was mere unmeaning pretence. The real and only question was (as Alexander himself had put it in his

¹ Arrian, ii. 15, 8; ii. 20; 1. Curtius, Both Curtius and Diodorus represent iv. 1, 6-16. Darius as offering great sums of money

² Arrian, ii. 14; Curtius, iv. i. 10; and large cessions of territory, in ex-Diodor. xvii. 39. I give the substance of this correspondence from Arrian. Arrian says nothing of the kind.
message to the captive Sisygambis') which of the two should be master of Asia.

The decision of this question, already sufficiently advanced on the morrow after the battle of Issus, was placed almost beyond doubt by the rapid and unopposed successes of Alexander among most of the Phenician cities. The last hopes of Persia now turned chiefly upon the sentiments of these Phenicians. The greater part of the Persian fleet in the Ægean was composed of Phenician triremes, partly from the coast of Syria, partly from the island of Cyprus. If the Phenician towns made submission to Alexander, it was certain that their ships and seamen would either return home spontaneously or be recalled; thus depriving the Persian quiver of its best remaining arrow. But if the Phenician towns held out resolutely against him, one and all, so as to put him under the necessity of besieging them in succession—each lending aid to the rest by sea, with superiority of naval force, and more than one of them being situated upon islets—the obstacles to be overcome would have been so multiplied, that even Alexander's energy and ability might hardly have proved sufficient for them: at any rate, he would have had hard work before him for perhaps two years, opening the door to many new accidents and efforts. It was therefore a signal good fortune to Alexander when the prince of the islet of Aradus spontaneously surrendered to him that difficult city, and when the example was followed by the still greater city of Sidon. The Phenicians, taking them generally, had no positive tie to the Persians; neither had they much confederate attachment one towards the other, although as separate communities they were brave and enterprising. Among the Sidonians, there was even a prevalent feeling of aversion to the Persians, from the cause above mentioned. Hence the prince of Aradus, upon whom Alexander's march first came, had little certainty of aid from his neighbours, if he resolved to hold out; and still less disposition to hold out single-handed, after the battle of Issus had proclaimed the irresistible force of Alexander not less than the impotence of Persia. One after another, all these important Phenician seaports, except Tyre, fell into the hands of Alexander without striking a blow. At Sidon, the reigning prince Strato, reputed as philo-Persian, was deposed, and a person named Abdalonymus—of the reigning family, yet poor in circumstances—was appointed in his room.\(^1\)

1 Arrian, ii. 12, 9.  
2 Curtius, iv. 1, 20–25; Justin, xi. 10, Diodorus (xvii, 47) tells the story as if it had occurred at Tyre, and not at Sidon; which is highly improbable.
With his usual rapidity, Alexander marched onward towards Tyre; the most powerful among the Phoenician cities, though apparently less ancient than Sidon. Even on the march, he was met by a deputation from Tyre, composed of the most eminent men in the city, and headed by the son of the Tyrian prince Azemilchus, who was himself absent commanding the Tyrian contingent in the Persian fleet. These men brought large presents and supplies for the Macedonian army, together with a golden wreath of honour; announcing formally that the Tyrians were prepared to do whatever Alexander commanded.1 In reply, he commended the dispositions of the city, accepted the presents, and desired the deputation to communicate at home, that he wished to enter Tyre and offer sacrifice to Héraklēs. The Phoenician 'God Melkart was supposed identical with the Grecian Héraklēs, and was thus ancestor of the Macedonian kings. His temple at Tyre was of the most venerable antiquity; moreover the injunction, to sacrifice there, is said to have been conveyed to Alexander in an oracle.2 The Tyrians at home, after deliberating on this message, sent out an answer declining to comply, and intimating that they would not admit within their walls either Macedonians or Persians; but that as to all other points, they would obey Alexander's orders.3 They added that his wish to sacrifice to Héraklēs might be accomplished without entering their city, since there was in Paletyrus (on the mainland over against the island of Tyre, separated from it only by the narrow strait) a temple of that God yet more ancient and venerable than their own.4 Incensed at this qualified adhesion, in which he took note only of the point refused,—Alexander dismissed the envoys with angry menaces, and immediately resolved on taking Tyre by force.5

Those who (like Diodorus) treat such refusal on the part of the Tyrians as foolish wilfulness, have not fully considered how much

1 Arrian, ii. 15, 9. οἱ ἄριστοι των Τυρηνών πράσσειν, τὸ ἔγγραφον ἑκατέρου. Compare Curtius, iv. 2, 3.
2 Curtius (μέσω χιλιάδων) adds these motives: Arrian inserts nothing beyond the simple request. The statement of Curtius represents what is likely to have been the real fact and the real feeling of Alexander.
3 It is certainly true that Curtius overloads his narrative with rhetorical and dramatic amplification; but it is not less true that Arrian falls into the opposite extreme—squeezing out his narrative until little is left beyond the dry skeleton.
4 Curtius, iv. 2, 4; Justin, xi. 10. This item, both prudent and probable, in the reply of the Tyrians, is not noticed by Arrian.
6 Diodorus, xvii. 40. Οἱ δὲ Τύριοι, ἐνενεμάλην τῷ βασιλεῖ τῷ Ἡρακλῆι τῷ Τυριῷ θῶσαν, προτετειθέντων δικαίων.
the demand included. When Alexander made a solemn sacrifice to Artemis at Ephesus, he marched to her temple with his whole force armed and in battle array. We cannot doubt that his sacrifice at Tyre to Herakles—his ancestral Hero, whose especial attribute was force—would have been celebrated with an array equally formidable, as in fact it was, after the town had been taken. The Tyrians were thus required, to admit within their walls an irresistible military force; which might indeed be withdrawn after the sacrifice was completed, but which might also remain, either wholly or in part, as permanent garrison of an almost impregnable position. They had not endured such treatment from Persia, nor were they disposed to endure it from a new master. It was in fact, hazarding their all; submitting at once to a fate which might be as bad as could befall them after a successful siege. On the other hand, when we reflect that the Tyrians promised every thing short of submission to military occupation, we see that Alexander, had he been so inclined, could have obtained from them all that was really essential to his purpose, without the necessity of besieging the town. The great value of the Phoenician cities consisted in their fleet, which now acted with the Persians, and gave to them the command of the sea. Had Alexander required that this fleet should be withdrawn from the Persians and placed in his service, there can be no doubt that he would have obtained it readily. The Tyrians had no motive to devote themselves for Persia, nor did they probably (as Arrian supposes) attempt to trim between the two belligerents, as if the contest was still undecided. Yet rather than hand over their city to the chances of a Macedonian soldiery, they resolved to brave the hazards of a siege. The pride of Alexander, impatient of opposition even to his most extreme demands, prompted him to take a step politically unprofitable, in order to make display of his power, by degrading and crushing, with or without a siege, one of the most ancient, spirited, wealthy, and intelligent communities of the ancient world.

λυσαν αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐισόβου.

1 Arrian, i. 18, 4.
2 Arrian, ii. 24, 10.
3 This is the view expressed by Alexander himself, in his addresses to the army, inviting them to undertake the siege of Tyre (Arrian, ii. 17, 3-8).
4 Arrian, ii. 16, 12. Curtius says (iv. 2, 2), "Tyros facilissimum Alexander acceptum videbatur, quama imperium." This is representing the pretensions of the Tyrians as greater than the fact warrants. They did not refuse the imperium of Alexander, though they declined compliance with one extreme demand. Ptolemy I. (son of Lagus) afterwards made himself master of Jerusalem, by entering the town on the Sabbath, under pretense of offering sacrifice (Josephus, Antiq. Jud. xii. 1).
Tyre was situated on an islet nearly half a mile from the mainland; the channel between the two being shallow towards the land, but reaching a depth of eighteen feet in the part adjoining the city. The islet was completely surrounded by prodigious walls, the loftiest portion of which, on the side fronting the mainland, reached a height not less than 150 feet, with corresponding solidity and base. Besides these external fortifications, there was a brave and numerous population within, aided by a good stock of arms, machines, ships, provisions, and other things essential to defence.

It was not without reason, therefore, that the Tyrians, when driven to their last resource, entertained hopes of holding out even against the formidable arm of Alexander; and against Alexander as he then stood, they might have held out successfully; for he had as yet no fleet, and they could defy any attack made simply from land. The question turned upon the Phenician and Cyprian ships, which were for the most part (the Tyrian among them) in the Ægean under the Persian admiral. Alexander—master as he was of Aradus, Byblus, Sidon, and all the Phenician cities except Tyre—calculated that the seamen belonging to these cities would follow their countrymen at home and bring away their ships to join him. He hoped also, as the victorious potentate, to draw to himself the willing adhesion of the Cyprian cities. This could hardly have failed to happen, if he had treated the Tyrians with decent consideration; but it was no longer certain, now that he had made them his enemies.

What passed among the Persian fleet under Autophradates in the Ægean, when they were informed, first that Alexander was master of the other Phenician cities—next, that he was commencing the siege of Tyre—we know very imperfectly. The Tyrian prince Azemilchus brought home his ships for the defence of his own city; the Sidonian and Aradian ships also went home, no longer serving against a power to whom their own cities had submitted; but the Cyprians hesitated longer before they declared themselves. If Darius, or even Autophradates without Darius, instead of abandoning Tyre altogether (as they actually did), had energetically aided the resistance which it offered to Alexander, as the

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1 Curtius, iv. 2, 7, 8. The site of Tyre at the present day presents nothing in the least conformable to the description of Alexander's time.

2 Arrian, ii. 18, 3; ii. 21, 4; ii. 22, 8.

3 Azemilchus was with Autophradates when Alexander declared hostility against Tyre (Arrian, ii. 15, 10); he was in Tyre when it was captured (Arrian, ii. 24, 8).
interests of Persia dictated—the Cypriot ships might not improbably have been regained on that side in the struggle. Lastly, the Tyrians might indulge a hope, that their Phenician brethren, if ready to serve Alexander against Persia, would be no wise hearty as his instruments for crushing a kindred city. These contingences, though ultimately they all turned out in favour of Alexander, were in the beginning sufficiently promising to justify the intrepid resolution of the Tyrians; who were farther encouraged by promises of aid from the powerful fleets of their colony Carthage. To that city, whose deputies were then within their walls for some religious solemnities, they sent many of their wives and children.\(^1\)

Alexander began the siege of Tyre without any fleet; the Sidonian and Aradian ships not having yet come. It was his first task to construct a solid mole two hundred feet broad, reaching across the half mile of channel between the mainland and the islet. He pressed into his service labouring hands by thousands from the neighbourhood; he had stones in abundance from Palatyrus, and wood from the forests in Lebanon. But the work, though prosecuted with ardour and perseverance, under pressing instigations from Alexander, was tedious and toilsome, even near the mainland, where the Tyrians could do little to impede it; and became far more tedious as it advanced into the sea, so as to be exposed to their obstruction, as well as to damage from winds and waves. The Tyrian triremes and small boats perpetually annoyed the workmen, and destroyed parts of the work, in spite of all the protection devised by the Macedonians, who planted two towers in front of their advancing mole, and discharged projectiles from engines provided for the purpose. At length, by unremitting efforts the mole was pushed forward until it came nearly across the channel to the city-wall; when suddenly, on a day of strong wind, the Tyrians sent forth a fireship loaded with combustibles, which they drove against the front of the mole and set fire to the two towers. At the same time, the full naval force of the city, ships and little boats, was sent forth to land men at once on all parts of the mole. So successful was this attack, that all the

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\(^1\) Curtius, iv. 2, 10; Arrian, ii. 24, 8; Diodor. xvii. 49, 41. Curtius (iv. 2, 15) says that Alexander sent envoys to the Tyrians to invite them to peace; that the Tyrians not only refused the propositions, but put the deputies to death, contrary to the law of nations. Arrian mentions nothing about this sending of deputies, which he would hardly have omitted to do had he found it stated in his authorities, since it tends to justify the proceedings of Alexander. Moreover it is not conformable to Alexander's temperament, after what had passed between him and the Tyrians.
Macedonian engines were burnt,—the outer woodwork which kept
the mole together was torn up in many places,—and a large part
of the structure came to pieces.1

Alexander had thus not only to construct fresh engines, but also
to begin the mole nearly anew. He resolved to give it
greater breadth and strength, for the purpose of carrying
more towers abreast in front, and for better defence
against lateral attacks. But it had now become plain
to him, that while the Tyrians were masters of the sea,
no efforts by land alone would enable him to take the
town. Leaving Perdikkas and Kratcrus therefore to reconstruct
the mole and build new engines, he himself reared to Sidon, for
the purpose of assembling as large a fleet as he could. He got
together triremes from various quarters—two from Rhodes, ten
from the seaports in Lykia, three from Soli and Mallus. But his
principal force was obtained by putting in requisition the ships of
the Phenician towns, Sidon, Byblus, and Aradus, now subject to
him. These ships, eighty in number, had left the Persian admiral
and come to Sidon, there awaiting his orders; while not long
afterwards, the princes of Cyprus came thither also, tendering to
him their powerful fleet of 129 ships of war.2 He was now master
of a fleet of 200 sail, comprising the most part, and the best part,
of the Persian navy. This was the consummation of Macedonian
triumph—the last real and effective weapon wrested from the
grasp of Persia. The prognostic afforded by the eagle near the
ships at Miletus, as interpreted by Alexander, had now been ful-
filled; since by successful operations on land, he had conquered
and brought into his power a superior Persian fleet.3

Having directed these ships to complete their equipments and
training, with Macedonians as soldiers on board, Alex-
ander put himself at the head of some light troops for an
expedition of eleven days against the "Arabian moun-
taineers on Libanus, whom he dispersed or put down,
though not without some personal exposure and hazard.4 On re-

1 Arrian, ii. 18, 19; Diodor, xvii. 42;
Curtius, iv. 3, 6, 7.
2 Arrian, ii. 20, 1-4; Curtius, iv. 2,
14. It evinces how strongly Arrian
looks at everything from Alexander's
point of view, when we find him telling
us, that the monarch forgave the Phoe-
nicians and Cyprians for their adherence
and past service in the Persian fleet,
considering that they had acted under
compulsion.
3 Arrian, i. 18, 15. In the siege of
Tyre (four centuries earlier) by the
Assyrian monarch Salmaneser, Sidon
and other Phenician towns had lent
their ships to the besieger (Menander
4 Arrian, ii. 20, 5; Plutarch, Alex-
ander, 24.
turning to Sidon, he found Kleander arrived with a reinforcement of 4000 Grecian hoplites, welcome auxiliaries for prosecuting the siege. Then, going aboard his fleet in the harbour of Sidon, he sailed with it in good battle order to Tyre, hoping that the Tyrians would come out and fight. But they kept within, struck with surprise and consternation; having not before known that their fellow-Phenicians were now among the besiegers. Alexander, having ascertained that the Tyrians would not accept a sea-fight, immediately caused their two harbours to be blocked up and watched; that on the north, towards Sidon, by the Cyprians—that on the south, towards Egypt, by the Phenicians.

From this time forward the doom of Tyre was certain. The Tyrians could no longer offer obstruction to the mole, which was completed across the channel and brought up to the town. Engines were planted upon it to batter the walls; movable towers were rolled up to take them by assault; attack was also made from seaward. Yet though reduced altogether to the defensive, the Tyrians still displayed obstinate bravery, and exhausted all the resources of ingenuity in repelling the besiegers. So gigantic was the strength of the wall fronting the mole, and even that of the northern side fronting Sidon, that none of Alexander’s engines could make any breach in it; but on the south side towards Egypt he was more successful. A large breach having been made in this south wall, he assaulted it with two ships manned by the hypaspists and the soldiers of his phalanx: he himself commanded in one and Admetus in the other. At the same time he caused the town to be menaced all round, at every approachable point, for the purpose of distracting the attention of the defenders. Himself and his two ships having been rowed close up to the breach in the south wall, boarding bridges were thrown out from each deck, upon which he and Admetus rushed forward with their respective storming parties. Admetus got upon the wall, but was there slain; Alexander also was among the first to mount, and the two parties got such a footing on the wall as to overpower all resistance. At the same time his ships also forced their way into the two harbours, so that Tyre came on all sides into his power.

Though the walls were now lost, and resistance had become desperate, the gallant defenders did not lose their courage. They barricaded the streets, and concentrated their strength especially at a

1 Arrian, ii, 20, 9-18.
2 Arrian, ii, 23, 27; Curtius, iv, 4, 11; Diodor, xvii, 46.
defensible post called the Agenorion, or chapel of Agenor. Here the battle again raged furiously until they were overpowered by the Macedonians, incensed with the long toils of the previous siege, as well as by the slaughter of some of their prisoners, whom the Tyrians had killed publicly on the battlements. All who took shelter in the temple of Héraklès were spared by Alexander, from respect to the sanctuary: among the number were the prince Azemilchus, a few leading Tyrians, the Carthaginian envoys, and some children of both sexes. The Sidonians also, displaying a tardy sentiment of kindred, and making partial amends for the share which they had taken in the capture, preserved some lives from the sword of the conqueror. But the greater number of the adult freemen perished with arms in their hands; while 2000 of them who survived either from disabling wounds, or from the fatigue of the slayerers, were hanged on the sea-shore by order of Alexander. The females, the children, and the slaves, were sold to the slave-merchant. The number sold is said to have been about 30,000: a total rather small, as we must assume slaves to be included; but we are told that many had been previously sent away to Carthage.

Thus master of Tyre, Alexander marched into the city and consummated his much-desired sacrifice to Héraklès. His whole force, land and naval, fully armed and arrayed, took part in the procession. A more costly hecatomb had never been offered to that God, when we consider that it had been purchased by all the toils of an unnecessary siege, and by the extirpation of these free and high-spirited citizens, his former worshippers. What the loss of the Macedonians had been, we cannot say. The number of their slain is stated by Arrian at 400, which must be greatly beneath the truth; for the courage and skill of the besieged had prolonged the siege to the prodigious period of seven months, though Alexander had left no means untried to accomplish it sooner.

Towards the close of the siege of Tyre, Alexander received and rejected a second proposition from Darius, offering 10,000 talents, with the cession of all the territory westward of the Euphrates,

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1 Curtius, iv. 4, 15. Arrian, iv. 24, 9; Diodorus, xvii. 46.
2 This is mentioned both by Curtius (iv. 4, 17) and by Diodorus (xx. 46). It is not mentioned by Arrian, and perhaps may not have found a place in Ptolemy or Aristobulus; but I see no ground for disbelieving it.
4 The resuscitating force of commercial industry is seen by the fact, that in spite of this total destruction, Tyre again rose to be a wealthy and flourishing city (Strabo, xvi. p. 757).
as ransom for his mother and wife, and proposing that Alexander should become his son-in-law as well as his ally. "If I were Alexander (said Parmenio) I should accept such terms, instead of plunging into farther peril." — "So would I (replied Alexander) if I were Parmenio; but since I am Alexander, I must return a different answer." His answer to Darius was to this effect: — "I want neither your money nor your cession. All your money and territory are already mine, and you are tendering to me a part in place of the whole. If I choose to marry your daughter, I shall marry her—whether you give her to me or not. Come hither to me, if you wish to obtain from me any act of friendship." Alexander might spare the submissive and the prostrate; but he could not brook an equal or a competitor, and his language towards them was that of brutal insolence. Of course this was the last message sent by Darius, who now saw, if he had not before seen, that he had no chance open except by the renewal of war.

Being thus entire master of Syria, Phenicia, and Palestine, and having accepted the voluntary submission of the Jews, Alexander marched forward to conquer Egypt. He had determined, before he undertook any farther expedition into the interior of the Persian empire, to make himself master of all the coast-lands which kept open the communications of the Persians with Greece, so as to secure his rear against any serious hostility. His great fear was, of Grecian soldiers or cities raised against him by Persian gold; and Egypt was the last remaining possession of the Persians, which gave them the means of acting upon Greece. Those means were indeed now prodigiously curtailed by the feeble condition of the Persian fleet in the Ægean, unable to contend with the increasing fleet of the Macedonian admirals Hegelochus and Amphoterus, now numbering 160 sail. During the summer of 332 B.C., while Alexander was prosecuting the siege of Tyre, these admirals recovered all the important acquisitions—Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos—which had been made by Memnon for the Persian interests. The inhabitants of Tenedos invited them and ensured their success; those of Chios attempted to do the same, but were coerced by Pharnabazus, who

1 Arrian, ii. 25, 5; Curtius, iv. 5. The answer is more insolent in the naked simplicity of Arrian, than in the pomp of Curtius. Plutarch (Alex. and, 29) both abridges and softens it. Diodorus also gives the answer differently (xvii. 54)—and represents the embassy as coming somewhat later in time, after Alexander's return from Egypt.

2 Arrian, ii. 17, 4.

3 Curtius, iv. 5, 14.
retained the city by means of his insular partisans, Apollonidés and others, with a military force. The Macedonian admirals laid siege to the town, and were presently enabled to carry it by their friends within. Pharnabazus was here captured with his entire force; twelve triremes thoroughly armed and manned, thirty store-ships, several privateers, and 3000 Grecian mercenaries. Aristonikus, philo-Persian despot of Methymna—arriving at Chios shortly afterwards, but ignorant of the capture—was entrapped into the harbour and made prisoner. There remained only Mityléné, which was held for the Persians by the Athenian Charés, with a garrison of 2000 men: who however, seeing no hope of holding out against the Macedonians, consented to evacuate the city on condition of a free departure. The Persians were thus expelled from the sea, from all footing among the Grecian islands, and from the vicinity of Greece and Macedonia.

These successes were in full progress, when Alexander himself directed his march from Tyre to Egypt, stopping in his way to besiege Gaza. This considerable town, the last before entering on the desert track between Syria and Egypt, was situated between one and two miles from the sea. It was built upon a lofty artificial mound, and encircled with a high wall; but its main defence was derived from the deep sand immediately around it, as well as from the mud and quicksand on its coast. It was defended by a brave man, the eunuch Batis, with a strong garrison of Arabs, and abundant provision of every kind. Confiding in the strength of the place, Batis refused to admit Alexander. Moreover his judgement was confirmed by the Macedonian engineers themselves, who, when Alexander first surveyed the walls, pronounced it to be impregnable, chiefly from the height of its supporting mound. But Alexander could not endure the thought of tacitly confessing his inability to take Gaza. The more difficult the enterprise, the greater was the charm for him, and the greater would be the astonishment produced all around when he should be seen to have triumphed.

He began by erecting a mound south of the city, close by the wall, for the purpose of bringing up his battering engines. This

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1 Curtius, iv, 5, 14-22; Arrian, iii, 2, 8.
2 Arrian, ii, 26, 5. Οἱ δὲ μηχανοποιοὶ γράφοντες τεθείκαντο, ἐπεὶ δὲ μὴ ἐλέειν τὸ τεῖχος, διὰ ὅτι δὲ μὴ ἐλέει πολλὸν ἐπήσπασαν τὴν ἰδίαν, ἢ ἐπὶ μέγα ἐλεῖν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι ἐπὶ μεγάλον ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ Δαρῆον.

About the fidelity and obstinate defensive courage, shown more than once by the inhabitants of Gaza—see Polybius, xvi, 40.
Cuar, CUL GAZA TAKEN. 3867

external mound was completed, and the engines had begun to batter the wall, when a well-planned sally by the garrison overthrew the assailants and destroyed the engines. The timely aid of Alexander himself with his hypaspists, protected their retreat; but he himself, after escaping a snare from a pretended Arabian deserter, received a severe wound through the shield and the breastplate into the shoulders by a dart discharged from a catapult; as the prophet Aristander had predicted—giving assurance at the same time, that Gaza would fall into his hands. During the treatment of his wound, he ordered the engines employed at Tyre to be brought up by sea; and caused his mound to be carried around the whole circumference of the town, so as to render it approachable from every point. This Herculean work, the description of which we read with astonishment, was 250 feet high all round, and two stadia (1240 feet) broad; the loose sand around could hardly have been suitable, so that materials must have been brought up from a distance. The undertaking was at length completed; in what length of time we do not know, but it must have been considerable—though doubtless thousands of labourers would be pressed in from the circumjacent country.

Gaza was now attacked at all points by battering-rams, by mines, and by projectile engines with various missiles. Presently the walls were breached in several places, though the defenders were unremitting in their efforts to repair the damaged parts. Alexander attempted three distinct general assaults; but in all three he was repulsed by the bravery of the Gazeans. At length, after still farther breaching of the wall, he renewed for the fourth time his attempt to storm. The entire Macedonian phalanx being brought up to attack at different points, the greatest emulation reigned among the officers. The Æakid Neoptolemus was first to mount the wall; but the other divisions manifested hardly less ardour, and the town was at length taken. Its gallant defenders resisted with unabated spirit to the last; and all fell in their posts, the incensed soldiery being no way disposed to give quarter.

1 Arrian, ii. 26, 27; Curtius, iv. 6, 12-18; Plutarch, Alexander. 25.
2 Arrian, ii. 27, 5. χωμα χωννύναι ἐν κύκλῳ παντόθεν τῆς πόλεως. It is certainly possible, as Droysen remarks (Gesch. Alex. des Grossen, p. 159), that παντόθεν is not to be interpreted with literal strictness, but only as meaning in many different portions of the walled circuit. Yet if this had been intended, Arrian would surely have said χωματα in the plural, not χωμα.
3 Diodorus (xvii. 48) states the whole duration of the siege as two months. This seems rather under than over the probable truth.
One prisoner alone was reserved for special treatment—the prince
or governor himself, the eunuch Batis; who, having mani-
fested the greatest energy and valour, was taken severely
wounded, yet still alive. In this condition he was brought
by Leonnatus and Philotas into the presence of Alex-
ander, who cast upon him looks of vengeance and fury.
The Macedonian prince had undertaken the siege mainly in order
to prove to the world that he could overcome difficulties insuperable
as was cruel. He directed the feet of Batis to be bored,
and brazen rings to be passed through them; after
which the naked body of this brave man, yet surviving,
was tied with cords to the tail of a chariot driven by
Alexander himself, and dragged at full speed amidst
the triumphant jeers and shouts of the army.1 Herein

1 Curtius, iv. 6, 25-30; Dionys. Hal.
De Comp. Verbor. p. 123-125—with
the citation there given from Hegesias
of Magnesia. Diodorus (xvii. 48, 49)
simply mentions Gaza in two sentences,
but gives no details of any kind.
Arrian says nothing about the treat-
ment of Batis, nor did he probably find
anything about it in Ptolemy or Ari-
stobulus. There are assignable reasons
why they should pass it over in silence,
as disgraceful to Alexander, But Arrian,
at the same time, says nothing incon-
sistent with or contradicting the state-
ment of Curtius; while he himself
recognizes how emulous Alexander was
of the proceedings of Achilles (vii. 14, 7).
The passage describing this scene,
cited from the lost author Hegesias
by Dionysius of Halikarnassus, as an
example of bad rhythm and taste, has
the merit of bringing out the details
respecting the person of Batis, which
were well calculated to disgust and
aggravate the wrath of Alexander.
The bad taste of Hegesias as a writer
does not diminish his credibility as a
witness.
legendary ancestor Achilles, copied the ignominious treatment described in the Iliad as inflicted on the dead body of Hektor.  

This proceeding of Alexander, the product of Homeric reminiscences operating upon an infuriated and vindictive temperament, stands out in respect of barbarity from all that we read respecting the treatment of conquered towns in antiquity. His remaining measures were conformable to received usage. The wives and children of the Gazazans were sold into slavery. New inhabitants were admitted from the neighbourhood, and a garrison was placed there to hold the town for the Macedonians.

The two sieges of Tyre and Gaza, which occupied both together nine months, were the hardest fighting that Alexander had ever encountered, or in fact ever did encounter throughout his life. After such toils, the march to Egypt, which he now commenced (October 332 B.C.), was an affair of holiday and triumph. Mazakês, the satrap of Egypt, having few Persian troops and a disaffected native population, was noway disposed to resist the approaching conqueror. Seven days’ march brought Alexander and his army from Gaza to Pelusium, the frontier fortress of Egypt, commanding the eastern branch of the Nile, whither his fleet, under the command of Hephaestion, had come also. Here he found not only open gates and a submissive governor, but also crowds of Egyptians assembled to welcome him. He placed a garrison in Pelusium, sent his fleet up the river to Memphis, and marched himself to the same place by land. The satrap Mazakês surrendered himself, with all the treasure in the city, 800 talents in amount, and much precious furniture. Here Alexander reposed some time, offering splendid sacrifices to the Gods generally, and especially to the Egyptian God Apis; to which he added gymnastic and musical matches, sending to Greece for the most distinguished artists.

From Memphis, he descended the westernmost branch of the Nile to Canopus at its mouth, from whence he sailed westerly along the shore to look at the island of Pharos, celebrated in Homer, and the lake Mareotis. Reckoning Egypt now as a portion of his empire, and considering that the business of keeping down an unquiet population, as well as of collecting a large revenue, would have to be performed by his extra-

1 Arrian, vii. 14, 7.  3 Diodor, xvii. 48; Josephus, Antiq. xi. 4.
2 Arrian, ii. 27, 11. About the circumstances and siege of Gaza, see the work of Stark, Gaza und die Philistische Küste, p. 243. Leip. 1852.
4 Arrian, iii. 1, 3; Curtius, iv. 7, 1, 2; Diodor. xvii. 49.
neous land and sea force, he saw the necessity of withdrawing the seat of government from Memphis, where both the Persians and the natives had maintained it, and of founding a new city of his own on the seaboard, convenient for communication with Greece and Macedonia. His imagination, susceptible to all Homeric impressions and influenced by a dream, first fixed upon the isle of Pharos as a suitable place for his intended city.  

Perceiving soon, however, that this little isle was inadequate by itself, he included it as part of a larger city to be founded on the adjacent mainland. The Gods were consulted, and encouraging responses were obtained; upon which Alexander himself marked out the circuit of the walls, the direction of the principal streets, and the sites of numerous temples to Grecian Gods as well as Egyptian. It was thus that the first stone was laid of the mighty, populous, and busy Alexandria; which however the founder himself never lived to see, and wherein he was only destined to repose as a corpse. The site of the place between the sea and the Lake Mareótis, was found airy and healthy, as well as convenient for shipping and commerce. The protecting island of Pharos gave the means of forming two good harbours for ships coming by sea, on a coast harbourless elsewhere; while the Lake Mareótis, communicating by various canals with the river Nile, received with facility the exportable produce from the interior. As soon as houses were ready, commencement was made by the intendant Kleomenès, transporting to them in mass the population of the neighbouring town of Kanòpus, and probably of other towns besides.

Alexandria became afterwards the capital of the Ptolemaic princes. It acquired immense grandeur and population during their rule of two centuries and a half, when their enormous revenues were spent greatly in its improvement and decoration. But we cannot reasonably ascribe to Alexander himself any prescience of such an imposing future. He intended it as a place from which he could conveniently rule Egypt, considered as a portion of his extensive empire all round the Ægean; and had Egypt remained thus a fraction, instead of becoming a substantive imperial whole, Alexandria would probably not have risen beyond mediocrity.

1 Curtius, iv. 8, 1-4; Plutarch, Alex-
2 Arrian, iii. 1, 8; Curtius, iv. 8, 2-6; Diodor, xvi. 52.
3 Strabo, xvii. p. 793. Other authors however speak of the salubrity of Alexandria less favourably than Strabo: see St. Croix, Examen des Hist. d'Alex-
4 Pseudo-Aristotle, Economie. ii. 32.
5 Arrian, iii. 5, 4-9. Tacitus (Annal. i. 11) says about Egypt under the Romans—"provinciam aditu difficilior, armonum facundam, superstitiones et

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The other most notable incident, which distinguished the four or five months' stay of Alexander in Egypt, was his march through the sandy desert to the temple of Zeus Ammon. This is chieflv memorable as it marks his increasing self-adoration and inflation above the limits of humanity. His achievements during the last three years had so transcended the expectations of every one, himself included—the Gods had given to him such incessant good fortune, and so paralysed or put down his enemies—that the hypothesis of a superhuman personality seemed the natural explanation of such a superhuman career. He had to look back to the heroic legends, and to his ancestors Perseus and Héraklès, to find a worthy prototype. Conceiving himself to be (like them) the son of Zeus, with only a nominal human parentage, he resolved to go and ascertain the fact by questioning the infallible oracle of Zeus Ammon. His march of several days, through a sandy desert—always fatiguing, sometimes perilous—was distinguished by manifest evidences of the favour of the Gods. Unexpected rain fell just when the thirsty soldiers required water. When the guides lost their track, from shifting of the sand, on a sudden two speaking serpents, or two ravens, appeared preceding the march and indicating the right direction. Such were the statements made by Ptolemy, Aristobulus, and Kallisthenès, companions and contemporaries; while Arrian, four centuries afterwards, announces his positive conviction that there was a divine intervention on behalf of Alexander, though he cannot satisfy himself about the details. The priest of Zeus Ammon addressed Alexander, as being the son of the God, and farther assured him that his career would be one of uninterrupted victory, until he was taken away to the Gods; while his friends also, who consulted the oracle for their own satisfaction, received for answer that the rendering of divine honours to him would be acceptable to Zeus. After profuse sacrifices and presents, Alexander quitted the oracle, with a full and sincere faith that he really was the son of Zeus Ammon; which faith was farther confirmed by declarations transmitted to him from other oracles.

1 Diodor. xvii. 51, 61. 
2 Arrian, iii. 3. 2.
3 Arrian, iii. 3. 12. 

Compare Curtius, iv. 7, 12-15; Diodor. xvii. 49-51; Flutarch, Alex. 27; Kallisthenes ap. Strabon. xvii. p. 814.
that of Erythrae in Ionia, and of Branchidae near Miletus.\(^1\) Though he did not directly order himself to be addressed as the son of Zeus, he was pleased with those who volunteered such a recognition, and angry with sceptics or scoffers, who disbelieved the oracle of Amon. Plutarch thinks that this was a mere political manoeuvre of Alexander, for the purpose of overawing the non-Hellenic population over whom he was enlarging his empire.\(^2\) But it seems rather to have been a genuine faith,—a simple exaggeration of that exorbitant vanity which from the beginning reigned so largely in his bosom. He was indeed aware that it was repugnant to the leading Macedonians in many ways, but especially as a deliberate insult to the memory of Philip. This is the theme always touched upon in moments of dissatisfaction. To Parmenio, to Philotas, to Kleitus, and other principal officers, the insolence of the king, in disclaiming Philip and putting himself above the level of humanity, appeared highly offensive. Discontents on this subject among the Macedonian officers, though condemned to silence by fear and admiration of Alexander, became serious, and will be found reappearing hereafter.\(^3\)

The last month of Alexander’s stay in Egypt was passed at Memphis. While nominating various officers for the permanent administration of the country, he also received a visit of Hegelochus his admiral, who brought as prisoners Aristokles of Methymna, and other despots of the various insular Grecian cities. Alexander ordered them to be handed over to their respective cities, to be dealt with as the citizens pleased; all except the Chian Apollonides, who was sent to Elephantine in the south of Egypt for detention. In most of the cities, the despots had incurred such violent hatred, that when delivered up, they were tortured and put to death.\(^4\) Pharnabazus also had been among the prisoners, but had found means to escape from his guards when the fleet touched at Kos.\(^5\)

In the early spring, after receiving reinforcements of Greeks and Thracians, Alexander marched into Phenicia. It was there that he regulated the affairs of Phenicia, Syria, and Greece, prior to his intended expedition into the interior against Darius.

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\(^3\) Curtius, iv. 10, 3 — "fastidio sese patrum, abdicari Philippum patrem, carnem vanis cogitationibus petere.

\(^4\) Arrian, iii. ii. 8, 18; Curtius, vi. 6, 23.

\(^5\) Arrian, iii. ii. 8, 9.
He punished the inhabitants of Samaria, who had revolted and burnt alive the Macedonian prefect Andromachus.\(^1\) In addition to all the business transacted, Alexander made costly presents to the Tyrian Herakles, and offered splendid sacrifices to other Gods. Choice festivals with tragedy were also celebrated, analogous to the Dionysia at Athens, with the best actors and chorists contending for the prize. The princes of Cyprus vied with each other in doing honour to the son of Zeus Ammon; each undertaking the duty of chorégus, getting up at his own cost a drama with distinguished chorus and actors, and striving to obtain the prize from pre-appointed judges—as was practised among the ten tribes at Athens.\(^2\)

In the midst of these religious and festive exhibitions, Alexander was collecting magazines for his march into the interior.\(^3\) He had already sent forward a detachment to Thapsakus, the usual ford of the Euphrates, to throw bridges over the river. The Persian Mazaeus was on guard on the other side, with a small force of 3000 men, 2000 of them Greeks; not sufficient to hinder the bridges from being built, but only to hinder them from being carried completely over to the left bank. After eleven days of march from Phenicia, Alexander and his whole army reached Thapsakus. Mazaeus, on the other side, as soon as he saw the main army arrive, withdrew his small force without delay, and retreated to the Tigris; so that the two bridges were completed, and Alexander crossed forthwith.\(^4\)

Once over the Euphrates, Alexander had the option of marching down the left bank of that river to Babylon, the chief city of the Persian empire, and the natural place to find Darius.\(^5\) But this march (as we know from Xenophon, who made it with the Ten Thousand Greeks) would be one of extreme suffering and through a desert country where no provisions were to be got. Moreover, Mazaeus

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\(^1\) Curtius, iv. 8, 10.
\(^2\) Plutarch, Alexander. 29; Arrian, l. c.
\(^3\) Arrian, iii. 6, 12.
\(^4\) Arrian, iii. 7, 1-6; Curtius, iv. 9, 12—\(\text{υπεδιδόμενος καστρίων περαιτέρως κατά}\) Euphratan.\(^5\) So Alexander considers Babylon (Arrian, ii. 17, 3-10)—προχώρησαν ἐν τῇ δυναμείς ἐπὶ Βαβυλῶνα τοῖς δαρείοις . . . τοῖς ἐπὶ Βαβυλῶνος στόλοις παραδίδομεν, &c. This is the explanation of Arrian's remark, iii. 7, 6—where he assigns the reason why Alexander, after passing the Euphrates at Thapsakus, did not take the straight road towards Babylon, Cyrus the younger marched directly to Babylon to attack Artaxerxes. Susa, Ecbatana, and Persepolis were more distant, and less exposed to an enemy from the west.
in retreating had taken a north-easterly direction towards the upper part of the Tigris; and some prisoners reported that Darius with his main army was behind the Tigris, intending to defend the passage of that river against Alexander. The Tigris appears not to be fordable below Nineveh (Mosul). Accordingly he directed his march, first nearly northward, having the Euphrates on his left hand; next eastward across Northern Mesopotamia, having the Armenian mountains on his left hand. On reaching the ford of the Tigris, he found it absolutely undefended. Not a single enemy being in sight, he forded the river as soon as possible, with all his infantry, cavalry, and baggage. The difficulties and perils of crossing were extreme, from the depth of the water, above their breasts, the rapidity of the current, and the slippery footing. A resolute and vigilant enemy might have rendered the passage almost impossible. But the good fortune of Alexander was not less conspicuous in what his enemies left undone, than in what they actually did.

After this fatiguing passage, Alexander rested for two days. During the night an eclipse of the moon occurred, nearly total; which spread consternation among the army, combined with complaints against his overweening insolence, and mistrust as to the unknown regions on which they were entering. Alexander, while offering solemn sacrifices to Sun, Moon, and Earth, combated the prevailing depression by declarations from his own prophet Aristander and from Egyptian astrologers, who proclaimed that Helios favoured the Greeks, and Seléné the Persians; hence the eclipse of the moon portended victory to the Macedonians—and victory too (so Aristander promised), before the next new moon. Having thus reassured the soldiers, Alexander marched for four days in a south-easterly direction through the territory called Aturia, with the Tigris on his right hand, and the Gordyene or Kurd mountains on his left. Encountering a small advanced guard of the Persians, he here learnt from prisoners that Darius with his main host was not far off.

Nearly two years had elapsed since the ruinous defeat of Issus. What Darius had been doing during this long interval, and espe-

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1 Arrian, iii. 7, 8; Diodor. xvii. 55; Curtius, iv. 9, 17-24. "Magna munita regni Tigris atque Euphrates erant," is a part of the speech put into the mouth of Darius before the battle of Arbela, by Curtius (iv. 14, 10). Both these great defences were abandoned.

2 Curtius, iv. 9, 23; Plutarch, Alex- and, 39.

3 Arrian, iii. 7, 12; iii. 8, 3. Curtius, iv. 10, 11-18.
cially during the first half of it, we are unable to say. We hear only of one proceeding on his past—his missions, twice repeated, to Alexander, tendering or entreating peace, with the especial view of recovering his captive family. Nothing else does he appear to have done, either to re-
trieve the losses of the past, or to avert the perils of the future; nothing, to save his fleet from passing into the hands of the conqueror; nothing, to relieve either Tyre or Gaza, the sieges of which collectively occupied Alexander for near ten months. The disgraceful flight of Darius at Issus had already lost him the confidence of several of his most valuable servants. The Macedonian exile Amyntas, a brave and energetic man, with the best of the Grecian mercenaries, gave up the Persian cause as lost, and tried to set up for himself, in which attempt he failed and perished in Egypt. The satrap of Egypt, penetrated with contempt for the timidity of his master, was induced, by that reason as well as by others, to throw open the country to Alexander. Having incurred so deplorable a loss, as well in reputation as in territory, Darius had the strongest motives to redeem it by augmented vigour.

But he was paralysed by the fact, that his mother, his wife, and several of his children, had fallen into the hands of the conqueror. Among the countless advantages growing out of the victory of Issus, this acquisition was not the least. It placed Darius in the condition of one who had given hostages for good behaviour to his enemy. The Persian kings were often in the habit of exacting from satraps or generals the deposit of their wives and families, as a pledge for fidelity; and Darius himself had received this guarantee from Memnon, as a condition of entrusting him with the Persian fleet. Bound by the like chains himself, towards one who had now become his superior, Darius was afraid to act with energy, lest success should bring down evil upon his captive family. By allowing Alexander to subdue unopposed all the territory west of the Euphrates, he hoped to be allowed to retain his empire eastward, and to ransom back his family at an enormous price. Such propositions did satisfy Parmenio, and would probably have satisfied even Philip, had Philip been the victor. The insatiate nature of

1 Arrian, ii. 13; Curtius, iv. 1, 27-30.
2 Arrian, i. 1, 3. τὴν τε ἐν Ἴσσῳ μάχην ὑπὸς συνείδης πεπρωμένης (the satrap of Egypt) καὶ Δαρείου θανατοφραγημένη ἔρρημεν ἐκατ, &c.
3 Diodor. xvii. 23. Compare Xenophon, Anabasis, i. 4, 9; Herodot. vii. 10.
Alexander had not yet been fully proved. It was only when the latter contemptuously rejected everything short of surrender at discretion, that Darius began to take measures east of the Euphrates for defending what yet remained.

The conduct of Alexander towards the regal hostages, honourable as it was to his sentiment, evinced at the same time that he knew their value as a subject of political negotiation. It was essential that he should treat them with the full deference due to their rank, if he desired to keep up their price as hostages in the eyes of Darius as well as of his own army. He carried them along with his army, from the coast of Syria, over the bridge of the Euphrates, and even through the waters of the Tigris. To them, this must have proved a severe toil; and in fact, the queen Statira became so worn out that she died shortly after crossing the Tigris; to him also, it must have been an onerous obligation, since he not only sought to ensure to them all their accustomed pomp, but must have assigned a considerable guard to watch them, at a moment when he was marching into an unknown country, and required all his military resources to be disposable. Simply for safe detention, the hostages would have been better guarded and might have been treated with still greater ceremony, in a city or a fortress. But

1 The praise bestowed upon the continence of Alexander, for refusing to visit Statira the wife of Darius, is exaggerated even to absurdity.

In regard to women, Alexander was by temperament cold, the opposite of his father Philip. During his youth, his development was so tardy, that there was even a surmise of some physical disability (Hieronymus ap. Athen. x. p. 435). As to the most beautiful persons, of both sexes, he had only to refuse the numerous tenders made to him by those who sought to gain his favour (Plutarch, Alex. 22). Moreover, after the capture of Damascus, he did select for himself, from among the female captives, Barsiné, the widow of his illustrious rival Memnon; daughter of Artabazus, a beautiful woman of engaging manners, and above all, distinguished by having received Hellenic education, from the simply Oriental harem of Darius (Plutarch, Alex. 21). In adopting the widow of Memnon as his mistress, Alexander may probably have had present to his imagination the example of his legendary ancestor Neoptolemus, whose tender relations with Andromache, widow of his enemy Hektor, would not be forgotten by any reader of Euripides. Alexander had by Barsiné a son called Heraklés.

Lastly, Alexander was so absorbed by ambition,—so overcharged with the duties and difficulties of command, which he always performed himself,—and so continually engaged in fatiguing bodily effort,—that he had little leisure left for indulgences; such leisure as he had, he preferred devoting to wine-parties with the society and conversation of his officers.


Curtius and Justin mention a third embassy sent by Darius (immediately after having heard of the death and honourable obsequies of Statira) to Alexander, asking for peace. The other authors allude only to two tentative of this kind; and the third seems by no means probable.
Alexander probably wished to have them near him, in case of the possible contingency of serious reverses to his army on the eastern side of the Tigris. Assuming such a misfortune to happen, the surrender of them might ensure a safe retreat under circumstances otherwise fatal to its accomplishment.

Being at length convinced that Alexander would not be satisfied with any prize short of the entire Persian empire, Darius summoned all his forces to defend what he still retained. He brought together a host said to be superior in number to that which had been defeated at Issus. Contingents arrived from the farthest extremities of the vast Persian territory—from the Caspian sea, the rivers Oxus and Indus, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea. The plains eastward of the Tigris, about the latitude of the modern town of Mosul, between that river and the Gordyene mountains (Zagros), were fixed upon for the muster of this prodigious multitude; partly conducted by Darius himself from Babylon, partly arriving there by different routes from the north, east, and south. Arbela—a considerable town about twenty miles east of the Great Zab river, still known under the name of Erbil, as a caravan station on the ordinary road between Erzeroum and Bagdad—was fixed on as the muster-place or head-quarters, where the chief magazines were collected and the heavy baggage lodged, and near which the troops were first assembled and exercised.

But the spot predetermined for a pitched battle was the neighbourhood of Gaugamela near the river Bumodus, about thirty miles west of Arbela, towards the Tigris, and about as much south-east of Mosul—a spacious and level plain, with nothing more than a few undulating slopes, and without any trees. It was by nature well adapted for drawing up a numerous army, especially for the free manoeuvres of cavalry, and the rush of scythed chariots; moreover, the Persian officers had been careful beforehand to level artificially such of the slopes as they thought inconvenient. There seemed every thing in the ground to favour the operation both of the vast total, and the special forces, of Darius; who fancied that his defeat at Issus had been occasioned altogether by his having冒险ed himself in the narrow defiles of Kilikia—and that on open and level ground his superior numbers must be triumphant.
He was even anxious that Alexander should come and attack him on the plain. Hence the undefended passage of the Tigris.

For those who looked only to numbers, the host assembled at Arbêla might well inspire confidence; for it is said to have consisted of 1,000,000 of infantry—40,000 cavalry—200 scythed chariots—and fifteen elephants; of which animals we now read for the first time in a field of battle. But besides the numbers, Darius had provided for his troops more effective arms; instead of mere javelins, strong swords and short thrusting pikes, such as the Macedonian cavalry wielded so admirably in close combat— together with shields for the infantry and breastplates for the horsemen. He counted much also on the terrific charge of the chariots, each of which had a pole projecting before the horses and terminating in a sharp point, together with three sword-blades stretching from the yoke on each side, and scythes also laterally from the naves of the wheels.

Informed of the approach of Alexander, about the time when the Macedonian army first reached the Tigris, Darius moved from Arbêla, where his baggage and treasure were left—crossed by bridges the river Lykus or Great Zab, an operation which occupied five days—and marched to take post on the prepared ground near Gaugamela. His battle array was formed—of the Baktrians on the extreme left, under command of Bessus the satrap of Baktria; next, the Daæae and Arachôti, under command of Barsâentes, satrap of Arachosia; then the native Persians, horse and foot alternating—the Susians, under Oxathrês,—and the Kadusians. On the extreme right were the contingents of Syria both east and west of the Euphrates, under Mazæus; then the Medes, under Atropatês; next, the Parthians, Sake, Tapyrians, and Hyrkanians, all cavalry, under Phrathaphernês; then the Albanians and the Sakesinæ. Darius himself was in the centre, with the choice troops of the army near and around him—the Persian select Horse-guards, called the king's

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1 This is the total given by Arrian as what he found set forth (ἐλέγετο), probably the best information which Ptolemeny and Aristobulus could procure (Arrian, iii. 8, 8). Diodorus (xvii. 53) says 800,000 foot, 200,000 horse, and 200 scythed chariots. Justin (xi. 12) gives 400,000 foot and 100,000 horse. Plutarch (Alex. 31) talks generally of a million of men. Curtius states the army to have been almost twice as large as that which had fought in Kilikia (iv. 9, 3); he gives the total as 200,000 foot, and 45,000 horse (iv. 12, 13).

2 Diodor. xvii. 53; Curtius, iv. 92.

3 Curtius, iv. 9, 3; Diodor. xvii. 53. Notwithstanding the instructive note of Müntz upon this passage of Curtius, the mode in which these chariots were armed is not clear on all points.
kinsmen—the Persian foot-guards, carrying pikes with a golden apple at the butt-end—a regiment of Karians, or descendants of Karians, who had been abstracted from their homes and planted as colonists in the interior of the empire—the contingent of Mardi, good archers—and lastly, the mercenary Greeks, of number unknown, in whom Darius placed his greatest confidence.

Such was the first or main line of the Persians. In the rear of it stood deep masses of Babylonians—inhabitants of Sittaké down to the Persian Gulf—Uxians, from the territory adjoining Susiana to the east—and others in unknown multitude. In front of it were posted the scythed chariots, with small advanced bodies of cavalry—Scythians and Baktrians on the left, with one hundred chariots—Armenians and Kappadokians on the right, with fifty more—and the remaining fifty chariots in front of the centre.

Alexander had advanced within about seven miles of the Persian army, and four days' march since his crossing the Tigris—when he first learnt from Persian prisoners how near his enemies were. He at once halted, established on the spot a camp with ditch and stockade, and remained there for four days, in order that the soldiers might repose. On the night of the fourth day, he moved forward, yet leaving under guard in the camp the baggage, the prisoners, and the ineffectives. He began his march, over a range of low elevations which divided him from the enemy, hoping to approach and attack them at daybreak. But his progress was so retarded, that day broke, and the two armies first came in sight, when he was still on the descending slope of the ground, more than three miles distant. On seeing the enemy, he halted, and called together his principal officers, to consult whether he should not prosecute his march and commence the attack forthwith. Though most of them pronounced for the affirmative, yet Parmenio contended that this course would be rash; that the ground before them, with all its difficulties, natural or artificial, was unknown, and that the enemy's position, which they now saw

1 The Persian battle order here given by Arrian (ii. 11), is taken from Aristobulus, who affirmed that it was so set down in the official scheme of the battle, drawn up by the Persian officers, and afterwards captured with the baggage of Darius. Though thus authentic as far as it goes, it is not complete, even as to names—while it says nothing about numbers or depth or extent of front. Several names, of various contingents stated to have been present in the field are not placed in the official return—thus the Sogdiani, the Arians, and the Indian mountaineers are mentioned by Arrian as having joined Darius (iii. 8); the Kosswans, by Diodorus (vii. 59); the Sogdiani, Massagetae, Bellita, Kosswans, Gortyce, Phrygians, and Kataouians, by Curtius (iv. 12).
for the first time, ought to be carefully reconnoitred. Adopting this latter view, Alexander halted for the day; yet still retaining his battle order, and forming a new entrenched camp, to which the baggage and the prisoners were now brought forward from the preceding day’s encampment.¹ He himself spent the day, with an escort of cavalry and light troops, in reconnoitring both the intermediate ground and the enemy, who did not interrupt him, in spite of their immense superiority in cavalry. Parmenio, with Polysperchon and others, advised him to attack the enemy in the night; which promised some advantages, since Persian armies were notoriously unmanageable by night,² and since their camp had no defence. But on the other hand, the plan involved so many disadvantages and perils, that Alexander rejected it; declaring—with an emphasis intentionally enhanced, since he spoke in the hearing of many others—that he disdained the meanness of stealing a victory; that he both would conquer, and could conquer, Darius fairly and in open daylight.³ Having then addressed to his officers a few brief encouragements, which met with enthusiastic response, he dismissed them to their evening meal and repose.

On the next morning, he marshalled his army, consisting of 40,000 foot, and 7000 horse, in two lines.⁴ The first or main line was composed, on the right, of the eight squadrons of Companion-cavalry, each with its separate captain, but all under the command of Philotas son of Parmenio. Next (proceeding from right to left) came the Agema or chosen band of the Hypaspistae—then the remaining Hypaspistae, under Nikanor—then the phalanx properly so called, distributed into six divisions, under the command of Kænus, Perdikkas, Mæleager, Polysperchon, Simmias, and Kraterus, respectively.⁵ Next on the left of the phalanx, were arranged the allied Grecian cavalry, Lokrian and Phokian, Plthiot, Malians, and

¹ Arrian, iii, 9, 2-8. ² It is not expressly mentioned by Arrian that the baggage, &c., was brought forward from the first camp to the second. But we see that such must have been the fact, from what happened during the battle. Alexander’s baggage, which was plundered by a body of Persian cavalry, cannot have been so far in the rear of the army as the distance of the first camp would require. This coincides also with Curtius, iv, 13, 35. The words ἔγνω ἀπολείπειν (Arr. iii, 9, 2), indicate the contemplation of a purpose which was not accomplished—ὡς ἐν ζωἡ ἡμέρᾳ προσμίξαι τοῖς πολεμίοις (iii, 9, 3). Instead of “coming into conflict” with the enemy at break of day—Alexander only arrived within sight of them at break of day; he then halted the whole day and night within sight of their position; and naturally brought up his baggage, having no motive to leave it so far in the rear.

² Xenoph. Anabas, iii, 4, 35.

³ Arrian, iii, 10, 3; Curtius, iv, 13, 4-10.

⁴ Arrian, iii, 12, 1-9.

⁵ Arrian, iii, 11; Diodor, xvii, 57; Curtius, iv, 13, 26-30.
Peloponnesians; after whom, at the extreme left, came the Thes-salians under Philippus—among the best cavalry in the army, hardly inferior to the Macedonian Companions. As in the two former battles, Alexander himself took the command of the right half of the army, confiding the left to Parmenio.

Behind this main line, was placed a second or body of reserve, intended to guard against attacks in the flanks and rear, which the superior numbers of the Persians rendered probable. For this purpose, Alexander reserved,—on the right, the light cavalry or Lancers—the Paeonians, under Arctés and Aristo—half the Agrinians, under Attalus—the Macedonian archers, under Brison—and the mercenaries of old service, under Kleander; on the left, various bodies of Thracian and allied cavalry, under their separate officers. All these different regiments were held ready to repel attack either in flank or rear. In front of the main line were some advanced squadrons of cavalry and light troops—Grecian cavalry, under Menidas on the right, and under Andromachus on the left—a brigade of darters under Balakrus, together with Agridian darters, and some bowmen. Lastly, the Thracian infantry were left to guard the camp and the baggage.¹

Forewarned by a deserter, Alexander avoided the places where iron spikes had been planted to damage the Macedonian cavalry.² He himself, at the head of the Royal Squadron, on the extreme right, led the march obliquely in that direction, keeping his right somewhat in advance. As he neared the enemy, he saw Darius himself with the Persian left centre immediately opposed to him—Persian guards, Indians, Albanians, and Karians. Alexander went on inclining to the right, and Darius stretching his front towards the left to counteract this movement, but still greatly outflanking the Macedonians to the left. Alexander had now got so far to his right, that he was almost beyond the ground levelled by Darius for the operations of his chariots in front. To check any farther movement in this direction, the Baktrian 1000 horse and the Scythians in front of the Persian left, were ordered to make a circuit and attack the Macedonian right flank. Alexander detached against them his regiment of cavalry under Menidas, and the action thus began.³

The Baktrian horse, perceiving the advance of Menidas, turned from their circuitous movement to attack him, and at first drove him back until he was supported by the other advanced detach-

¹ Arrian, iii. 12, 2–6; Curtius, iv. 13, 3; Polyænus, iv. 30–32; Diodor. xvii. 57.
² Curtius, iv. 13, 36; Polyænus, iv. 3, 17.
³ Arrian, iii. 13, 1–5.
ments—Paeonians and Grecian cavalry. The Baktrians, defeated in their turn, were supported by the satrap Bessus with the main body of Baktrians and Scythians in the left portion of Darius's line. The action was here for some time warmly contested, with some loss to the Greeks; who at length however, by a more compact order against enemies whose fighting was broken and desultory, succeeded in pushing them out of their place in the line, and thus making a partial opening in it.

While this conflict was still going on, Darius had ordered his scythed chariots to charge, and his main line to follow them, calculating on the disorder which he expected that they would occasion. But the chariots were found of little service. The horses were terrified, checked, or wounded, by the Macedonian archers and darters in front; who even found means to seize the reins, pull down the drivers, and kill the horses. Of the hundred chariots in Darius's front, intended to bear down the Macedonian ranks by simultaneous pressure along their whole line, many were altogether stopped or disabled; some turned right round, the horses refusing to face the pretended pikes, or being scared with the noise of pike and shield struck together; some which reached the Macedonian line, were let through without mischief by the soldiers opening their ranks; a few only inflicted wounds or damage.

As soon as the chariots were thus disposed of, and the Persian main force laid open as advancing behind them, Alexander gave orders to the troops of his main line, who had hitherto been perfectly silent, to raise the war-shout and charge at a quick pace; at the same time directing Arctés with the Paeonians to repel the assailants on his right flank. He himself, discontinuing his slanting movement to the right, turned towards the Persian line, and dashed, at the head of all the

1 Arrian, iii. 13, 9.
2 About the chariots, Arrian, iii. 13, 11; Curtius, iv. 15, 14; Diodor. xvii. 57, 58.
Arrian mentions distinctly only those chariots which were launched on Darius's left, immediately opposite to Alexander. But it is plain that the chariots along the whole line must have been let off at one and the same signal—which we may understand as implied in the words of Curtius—"Ipse (Darius) ante se falcatos currds habebat, quis signo dato in hostem effudit" (iv. 14, 3).

The scythed chariots of Artaxerxes, at the battle of Kunaxa, did no mischief (Xenoph. Anab. i. 8, 10-20). At the battle of Magnesia, gained by the Romans (n.c. 150) over the Syrian king Antiochus, his chariots were not only driven back, but spread disorder among his own troops (Appian, Reb. Syr. 33).

3 See the remarkable passage in the address of Alexander to his soldiers, previous to the battle, about the necessity of absolute silence until the moment came for the terrific war-shout (Arrian, iii. 9, 14); compare Thucyd. ii. 39—a similar direction from Phormio to the Athenians.
Companion-cavalry, into that partial opening in it, which had been made by the flank movement of the Baktrians. Having by this opening got partly within the line, he pushed straight towards the person of Darius; his cavalry engaging in the closest hand-combat, and thrusting with their short spikes at the faces of the Persians. Here, as at the Granikus, the latter were discomposed by this mode of fighting—accustomed as they were to rely on the use of missiles, with rapid wheeling of the horse for renewed attack. They were unable to prevent Alexander and his cavalry from gaining ground and approaching nearer to Darius; while at the same time, the Macedonian phalanx in front, with its compact order and long pretended pikes, pressed upon the Persian line opposed to it. For a short interval, the combat here was close and obstinate; and it might have been much prolonged—since the best troops of Darius's army—Greeks, Karians, Persian guards, regal kinsmen, &c., were here posted,—had the king's courage been equal to that of his soldiers. But here, even worse than at Issus, the flight of the army began with Darius himself. It had been the recommendation of Cyrus the younger, in attacking the army of his brother Artaxerxes at Kunaxa, to aim the main blow at the spot where his brother was in person—since he well knew that victory there was victory everywhere. Having already once followed this scheme successfully at Issus, Alexander repeated it with still more signal success at Arbela. Darius, who had been long in fear, from the time when he first beheld his formidable enemy on the neighbouring hills, became still more alarmed when he saw the scythed chariots prove a failure, and when the Macedonians, suddenly breaking out from absolute silence into an universal war-cry, came to close quarters with his troops pressing towards and menacing the conspicuous chariot on which he stood.

The sight and hearing of this terrific mêlée, combined with the prestige already attaching to Alexander's name, completely overthrew the courage and self-possession of Darius. He caused his chariot to be turned round, and himself set the example of flight.
From this moment, the battle, though it had lasted so short a time, was irreparably lost. The king’s flight, followed of course immediately by that of the numerous attendants around him, spread dismay among all his troops, leaving them neither centre of command, nor chief to fight for. The best soldiers in his army, being those immediately around him, were under these circumstances the first to give way. The fierce onset of Alexander with the Companion-cavalry, and the unremitting pressure of the phalanx in front, were obstructed by little else than a mass of disordered fugitives. During the same time, Aretés with his Pæonians had defeated the Baktrians on the right flank, so that Alexander was free to pursue the routed main body,—which he did most energetically. The cloud of dust raised by the dense multitude is said to have been so thick, that nothing could be clearly seen, nor could the pursuers distinguish the track taken by Darius himself. Amidst this darkness, the cries and noises from all sides were only the more impressive; especially the sound from the whips of the charioteers, pushing their horses to full speed. It was the dust alone which saved Darius himself from being overtaken by the pursuing cavalry.

While Alexander was thus fully successful on his right and centre, the scene on his left under Parmenio was different. 

Mazæus, who commanded the Persian right, after launching his scythed chariots (which may possibly have done more damage than those launched on the Persian left, though we have no direct information about them), followed it up by vigorously charging the Grecian and Thessalian horse in his front, and also by sending round a detachment of cavalry to attack
them on their left flank. Here the battle was obstinately contested, and success for some time doubtful. Even after the flight of Darius, Parmenio found himself so much pressed, that he sent a message to Alexander. Alexander, though full of mortification at relinquishing the pursuit, checked his troops, and brought them back to the assistance of his left, by the shortest course across the field of battle. The two left divisions of the phalanx, under Simmias and Kraterus, had already stopped short in the pursuit, on receiving the like message from Parmenio; leaving the other four divisions to follow the advanced movement of Alexander. Hence there arose a gap in the midst of the phalanx, between the four right divisions, and the two left; into which gap a brigade of Indian and Persian cavalry darted, galloping through the midst of the Macedonian line to get into the rear and attack the baggage.

At first this movement was successful, the guard was unprepared, and the Persian prisoners rose at once to set themselves free; though Sisygambis, whom these prisoners were above measure anxious to liberate, refused to accept their aid, either from mistrust of their force, or gratitude for the good treatment received from Alexander. But while these assailants were engaged in plundering the baggage, they were attacked in the rear by the troops forming the second Macedonian line, who though at first taken by surprise, had now had time to face about and reach the camp. Many of the Persian brigade were thus slain, the rest got off as they could.

Mazeus maintained for a certain time fair equality, on his own side of the battle, even after the flight of Darius. But when, to

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1 Curtius, iv. 16, 1; Diodorus, xvii. 59, 60; Arrian, iii. 14, 11. The two first authors are here superior to Arrian, who scarcely mentions at all this vigorous charge of Mazeus, though he alludes to the effects produced by it.

2 Arrian, iii. 14, 6. He speaks directly here only of the Τάξις under the command of Simmias; but it is plain that what he says must be understood of the Τάξις commanded by Kraterus also. Of the six Τάξις or divisions of the phalanx, that of Kraterus stood at the extreme left—that of Simmias (who commanded on this day the Τάξις of Amyntas son of Andromenes) next to it (iii. 11, 16). If therefore the Τάξις of Simmias was kept back from pursuit, on account of the pressure upon the general Macedonian left (iii. 14, 6)—a fortiori, the Τάξις of Kraterus must have been kept back in like manner.

3 Arrian, iii. 14, 7: Curtius, iv. 15, 9–11; Diodor. xvii. 59. Curtius and Diodorus represent the brigade of cavalry, who plundered the camp and rescued the prisoners, to have been sent round by Mazeus from the Persian right; while Arrian states, more probably, that they got through the break accidentally left in the phalanx, and traversed the Macedonian lines.

4 Arrian, iii. 14, 10. Curtius represents this brigade as having been driven off by Aretes and a detachment sent expressly by Alexander himself. Diodorus describes it as if it had not been defeated at all, but had ridden back to Mazeus after plundering the baggage. Neither of these accounts is so probable as that of Arrian.
the paralysing effect of that fact in itself, there was added the spectacle of its disastrous effects on the left half of the Persian army, neither he nor his soldiers could persevere with unabated vigour in a useless combat. The Thessalian and Grecian horse, on the other hand, animated by the turn of fortune in their favour, pressed their enemies with redoubled energy, and at length drove them to flight; so that Parmenio was victor, on his own side and with his own forces, before the succours from Alexander reached him.1

In conducting those succours, on his way back from the pursuit, Alexander traversed the whole field of battle, and thus met face to face some of the best Persian and Parthian cavalry, who were among the last to retire. The battle was already lost, and they were seeking only to escape. As they could not turn back, and had no chance for their lives except by forcing their way through his Companion-cavalry, the combat here was desperate and murderous; all at close quarters, cut and thrust with hand weapons on both sides, contrary to the Persian custom. Sixty of the Macedonian cavalry were slain; and a still greater number, including Hephaestion, Koenus, and Menidas, were wounded, and Alexander himself encountered great personal danger. He is said to have been victorious; yet probably most of these brave men forced their way through and escaped, though leaving many of their number on the field.2

Having rejoined his left, and ascertained that it was not only out of danger, but victorious, Alexander resumed his pursuit of the flying Persians, in which Parmenio now took part.3 The host of Darius was only a multitude of disorderly fugitives, horse and foot mingled together. The greater part of them had taken no share in the battle. Here, as at Issus, they remained crowded in stationary and unprofitable masses, ready to catch the contagion of terror and to swell the number of runaways, so soon as the comparatively small proportion of real combatants in the front had been beaten. On recommencing the pursuit, Alexander pushed forward with such celerity, that numbers of the fugitives were slain or taken, especially at the

1 Diodor. xvii, 60. ὃ Παρμενίων territus, perculsis languidiua instabat.”
2 Arrian, iv. 14, 11; iv. 15, 8.
3 Arrian, iii. 15, 6. Curtius alludes to this combat; but with many particulars very different from Arrian (iv. 16, 19–25).
4 Arrian, iii. 15, 9.
passage of the river Lykus;\(^1\) where he was obliged to halt for
while, since his men as well as their horses were exhausted. At
midnight, he again pushed forward, with such cavalry as could
follow him, to Arbela, in hopes of capturing the person of Darius.
In this he was disappointed, though he reached Arbela the
next day. Darius had merely passed through it, leaving an undefended town, with his bow, shield, chariot, a large treasure, and rich equipage, as prey to the victor. Parmenio had also occupied without resistance the Persian camp near the field of battle, capturing the baggage, the camels, and the elephants.\(^2\)

To state any thing like positive numbers of slain or prisoners, is
impossible. According to Arrian, 300,000 Persians were
slain, and many more taken prisoners. Diodorus puts
the slain at 90,000, Curtius at 40,000. The Macedonian
killed were, according to Arrian, not more than 100—as
according to Curtius, 300; Diodorus states the slain at
500, besides a great number of wounded.\(^3\) The esti-
mate of Arrian is obviously too great on one side, and too small
on the other; but whatever may be the numerical truth, it is
certain that the prodigious army of Darius was all either killed,
taken, or dispersed at the battle of Arbela. No attempt to form
a subsequent army ever succeeded; we read of nothing stronger
than divisions or detachments. The miscellaneous contingents of
this once mighty empire, such at least among them as survived,
dispersed to their respective homes and could never be again
mustered in mass.

The defeat of Arbela was in fact the death-blow of the Persian
empire. It converted Alexander into the Great King,
and Darius into nothing better than a fugitive pretender.
Among all the causes of the defeat—here as at Issus—
the most prominent and indisputable was the cowardice
of Darius himself. Under a king deficient not merely
in the virtues of a general, but even in those of a private soldier,
and who nevertheless insisted on commanding in person—nothing
short of ruin could ensue. To those brave Persians whom he
dragged into ruin along with him and who knew the real facts, he

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1 Arrian, iii. 15, 10. Curtius (iv. 16, 12-18) gives aggravated details about
the sufferings of the fugitives in passing the river Lykus—which are probably
founded on fact. But he makes the mistake of supposing that Alexander had
not as far as this river in his first pur-
suit, from which he was called back to
assist Parmenio.

2 Arrian, iii. 15, 14; Curtius, v. 1,
10.

3 Arrian, iii. 15, 16; Curtius, iv. 16,
27; Diodor. xvii. 61.
must have appeared as the betrayer of the empire. We shall have to recall this state of sentiment, when we describe hereafter the conspiracy formed by the Baktrian satrap Bessus. Nevertheless, even if Darius had behaved with unimpeachable courage, there is little reason to believe that the defeat of Arbêla, much less that of Issus, could have been converted into a victory. Mere immensity of number, even with immensity of space, was of no efficacy without skill as well as bravery in the commander. Three-fourths of the Persian army were mere spectators, who did nothing, and produced absolutely no effect. The flank movement against Alexander's right, instead of being made by some unemployed division, was so carried into effect, as to distract the Baktrian troops from their place in the front line, and thus to create a fatal break, of which Alexander availed himself for his own formidable charge in front. In spite of amplitude of space—the condition wanting at Issus—the attacks of the Persians on Alexander's flanks and rear were feeble and inefficient. After all, Darius relied mainly upon his front line of battle, strengthened by the scythe chariots; these latter being found unprofitable, there remained only the direct conflict, wherein the strong point of the Macedonians resided.

On the other hand, in so far as we can follow the dispositions of Alexander, they appear the most signal example recorded in antiquity, of military genius and sagacious combination. He had really as great an available force as his enemies, because every company in his army was turned to account, either in actual combat, or in reserve against definite and reasonable contingences. All his successes, and this most of all, were fairly earned by his own genius and indefatigable effort, combined with the admirable organization of his army. But his good fortune was no less conspicuous in the unceasing faults committed by his enemies. Except during the short period of Memnon's command, the Persian king exhibited nothing but ignorant rashness alternating with disgraceful apathy; turning to no account his vast real power of resistance in detail—keeping back his treasures to become the booty of the victor—suffering the cities which stoutly held out to perish unassisted—and committing the whole fate of the empire, on two successive occasions, to that very hazard which Alexander most desired.

The decisive character of the victory was manifested at once by the surrender of the two great capitals of the Persian empire—Babylon and Susa. To Babylon, Alexander marched in person;
to Susa, he sent Philoxenus. As he approached Babylon, the satrap Mazeus met him with the keys of the city; Bagophanes, collector of the revenue, decorated the road of march with altars, sacrifices, and scattered flowers; while the general Babylonian population and their Chaldaean priests poured forth in crowds with acclamations and presents. Susa was yielded to Philoxenus with the same readiness, as Babylon to Alexander. The sum of treasure acquired at Babylon was great; sufficient to furnish a large donative to the troops—500 drachms per man to the Macedonian cavalry, 500 to the foreign cavalry, 200 to the Macedonian infantry, and something less to the foreign infantry. But the treasure found and appropriated at Susa was yet greater. It is stated at 50,000 talents (= about 11,500,000 sterling), a sum which we might have deemed incredible, if we did not find it greatly exceeded by what is subsequently reported about the treasures in Persepolis. Of this Susian treasure four-fifths are said to have been in uncoined gold and silver, the remainder in golden Darics; the untouched accumulations of several preceding kings, who had husbanded them against a season of unforeseen urgency. A moderate portion of this immense wealth, employed by Darius three years earlier to push the operations of his fleet, subsidize able Grecian officers, and organize anti-Macedonian resistance—would have preserved both his life and his crown.

Alexander rested his troops for more than thirty days amidst the luxurious indulgences of Babylon. He gratified the feelings of the population and the Chaldaean priests by solemn sacrifices to Belus, as well as by directing that the temple of that God, and the other temples destroyed in the preceding century by Xerxes, should be rebuilt. Treating the Persian empire now as an established conquest, he nominated the various satraps. He confirmed the Persian Mazaeus in the satrapy of Babylon, but put along with him two Greeks as assistants and guarantors—Apollodorus of Amphipolis, as commander of the military force—Asklepiodorus as collector of the revenue. He rewarded the

1 Arrian, iii, 16, 5–11; Diodor. xvii. 64; Curtius, v. 1, 17–20.
2 Arrian, v. 1, 43; Diodor. xvii. 64.
3 Arrian states this total of 50,000 talents (iii, 16, 12).
4 I have taken them as Attic talents; if they were Egyptian talents, the value of them would be greater in the proportion of five to three.
5 Curtius, v. 2, 11; Diodor. xvii. 66.
6 Arrian, iii, 16, 6–9; compare Strabo, xvi, 1, 738.
Persian traitor Mithridates, who had surrendered at his approach the strong citadel of Sardis, with the satrapy of Armenia. To that of Syria and Phenicia, he appointed Menes, who took with him 3000 talents, to be remitted to Antipater for levying new troops against the Lacedemonians in Peloponnesus. The march of Alexander from Babylon to Susa occupied twenty days; an easy route through a country abundantly supplied. At Susa he was joined by Amyntas son of Andromenes, with a large reinforcement of about 15,000 men—Macedonians, Greeks, and Thracians. There were both cavalry and infantry—and what is not the least remarkable, fifty Macedonian youths of noble family, soliciting admission into Alexander's corps of pages. The incorporation of these new-comers into the army afforded him the opportunity for remodelling on several points the organization of his different divisions, the smaller as well as the larger.

After some delay at Susa—and after confirming the Persian Abulites, who had surrendered the city, in his satrapy, yet not without two Grecian officers as guarantees, one commanding the military force, the other governor of the citadel—Alexander crossed the river Euleus or Pasitigris, and directed his march to the south-east towards Persis proper, the ancient hearth or primitive seat from whence the original Persian conquerors had issued.

Between Susa and Persis lay a mountainous region occupied by the Uxii— rude but warlike shepherds, to whom the Great King himself had always been obliged to pay a tribute whenever he went from Susa to Persepolis, being unable with his inefficient military organization to overcome the difficulties of such a pass held by an

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1 Arrian, iii. 16, 16; Curtius, v. 1, 44; Diodor, xvii. 64; Curtius and Diodorus do not exactly coincide with Arrian; but the discrepancy here is not very important.
2 Curtius, v. 1, 42: compare Diodor, xvii. 65; Arrian, iii. 16, 18.
3 Arrian, iii. 16, 20; Curtius, v. 2, 6; Diodor, xvii. 65. Respecting this reorganization, begun now at Susa and carried farther during the next year at Ecbatana, see Ristow and Kochly, Griechisches Kriegswesen, p. 252 svy.

One among the changes now made was, that the divisions of cavalry—which, having hitherto coincided with various local districts or towns in Macedonia, had been officered accordingly—were redistributed and mingled together (Curtius, v. 2, 6).

The Persian Susa was situated between two rivers; the Choaspes (now Kherkha) on the west; the Euleus or Pasitigris, now Karun, on the east; both rivers distinguished for excellent water. The Eulwus appears to have been called Pasatigris in the lower part of its course (Pliny, II. N. xxxi. 21, "Partherorum reges ex Choaspe et Eulaco tantum bibunt."

Ritter has given an elaborate exposition respecting these two rivers and the site of the Persian Susa (Erdkunde, part ix. book iii. West-Asien, p. 291-320).
enemy. The Uxii now demanded the like tribute from Alexander, who replied by inviting them to meet him at their pass and receive it. Meanwhile a new and little frequented mountain track had been made known to him, over which he conducted in person a detachment of troops so rapidly and secretly as to surprise the mountainers in their own villages. He thus not only opened the usual mountain pass for the transit of his main army, but so cut to pieces and humiliated the Uxii, that they were forced to sue for pardon. Alexander was at first disposed to extirpate or expel them; but at length, at the request of the captive Sisygambis, permitted them to remain as subjects of the satrap of Susa, imposing a tribute of sheep, horses, and cattle, the only payment which their poverty allowed.

But bad as the Uxian pass had been, there remained another still worse—called the Susian or Persian gates, in the mountains which surrounded the plain of Persepolis, the centre of Persis proper. Ariobarzanés, satrap of the province, held this pass; a narrow defile walled across, with mountain positions on both sides, from whence the defenders, while out of reach themselves, could shower down missiles upon an approaching enemy. After four days of march, Alexander reached on the fifth day the Susian Gates, which, inexpugnable as they seemed, he attacked on the ensuing morning. In spite of all the courage of his soldiers, however, he sustained loss without damaging his enemy, and was obliged to return to his camp. He was informed that there was no other track by which this difficult pass could be turned; but there was a long circuitous march of many days whereby it might be evaded, and another entrance found into the plain of Persepolis. To recede from any enterprise as impracticable, was a humiliation which Alexander had never yet endured. On farther inquiry, a Lykian captive, who had been for many years tending sheep as a

1 Arrian, iii. 17; Curtius, v. 3, 5–12; Diodor, xvii. 67; Strabo, xv. p. 729. It would seem that the road taken by Alexander in this march, was that described by Kinnair, through Hebelian and Kala-Seid to Shiraz (Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire, p. 72). Nothing can exceed the difficulties of the territory for military operation.

No certainty is attainable, however, respecting the ancient geography of these regions, Mr. Long's Map of Ancient Persia shows how little can be made out.

2 See the instructive notes of Mitzev—on Quintus Curtius, v. 10, 3; and v. 12, 17, discussing the topography of this region, in so far as it is known from modern travellers. He supposes the Susian Gates to have been near Kala-Seidh, west of the plain of Merdasht or Persepolis. Herein he dissent from Ritter, apparently on good grounds, as far as an opinion can be formed.
slave on the mountains, acquainted him with the existence of a track known only to himself, whereby he might come on the flank of Ariobarzanes. Leaving Kraterus in command of the camp, with orders to attack the pass in front, when he should hear the trumpet give signal—Alexander marched forth at night at the head of a light detachment, under the guidance of the Lykian. He had to surmount incredible hardship and difficulty—the more so as it was mid-winter, and the mountain was covered with snow; yet such were the efforts of his soldiers and the rapidity of his movements, that he surprised all the Persian outposts, and came upon Ariobarzanes altogether unprepared. Attacked as they were at the same time by Kraterus also, the troops of the satrap were forced to abandon the Gates, and were for the most part cut to pieces. Many perished in their flight among the rocks and precipices; the satrap himself being one of a few that escaped.

Though the citadel of Persepolis is described as one of the strongest of fortresses, yet after this unexpected conquest of a pass hitherto deemed inexpugnable, few had courage to think of holding it against Alexander. Nevertheless Ariobarzanes, hastening thither from the conquered pass, still strove to organise a defence, and at least to carry off the regal treasure, which some in the town were already preparing to pillage. But Tiridates, commander of the garrison, fearing the wrath of the conqueror, resisted this, and despatched a message entreating Alexander to hasten his march. Accordingly Alexander, at the head of his cavalry, set forth with the utmost speed, and arrived in time to detain and appropriate the whole. Ariobarzanes, in a vain attempt to resist, was slain with all his companions. Persepolis and Pasargadae—the two peculiar capitals of the Persian race, the latter memorable as containing the sepulchre of Cyrus the Great—both fell into the hands of the conqueror.

On approaching Persepolis, the compassion of the army was powerfully moved by the sight of about 800 Grecian captives, all of them mutilated in some frightful and distressing way, by loss of legs, arms, eyes, ears, or some other bodily members. Mutilation was a punishment commonly inflicted in that age by Oriental governors, even by such as were not accounted cruel. Thus Xenophon, in eulogizing the rigid justice of Cyrus the younger, remarks that in the

1 Arrian, iii. 18, 1-14; Curtius, v. 4, 10-20; Diodor. xvii. 68.  
2 Diodor, xvii. 71.
public roads of his satrapy, men were often seen who had been deprived of their arms or legs, or otherwise mutilated, by penal authority. Many of these maimed captives at Persepolis were old, and had lived for years in their unfortunate condition. They had been brought up from various Greek cities by order of some of the preceding Persian kings; but on what pretences they had been thus cruelly dealt with we are not informed. Alexander, moved to tears at such a spectacle, offered to restore them to their respective homes, with a comfortable provision for the future. But most of them felt so ashamed of returning to their homes, that they entreated to be allowed to remain all together in Persis, with lands assigned to them, and with dependent cultivators to raise produce for them. Alexander granted their request in the fullest measure, conferring besides upon each an ample donation of money, clothing, and cattle.

The sight of these mutilated Greeks was well calculated to excite not merely sympathy for them, but rage against the Persians, in the bosoms of all spectators. Alexander seized this opportunity, as well for satiating the anger and cupidity of his soldiers, as for manifesting himself in his self-assumed character of avenger of Greece against the Persians, to punish the wrongs done by Xerxes.

1 Xenoph. Anabas. i. 9, 13. Similar habits have always prevailed among Orientals. "The most atrocious part of the Mahommedan system of punishment is that which regards theft and robbery. Mutilation, by cutting off the hand or the foot, is the prescribed remedy for all higher degrees of the offence." (Mill, History of British India, book iii. ch. 5. p. 447).

"Tippoo Saib used to cut off the right hands and noses of the British camp-followers that fell into his hands." (Elphinstone, Hist. of India, vol. i. p. 390. ch. xi.).

A recent traveller notices the many mutilated persons, female as well as male, who are to be seen in the northern part of Sind (Burton, Scenes in Sind, vol. ii. p. 281).

2 Diodor. xvii. 69; Curtius, v. 5; Justin, xi. 14. Arrian does not mention these mutilated captives; but I see no reason to mistrust the deposition of the three authors by whom it is certified. Curtius talks of 4000 captives; the other two mention 800. Diodorus calls them — "Σάλπερες έπο

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century and a half before. He was now amidst the native tribes and seats of the Persians, the descendants of those rude warriors who, under the first Cyrus, had overspread Western Asia from the Indus to the Ægean. In this their home the Persian kings had accumulated their national edifices, their regal sepulchres, the inscriptions commemorative of their religious or legendary sentiment, with many trophies and acquisitions arising out of their conquests. For the purposes of the Great King's empire, Babylon, or Susa, or Ecbatana, were more central and convenient residences; but Persepolis was still regarded as the heart of Persian nationality. It was the chief magazine, though not the only one; of those annual accumulations from the imperial revenue, which each king successively increased, and which none seems to have ever diminished. Moreover, the Persian grandees and officers, who held the lucrative satrapies and posts of the empire, were continually sending wealth home to Persis, for themselves or their relatives. We may therefore reasonably believe what we find asserted, that Persepolis possessed at this time more wealth, public and private, than any place within the range of Grecian or Macedonian knowledge.

Convening his principal officers, Alexander denounced Persepolis as the most hostile of all Asiatic cities—the home of those impious invaders of Greece, whom he had come to attack. He proclaimed his intention of abandoning it to plunder, as well as of burning the citadel. In this resolution he persisted, notwithstanding the remonstrance of Parmenio, who reminded him that the act would be a mere injury to himself by ruining his own property, and that the Asiatics would construe it as evidence of an intention to retire speedily, without founding any permanent dominion in the country. After appropriating the regal treasure—to the alleged amount of 120,000 talents in gold and silver (=27,600,000£ sterling)—Alexander set fire to the citadel. A host

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1 Diodor. xvi. 70. πλουσιώτατης οἰκεία τῶν ἐπὶ τὸν ἕλιον, &c. Curtius, v. 6, 2, 3.
2 Arrian, iii. 18, 18; Diodor. xvi. 70; Curtius, v. 6, 1; Strabo, xv. p. 731.
3 This amount is given both by Diodorus (xvii. 71) and by Curtius (v. 6, 9). We see however from Strabo that there were different statements as to the amount. Such overwhelming figures deserve no confidence upon any evidence short of an official return. At the same time, we ought to expect a very great sum, considering the long series of years that had been spent in amassing it. Alexander's own letters (Plutarch, Alex. 37) stated that enough was carried away to load 10,000 mule carts and 5000 camels. To explain the fact of a large accumulated treasure in the Persian capitals
of mules, with 5000 camels, were sent for from Mesopotamia and elsewhere, to carry off this prodigious treasure; the whole of which was conveyed out of Persis proper, partly to be taken along with Alexander himself in his ulterior marches, partly to be lodged in Susa and Ecbatana. Six thousand talents more, found in Pasargadae, were added to the spoil. The persons and property of the inhabitants were abandoned to the licence of the soldiers, who obtained an immense booty, not merely in gold and silver, but also in rich clothing, furniture, and ostentatious ornaments of every kind. The male inhabitants were slain, the females dragged into servitude; except such as obtained safety by flight, or burned themselves with their property in their own houses. Among the soldiers themselves, much angry scrambling took place for the possession of precious articles, not without occa-

it must be remarked, that what we are accustomed to consider as expenses of government, were not defrayed out of the regal treasure. The military force, speaking generally, was not paid by the Great King, but summoned by requisition from the provinces, upon which the cost of maintaining the soldiers fell, over and above the ordinary tribute. The king's numerous servants and attendants received no pay in money, but in kind; provisions for maintaining the court with its retinue were furnished by the provinces, over and above the tribute. See Herodot. i. 192; and ii. 91—and a good passage of Heren, setting forth the small public disbursements out of the regal treasure, in his account of the interior constitution of the ancient Persian Empire (Ideen iiber die Politik und den Verkehr der Volker der alten Welt, part i. abth. 1. p. 511-519).

Respecting modern Persia, Jaubert remarks (Voyage en Arménie et en Perse, Paris, 1821, p. 272. ch. 39)—"Si les sommes que Ton verse dans le trésor du Sha n'ont pas excité les commerçants, comparativement à l'étendue et à la population de la Perse, elles n'en sortent pas non plus que pour des dépenses indispensables qui n'ont absorbé que l'unité. Le reste est converti en lingots, en pierres précieuses, et en divers objets d'une grande valeur et d'un transport facile en cas d'événement; ce qui doit suffire pour empêcher qu'on ne trouve excédant les rapports que tous les voyageurs ont faits de la magnificence de la cour de Perse. Les Persans sont assez clairvoyants pour pénétrer les motifs réels qui portent Fath Ali Shah à thésauriser."

When Nadir-Shah conquered the Mogul Emperor Mahomed, and entered Delhi in 1739,—the imperial treasure and effects which fell into his hands is said to have amounted to 32,000,000, sterling, besides heavy contributions levied on the inhabitants (Mill, History of British India, vol. ii. B. iii. ch. 4, p. 493).—Runjeet Sing left at his death (1818) a treasure of 8,000,000, sterling, with jewels and other effects to several millions more. (The Punjab, by Col. Steinbach, p. 16. London, 1845.)

Mr. Mill remarks, in another place, that "in Hindostan, gold, silver, and gems are most commonly hoarded, and not devoted to production" (vol. 1. p. 254. B. ii. ch. 5):

Herodotus (iii. 90) tells us that the gold and silver brought to the Persian regal treasure was poured in a melted state into earthen vessels; when it cooled, the earthen vessel was withdrawn, and the solid metallic mass left standing; a portion of it was cut off when occasion required for disbursements. This practice warrants the supposition that a large portion of it was habitually accumulated, and not expended.

1 Arrian, iii. 18, 17. He does not give the amount, which I transcribe from Curtius, v. 6, 10.
2 Diodor. xvii. 70. OI Μακεδόνες ἔτηκαν, τοὺς μὲν ἄνδρας πάντας φοινικίσαντες, τὰς δὲ κτήσεις διαμπάζοντες, &c. Curtius, v. 6, 6.
As soon as their ferocity and cupidity had been satiated, Alexander arrested the massacre. His encouragement and sanction of it was not a burst of transient fury, provoked by unexpected length of resistance, such as the hanging of the 2000 Tyrians and the dragging of Batis at Gaza—but a deliberate proceeding, intended partly as a recompense and gratification to the soldiery, but still more as an imposing manifestation of retributive vengeance against the descendants of the ancient Persian invaders.

In his own letters seen by Plutarch, Alexander described the massacre of the native Persians as having been ordered by him on grounds of state policy.

As it was now winter or very early spring, he suffered his main army to enjoy a month or more of respite at or near Persepolis. But he himself, at the head of a rapidly moving division, traversed the interior of Persis proper; conquering or receiving into submission the various towns and villages. The greatest resistance which he experienced was offered by the rude and warlike tribe called the Mardi; but worse than any enemy was the severity of the season and the rugged destitution of a frozen country. Neither physical difficulties, however, nor human enemies, could arrest the march of Alexander. He returned from his expedition, complete master of Persis; and in the spring, quitted that province with his whole army, to follow Darius into Media. He left only a garrison of

1 Diodor. xvii. 70, 71; Curtius, v. 6, 3-7. These two authors concur in the main features of the massacre and plunder in Persepolis, permitted to the soldiers by Alexander. Arrian does not mention it: he mentions only the deliberate resolution of Alexander to burn the palace or citadel, out of revenge on the Persian name. And such feeling, assuming it to exist, would naturally dictate the general license to plunder and massacre. Himself entertaining such vindictive feeling, and regarding it as legitimate, Alexander would either presume it to exist, or love to kindle it, in his soldiers; by whom indeed the license to plunder would be sufficiently welcomed, with or without any antecedent sentiment of vengeance.

The story (told by Diodorus, Curtius, and Plutarch, Alex. 38) that Alexander, in the drunkenness of a banquet, was first instigated by the courtezan Thais to set fire to the palace of Persepolis, and accompanied her to begin the conflagration with his own hand—may perhaps be so far true, that he really showed himself in the scene and helped in the burning. But that his resolution to burn was deliberately taken, and even maintained against the opposition of esteemed officers, is established on the authority of Arrian.

2 Plutarch, Alexand. 37. Φόνον μὲν οὖν ἐνταῦθα πολὺν τῶν ἁλισκομένων γενέσθαι συνέπεσε' γράφει γὰρ αὐτὸς ἅπας, ὥς νομίζει εὐφράτης τὸν νόμον αὐτὴς τοῦτον λυσιτελεῖν ἐκφέρεν, ἐτελεῖν τὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπους νομισματος δὲ εἰρήκει πλὴθος δύον ἐν Σούσοις, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην κατασκεύασε καὶ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐκκομίσθηναί φησι μυρίοις ἄτομοι καὶ πεντακισχιλίαι εἰκόνες. That ἐνταῦθα means Persepolis, is shown by the immediately following comparison with the treasure found at Susa.

3 Diod. xvii. 73; Curtius, v. 6, 12-20.
3000 Macedonians at Persepolis, preserving to Tiridatès, who had surrendered to him the place, the title of satrap.¹

Darius was now a fugitive, with the mere title of king, and with a simple body-guard rather than an army. On leaving Arbêla after the defeat, he had struck in an easterly direction across the mountains into Media; having only a few attendants round him, and thinking himself too happy to preserve his own life from an indefatigable pursuer.² He calculated that once across these mountains, Alexander would leave him for a time unmolested, in haste to march southward for the purpose of appropriating the great and real prizes of the campaign—Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis. The last struggles of this ill-starred prince will be recounted in another chapter.

¹ Curtius, v. 6, 11. ² Arrian, iii. 16, 1-4.
CHAPTER XCIV.

MILITARY OPERATIONS AND CONQUESTS OF ALEXANDER, AFTER HIS WINTER-QUARTERS IN PERSIS, DOWN TO HIS DEATH AT BABYLON.

From this time forward to the close of Alexander's life—a period of about seven years—his time was spent in conquering the eastern half of the Persian empire, together with various independent tribes lying beyond its extreme boundary. But neither Greece, nor Asia Minor, nor any of his previous western acquisitions, was he ever destined to see again.

Now, in regard to the history of Greece—the subject of these volumes—the first portion of Alexander's Asiatic campaigns (from his crossing the Hellespont to the conquest of Persis, a period of four years, March 334 B.C. to March 330 B.C.), though not of direct bearing, is yet of material importance. Having in his first year completed the subjugation of the Hellenic world, he had by these subsequent campaigns absorbed it as a small fraction into the vast Persian empire, renovated under his imperial sceptre. He had accomplished a result substantially the same as would have been brought about if the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, destined, a century and a half before, to incorporate Greece with the Persian monarchy, had succeeded instead of failing. Towards the kings of Macedonia alone, the subjugation of Greece would never have become complete, so long as she could receive help from the native Persian kings—who were perfectly adequate as a countervailing and tutelary force, had they known how to play their game. But all hope for Greece from without was extinguished, when Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis became subject to the same ruler as Pella and Amphipolis—and that ruler too, the ablest general, and most insatiate aggressor, of his age; to whose name was attached the prestige of success almost superhuman. Still, against even this

1 Compare the language addressed by the mouth of Xerxes, when announcing his intended expedition against Greece (Herodot. vii. 8), with that which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Alexander to his weary soldiers, on the banks of the Hyphasis (Arrian, v. 26).
overwhelming power, some of the bravest of the Greeks at home tried to achieve their liberation with the sword: we shall see presently how sadly the attempt miscarried.

But though the first four years of Alexander's Asiatic expedition, in which he conquered the Western half of the Persian empire, had thus an important effect on the condition and destinies of the Grecian cities—his last seven years, on which we are now about to enter, employed chiefly in conquering the Eastern half, scarcely touched these cities in any way. The stupendous marches to the rivers Jaxartes, Indus, and Hyphasis, which carried his victorious armies over so wide a space of Central Asia, not only added nothing to his power over the Greeks, but even withdrew him from all dealings with them, and placed him almost beyond their cognizance. To the historian of Greece, therefore, these latter campaigns can hardly be regarded as included within the range of his subject. They deserve to be told as examples of military skill and energy, and as illustrating the character of the most illustrious general of antiquity—one who, though not a Greek, had become the master of all Greeks. But I shall not think it necessary to recount them in any detail, like the battles of Issus and Arbela.

About six or seven months had elapsed from the battle of Arbela to the time when Alexander prepared to quit his most recent conquest—Persis proper. During all this time, Darius had remained at Ekbatana, the chief city of Media, clinging to the hope, that Alexander, when possessed of the three southern capitals and the best part of the Persian empire, might have reached the point of satiety, and might leave him unmolested in the more barren East. As soon as he learnt that Alexander was in movement towards him, he sent forward his harem and his baggage to Hyrkania, on the south-eastern border of the Caspian sea. Himself, with the small force around him, followed in the same direction, carrying off the treasure in the city (7000 talents = 1,610,000).
in amount), and passed through the Caspian Gates into the territory of Parthyène. His only chance was to escape to Baktria at the eastern extremity of the empire, ruining the country in his way for the purpose of retarding pursuers. But this chance diminished every day, from desertion among his few followers, and angry disgust among many who remained.¹

Eight days after Darius had quitted Ekbatana, Alexander entered it. How many days had been occupied in his march from Persepolis, we cannot say; in itself a long march, it had been further prolonged, partly by the necessity of subduing the intervening mountaineers called Paretakeni,² partly by rumours exaggerating the Persian force at Ekbatana, and inducing him to advance with precaution and regular array. Possessed of Ekbatana—the last capital stronghold of the Persian kings, and their ordinary residence during the summer months—he halted to rest his troops, and establish a new base of operations for his future proceedings eastward. He made Ekbatana his principal dépôt; depositing in the citadel, under the care of Harpalus as treasurer, with a garrison of 6000 or 7000 Macedonians, the accumulated treasures of his past conquests out of Susa and Persepolis; amounting, we are told, to the enormous sum of 180,000 talents = 41,400,000£ sterling.³ Parmenio was invested with the chief command of this important post, and of the military force left in Media; of which territory Oxodatés, a Persian who had been imprisoned at Susa by Darius, was named satrap.⁴

At Ekbatana Alexander was joined by a fresh force of 6000 Grecian mercenaries,⁵ who had marched from Kilikia into the interior, probably crossing the Euphrates and Tigris at the same points as Alexander himself had crossed. Hence he was enabled the better to dismiss his Thessalian cavalry, with other Greeks who had been serving during his four years of Asiatic war, and who now wished to go home.⁶ He distributed among them the sum of 2000 talents in addition to their full pay, and gave them the price of their horses, which they sold before departure.

1 Arrian, iii. 19, 2-9; iii. 20, 3.
2 Arrian, iii. 19, 5.
3 Arrian, iii. 19, 14; Diodor. xvii. 80. Diodorus had before added (xvii. 66, 71) the treasure in Susa as being 42,000 talents, and that in Persepolis as 120,000. Arrian announces the treasure in Susa as 50,000 talents—Curtius gives the uncoined gold and silver alone as 50,000 talents (v. 8, 11). The treasure of both places was transported to Ekbatana.
4 Arrian, iii. 20, 4.
5 Curtius, v. 23, 12.
6 Arrian, iii. 18, 10: compare v. 27, 7.
The operations which he was now about to commence against the eastern territories of Persia were not against regular armies, but against flying corps and distinct native tribes, relying for defence chiefly on the difficulties which mountains, deserts, privation, or mere distance, would throw in the way of an assailant. For these purposes he required an increased number of light troops, and was obliged to impose even upon his heavy-armed cavalry the most rapid and fatiguing marches, such as none but his Macedonian Companions would have been contented to execute; moreover he was called upon to act less with large masses, and more with small and broken divisions. He now therefore for the first time established a regular Taxis, or division of horse-bowmen.¹

Remaining at Ekbatana no longer than was sufficient for these new arrangements, Alexander recommenced his pursuit of Darius. He hoped to get before Darius to the Caspian Gates, at the north-eastern extremity of Media; by which Gates² was understood a mountain-pass, or rather a road of many hours' march, including several difficult passes stretching eastward along the southern side of the great range of Taurus towards Parthia. He marched with his Companion-cavalry, the light-horse, the Agrianians, and the bowmen—the greater part of the phalanx keeping up as well as it could—to Rhage, about fifty miles north of the Caspian Gates; which town he reached in eleven

¹ Arrian, iii. 24, 1. ἢδη γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ἱππακοντισταὶ τάξις.
² The passes called the Caspian Gates appear to be those described by Morier, Fraser, and other modern travellers, as the series of narrow valleys and defiles called Ser-Desch, Sirdari, or Serdara Khan,—on the southernmost of the two roads which lead eastward from Teheran towards Damaghan, and thence farther eastward towards Meshed and Herat. See the note of Miletz in his edition of Curtius, v. 35, 2, p. 489; also Morier, Second Journey through Persia, p. 368; Fraser's Narrative of a Journey into Khorasan, p. 291.

The long range of mountains, called by the ancients Taurus, extends from Lesser Media and Armenia in an easterly direction along the southern coast of the Caspian Sea. Its northern declivity, covered by prodigious forests with valleys and plains of no great breadth reaching to the Caspian, comprehends the moist and fertile territories now denominated Ghilan and Mazanderan. The eastern portion of Mazanderan was known in ancient times as Hyrkania, then productive and populous; while the mountain range itself was occupied by various rude and warlike tribes—Kadusii, Mardi, Tapyri, &c. The mountain range, now called Elburz, includes among other lofty eminences the very high peak of Damavand. The road from Eberuana to Baktria, along which both the flight of Darius and the pursuit of Alexander lay, passed along the broken ground skirting the southern flank of the mountain range Elburz. Of this broken ground the Caspian Gates formed the worst and most difficult portion.
days, by exertions so severe that many men as well as horses were disabled on the road. But in spite of all speed, he learnt that Darius had already passed through the Caspian Gates. After five days of halt at Rhaga, indispensable for his army, Alexander passed them also. A day’s march on the other side of them, he was joined by two eminent Persians, Bagistanês and Antiôbelus, who informed him that Darius was already dethroned and in imminent danger of losing his life.¹

The conspirators by whom this had been done, were Bessus, satrap of Baktria—Parsaentês, satrap of Drangiana and Arachosia—and Nabarzanes, general of the regal guards. The small force of Darius having been thinned by daily desertion, most of those who remained were the contingents of the still unconquered territories, Baktria, Arachosia, and Drangiana, under the orders of their respective satraps. The Grecian mercenaries, 1500 in number, and Artabazus, with a band under his special command, adhered inflexibly to Darius, but the soldiers of Eastern Asia followed their own satraps. Bessus and his colleagues intended to make their peace with Alexander by surrendering Darius, should Alexander pursue so vigorously as to leave them no hope of escape; but if they could obtain time to reach Baktria and Sogdiana, they resolved to organise an energetic resistance, under their own joint command; for the defence of those eastern provinces—the most warlike population of the empire.² Under the desperate circumstances of the case, this plan was perhaps the least unpromising that could be proposed. The chance of resisting Alexander, small as it was at the best, became absolutely nothing under the command of Darius, who had twice set the example of flight from the field of battle, betraying both his friends and his empire, even when surrounded by the full force of Persia. For brave and energetic Persians, unless they were prepared at once to submit to the invader, there was no choice but to set aside Darius; nor does it appear that the conspirators intended at first anything worse. At a village called Thara in Parthia, they bound him in chains of gold—placed him in a covered chariot surrounded by the Baktrian troops—and thus carried him onward, retreating as fast as they could; Bessus assuming the command. Artabazus, with the Grecian mercenaries, too feeble to prevent the proceeding, quitted the army in disgust,

¹ Arrian, iii. 20, 21. ² Masistês, after the shocking outrage upon his wife by Queen Amestris, was going to Baktria to organise a revolt; see Herodot, ix. 113—about the importance of that satrapy.
and sought refuge among the mountains of the Tapyri bordering on Hyrkania towards the Caspian Sea.

On hearing this intelligence, Alexander strained every nerve to overtake the fugitives and get possession of the person of Darius. At the head of his Companion-cavalry, his light-horse, and a body of infantry picked out for their strength and activity, he put himself in instant march, with nothing but arms and two days' provisions for each man; leaving Kraterus to bring on the main body by easier journeys. A forced march of two nights and one day, interrupted only by a short midday repose (it was now the month of July), brought him at daybreak to the Persian camp which his informant Bagistanés had quitted. But Bessus and his troops were already beyond it, having made considerable advance in their flight; upon which Alexander, notwithstanding the exhaustion both of men and horses, pushed on with increased speed through all the night to the ensuing day at noon. He there found himself in the village where Bessus had encamped on the preceding day. Yet learning from deserters that his enemies had resolved to hasten their retreat by night marches, he despaired of overtaking them, unless he could find some shorter road. He was informed that there was another shorter, but leading through a waterless desert. Setting out by this road late in the day with his cavalry, he got over no less than forty-five miles during the night, so as to come on Bessus by complete surprise on the following morning. The Persians, marching in disorder without arms, and having no expectation of an enemy, were so panic-struck at the sudden appearance of their indefatigable conqueror, that they dispersed and fled without any attempt to resist. In this critical moment, Bessus and Barsacrites urged Darius to leave his chariot, mount his horse, and accompany them in their flight. But he refused to comply. They were determined however that he should not fall alive into the hands of Alexander, whereby his name would have been employed against them, and would have materially lessened their chance of defending the eastern provinces; they were moreover incensed by his refusal, and had contracted a feeling of hatred and contempt to which

1 Agrian, iii, 21-23. Justin (xi. 15) specifies the name of the place—Thara. Both he and Curtius mention the golden chains (Curtius, v. 34, 20). Probably the conspirators made use of some chains which had formed a part of the ornaments of the royal wardrobe. Among the presents given by Darius son of Hystaspes to the surgeon Damoskölös, there were two pairs of golden chains—Δειδήπερον δυάς μοι Δαμασκόλου χρυσέων δύο σχημάτων—Herodot. iii. 139; compare iii. 15. The Persian king and grandees luxuriously wore golden chains round neck and arms.
they were glad to give effect. Casting their javelins at him, they left him mortally wounded, and then pursued their flight. His chariot, not distinguished by any visible mark, nor known even to the Persian soldiers themselves, was for some time not detected by the pursuers. At length a Macedonian soldier named Polystratus found him expiring, and is said to have received his last words; wherein he expressed thanks to Alexander for the kind treatment of his captive female relatives, and satisfaction that the Persian throne, lost to himself, was about to pass to so generous a conqueror. It is at least certain that he never lived to see Alexander himself.

Alexander had made the prodigious and indefatigable marches of the last four days, not without destruction to many men and horses, for the express purpose of taking Darius alive. It would have been a gratification to his vanity to exhibit the Great King as a helpless captive, rescued from his own servants by the sword of his enemy, and spared to occupy some subordinate command as a token of ostentatious indulgence. Moreover, apart from such feelings, it would have been a point of real advantage to seize the person of Darius, by means of whose name Alexander would have been enabled to stifle all farther resistance in the extensive and imperfectly known regions eastward of the Caspian Gates. The satraps of these regions had now gone thither with their hands free, to kindle as much Asiatic sentiment and levy as large a force as they could, against the Macedonian conqueror; who was obliged to follow them, if he wished to complete the subjugation of the empire. We can understand therefore that Alexander was deeply mortified in deriving no result from this ruinously fatiguing march, and can the better explain that savage wrath which we shall hereafter find him manifesting against the satrap Bessus.

1 Harum spuld Medos regum errori; unaque cumque
Pars manet generi: quamvis crudelibus
Pars dominus.

2° This account of the remarkable incidents immediately preceding the death of Darius, is taken mainly from Arrian (iii. 21), and seems one of the most authentic chapters of his work. He is very sparing in telling what passed in the Persian camp; he mentions indeed only the communications made by the Persian deserters to Alexander. Curtius (v. 27–34) gives the narrative far more vaguely and loosely than Arrian, but with ample details of what was going on in the Persian camp. We should have been glad to know from whom those details were borrowed. In the main they do not contradict the narrative of Arrian, but rather amplify and dilute it.

Diodorus (xvii. 73), Plutarch (Alexander, 42, 43), and Justin (xi. 15) give no new information.
Alexander caused the body of Darius to be buried, with full pomp and ceremonial, in the regal sepulchres of Persis. The last days of this unfortunate prince have been described with almost tragic pathos by historians; and there are few subjects in history better calculated to excite such a feeling, if we regard simply the magnitude of his fall, from the highest pitch of power and splendour to defeat, degradation, and assassination. But an impartial review will not allow us to forget that the main cause of such ruin was his own blindness—his long apathy after the battle of Issus, and abandonment of Tyre and Gaza, in the fond hope of repurchasing queens whom he had himself exposed to captivity—lastly, what is still less pardonable, his personal cowardice in both the two decisive battles deliberately brought about by himself. If we follow his conduct throughout the struggle, we shall find little of that which renders a defeated prince either respectable or interesting. Those who had the greatest reason to denounce and despise him were his friends and countrymen, whom he possessed ample means of defending, yet threw those means away. On the other hand, no one had better grounds for indulgence towards him than his conqueror; for whom he had kept unused the countless treasures of the three capitals, and for whom he had lightened in every way the difficulties of a conquest, in itself hardly less than impracticable.

The recent forced march, undertaken by Alexander for the purpose of securing Darius as a captive, had been distressing in the extreme to his soldiers, who required a certain period of repose and compensation. This was granted to them at the town of Hekatompylus in Parthia, where the whole army was again united. Besides abundant supplies from the neighbouring region, the soldiers here received a donative derived from the large booty taken in the camp of Darius. In the enjoyment and revelry universal throughout the army, Alexander himself partook. His indulgences in the banquet and in wine-drinking, to which he

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1 Arrian (iii. 22) gives an indulgent criticism on Darius, dwelling chiefly upon his misfortunes, but calling him ἄθρα ὡς μεν πολέμια, εἰπή τινι θλήνη, μελάνθων τε καὶ οὐ φρενήρει, &c.
2 Curtius, vi. 3, 10; vi. 6, 15. Diodor, xvii. 74. Hekatompylus was an important position, where several roads joined (Polyb. x. 23). It was situated on one of the roads running eastward from the Caspian Gates, on the southern flank of Mount Taurus (Elburz). Its locality cannot be fixed with certainty; Ritter (Erdkunde, part viii. 405, 467) with others conceives it to have been near Damaghan; Forbiger (Handbuch der Alten Geographie, vol. ii. p. 349) places it farther eastward, near the Jaxartes. Mr. Long notes it on his map as site unknown.
Gradual aggravation of these new habits, from the present moment.

was always addicted when leisure allowed, were now unusually multiplied and prolonged. Public solemnities were celebrated, together with theatrical exhibitions by artists who joined the army from Greece. But the change of most importance in Alexander's conduct was, that he now began to feel and act manifestly as successor of Darius on the Persian throne; to disdain the comparative simplicity of Macedonian habits, and to assume the pomp, the ostentations apparatus of luxuries, and even the dress, of a Persian king.

To many of Alexander's soldiers, the conquest of Persia appeared to be consummated and the war finished, by the death of Darius. They were reluctant to exchange the repose and enjoyments of Hekatompylus for fresh fatigues; but Alexander, assembling the select regiments, addressed to them an emphatic appeal which revived the ardour of all. His first march was across one of the passes from the south to the north of Mount Elburz, into Hyrkania, the region bordering the southeastern corner of the Caspian Sea. Here he found no resistance; the Hyrkanian satrap Phrataphernes, together with Naburzanës, Artabazus, and other eminent Persians, surrendered themselves to him, and were favourably received. The Greek mercenaries, 1500 in number, who had served with Darius, but had retired when that monarch was placed under arrest by Bessus, sent envoys requesting to be allowed to surrender on capitulation. But Alexander—reproaching them with guilt for having taken service with the Persians, in contravention of the vote passed by the Hellenic synod—required them to surrender at discretion; which they expressed their readiness to do, praying that an officer might be despatched to conduct them to him in safety. The Macedonian Andromkus was sent for this purpose, while Alexander undertook an expedition into the mountains of the Mardi; a name seemingly borne by several distinct tribes in parts remote from each other, but all poor and brave mountainers. These Mardi occupied parts of the northern slope of the range of Mount Elburz, a few miles from the Caspian Sea (Mazanderan and Ghilan). Alexander pursued them into all their retreats,—overcame them, when they stood on their defence, with great slaughter,—and reduced the remnant of the half-destroyed tribes to sue for peace.

1 This was attested by his own letters to Antipater, which Plutarch had seen (Plutarch, Alexander, 47). Curtius composed a long speech for Alexander (vi, 7, 9).

2 Arrian, iii, 23, 15.

3 Arrian, iii, 24, 4. In reference to the mountain tribes called Mardi, who are mentioned in several different loca-
From this march, which had carried him in a westerly direction, he returned to Hyrkania. At the first halt he was met by the Grecian mercenaries who came to surrender themselves, as well as by various Grecian envoys from Sparta, Chalkedon, and Sinopé, who had accompanied Darius in his flight. Alexander put the Lacedamomians under arrest, but liberated the other envoys, considering Chalkedon and Sinopé to have been subjects of Darius, not members of the Hellenic synod. As to the mercenaries, he made a distinction between those who had enlisted in the Persian service before the recognition of Philip as leader of Greece, and those whose enlistment had been of later date. The former he liberated at once; the latter he required to remain in his service under the command of Andronikus, on the same pay as they had hitherto received. Such was the untoward conclusion of Grecian mercenary service with Persia; a system whereby the Persian monarchs, had they known how to employ it with tolerable ability, might well have maintained their empire even against such an enemy as Alexander.

After fifteen days of repose and festivity at Zeudracarta, the chief town of Hyrkania, Alexander marched eastward with his united army through Parthia into Aria—the region adjoining the modern Herat with its river now known as Herrood. Satibarzanes, the satrap of Aria, came to him near the border, to a town named Susia, submitted, and was allowed to retain his satrapy, while Alexander, merely skirting the northern border of Aria, marched in a direction nearly east towards Baktia against the satrap Bessus, who was reported as having proclaimed himself King...
of Persia. But it was discovered, after three or four days, that Satibarzanes was in league with Bessus; upon which Alexander suspended for the present his plans against Baktria, and turned by forced marches to Artakoana, the chief city of Aria. His return was so unexpectedly rapid, that the Arians were overawed, and Satibarzanes was obliged to escape. A few days enabled him to crush the disaffected Arians and to await the arrival of his rear division under Kraterus. He then marched southward into the territory of the Drangi, or Drangiana (the modern Seiestan), where he found no resistance—the satrap Barsaentes having sought safety among some of the Indians.

In the chief town of Drangiana occurred the revolting tragedy, of which Philotas was the first victim, and his father Parmenio the second. Parmenio, now seventy years of age, and therefore little qualified for the fatigue inseparable from the invasion of the eastern satrapies, had been left in the important post of commanding the great depot and treasure at Ekbatana. His long military experience, and confidential position even under Philip, rendered him the second person in the Macedonian army, next to Alexander himself. His three sons were all soldiers. The youngest of them, Hektor, had been accidentally drowned in the Nile, while in the suite of Alexander in Egypt; the second, Nikanor, had commanded the hypaspists or light infantry, but had died of illness, fortunately for himself, a short time before; the eldest, Philotas, occupied the high rank of general of the Companion-cavalry, in daily communication with Alexander, from whom he received personal orders.

A revelation came to Philotas, from Kebalinus, brother of a youth named Nikomachus, that a soldier, named Dimnus of Chalastra, had made boast to Nikomachus, his intimate friend or beloved person, under vows of secrecy, of an intended conspiracy against Alexander, inviting him to become an accomplice. Nikomachus, at first...
struck with abhorrence, at length simulated compliance, asked who were the accomplices of Dimnus, and received intimation of a few names; all of which he presently communicated to his brother Kebalinus, for the purpose of being divulged. Kebalinus told the facts to Philotas, entreatimg him to mention them to Alexander. But Philotas, though every day in communication with the king, neglected to do this for two days; upon which Kebalinus began to suspect him of connivance, and caused the revelation to be made to Alexander through one of the pages named Metron. Dimnus was immediately arrested, but ran himself through with his sword, and expired without making any declaration.

Of this conspiracy, real or pretended, every thing rested on the testimony of Nikomachus. Alexander indignantly sent for Philotas, demanding why he had omitted for two days to communicate what he had heard. Philotas replied that the source from which it came was too contemptible to deserve notice—that it would have been ridiculous to attach importance to the simple declarations of such a youth as Nikomachus, recounting the foolish boasts addressed to him by a lover. Alexander received, or affected to receive, the explanation, gave his hand to Philotas, invited him to supper, and talked to him with his usual familiarity.

But it soon appeared that advantage was to be taken of this incident for the disgrace and ruin of Philotas, whose free-spoken criticisms on the pretended divine paternity,—coupled with boasts, that he and his father Parmenio had been chief agents in the conquest of Asia,—had neither been forgotten nor forgiven. These and other self-praises, disparaging to the glory of Alexander, had been divulged by a mistress to whom Philotas was attached; a beautiful Macedonian woman of Pydna, named Antigonè, who, having first been made a prize in visiting Samothrace by the Persian admiral Autophradatès, was afterwards taken amidst the spoils of Damascus by the Macedonians victorious at Issus. The reports of Antigonè, respecting some unguarded language held by Philotas to her, had come to the knowledge of Kraterus, who brought her to Alexander, and caused her to repeat them to him. Alexander desired

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her to take secret note of the confidential expressions of Philotas, and report them from time to time to himself.¹

It thus turned out that Alexander, though continuing to Philotas his high military rank, and talking to him constantly with seeming confidence, had for at least eighteen months, ever since his conquest of Egypt and perhaps even earlier, disliked and suspected him, keeping him under perpetual watch through the suborned and secret communication of a treacherous mistress.² Some of the generals around Alexander—especially Kraterus, the first suborner of Antigone—fomented these suspicions, from jealousy of the great ascendency of Parmenio and his family. Moreover, Philotas himself was ostentatious and overbearing in his demeanour, so as to have made many enemies among the soldiers.³ But whatever may have been his defects on this head—defects which he shared with the other Macedonian generals, all gorged with plunder and presents—⁴ his fidelity as well as his military merits stand attested by the fact that Alexander had continued to employ him in the highest and most confidential command throughout all the long subsequent interval; and that Parmenio was now general at Ekbatana, the most important military appointment which the king had to confer. Even granting the deposition of Nikomachus to be trustworthy, there was nothing to implicate Philotas, whose name had not been included among the accomplices said to have been enumerated by Dimnus. There was not a tittle of evidence against him, except the fact that the deposition had been known to him, and that he had seen Alexander twice without communicating it. Upon this single fact, however, Kraterus and the other enemies of Philotas worked so effectually as to inflame the suspicions and the pre-existing ill-will of Alexander into fierce rancour. He resolved on the disgrace, torture, and death, of Philotas,—and on the death of Parmenio besides.⁵

To accomplish this, however, against the two highest officers in the Macedonian service, one of them enjoying a separate and dis-

¹ Plutarch, Alexand. 48,
² Plutarch, Alexand. 48, 49. Πρὸς δὲ αὐτὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἐκ πάνυ πολλῶν κρυπτῶν ἔτυγχαν διαβεβλημένοι (Philotas); .. . . Ὁ μὲν οὖν Φιλώτας ἐπιβουλεύομεν αὐτῶν ἔτη, καὶ κατὰ τὴν Ἀντιγόνην πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς ῥήματα καὶ μεγαλαυχίαν ῥήματα καὶ ἄλογος κατὰ τὸν βασιλέα ἀνεπιθετῶν φρενάριον.
³ Both Polybius and Aristobulus recognised these previous communications made to Alexander against Philotas in Egypt, but stated that he did not believe them (Arrian, iii. 26, 1).
⁴ Phylarchus, Fragment. 41. Didot, ap. Athenaeum, xii. p. 539; Plutarch, Alexand. 39, 40. Even Eumenes enriched himself much; though being only secretary, and a Greek, he could not take the same liberties as the great native Macedonian generals (Plutarch, Eumenes, 2).
⁵ Plutarch, Alexand. 49; Curtius,
tant command—required management. Alexander was obliged to carry the feelings of the soldiers along with him, and to obtain a condemnation from the army; according to an ancient Macedonian custom, in regard to capital crimes, though (as it seems) not uniformly practised. He not only kept the resolution secret, but is even said to have invited Philotas to supper with the other officers, conversing with him just as usual. In the middle of the night, Philotas was arrested while asleep in his bed,—put in chains,—and clothed in an ignoble garb. A military assembly was convened at daybreak, before which Alexander appeared with the chief officers in his confidence. Addressing the soldiers in a vehement tone of mingled sorrow and anger, he proclaimed to them that his life had just been providentially rescued from a dangerous conspiracy organized by two men hitherto trusted as his best friends—Philotas and Parmenio—through the intended agency of a soldier named Dimnus, who had slain himself when arrested. The dead body of Dimnus was then exhibited to the meeting, while Nikomachus and Kebalinus were brought forward to tell their story. A letter from Parmenio to his sons Philotas and Nikanor, found among the papers seized on the arrest, was read to the meeting. Its terms were altogether vague and unmeaning; but Alexander chose to construe them as it suited his purpose.

We may easily conceive the impression produced upon these assembled soldiers by such denunciations from Alexander himself—revelations of his own personal danger, and reproaches against treacherous friends. Amyntas, and even Kamos, the brother-in-law of Philotas, were yet more unmeasured in their invectives against the accused. They, as well as the other officers with whom the arrest had been concerted, set the example of violent manifestation against him, and ardent sympathy with the king's danger. Philotas was heard in his defence, which, though strenuously denying the charge, is said to have been feeble. It was indeed sure to be so, coming from one seized thus suddenly, and overwhelmed with disadvantages; while a degree of courage, absolutely heroic, would have been required for any one else to rise and presume to criticise the proofs. A soldier named Bolon harangued his comrades on the insupportable insolence of Philotas,

1 Curtius, vi. 9, 16. "Invitatitn est etiam Philotas ad ultimas sibi epulas; et rex non creare molo, sed etiam familiariter colloqui, cum vo quem damnaverat, sustinuit."

2 Arrian, § i. 56, 2. Λέγει δὲ Πτολεμαῖος εἰς Μακεδόνας Φιλώταν, καὶ καταγγέλει αὐτοῖς ἰσχυρὸς Ἀλέξανδρος, &c. Curtius, vi. 9, 15; Diodor. xiii. 86.

3 Curtius, vi. 9, 30.
who always (he said) treated the soldiers with contempt, turning them out of their quarters to make room for his countless retinue of slaves. Though this allegation (probably enough well-founded) was noway connected with the charge of treason against the king, it harmonized fully with the temper of the assembly, and wound them up to the last pitch of fury. The royal pages began the cry, echoed by all around, that they would with their own hands tear the parricide in pieces.

It would have been fortunate for Philotas if their wrath had been sufficiently ungovernable to instigate the execution of such a sentence on the spot. But this did not suit the purpose of his enemies. Aware that he had been condemned upon the regal word, with nothing better than the faintest negative ground of suspicion, they determined to extort from him a confession such as would justify their own purposes, not only against him, but against his father Parmenio—who there was as yet nothing to implicate. Accordingly, during the ensuing night, Philotas was put to the torture. Hephaestion, Kraterus, and Koenus—the last of the three being brother-in-law of Philotas—themselves superintended the ministers of physical suffering. Alexander himself too was at hand, but concealed by a curtain. It is said that Philotas manifested little firmness under torture, and that Alexander, an unseen witness, indulged in sneers against the cowardice of one who had fought by his side in so many battles. All who stood by were enemies, and likely to describe the conduct of Philotas in such manner as to justify their own hatred. The tortures inflicted, cruel in the extreme and long continued, wrung from him at last a confession, implicating his father along with himself. He was put to death; and at the same time, all those whose names had been indicated by Nikomachus, were slain also—apparently by being stoned, without preliminary torture. Philotas had serving in the army a numerous kindred, all of whom were struck with consternation at the news of his being tortured. It was the Macedonian law that

1 Curtius, vi, 11, 8. "Tum vero universa concio accensa est, et ad corpora custodibus initium factum, clamantis, discorpusse esse parricidum menibus sorum. Id quidem Philotas, qui gravior suplpecia metuerat, haud sane iniquo animo audiebat."

2 Curtius, vi, 9, 30; vi, 11, 11.

3 Plutarch, Alexand. 49.

Curtius, vi, 11, 15. "Per ultimos deinde cruciatius, utpote et damnatus et inimicus in gravi regis tormentibus, lacessatur. Ac primo quidem, quamquam hinc ignis, illic verbera, jam non ad questionem, sed ad poenam, ingens, non vox modo, sed etiam genitus habitus in potestate; sed postquam intumescens corpus ulceribus flagellorum ictus mulie osabus incusos ferro non potent," &c.
all kinsmen of a man guilty of treason were doomed to death along with him. Accordingly, some of these men slew themselves, others fled from the camp, seeking refuge wherever they could. Such was the terror and tumult in the camp, that Alexander was obliged to proclaim a suspension of this sanguinary law for the occasion.¹

It now remained to kill Parmenio, who could not be safely left alive after the atrocities used towards Philotas; and to kill him, moreover, before he could have time to hear of them, since he was not only the oldest, most respected, and most influential of all Macedonian officers, but also in separate command of the great depot at Ekbatana. Alexander summoned to his presence one of the Companions named Polydamas; a particular friend, comrade, or aide de camp, of Parmenio. Every friend of Philotas felt at this moment that his life hung by a thread; so that Polydamas entered the king’s presence in extreme terror, the rather as he was ordered to bring with him his two younger brothers. Alexander addressed him, denouncing Parmenio as a traitor, and intimating that Polydamas would be required to carry a swift and confidential message to Ekbatana, ordering his execution. Polydamas was selected as the attached friend of Parmenio, and therefore as best calculated to deceive him. Two letters were placed in his hands, addressed to Parmenio; one from Alexander himself, conveying ostensibly military communications and orders; the other, signed with the seal-ring of the deceased Philotas, and purporting to be addressed by the son to the father. Together with these, Polydamas received the real and important despatch, addressed by Alexander to Kleander and Menidas, the officers immediately subordinate to Parmenio at Ekbatana; proclaiming Parmenio guilty of high treason, and directing them to kill him at once. Large rewards were offered to Polydamas if he performed this commission with success, while his two brothers were retained as hostages against scruples or compunction. He promised even more than was demanded—too happy to purchase this reprieve from what had seemed impending death. Furnished with native guides and with swift dromedaries, he struck by the straightest road across the desert of Khorasan, and arrived at Ekbatana on the eleventh day—a distance usually requiring more than thirty days to traverse.² Entering the camp by night, without the knowledge of Parmenio, he delivered his

¹ Curtius, vi. 11, 20. ² Curtius, vii. 2, 11-18. ³ Strabo, xv. p. 724; Diodor. xvii. 80;
despatch to Kleander, with whom he concerted measures. On the morrow he was admitted to Parmenio, while walking in his garden with Kleander and the other officers marked out by Alexander's order as his executioners. Polydamas ran to embrace his old friend, and was heartily welcomed by the unsuspecting veteran, to whom he presented the letters professedly coming from Alexander and Philotas. While Parmenio was absorbed in the perusal, he was suddenly assailed by a mortal stab from the hand and sword of Kleander. Other wounds were heaped upon him as he fell, by the remaining officers,—the last even after life had departed.\footnote{Curtius, vii. 2, 27. The proceedings respecting Philotas and Parmenio are recounted in the greatest detail by Curtius; but his details are in general harmony with the brief heads given by Arrian from Ptolemy and Aristobulus—except as to one material point. Plutarch (Alex. 49), Diodorus (xvii. 79, 80), and Justin (xii. 5), also state the facts in the same manner. Ptolemy and Aristobulus, according to the narrative of Arrian, appear to have considered that Philotas was really implicated in a conspiracy against Alexander's life. But when we analyse what they are reported to have said, their opinion will not be found entitled to much weight. In the first place, they state (Arr, iii, 26, 1) that the conspiracy of Philotas had been before made known to Alexander while he was in Egypt, but that he did not then believe it. Now eighteen months had elapsed since the stay in Egypt; and the idea of a conspiracy going on for eighteen months is preposterous. That Philotas was in a mood in which he might be supposed likely to conspire, is one proposition; that he actually did conspire, is another; Arrian and his authorities run the two together as if they were one—Arrian and his authorities run the two together as if they were one. As to the evidence purporting to prove that Philotas did conspire, Arrian tells us that "the informers came forward before the assembled soldiers and convicted Philotas with the rest by other indicia not obscure, but chiefly by this—that Philotas confessed to have heard of a conspiracy going on, without mentioning it to Alexander, though twice a day in his presence"—καὶ τοὺς μηνυτὰς τοῦ ἔργου περιελθόντας ἐξελέγξαι Φιλώτας τε καὶ τοὺς ὑμῖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν τε ἐλεγχεῖς οὗτος ἄφαπε, καὶ μᾶλιστα ἐν τῇ ὄλοις ὅτι ἄλλοις πεπύσθαι μὲν—ἀναθεί, &c. What these other indicia were, we are not told; but we may see how slender was their value, when we learn that the non-revelation admitted by Philotas was stronger than any of them. The non-revelation, when we recollect that Nikomachus was the only informant (Arrian loosely talks of μηνυτάς, as if there were more), proves absolutely nothing as to the complicity of Philotas, though it may prove something as to his indiscretion. Even on this minor charge, Curtius puts into his mouth a very sufficient exculpation. But if Alexander had taken a different view, and dismissed or even confined him for it, there would have been little room for remark. The point upon which Arrian is at variance with Curtius, is that he states "Philotas with the rest to have been shot to death by the Macedonians"—thus, seemingly contradicting, at least by implication, the fact of his having been tortured. Now Plutarch, Diodorus, and Justin, all concur with Curtius in affirming that he was tortured. On such a matter, I prefer their united authority to that of Ptolemy and Aristobulus. These two last-mentioned authors were probably quite content to "believe in the complicity of Philotas upon the authority of Alexander himself; without troubling themselves to criticise the proofs. They tell us that Alexander vehemently denounced κατηγορῆσαι ἰσχυρῶς Philotas before the assembled soldiers. After this, any mere shadow or pretence of proof would be sufficient. Moreover, let us recollect that Ptolemy obtained his promotion, to be one of the confidential body guards (σωματοφύλακες), out of this very conspiracy, real or fictitious; he was promoted to the post of the condemned Demetrius (Arrian, iii. 27, 11). How little Ptolemy and Aristobulus cared to do justice to any one whom
The soldiers in Ekbatana, on hearing of this bloody deed, burst into furious mutiny, surrounded the garden wall, and threatened to break in for the purpose of avenging their general, unless Polydamas and the other murderers should be delivered to them. But Kleander, admitting a few of the ringleaders, exhibited to them Alexander’s written orders, to which the soldiers yielded, not without murmurs of reluctance and indignation. Most of them dispersed, yet a few remained, entreating permission to bury Parmenio’s body. Even this was long refused by Kleander, from dread of the king’s displeasure. At last, however, thinking it prudent to comply in part, he cut off the head, delivering to them the trunk alone for burial. The head was sent to Alexander.

Among the many tragical deeds recounted throughout the course of this history, there is none more revolting than the fate of these two generals. Alexander, violent in all his impulses, displayed on this occasion a personal rancour worthy of his ferocious mother Olympias, exasperated rather than softened by the magnitude of past services. When we see the greatest officers of the Macedonian army directing in person, and under the eye of Alexander, the laceration and burning of the naked body of their colleague Philotas, and assassinating with their own hands the veteran Parmenio,—we feel how much we have passed into the region of Greek civic feeling into that of the more savage Illyrian warrior, partially orientalised. It is not surprising to read, that Antipater, viceroy of Macedonia, who had shared with Parmenio the favour and confidence of Philip as well as of Alexander, should tremble when informed of such proceedings, and cast about for a refuge against the like possibilities Alexander hated, may be seen by what they say afterwards about the philosopher Callisthenes. Both of them affirmed that the pages, condemned for conspiracy against Alexander, deposed against Callisthenes as having instigated them to the deed (Arrian, iv. 14, 1). Now we know, from the authority of Alexander himself, whose letters Plutarch quotes (Alexand. 55), that the pages denied the privity of any one else—maintaining the project to have been altogether their own. To their great honour, the pages persisted in this deposition, even under extreme tortures—though they knew that a deposition against Callisthenes was desired from them.

My belief is, that Diodorus, Plutarch, Curtius, and Justin, are correct in stating that Philotas was tortured. Ptolemy and Aristobulus have thought themselves warranted in omitting this fact, which they probably had little satisfaction in reflecting upon. If Philotas was not tortured, there could have been no evidence at all against Parmenio—for the only evidence against the latter was the extorted confession of Philotas.

1 Curtius, vii. 2, 32, 33.
2 Contrast the conduct of Alexander towards Philotas and Parmenio, with that of Cyrus the younger towards the conspirator Orontes, as described in Xenophon, Anabas, i. 6.
to himself. Many other officers were alike alarmed and disgusted with the transactions. 1 Hence Alexander, opening and examining the letters sent home from his army to Macedonia, detected such strong expressions of indignation, that he thought it prudent to transfer many pronounced malcontents into a division by themselves, parting them off from the remaining army. 2 Instead of appointing any substitute for Philotas in the command of the Companion-cavalry, he cast that body into two divisions, nominating Hephæston to the command of one, and Kleitus to that of the other. 3

The autumn and winter were spent by Alexander in reducing Drangiana, Gedrosia, Arachosia, and the Paropamisade; the modern Sciestan, Afghanistan, and the western part of Kabul, lying between Ghazna on the north, Kandahar or Kelat on the south, and Furrab in the west. He experienced no combined resistance, but his troops suffered severely from cold and privation. 4 Near the southern termination of one of the passes of the Hindoo-Koosh (apparently north-east of the town of Kabul) he founded a new city, called Alexandria ad Caucasum, where he planted 7000 old soldiers, Macedonians, and others as colonists. 5 Towards the close

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1 Plutarch, Alexand. 49.
2 Curtius, vii. 2, 36; Diodor, xvii. 80; Justin, xii. 5.
3 Arrian, iii. 27, 8.
4 Arrian, iii. 28, 2. About the geography, compare Wilson's Ariana Antiqua, p. 173-178. "By perambulator, the distance from Herat to Kandahar is 371 miles; from Kandahar to Kabul, 309 miles; total 680 miles (English)."
5 The principal city in Drangiana (Sciestan) mentioned by the subsequent Greek geographers is, Proplithasia; existing seemingly before Alexander's arrival. See the fragments of his works, ap. Didot, Fragm. Hist. Alex. Magn. p. 153; Pliny, H. N. vi. 21. The quantity of remains of ancient cities, still to be found in this territory, is remarkable. Wilson observes this (p. 154).
6 Arrian, iii. 28, 6; Curtius, vii. 3, 23; Diodor, xvii. 83. Alexandria in Aris is probably Herat; Alexandria in Arachosia is probably Kandahar. But neither the one nor the other is mentioned as having been founded by Alexander, either in Arrian or Curtius, or Diodorus. The name Alexandria does not prove that they were founded by him; for several of the Diadochi called their own foundations by his name (Strabo, xiii, p. 513). Considering how very short a time Alexander spent in these regions, the wonder is that he could have found time to establish those foundations which are expressly ascribed to him by Arrian and his other historians. The authority of Pliny and Steph. Byzant. is hardly sufficient to warrant us in ascribing to him more. The exact site of Alexandria ad Caucasum cannot be determined, for want of sufficient topographical data. There seems much probability that it was at the place called Beghram, twenty-five miles north-east of Kabul—in the way between Kabul on the south side of the Hindoo-Koosh, and Anderab on the north side. The prodigious number of coins and relics, Greek as well as Mahometan, discovered by Mr. Masson at Beghram, supply better evidence for identifying the site with that of Alexandria ad Caucasum, than can be pleaded on behalf of any other locality. See Masson's Narrative of Journeys in Afghanistan, &c., vol. iii. ch. 7. p. 148 seqq.
7 In crossing the Hindoo-Koosh from
of winter he crossed over the mighty range of the Hindoo-Koosh; a march of fifteen days through regions of snow, and fraught with hardship to his army. On reaching the north side of these mountains, he found himself in Baktia.

The Baktrian leader Bessus, who had assumed the title of king, could muster no more than a small force, with which he laid waste the country, and then retired across the river Oxus into Sogdiana, destroying all the boats. Alexander overran Baktria with scarce any resistance; the chief places, Baktra (Balkh) and Aornos surrendering to him on the first demonstration of attack. Having named Artabazus satrap of Baktria, and placed Archelaus with a garrison in Aornos, he marched northward towards the river Oxus, the boundary between Baktria and Sogdiana. It was a march of extreme hardship; reaching for two or three days across a sandy desert destitute of water; and under very hot weather. The Oxus, six furlongs in breadth, deep, and rapid, was the most formidable river that the Macedonians had yet seen. Alexander transported his army across it on the tent-skins inflated and stuffed with straw. It seems surprising that Bessus did not avail himself of this favourable opportunity for resisting a passage in itself so difficult; he had however been abandoned by his Baktrian cavalry at the moment when he quitted their territory. Some of his companions, Spitamenés and others, terrified at the news that Alexander had crossed the Oxus, were anxious to make their own peace by betraying their leader. They sent a proposition to this effect; upon

South to north, Alexander probably reached by the pass of Baniad, which was the only one among the four passes open to an army in the winter. See Wood's Journey to the Oxus, p. 195.

1 Arrian, iii. 28, 4; Curtius, vi. 5, 1. 2 Arrian, iii. 29, 4; Strabo, xi. p. 509. Evidently Ptolemy and Aristobulus were much more awe-struck with the Oxus than with either the Tigris or the Euphrates. Arrian (iv. 6, 14) takes his standard of comparison, in regard to rivers, from the river Peneius in Thessaly.

Curtius, vii. 5, 10. The exactness of Quintus Curtius, in describing the general features of Baktria and Sogdiana, is attested in the strongest language by modern travellers. See Burnes's Travels into Bokhara, vol. ii. ch. 8, p. 211, 2nd edit.; also Morier, Second Journey into Persia, p. 282.

But in the geographical details of the country, we are at fault. We have not sufficient data to identify more than one or two of the localities mentioned, in the narrative of Alexander's proceedings, either by Curtius or Arrian. That Marakanda is the modern Samarkand—the river Polytimetus, the modern Kohik—and Baktra or Zanisp the modern Balkh—appears certain; but the attempts made by commentators to assign the site of other places are not such as to carry conviction.

In fact, these countries, at the present moment, are known only superficially as to their general scenery; for purposes of measurement and geography, they are almost unknown; as may be seen by any one who reads the Introduction to Eiskign's translation of the Memoirs of Sultan Baber.
which Ptolemy with a light division was sent forward by Alexander, and was enabled, by extreme celerity of movements, to surprise and seize Bessus in a village. Alexander ordered that he should be held in chains, naked and with a collar round his neck, at the side of the road along which the army were marching. On reaching the spot; Alexander stopped his chariot, and sternly demanded from Bessus, on what pretence he had first arrested, and afterwards slain, his king and benefactor Darius. Bessus replied, that he had not done this single-handed; others were concerned in it along with him, to procure for themselves lenient treatment from Alexander. The king said no more, but ordered Bessus to be scourged, and then sent back as prisoner to Baktra—where we shall again hear of him.

In his onward march, Alexander approached a small town, inhabited by the Branchidae; descendants of those Branchidae near Miletus on the coast of Ionia, who had administered the great temple and oracle of Apollo on Cape Poseidion, and who had yielded up the treasures of that temple to the Persian king Xerxes, 150 years before. This surrender had brought upon them so much odium, that when the dominion of Xerxes was overthrown on the coast, they retired with him into the interior of Asia. Assigned to them lands in the distant region of Sogdiana, where their descendants had ever since remained; bilingual and partially dishevelled, yet still attached to their traditions and origin. Delighted to find themselves once more in commerce with Greeks, they poured forth to meet and welcome the army, tendering all that they possessed. Alexander, when he heard who they were and what was their parentage, desired the Milesians in his army to determine how they should be treated. But as these Milesians were neither decided nor unanimous, Alexander announced that he would determine for himself. Having first occupied the city in person with a select detachment, he posted his army all round the walls, and then gave orders not only to plunder it, but to massacre the entire population—men, women, and children. They were slain without arms or attempt at resistance, resorting to nothing but prayers and suppliant manifestations. Alexander next commanded the walls to

\[1\] Arrian, iii, 39, 5-10. These details are peculiarly authentic, as coming from Ptolemy, the person chiefly concerned.

Aristobulus agreed in the description of the guise in which Bessus was exhibited, but stated that he was brought up in this way by Spitamenes and Datisphernes. Curtius (vii, 24, 32) follows this version. Diodorus also gives an account very like it, mentioning nothing about Ptolemy (xvii, 83).
be levelled, and the sacred groves cut down, so that no habitable site might remain; nor any thing except solitude and sterility. Such was the revenge taken upon these unhappy victims for the deeds of their ancestors in the fourth or fifth generation before. Alexander doubtless considered himself to be executing the wrath of Apollo against an accursed race who had robbed the temple of the God. The Macedonian expedition had been proclaimed to be undertaken originally for the purpose of revenging upon the contemporary Persians the ancient wrongs done to Greece by Xerxes; so that Alexander would follow out the same sentiment in revenging upon the contemporary Branchidae the acts of their ancestors—yet more guilty than Xerxes, in his belief. The massacre of this unfortunate population was in fact an example of human sacrifice on the largest scale, offered to the Gods by the religious impulses of Alexander, and worthy to be compared to that of the Carthaginian general Hannibal, when he sacrificed 3000 Grecian prisoners on the field of Himera, where his grandfather Hamilcar had been slain seventy years before.

Alexander then continued his onward progress, first to Marakanda (Samarcand), the chief town of Sogdiana—next to the river

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1 Curtius, vii. 23; Plutarch de Seraphinum Vindicta, p. 557 B; Strabo, xi. p. 518, compare also xiv. p. 631, and xvii. p. 814. This last-mentioned passage of Strabo helps us to understand the peculiarly strong pious favour with which Alexander regarded the temple and oracle of Branchidae. At the time when Alexander went up to the oracle of Ammon in Egypt, for the purpose of affixing himself to Zeus Ammon, there came to him envoys from Miletus announcing that the oracle at Branchidae, which had been silent ever since the time of Xerxes, had just begun again to give prophecy, and had certified the fact that Alexander was the son of Zeus, besides many other encouraging predictions.

The massacre of the Branchidae by Alexander was described by Diodorus, but was contained in that portion of the seventeenth book which is lost; there is a great lacuna in the MSS. after cap. 83. The fact is distinctly indicated in the table of contents prefixed to book xvii.

Arrian makes no mention of these descendants of the Branchidae in Sogdiana, nor of the destruction of the town and its inhabitants by Alexander. Perhaps neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus said anything about it. Their silence is not at all difficult to explain, nor does it, in my judgment, impeach the credibility of the narrative. They do not feel under obligation to give publicity to the worst acts of their hero.

2 The Delphian oracle pronounced, in explaining the subjugation and ruin of Croesus king of Lydia, that he had thereby expiated the sin of his ancestor in the fifth generation before (Herodot. i. 91: compare vi. 86). Immediately before the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war, the Lacedaemonians called upon the Athenians to expel the descendants of those who had taken part in the Kylonian sacrilege, 180 years before; they addressed this injunction with a view to procure the banishment of Perikles, yet still τοῖς θεοῖς πρῶτον τιμωροῦντες (Thucyd. i. 125-127).

The idea that the sins of fathers were visited upon their descendants, even to the third and fourth generation, had great currency in the ancient world.

3 Diodor. xii. 62. See Ch. LXXI, of this History.
Jaxartes, which he and his companions, in their imperfect geographical notions, believed to be the Tanais, the boundary between Asia and Europe. In his march, he left garrisons in various towns, but experienced no resistance, though detached bodies of the natives hovered on his flanks. Some of these bodies, having cut off a few of his foragers, took refuge afterwards on a steep and rugged mountain, conceived to be unassailable. Thither however Alexander pursued them, at the head of his lightest and most active troops. Though at first repulsed, he succeeded in scaling and capturing the place. Of its defenders, thirty thousand in number, three-fourths were either put to the sword, or perished in jumping down the precipices. Several of his soldiers were wounded with arrows, and he himself received a shot from one of them through his leg. But here, as elsewhere, we perceive that nearly all the Orientals whom Alexander subdued were men little suited for close combat hand to hand, —fighting only with missiles.

Here, on the river Jaxartes, Alexander projected the foundation of a new city to bear his name; intended partly as a protection against incursions from the Scythian Nomads on the other side of the river, partly as a facility for himself to cross over and subdue them, which he intended to do as soon as he could find opportunity. He was however called off for the time by the news of a wide-spread revolt among the newly-conquered inhabitants both of Sogdiana and Baktria. He suppressed the revolt with his habitual vigour and celerity, distributing his troops so as to capture five townships in two days, and Kyropolis or Kyra, the largest of the neighbouring Sogdian towns (founded by the Persian Cyrus), immediately afterwards. He put all the defenders and inhabitants to the sword. Returning then to the Jaxartes, he completed in twenty days the fortifications of his new town of Alexandria (perhaps at or near Khodjend), with suitable sacrifices and festivities to the Gods.

1 Pliny, H. N. vi. 16. In the Meteorologica of Aristotle (i. 13, 15–18) we read that the rivers Baktrus, Choraspos, and Araxes flowed from the lofty mountain Paraurus (Paropamisus) in Asia; and that the Araxes bifurcated, one branch forming the Tanais, which fell into the Palus Macedon. For this fact he refers to the γῆς περιύδοι current in his time. It seems plain that by the Araxes Aristotle must mean the Jaxartes. We see therefore that Alexander and his companions, in identifying the Jaxartes with the Tanais, only followed the geographical descriptions and ideas current in their time. Humboldt remarks several cases in which the Greek geographers were fond of supposing bifurcation of rivers (Asie Centrale, vol. ii. p. 291).

2 Arrian, i. 1, 5.

3 Arrian, iii. 30, 17.

4 Arrian, iv. 1, 3.
He planted in it some Macedonian veterans and Grecian mercenaries, together with volunteer settlers from the natives around. An army of Scythian Nomads, showing themselves on the other side of the river, piqued his vanity to cross over and attack them. Carrying over a division of his army on inflated skins, he defeated them with little difficulty, pursuing them briskly into the desert. But the weather was intensely hot, and the army suffered much from thirst; while the little water to be found was so bad, that it brought upon Alexander a diarrhoea which endangered his life. This chase, of a few miles on the right bank of the Jaxartes (seemingly in the present Khanat of Kokand), marked the utmost limit of Alexander’s progress northward.

Shortly afterwards, a Macedonian detachment, unskilfully conducted, was destroyed in Sogdiana by Spitamenes and the Scythians: a rare misfortune, which Alexander avenged by overrunning the region near the river Polytimetus (the Kohik), and putting to the sword the inhabitants of all the towns which he took. He then recrossed the Oxus, to rest during the extreme season of winter at Zariaspa in Baktria, from whence his communications with the West and with Macedonia were more easy, and where he received various reinforcements of Greek troops. Bessus, who had been here retained as a prisoner, was now brought forward amidst a public assembly; wherein Alexander, having first reproached him for his treason to Darius, caused his nose and ears to be cut off—and sent him in this condition to Ecbatana, to be finally slain by the Medes and Persians. Mutilation was a practice altogether Oriental and non-Hellenic: even Arrian, admiring and indulgent as he is towards his hero, censures this savage order, as one among many proofs how much Alexander had taken on Oriental dispositions. We may remark that his extreme wrath on this occasion was founded partly on disappointment that Bessus had frustrated his toilsome efforts for taking Darius alive—partly on the fact that the satrap had committed treason against the king’s person, which it was the policy as well as the feeling of Alexander to surround

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1 Arrian, iv. 3, 17; Curtius, vii. 6, 25.
2 Arrian, iv. 5, 6; Curtius, vii. 9.
3 Arrian, iv. 6, 11; Curtius, vii. 9, 22.
4 The river, called by the Macedonians Polytimetus (Strabo, xi. p. 388, now bears the name of Kohik or Zorafshan. It rises in the mountains east of Samarkand, flowing westward on the north of that city and of Bokhara. It does not reach so far as the Oxus; during the full time of the year, it falls into a lake called Zarakal; during the dry months, it is lost in the sands, as Arrian states (Burnes’s Travels, vol. ii. ch. xi. p. 299, 2nd ed.).
5 Arrian, iv. 7, 1; Curtius, vii. 10, 12.
with a circle of Deity. For as to traitors against Persia, as a cause and country, Alexander had never discouraged, and had sometimes signally recompensed them. Mithrinés, the governor of Sardis, who opened to him the gates of that almost impregnable fortress immediately after the battle of the Granikus—the traitor who perhaps, next to Darius himself, had done most harm to the Persian cause—obtained from him high favour and promotion.

The rude, but spirited tribes of Baktria and Sogdiana were as yet but imperfectly subdued, seconded as their resistance was by wide spaces of sandy desert, by the neighbourhood of the Scythian Nomads, and by the presence of Spitanemés as a leader. Alexander, distributing his army into five divisions, traversed the country and put down all resistance, while he also took measures for establishing several military posts, or new towns, in convenient places. After some time the whole army was reunited at the chief place of Sogdiana—Marakanda—where some halt and repose was given.

During this halt at Marakanda (Samarcand) the memorable banquet occurred wherein Alexander murdered Kleitus. It has been already related that Kleitus had saved his life at the battle of the Granikus, by cutting off the sword arm of the Persian Spithridatés when already uplifted to strike him from behind. Since the death of Philotas, the important function of general of the Companion-
cavalry had been divided between Hephastion and Kleitus. Moreover the family of Kleitus had been attached to Philip, by ties so ancient, that his sister, Lainike, had been selected as the nurse of Alexander himself when a child. Two of her sons had already perished in the Asiatic battles. If therefore there were any man who stood high in the service, or was privileged to speak his mind freely to Alexander, it was Kleitus.

In this banquet at Marakanda, when wine, according to the Macedonian habit, had been abundantly drunk, and when Alexander, Kleitus, and most of the other guests were already nearly intoxicated, enthusiasts or flatterers heaped inmoderate eulogies upon the king's past achievements. They exalted him above all the most venerated legendary heroes; they proclaimed that his superhuman deeds proved his divine paternity, and that he had earned an apotheosis like Herakles, which nothing but envy could withhold from him even during his life. Alexander himself joined in these boasts, and even took credit for the later victories of the reign of his father, whose abilities and glory he depreciated. To the old Macedonian officers, such an insult cast on the memory of Philip was deeply offensive. But among them all, none had been more indignant than Kleitus, with the growing insolence of Alexander—his assumed filiation from Zeus Ammon, which put aside Philip as unworthy—his preference for Persian attendants, who granted or refused admittance to his person—his extending to Macedonian soldiers the contemptuous treatment habitually endured by Asiatics, and even allowing them to be scourged by Persian hands and Persian rods. The pride of a Macedonian general in the stupendous successes of the last five years, was effaced by his mortification, when he saw that they tended only to merge his countrymen amidst a crowd of servile Asiatics, and to inflame the prince with high-flown aspirations transmitted from Xerxes or Ochus. But whatever might be the internal thoughts of Macedonian officers, they held their peace before Alexander, whose formidable character and exorbitant self-estimation would tolerate no criticism.

At the banquet of Marakanda, this long-suppressed repugnance found an issue, accidental indeed and unpremeditated, but for that very reason all the more violent and unmeasured. The wine,
which made Alexander more boastful, and his flatterers fulsome.

He rebuked the impiety of those who degraded the ancient heroes in order to make a pedestal for Alexander. He protested against the injustice of disparaging the exalted and legitimate fame of Philip; whose achievements he loudly extolled, pronouncing them to be equal, and even superior, to those of his son. For the exploits of Alexander, splendid as they were, had been accomplished, not by himself alone, but by that unconquerable Macedonian force which he had found ready made to his hands; whereas those of Philip had been his own—since he had found Macedonia prostrate and disorganised, and had had to create for himself both soldiers and a military system. The great instruments of Alexander’s victories had been Philip’s old soldiers, whom he now despised—and among them Parmenio, whom he had put to death.

Remarks such as these, poured forth in the coarse language of a half-intoxicated Macedonian veteran, provoked loud contradiction from many, and gave poignant offence to Alexander; who now for the first time heard the open outburst of disapprobation, before concealed and known to him only by surmise. But wrath and contradiction, both from him and from others, only made Kleitus more reckless in the outpouring of his own feelings, now discharged with delight after having been so long pent up. He passed from the old Macedonian soldiers to himself individually. Stretching forth his right hand towards Alexander, he exclaimed—“Recollect that you owe your life to me; this hand preserved you at the Granikus. Listen to the outspoken language of truth, or else abstain from asking freemen to supper, and confine yourself to the society of barbaric slaves.” All these reproaches stung Alexander to the quick. But nothing was so intolerable to him as the respectful sympathy for Parmenio, which brought to his memory one of the blackest deeds of his life—and the reminiscence of his preservation at the Granikus, which lowered him into the position of a debtor towards the very censor under whose reproof he was now smarting. At length wrath and intoxication together drove him into uncontrollable fury. He started from his couch, and felt for his dagger to spring at Kleitus; but the dagger had been put out of reach by one of his attendants. In a loud voice and with the Macedonian word of

1 Arrian, iv. 8, 8. οὔκον μόνον δὲ γὰρ πολὺ μέρος Μακεδόνων εἶναι τὰ (Ἀλέξανδρον) καταπρᾶξαν αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐργα, &c.
command, he summoned the body guards and ordered the trumpeter to sound an alarm. But no one obeyed so grave an order, given in his condition of drunkenness. His principal officers, Ptolemy, Perdikkas and others, clung round him, held his arms and body, and besought him to abstain from violence; others at the same time tried to silence Kleitus and hurry him out of the hall, which had now become a scene of tumult and consternation. But Kleitus was not in a humour to confess himself in the wrong by retiring; while Alexander, furious at the opposition now, for the first time, offered to his will, exclaimed, that his officers held him in chains as Bessus had held Darius, and left him nothing but the name of a king. Though anxious to restrain his movements, they doubtless did not dare to employ much physical force; so that his great personal strength, and continued efforts, presently set him free. He then snatched a pike from one of the soldiers, rushed upon Kleitus, and thrust him through on the spot, exclaiming, “Go now to Philip and Parmenio.”

1 Arrian, iv. 8; Curtius, vi. 1; Plutarch, Alex. 50, 1; Justin, xii. 6, iv others; that Kleitus retorted by aspersing the courage of Kleitus, which I think no way probable, nor would he be likely to encourage a song of that tapiro.

Curtius agrees with Arrian in ascribing the origin of the mischief to the extravagant boasts of Alexander and his flatterers, and to their depreciation of Philip. He then tells us that Kleitus, on hearing their unseemly talk, turned round and whispered to his neighbour some lines out of the Andromache of Euripides (which lines Plutarch also ascribes to him, though at a later moment); that Alexander, not hearing the words, asked what had been said; at length Kleitus himself repeated the sentiment in language of his own. This would suit a literary Greek, but an old Macedonian officer half-intoxicated, when amended by a vehement sentiment, would hardly express it by whispering a Greek poetical quotation to his neighbour. He would either hold his tongue, or speak what he felt broadly and directly. Nevertheless Curtius has stated two points very material to the case, which do not appear in Arrian.

1. It was Alexander himself, not his flattaters, who vilipended Philip; at least the flatoters only did so, after
No sooner was the deed perpetrated, than the feelings of Alexander underwent an entire revolution. The spectacle of Kleitus, a bleeding corpse on the floor,—the marks of stupefaction and horror evident in all the spectators, and the reaction from a furious impulse instantaneously satiated—plunged him at once into the opposite extreme of remorse and self-condemnation. Hastening out of the hall, and retiring to bed, he passed three days in an agony of distress, without food or drink. He burst into tears and multiplied exclamations on his own mad act; he dwelt upon the names of Kleitus and Lamicle with the debt of gratitude which he owed to each, and denounced himself as unworthy to live after having required such services with a foul murder. His friends at length prevailed on him to take food, and return to activity. All joined in trying to restore his self-satisfaction. The Macedonian army passed a public vote that Kleitus had been justly slain, and that his body should remain unburied; which afforded opportunity to Alexander to reverse the vote, and to direct that it should be buried by his own order. The prophets comforted him by the assurance that his murderous impulse had arisen, not from his own natural mind, but from a maddening perversion intentionally brought on by the God Dionysus, to avenge the omission of a sacrifice due to him on the day of the banquet, but from a maddening perversion intentionally brought on by the God Dionysus, to avenge the omission of a sacrifice due to him on the day of the banquet, but from a maddening perversion intentionally brought on by the God Dionysus, to avenge the omission of a sacrifice due to him on the day of the banquet, but from a maddening perversion intentionally brought on by the God Dionysus, to avenge the omission of a sacrifice due to him on the day of the banquet, but from a maddening perversion intentionally brought on by the God Dionysus, to avenge the omission of a sacrifice due to him on the day of the banquet, but from a maddening perversion intentionally brought on by the God Dionysus, to avenge the omission of a sacrifice due to him on the day of the banquet, but from a maddening perversion intentionally brought on by the God Dionysus, to avenge the omission of a sacrifice due to him on the day of the banquet, but from a maddening perversion intentionally brought on by the God Dionysus, to avenge the omission of a sacrifice due to him on the day of the banquet, but from a maddening perversion intentionally brought on by the God Dionysus, to avenge the omission of a sacrifice due to him on the day of the banquet, but from a maddening perversion intentionally brought on by the God Dionysus, to avenge the omission of a sacrifice due to him on the day of the banquet, but from a maddening perversion intentionally brought on by the God Dionysus, to avenge the omission of a sacrifice due to him on the day of the banquet, but from a maddening perversion intentionally brought on by the God Dionysus, to avenge the omission of a sacrifice due to him on the day of the banquet, but from a maddening perversion intentionally brought on by the God Dionysus, to avenge the omission of a sacrifice due to him on the day of the banquet, but
or philosopher, Anaxarchus of Abdera, revived Alexander's spirits by well-timed flattery, treating his sensibility as nothing better than generous weakness; reminding him that in his exalted position of conqueror and Great King, he was entitled to prescribe what was right and just, instead of submitting himself to laws dictated from without. ¹ Kallisthenès the philosopher was also summoned, along with Anaxarchus, to the king's presence, for the same purpose of offering consolatory reflections. But he is said to have adopted a tone of discourse altogether different, and to have given offence rather than satisfaction to Alexander.

To such remedial influences, and probably still more to the absolute necessity for action, Alexander's remorse at length yielded. Like the other emotions of his fiery soul, it was violent and overpowering while it lasted. But it cannot be shown to have left any durable trace on his character, nor any effects justifying the unbounded admiration of Arrian; who has little but blame to bestow on the murdered Kleitus, while he expresses the strongest sympathy for the mental suffering of the murderee.

After ten days, Alexander again put his army in motion, to complete the subjugation of Sogdiana. He found no enemy capable of meeting him in pitched battle; yet Spitaménès, with the Sogdians and some Scythian allies, raised much hostility of detail, which it cost another year to put down. Alexander underwent the greatest fatigue and hardships in his marches through the mountainous parts of this wide, rugged, and poorly supplied country, with rocky positions, strong by nature, which his enemies sought to defend. One of these fastnesses, held by a native chief named Sisymithrés, seemed almost unattackable, and was indeed taken rather by intimidation than by actual force.³ The Scythians, after a partial success over a small Macedonian detachment, were at length so thoroughly beaten and overawed, that they slew Spitaménès, and sent his head to the conqueror as a propitiatory offering.⁴

After a short rest at Nautaka during the extreme winter, Alexander resumed operations, by attacking a strong post called the Sogdian Rock, whither a large number of fugitives had assembled, with an ample supply of provision. It was a precipice supposed

¹ Arrian, iv. 9, 10; Plutarch, Alex. Curtius, viii. 2, 1:—"dovem dieibus |
² Arrian, iv. 9, 10; Plutarch, Alex. Curtius, viii. 2, 1:—"dovem dieibus |
⁴ Arrian, iv. 17, 11. Curtius (viii. 3) gives a different narrative of the death of Spitaménès.
to be inexpugnable; and would seemingly have proved so, in spite of the energy and abilities of Alexander, had not the occupants altogether neglected their guard, and yielded at the mere sight of a handful of Macedonians who had scrambled up the precipice. Among the captives taken by Alexander on this rock, were the wife and family of the Bactrian chief Oxyartés; one of whose daughters, named Roxana, so captivated Alexander by her beauty that he resolved to make her his wife.¹ He then passed out of Sogdiana into the neighbouring territory Paratákénē, where there was another inexpugnable site called the Rock of Choriēnēs, which he was also fortunate enough to reduce.²

From hence Alexander went to Baktra. Sending Kraterus with a division to put the last hand to the reduction of Paratákénē, he himself remained at Baktra, preparing for his expedition across the Hindoo-Koosh to the conquest of India. As a security for the tranquillity of Baktria and Sogdiana during his absence, he levied 30,000 young soldiers from those countries to accompany him.³

It was at Baktra that Alexander celebrated his marriage with the captive Roxana. Amidst the repose and festivities connected with that event, the Oriental temper which he was now acquiring displayed itself more forcibly than ever. He could no longer be satisfied without obtaining prostration, or worship, from Greeks and Macedonians as well as from Persians; a public and unanimous recognition of his divine origin and superhuman dignity. Some Greeks and Macedonians had already rendered to him this homage. Nevertheless to the greater number, in spite of their extreme deference and admiration for him, it was repugnant and degrading. Even the imperious Alexander shrank from issuing public and formal orders on such a subject; but a manoeuvre was concerted, with his privy, by the Persians and certain compliant Greek sophists or philosophers, for the purpose of carrying the point by surprise.

During a banquet at Baktra, the philosopher Auaaxarchus, addressing the assembly in a prepared harangue, extolled Alexander’s exploits as greatly surpassing those of Dionysus and Héraklēs. He proclaimed that Alexander had already done more than enough to establish a title to divine honours from the Macedonians; who (he
said) would assuredly worship Alexander after his death, and ought in justice to worship him during his life, forthwith.

This harangue was applauded, and similar sentiments were enforced, by others favourable to the plan; who proceeded to set the example of immediate compliance, and were themselves the first to tender worship. Most of the Macedonian officers sat unmoved, disgusted at the speech. But though disgusted, they said nothing. To reply to a speech doubtless well-turned and flowing, required some powers of oratory; moreover, it was well known that whoever dared to reply stood marked out for the antipathy of Alexander. The fate of Kleitus, who had arraigned the same sentiments in the banqueting hall of Marakanda, was fresh in the recollection of every one. The repugnance which many felt, but none ventured to express, at length found an organ in Kallisthenes of Olynthus.

This philosopher, whose melancholy fate imparts a peculiar interest to his name, was nephew of Aristotle, and had enjoyed through his uncle an early acquaintance with Alexander during the boyhood of the latter. At the recommendation of Aristotle, Kallisthenes had accompanied Alexander in his Asiatic expedition. He was a man of much literary and rhetorical talent, which he turned towards the composition of history—and to the history of recent times. Alexander, full of ardour for conquest, was at the same time anxious that his achievements should be commemorated by poets and men of letters; there were seasons also when he enjoyed their conversation. On both these grounds he invited several of them to accompany the army. The more prudent among them declined, but Kallisthenes obeyed, partly in hopes of procuring the reconstitution of his native city Olynthus, as Aristotle had obtained the like favour for Stageira. Kallisthenes had composed a narrative (not preserved) of Alexander's exploits,
which certainly reached to the battle of Arbela, and may perhaps have gone down farther. The few fragments of this narrative remaining seem to betoken extreme admiration, not merely of the bravery and ability, but also of the transcendent and unbroken good fortune of Alexander—marking him out as the chosen favourite of the Gods. This feeling was perfectly natural under the grandeur of the events. Insofar as we can judge from one or two specimens, Kallisthenes was full of complimentary tribute to the hero of his history. But the character of Alexander himself had undergone a material change during the six years between his first landing in Asia and his campaign in Sogdiana. All his worst qualities had been developed by unparalleled success and by Asiatic example. He required larger doses of flattery, and had now come to thirst, not merely for the reputation of divine paternity, but for the actual manifestations of worship as towards a God.

To the literary Greeks who accompanied Alexander, this change in his temper must have been especially palpable and full of serious consequence; since it was chiefly manifested, not at periods of active military duty, but at his hours of leisure, when he recreated himself by their conversation and discourses. Several of these Greeks—Anaxarchus, Kleon, the poet Agis of Argos—accommodated themselves to the change, and wound up their flatteries to the pitch required. Kallisthenes could not do so. He was a man of sedate character, of simple, severe, and almost unsocial habits—to whose sobriety the long Macedonian potations were distasteful. Aristotle said of him, that he was a great and powerful speaker, but that he had no judgement; according to other reports, he was a vain and arrogant man—who boasted that Alexander’s reputation and immortality were dependent on the composition and tone of his history.¹ Of personal vanity,—a

¹ Arrian, iv. 10, 2; Plutarch, Alex. 53, 54. It is remarkable that Timaeus denounced Kallisthenes as having in his historical work flattered Alexander to excess (Polyb. xii. 12). Kallisthenes seems to have recognised various special interpositions of the Gods, to aid Alexander’s successes—see Fragments 25 and 36 of the Fragmenta Callisthenis in the edition of Didot. In reading the censure which Arrian passes on the arrogant pretensions of Kallisthenes, we ought at the same time to read the pretensions raised by Arrian on his own behalf as an historian (i. 12, 7-9)—καὶ ἐν τῷ διδὼν αὐτῷ ἀπειρίω εἰμαστὶν τῶν πρῶτων ὧν τῇ ὁμιλήθην τῇ Ἑλλάδι, ἐπερ καὶ Αλέξανδρος τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὕπλοις, &c. I doubt much whether Kallisthenes pitched his self-estimation so high. In this chapter, Arrian recounts, that Alexander envied Achilles for having been fortunate enough to obtain such a poet as Homer for panegyrist; and Arrian laments that Alexander had not, as yet, found an historian equal to his deserts. This, in point of fact, is a re-assertion of the same truth which Kallisthenes stands condemned for asserting—that the fame even of the greatest
common quality among literary Greeks,—Kallisthenes probably had his full share. But there is no ground for believing that his character had altered. Whatever his vanity may have been, it had given no offence to Alexander during the earlier years; nor would it have given offence now, had not Alexander himself become a different man.

On occasion of the demonstration led up by Anaxarchus at the banquet, Kallisthenes had been invited by Hephaestion to join in the worship intended to be proposed towards Alexander; and Hephaestion afterwards alleged, that he had promised to comply. But his actual conduct affords reasonable ground for believing that he made no such promise; for he not only thought it his duty to refuse the act of worship, but also to state publicly his reasons for disapproving it; the more so, as he perceived that most of the Macedonians present felt like himself. He contended that the distinction between Gods and men was one which could not be confounded without impiety and wrong. Alexander had amply earned,—as a man, a general, and a king,—the highest honours compatible with humanity; but to exalt him into a God would be both an injury to him and an offence to the Gods. Anaxarchus (he said) was the last person from whom such a proposition ought to come, because he was one of those whose only title to Alexander's society was founded upon his capacity to give instructive and wholesome counsel.

Kallisthenes here spoke out, what numbers of his hearers felt. The speech was not only approved, but so warmly applauded by the Macedonians present, especially the older officers,—that Alexander thought it prudent to forbid all farther discussion upon this delicate subject. Presently the Persians present, according to Asiatic custom, approached him and performed their prostration; after which Alexander pledged, in successive goblets of wine, those Greeks and Macedonians with whom he had held previous concert. To each of them the goblet was handed, and each, after drinking to answer the pledge, approached the King, made his prostration, and then received a salute. Lastly, Alexander sent the pledge to Kalli-
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Kallisthenes, who, after drinking like the rest, approached him, for the purpose of receiving the salute, but without any prostration. Of this omission Alexander was expressly informed by one of the Companions; upon which he declined to admit Kallisthenes to a salute. The latter retired, observing, "Then I shall go away, worse off than others as far as the salute goes." 1

Kallisthenes was imprudent, and even blameable, in making this last observation, which, without any necessity or advantage, aggravated the offence already given to Alexander. He was more imprudent still, if we look simply to his own personal safety, in standing forward publicly to protest against the suggestion for rendering divine honours to that prince, and in thus creating the main offence which even in itself was inexpiable. But here the occasion was one serious and important, so as to convert the imprudence into an act of genuine moral courage. The question was, not about obeying an order given by Alexander, for no order had been given—but about accepting or rejecting a motion made by Anaxarchus; which Alexander, by a shabbily preconcerted manœuvre, affected to leave to the free decision of the assembly, in full confidence that no one would be found intrepid enough to oppose it. If one Greek sophist made a proposition, in itself servile and disgraceful, another sophist could do himself nothing but honour by entering public protest against it; more especially since this was done (as we may see by the report in Arrian) in terms noway insulting, but full of respectful admiration towards Alexander personally. The perfect success of the speech is in itself a proof of the propriety of its tone; 2 for the Macedonian officers would feel indifference, if not contempt, towards a rhetor like Kallisthenes, while towards Alexander they had the greatest deference short of actual worship. There are few occasions on which the free spirit of Greek letters and Greek citizenship, in their protest against exorbitant individual insolence, appears more conspicuous and estimable than in the speech of Kallisthenes. 3 Arrian disapproves the purpose of Alexander, and

1 Arrian, iv. 12, 7. φιλήματι ηλικίων ἔχων ἄπειμι. Ἴ
2 Arrian, iv. 12, 1, ἀνιᾶσομεν μὲν μετριαλοιτι Ἀλέξανδρος, Μακεδόνι δὲ πρὸς θυμοῦ εἰπεῖν. . . .
3 Curtius, vii. 5, 20. "Εξείσις αὐτής Καλλισθηνεὶς velut vindicta publica libertatis audiebatur. Expresserat non aseensionem modo, sed eiam vocem, seniorum priusque, quibus gravis sit inveterati moris externa mutatio."

There was no sentiment more deeply rooted in the free Greek mind, prior to Alexander's conquests, than the repugnance to arrogant aspirations on the part of the fortunate man, swelling himself above the limits of humanity—and the belief that such aspirations were followed by the Nemesis of the Gods. In the dying speech which Xenophon puts into the mouth of Cyrus the Great, we find—"Yc Gods, 1 thank you much,
strongly blames the motion of Anaxarchus; nevertheless such is
his anxiety to find some excuse for Alexander, that he also blames
Kallisthenes for unseasonable frankness, folly, and insolence, in
offering opposition. He might have said with some truth, that
Kallisthenes would have done well to withdraw earlier (if indeed
he could have withdrawn without offence) from the camp of Alex-
ander, in which no lettered Greek could now associate without
abnegating his freedom of speech and sentiment, and emulating
the servility of Anaxarchus. But being present, as Kallisthenes
was, in the hall at Baktra when the proposition of Anaxarchus was
made, and when silence would have been assent—his protest
against it was both seasonable and dignified; and all the more
dignified for being fraught with danger to himself.

Kallisthenes knew that danger well, and was quickly enabled to
recognize it in the altered demeanour of Alexander to-
wards him. He was, from that day, a marked man in
two senses: first, to Alexander himself, as well as to the
rival sophists and all promoters of the intended dedication,—for
hatred, and for getting up some accusatory pretence such as might
serve to ruin him; next, to the more free-spirited Macedonians,
indignant witnesses of Alexander's increased insolence, and ad-
mirers of the courageous Greek who had protested against the
motion of Anaxarchus. By such men he was doubtless much
extolled; which praises aggravated his danger, as they were sure
to be reported to Alexander. The pretext for his ruin was not
long wanting.

Among those who admired and sought the conversation of Kal-
isthenes, was Hermolaus, one of the royal pages,—the
band, selected from noble Macedonian families, who did
duty about the person of the king. It had happened
that this young man, one of Alexander's companions in
the chase, on seeing a wild boar rushing up to attack
the king, darted his javelin, and slew the animal. Alex-
ander, angry to be anticipated in killing the boar, ordered
Hermolaus to be scourged before all the other pages, and
deprived him of his horse. Thus humiliated and outraged—for

that I have been sensible of your care
for me, and that I have never in my
successes raised my thoughts above the
measure of man" (Cyropæd, viii. 7, 34).
Among the most striking illustrations of
this sentiment is the story of Solon
and Croesus (Herodot. i. 82-84).
I shall recount in the next chapter

examples of monstrous flattery on the
part of the Athenians, proving how this
sentiment expired with their freedom.

Plutarch, Alex. 34. He refers
to Hermippus, who mentions what was
told to Aristotle by Strabonus, the reader
attendant on Kallisthenes.
an act not merely innocent, but the omission of which, if Alexander had sustained any injury from the boar, might have been held punishable—Hermolaus became resolutely bent on revenge. He enlisted in the project his intimate friend Sostratus, with several others among the pages; and it was agreed among them to kill Alexander in his chamber, on the first night when they were all on guard together. The appointed night arrived, without any divulgence of their secret; yet the scheme was frustrated by the accident, that Alexander continued till daybreak drinking with his officers, and never retired to bed. On the morrow, one of the conspirators, becoming alarmed or repentant, divulged the scheme to his friend Charikles, with the names of those concerned. Eurylochus, brother to Charikles, apprised by him of what he had heard, immediately informed Ptolemy, through whom it was conveyed to Alexander. By Alexander's order, the persons indicted were arrested and put to the torture; under which they confessed that they had themselves conspired to kill him, but named no other accomplices, and even denied that any one else was privy to the scheme. In this denial they persisted, though extreme suffering was applied to extort the revelation of new names. They were then brought up and arraigned as conspirators before the assembled Macedonian soldiers. There their confession was repeated. It is even said that Hermolaus, in repeating it, boasted of the enterprise as legitimate and glorious; denouncing the tyranny and cruelty of Alexander as having become insupportable to a freeman. Whether such boast was actually made or not, the persons brought up were pronounced guilty, and stoned to death forthwith by the soldiers.

The pages thus executed were young men of good Macedonian families, for whose condemnation accordingly Alexander had thought it necessary to invoke—what he was sure of obtaining against any one—the sentence of the soldiers. To satisfy his hatred against Kallisthenes—not a Macedonian, but only a Greek citizen, one of the surviving remnants of the subverted city of Olynthus—no such formality was required. As yet, there was not a shadow

1 Arrian, iv. 13; Curtius, viii. 6, 7.
2 Arrian, iv. 13, 13.
3 Arrian, iv. 14, 4. Curtius expands this scene into great detail; composing a long speech for Hermolaus, and another for Alexander (viii. 6, 7, 8).
4 "Quem, si Macedon essest, (Call isthenem) tecum introduxisset, dignissimum te discipulo magistram: nun Olynthio non idem juris est." (Curtius, viii. 8, 19—speech of Alexander before the soldiers, addressing Hermolaus especially).
of proof to implicate this philosopher; for obnoxious as his name was known to be, Hermolaus and his companions had, with exemplary fortitude, declined to purchase the chance of respite from extreme torture by pronouncing it. Their confessions,—all extorted by suffering, unless confirmed by other evidence, of which we do not know whether any was taken—were hardly of the least value, even against themselves; but against Kallisthenes they had no bearing whatever; nay, they tended indirectly, not to convict, but to absolve him. In his case, therefore, as in that of Philotas before, it was necessary to pick up matter of suspicious tendency from his reported remarks and conversations. He was alleged 1 to have addressed dangerous and inflammatory language to the pages, holding up Alexander to odium, instigating them to conspiracy, and pointing out Athens as a place of refuge; he was moreover well known to have been often in conversation with Hermolaus. For a man of the violent temper and omnipotent authority of Alexander, such indications were quite sufficient as grounds of action against one whom he hated.

On this occasion, we have the state of Alexander’s mind disclosed by himself, in one of the references to his letters given by Plutarch. Writing to Kraterus and to others immediately afterwards, Alexander distinctly stated that the pages throughout all their torture had deposed against no one but themselves. Nevertheless, in another letter addressed to Antipater in Macedonia, he used these expressions—“The pages were stoned to death by the Macedonians; but I myself shall punish the sophist, as well as those who sent him out here, and those who harbour in their cities conspirators against me.” 2 The sophist Kallisthenes had been sent out by Aristotle, who is here designated; and probably the

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1 Plutarch, Alexander. 55; Arrian, iv. 10, 4.
2 Plutarch, Alex. 55. Κατ’ τὸν περὶ ᾿Ερμόλαου οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ διὰ τῆς ἐν χάτης ἀνάγκης Καλλισθένους κατείπεν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ᾿Αλέξανδρος οὐδὲν εἴδος γράφων Κρατέρῳ καὶ ᾿Αττάλῳ καὶ ᾿Αλκέτᾳ φησὶ τοὺς παῖδας βασανιζομένους ὀμολογούν, ὥς οὐδὲν παύεται, ἀλλ’ ἄν ἐνδειξείης ἀντιπατρίας. Τοιοῦτον δὲ γράφοντο τοὺς ἀντιπατριούς καὶ τὸν Καλλισθένην συνεπαιτιασάμενος, Οὐ μὴν ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔγραφεν ὑπὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων κατευθύνοντας, τὸν δὲ σαφιστὴν ἐγὼ κολάσω, καὶ τοὺς ἐκπέμπτως αὐτὸν, καὶ τῶς ἐκδικασμένως ταῖς πόλεισ τοὺς ἐμοὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντας . . . ἀντικριμένος εἰς γε τούτως ἀποκαλυπτόμενος. 3

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About the hostile dispositions of Alexander towards Aristotle, see Dio Chrysostom, Orat. 64, de Fortuna, p. 598.

Kraterus was at this time absent in Sogdiana, engaged in finishing the suppression of the rebellion (Arrian, iv. 22, 1). To him, therefore, Alexander would naturally write.

This statement, from the pen of Alexander himself, distinctly contradicts and refutes (as I have before observed) the affirmation of Ptolemy and Aristotle as given by Arrian (iv. 14, 1)—that the pages deposed against Kallisthenes.
Athenians after him. Fortunately for Aristotle, he was not at Baktra, but at Athens. That he could have had any concern in the conspiracy of the pages, was impossible. In this savage outburst of menace against his absent preceptor, Alexander discloses the real state of feeling which prompted him to the destruction of Kallisthenes; hatred towards that spirit of citizenship and free speech, which Kallisthenes not only cherished, in common with Aristotle and most other literary Greeks, but had courageously manifested in his protest against the motion for worshiping a mortal.

Kallisthenes was first put to the torture and then hanged. His tragical fate excited a profound sentiment of sympathy and indignation among the philosophers of antiquity.

The halts of Alexander were formidable to friends and companions; his marches, to the unconquered natives whom he chose to treat as enemies. On the return of Kraterus from Sogdiana, Alexander began his march from Baktra (Balkh) southward to the mountain range Paropamisus or Caucasus (Hindoo-Koosh); leaving however at Baktra Amyntas with a large force of 10,000 foot and 3500 horse, to keep these intractable territories in subjugation. His march over the mountains occupied ten days; he then visited his newly-founded city Alexandria in the Paropamisade. At or near the river Kophen (Kabool river), he was joined by Taxiles, a powerful Indian prince, who brought as a present twenty-five elephants, and whose alliance was very valuable to him. He then divided his army, sending one division under Hephastion and Perdikkas, towards the territory called Peukelaus (apparently that immediately north of the confluence of the Kafir river with the Indus); and conducting the remainder himself in an easterly
direction, over the mountainous regions between the Hindoo-Koosh and the right bank of the Indus. Hephaestion was ordered, after subduing all enemies in his way, to prepare a bridge ready for passing the Indus by the time when Alexander should arrive. Astes, prince of Peukelaotis, was taken and slain in the city where he had shut himself up; but the reduction of it cost Hephaestion a siege of thirty days.  

Alexander, with his own half of the army, undertook the reduction of the Aspasii, the Gurai, and the Assakeni, tribes occupying mountainous and difficult localities along the southern slopes of the Hindoo-Koosh; but neither they nor their various towns mentioned—Arigreon, Massaga, Bazira, Ora, Dytra, &c., except perhaps the remarkable rock of Aornos, near the Indus—can be more exactly

1 Arrian, iv. 22, 8-12.

* Respecting the rock called Aornos, a valuable and elaborate article, entitled "Gradus ad Aornon," has been published by Major Abbott in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, No. iv. 1854. This article gives much information, collected mainly by inquiries on the spot, and accompanied by a map, about the very little known country west of the Indus, between the Kooloo river on the south, and the Hindoo-Koosh on the north. Major Abbott attempts to follow the march and operations of Alexander, from Alexandria ad Caucastum to the rock of Aornos (p. 311 seq.). He shows highly probable reason for believing that the Aornos described by Arrian is the Mount Mahabunn, near the right bank of the Indus (lat. 34° 20'), about sixty miles above its confluence with the Kabool river. The whole account of Arrian of the rock Aornos is a faithful picture of the Mahabunn. It was the most remarkable feature of the country. It was the refuge of all the neighbouring tribes. It was covered with forest. It had good soil sufficient for a thousand ploughs, and pure springs of water everywhere abounded. It was 4125 feet above the plain, and fourteen miles in circuit. The summit was a plain where cavalry could act. It would be difficult to offer a more faithful description of the Mahabunn. The side on which Alexander scaled the main summit had certainly the character of a rock. But the whole description of Arrian indicates a table mountain" (p. 341). The Mahabunn "is a mountain table, scarped on the east by tremendous precipices, from which descends one large spur down upon the Indus between Sitana and Umb" (p. 340).

To this similarity in so many local features, is to be added the remarkable coincidence of name, between the town Embolina, where Arrian states that Alexander established his camp for the purpose of attacking Aornos—and the modern names Umb and Itimah (between the Mahabunn and the Indus)—the one in the river valley, the other on the mountain immediately above it" (p. 344). Mount Mahabunn is the natural refuge for the people of the neighbourhood from a conqueror, and was among the places taken by Nadir Shah (p. 358).

A strong case of identity is thus made out between this "mountain and the Aornos described by Arrian. But undoubtedly it does not coincide with the Aornos described by Curtius, who compares Aornos to a Meta (the conical goal of the stadium), and says that the Indus washed its base,—that at the first assault several Macedonian soldiers were hurled down into the river. This close juxtaposition of the Indus has been the principal feature looked for by travellers who have sought for Aornos; but no place has yet been found answering the conditions required. We have here to make our election between Arrian and Curtius. Now there is a general presumption in Arrian's favour, in the description of military operations, where he makes a positive statement; but in this case, the presumption is peculiarly
identified. These tribes were generally brave, and seconded by towns of strong position as well as by a rugged country, in many parts utterly without roads. But their defence was conducted with little union, no military skill, and miserable weapons; so that they were no way qualified to oppose the excellent combination and rapid movements of Alexander, together with the confident attack and very superior arms, offensive as well as defensive, of his soldiers. All those who attempted resistance were successively attacked, overpowered, and slain. Even those who did not resist, but fled to the mountains, were pursued and either slaughtered or sold for slaves. The only way of escaping the sword was to remain, submit, and await the fiat of the invader. Such a series of uninterrupted successes, all achieved with little loss, it is rare in military history to read. The capture of the rock of Aornos was peculiarly gratifying to Alexander, because it enjoyed the legendary reputation of having been assailed in vain by Herakles—and indeed he himself had deemed it, at first sight, unassailable. After having thus subdued the upper regions (above Attock or the confluence of the Kabul river) on the right bank of the Indus, he availed himself of some forests alongside to fell timber and build boats. These boats were sent down the stream, to the point where Hephaestion and Perdikkas were preparing the bridge.

Such fatiguing operations of Alexander, accomplished amidst all the hardships of winter, were followed by a halt of thirty days, to refresh the soldiers, before he crossed the Indus, in the early spring of 326 B.C. It is presumed, probably enough, that he crossed at or near Attock, the passage now frequented. He first marched to Taxila, where the prince Taxilus at once submitted, and reinforced the army with a strong contingent of Indian troops, defeating Porus with generous treatment, because Ptolemy was in the command for the capture of Aornos, and was therefore likely to be particular in the description of a scene where he had reaped much glory.

The countries here traversed by Alexander include parts of Kafiristan, Swat, Bajaur, Chitral, the neighbourhood of the Kameh and other affluents of the river Kabul before it falls into the Indus near Attock. Most of this is Terra Incognita even at present; especially Kafiristan, a territory inhabited by a population said to be rude and barbarous, but which has never been conquered—not indeed ever visited by strangers. It is remarkable, that among the inhabitants of Kafiristan—as well as among those of Badakshan, on the other or northern side of the Hindoo-Koosh—there exist traditions respecting Alexander, together with a sort of belief that they themselves are descended from his soldiers. See Ritter’s Erdkunde, part vii. book iii. p. 200 seq.; Burnes’s Travels, vol. iii. ch. 4. p. 186, 2nd ed.; Wilson, Ariana Antiqua, p. 194 seq.

1 Arrian, iv. 30, 13. η στρατιά αὐτῷ ὡδοποιεῖτο πρόσω ἱούσῳ, ἄπορα ἄλως ὄντα τὰ ταύτῃ χώρια, &c.

2 Arrian, iv. 30, 18; v. 7, ὡς

3 The halt of thirty days is mentioned by Diodorus, xvii. 86. For the
soldiers. His alliance and information was found extremely valuable. The whole neighbouring territory submitted, and was placed under Philippus as satrap, with a garrison and depot at Taxila. He experienced no resistance until he reached the river Hydaspes (Jelum), on the other side of which the Indian prince Porus stood prepared to dispute the passage; a brave man, with a formidable force, better armed than Indians generally were, and with many trained elephants; which animals the Macedonians had never yet encountered in battle. By a series of admirable military combinations, Alexander eluded the vigilance of Porus, stole the passage of the river at a point a few miles above, and completely defeated the Indian army. In spite of their elephants, which were skilfully managed, the Indians could not long withstand the shock of close combat, against such cavalry and infantry as the Macedonian. Porus, a prince of gigantic stature, mounted on an elephant, fought with the utmost gallantry, rallying his broken troops and keeping them together until the last. Having seen two of his sons slain, himself wounded and perishing with thirst, he was only preserved by the special directions of Alexander. When Porus was brought before him, Alexander was struck with admiration at his stature, beauty, and undaunted bearing. Addressing him first, he asked, what Porus wished to be done for him. "That you should treat me as a king," was the reply of Porus, Alexander, delighted with these words, behaved towards Porus with the utmost courtesy and generosity; not only ensuring to him his actual kingdom, but enlarging it by new additions. He found in Porus a faithful and efficient ally. This was the greatest day of Alexander's life; if we take together the splendour and difficulty of the military achievement, and the generous treatment of his conquered opponent.
Alexander celebrated his victory by sacrifices to the Gods, and festivities on the banks of the Hydaspes; where he also gave directions for the foundation of two cities—Nikæa, on the eastern bank; and Bukephalia, on the western, so named in commemoration of his favourite horse, who died here of age and fatigue. Leaving Kraterus to lay out and erect these new establishments, as well as to keep up communication, he conducted his army onward in an easterly direction towards the river Akesinês (Chenab). His recent victory had spread terror around; the Glaukæ, a powerful Indian tribe, with thirty-seven towns and many populous villages, submitted, and and Julalpoor—where high roads from the Indus now cross the Hydaspes. Each of these points has been assigned by different writers, as the probable scene of the crossing of the river by Alexander. Of the two, Jelum (rather higher up the river than Julalpoor) seems the more probable. Burnes points out, that near Jelum the river is divided into five or six channels with islands (Travels, vol. ii, ch. 5, p. 50). Captain Abbott (in the Journal of the Asiatic Society, Calcutta, Dec. 1848) has given an interesting memoir on the features and course of the Hydaspes a little above Jelum, comparing them with the particulars stated by Arrian, and showing highly plausible reasons in support of this hypothesis—that the crossing took place near Jelum.

Diodorus mentions a halt of thirty days, after the victory (xvii. 89), which seems not probable. Both he and Curtius allude to numerous serpents, by which the army was annoyed between the Akesinês and the Hydaspes (Curtius, ix. 1, 11).

Some critics have proposed to read *Meageiton* (July—August) as the month instead of *Munychion*; an alteration approved by Mr. Clinton and received into the text by Schmideler. But if this alteration be admitted, the name of the Athenian archon must be altered also; for *Meageiton* of the archon Hegemon would be eight months earlier—July—August, 326 B.C.; and at this date, Alexander had not as yet crossed the Indus, as the passage of Aratos (op. Strabo. xv. p. 691) plainly shows—and as Droysen and Muszel remark. Alexander did not cross the Indus before the spring of 326 B.C. If, in place of the archon Hegemon, we substitute the next following archon Chremés (and it is remarkable that Diodorus assigns the battle to this later archonship, xvii. 87), this would be July—August 326 B.C.; which would be a more admissible date for the battle than the preceding month of Munychion. At the same time, the substitution of *Meageiton* is mere conjecture; and seems to leave hardly time enough for the subsequent events. As far as an opinion can be formed, it would seem that the battle was fought about the end of June or beginning of July 326 B.C., after the rainy season had commenced; towards the close of the archonship of Hegemon, and the beginning of that of Chremés.

1 Arrian states (v. 19, 5) that the victory over Porus was gained in the month *Munychion* of the archon Hegemon at Athens—that is, about the end of April, 326 B.C. This date is not to be reconciled with another passage, v. 9, 6—where he says that the summer solstice had already passed, and that all the rivers of the Punjab were full of water, turbid and violent. This swelling of the rivers begins about June; they do not attain their full height until August. Moreover, the description of the battle, as given both by Arrian and by Curtius, implies that it took place after the rainy season had begun (Arrian, v. 9, 7; v. 12, 5. Curtius, viii. 14, 4).

2 Arrian, v. 20; Diodor. xvii. 25.

3 Lieut. Wood (Journey to the Source of the Oxus, p. 11-39) remarks that the large rivers of the Punjab change their course so often and so considerably, that monuments and indications of Alexander's march in that territory cannot be expected to remain, especially in ground near rivers.
were placed under the dominion of Porus; while embassies of submission were also received from two considerable princes—Abisares, and a second Porus, hitherto at enmity with his namesake. The passage of the great river Akesines, now full and impetuous in its current, was accomplished by boats and by inflated hides, yet not without difficulty and danger. From thence he proceeded onward in the same direction, across the Punjab—finding no enemies, but leaving detachments at suitable posts to keep up his communications and ensure his supplies—to the river Hydrametés or Ravee; which, though not less broad and full than the Akesines, was comparatively tranquil, so as to be crossed with facility. Here some free Indian tribes, Kathaans and others, had the courage to resist. They first attempted to maintain themselves in Sangala by surrounding their town with a triple entrenchment of wagons. These being attacked and carried, they were driven within the walls, which they now began to despair of defending, and resolved to evacuate by night; but the project was divulged to Alexander by deserters, and frustrated by his vigilance. On the next day he took the town by storm, putting to the sword 17,000 Indians, and taking (according to Arrian) 70,000 captives. His own loss before the town was less than 100 killed, and 1200 wounded. Two neighbouring towns, in alliance with Sangala, were evacuated by their terrified inhabitants. Alexander pursued, but could not overtake them, except 500 sick or weakly persons, whom his soldiers put to death. Demolishing the town of Sangala, he added the territory to the dominion of Porus, then present, with a contingent of 5000 Indians.

Sangala was the easternmost of all Alexander's conquests. Presently his march brought him to the river Hyphasis (Sutledge), the last of the rivers in the Punjab—seemingly at a point below its confluence with the Beas. Beyond this river, broad and rapid, Alexander was informed that there lay a desert of eleven days' march, extending to a still greater river called the Ganges; beyond which dwelt the Gandarida, the most powerful, warlike, and populous, of all the Indian tribes, distinguished for the number and training of their elephants. The prospect of a difficult march, and of an enemy esteemed invincible, only instigated his ardour. He gave orders for the crossing. But
here for the first time his army, officers as well as soldiers, manifested symptoms of uncontrollable weariness; murmuring aloud at these endless toils, and marches they knew not whither. They had already overpassed the limits where Dionysus and Héraklés were said to have stopped: they were travelling into regions hitherto unvisited either by Greeks or by Persians, merely for the purpose of provoking and conquering new enemies. Of victories they were sated; of their plunder, abundant as it was, they had no enjoyment; the hardships of a perpetual onward march, often excessively accelerated, had exhausted both men and horses; moreover, their advance from the Iydaspes had been accomplished in the wet season, under rains more violent and continued than they had ever before experienced. Informed of the reigning discontent, Alexander assembled his officers and harangued them, endeavouring to revive in them that forward spirit and promptitude which he had hitherto found not inadequate to his own. But he entirely failed. No one indeed dared openly to contradict him. Konus alone hazarded some words of timid dissuasion; the rest manifested a passive and sullen repugnance, even when he proclaimed that those who desired might return, with the shame of having deserted their king, while he would march forward with the volunteers only. After a suspense of two days, passed in solitary and silent mortification—he still apparently persisted in his determination, and offered the sacrifice usual previous to the passage of a river. The victims were inauspicious; he bowed to the will of the Gods; and

1 Curtius, ix. 3, 11 (speech of Konus).
4 In the speech which Arrian (v. 25, 26) puts into the mouth of Alexander, the most curious point is, the geographical views which he promulgates. We have not much farther now to march (he was standing on the western bank of the Sutledge) to the river Ganges, and the great eastern Sea which surrounds the whole earth. The Hyrkanian (Caspian) Sea joins on to this great sea on one side, the Persian Gulf on the other; after we have subdued all those nations which lie before us eastward towards the Great Sea, and northward towards the Hyrkanian Sea, we shall then sail by water first to the Persian Gulf, next round Libya to the pillars of Héraklés; from thence we shall march back all through Libya, and add it to all Asia as parts of our empire. (I here abridge rather than translate.)

It is remarkable, that while Alexander made so prodigious an error in narrowing the eastern limits of Asia, the Ptolemaic geography, recognised in the time of Columbus, made an error not less in the opposite direction, stretching it too far to the East. It was upon the faith of this last mistake, that Columbus projected his voyage of circumnavigation from Western Europe, expecting to come to the eastern coast of Asia from the West, after no great length of voyage.
gave orders for return, to the unanimous and unbounded delight of his army. 1

To mark the last extremity of his eastward progress, he erected twelve altars of extraordinary height and dimension on the western bank of the Hyphasis, offering sacrifices of thanks to the Gods, with the usual festivities, and matches of agility and force. Then, having committed all the territory west of the Hyphasis to the government of Porus, he marched back, re-passed the Hydæotès and Akesinès, and returned to the Hydætes near the point where he had first crossed it. The two new cities—Bukephalia and Nikæa—which he had left orders for commencing on that river, had suffered much from the rains and inundations during his forward march to the Hyphasis, and now required the aid of the army to repair the damage. 2 The heavy rains continued throughout most of his return march to the Hydætes. 3

On coming back to this river, Alexander received a large reinforcement both of cavalry and infantry, sent to him from Europe, together with 25,000 new panoplies, and a considerable stock of medicines. 4 Had these reinforcements reached him on the Hyphasis, it seems not impossible that he might have prevailed on his army to accompany him in his further advance to the Ganges and the regions beyond. He now employed himself, assisted by Porus and Taxilus, in collecting and constructing a fleet for sailing down the Hydætes, and thence down to the mouth of the Indus. By the early part of November, a fleet of nearly 2000 boats or vessels of various sizes having been prepared, he began his voyage. 5 Kraterus marched with one division of the army, along the right bank of the Hydætes—Hephiestion on the left, and the remainder, including 200 elephants; Nearchus had the command of the fleet in the river, on board of which was Alexander himself. He pursued his voyage slowly down the river,

1 Arrian, v. 28, 7. The fact that Alexander, under all this insuperable repugnance of his soldiers, still offered the sacrifice preliminary to crossing—is curious as an illustration of his character, and was specially attested by Ptolemy. 2 Arrian, v. 29, 8; Diodor, xvii. 95. 3 Aristobulus, ap. Strab. xv. p. 691—until the rising of Arkturus. Diodorus says 70 days (xvii. 93), which seems more probable. 4 Diodor, xvii. 95; Curtius, ix. 3, 21. 5 The voyage was commenced a few days before the setting of the Pleiades (Aristobulus ap. Strab. xv. p. 692). For the number of the ships, see Ptolemy ap. Arrian. vi. 2, 8. On seeing crocodiles in the Indus, Alexander was at first led to suppose that it was the same river as the Nile, and that he had discovered the higher course of the Nile, from whence it flowed into Egypt. This is curious, as an illustration of the geographical knowledge of the time (Arrian, vi. 1, 3).
to the confluence of the Hydaspes with the Akesinês—with the Hydraotês—and with the Hyphasis—all pouring, in one united stream, into the Indus. He sailed down the Indus to its junction with the Indian Ocean. Altogether this voyage occupied nine months, from November 326 B.C. to August 325 B.C. But it was a voyage full of active military operations on both sides of the river. Alexander perpetually disembarked, to attack, subdue, and slaughter all such nations near the banks as did not voluntarily submit. Among them were the Malli and Oxydrakê, free and brave tribes, who resolved to defend their liberty, but, unfortunately for themselves, were habitually at variance, and could not now accomplish any hearty coöperation against the common invader. Alexander first assailed the Malli with his usual celerity and vigour, beat them with slaughter in the field, and took several of their towns. There remained only their last and strongest town, from which the defenders were already driven out and forced to retire to the citadel. Thither they were pursued by the Macedonians, Alexander himself being among the foremost, with only a few guards near him. Impatient because the troops with their scaling-ladders did not come up more rapidly, he mounted upon a ladder that happened to be at hand, attended only by Peukestês and one or two others, with an adventurous courage even transcending what he was wont to display. Having cleared the wall by killing several of its defenders, he jumped down into the interior of the citadel, and made head for some time, nearly alone, against all within. He received however a bad wound from an arrow in the breast, and was on the point of fainting, when his soldiers burst in, rescued him, and took the place. Every person within—man, woman, and child—was slain.

The wound of Alexander was so severe, that he was at first reported to be dead, to the great consternation and distress of the army. However, he became soon sufficiently recovered to show himself, and to receive their ardent congratulations, in the camp

1 Aristobulus ap. Strab. xv. p. 692. Aristobulus said that the downward voyage occupied ten months; this seems longer than the exact reality. Moreover Aristobulus said that they had no rain during all the voyage down, through all the summer months: Nearchus stated the contrary (Strabo, l. c.).
2 Curtius, ix. 4, 15; Diodor. xvii. 98.
3 Arrian, vi. 7, 8.
4 This last stronghold of the Malli is supposed, by Mr. Cunningham and others, to have been the modern city of Multan. The river Ravee or Hydraotês is said to have formerly run past the city of Multan into the Chenab or Akesinês.
5 Arrian, vi. 9, 10, 11. He notices the great discrepancy in the various accounts given of this achievement and dangerous wound of Alexander. Compare Diodor. xvii. 98, 99; Curtius, ix. 4, 5; Plutarch, Alex. 60.
established at the point of junction between the Hydraotēs (Ravee) and (Akesinēs) Chenab. 1 His voyage down the river, though delayed by the care of his wound, was soon resumed and prosecuted, with the same active operations by his land-force on both sides to subjugate all the Indian tribes and cities within accessible distance. At the junction of the river Akesinēs (Punjunīd) with the Indus, Alexander directed the foundation of a new city, with adequate docks and conveniences for ship-building, whereby he expected to command the internal navigation. 2 Having no farther occasion now for so large a land-force, he sent a large portion of it under Kraterus westward (seemingly through the pass now called Balak into Karmania. 3 He established another military and naval post at Pattala, where the Delta of the Indus divided; and he then sailed with a portion of his fleet down the right arm of the river to have the first sight of the Indian Ocean. The view of ebbing and flowing tide, of which none had had experience on the scale there exhibited, occasioned to all much astonishment and alarm. 4

The fleet was now left to be conducted by the admiral Nearchus, from the mouth of the Indus round by the Persian Gulf to that of the Tigris; a memorable nautical enterprise in Greek antiquity. Alexander himself (about the month of August) began his march by land westward through the territories of the Arabiē and the Orītē, and afterwards through the deserts of Gedrosia. Parā; the principal town of the Gedrosians, was sixty days' march from the boundary of the Orītē. 5

Here his army, though without any formidable opposing enemy, underwent the most severe and deplorable sufferings; their march being through a sandy and trackless desert, with short sup-

1 Arrian, xi. 13.
2 Arrian, xi. 15, 5.
3 Arrian, xi. 17, 6; Strabo, xv. p. 721.
4 Arrian, xi. 18, 19; Curtius, ix. 9. He reached Pattala towards the middle or end of July, ώς ήδε των διατηρήσας (Strabo, xv. p. 692).
5 The site of Pattala has been usually looked for near the modern Tatta. But Dr. Kennedy, in his recent Narrative of the Campaign of the Army of the Indus in Seinde and Kabool (ch. v. p. 104), shows some reasons for thinking that it must have been considerably higher up the river than Tatta: somewhere near Schwan. 1 The Delta comma-
plies of food, and still shorter supplies of water, under a burning sun. The loss in men, horses, and baggage-cattle, from thirst, fatigue, and disease, was prodigious; and it required all the unconquerable energy of Alexander to bring through even the diminished number. At Pura the army obtained repose and refreshment, and was enabled to march forward into Karmania, where Kraterus joined them with his division from the Indus, and Kleander with the division which had been left at Ekbatana. Kleander, accused of heinous crimes in his late command, was put to death or imprisoned; several of his comrades were executed. To compensate the soldiers for their recent distress in Gedrosia, the king conducted them for seven days in drunken bacchanalian procession through Karmania, himself and all his friends taking part in the revelry; an imitation of the jovial festivity and triumph with which the god Dionysus had marched back from the conquest of India.

During the halt in Karmania Alexander had the satisfaction of seeing his admiral Nearchus, who had brought the fleet round from the mouth of the Indus to the harbour called Harmozeia (Ormuz), not far from the entrance of the Persian Gulf; a voyage of much hardship and distress, along the barren coasts of the Orita, the Gedrosians, and the Ichthyophagi. Nearchus, highly commended and honoured, was presently sent back to complete his voyage as far as the mouth of the Euphrates; while Hephaestion also was directed to conduct the larger portion of the army, with the elephants and heavy baggage, by the road near the coast from Karmania into Persia. This road, though circuitous, was the most

1 Arrian, vi, 25, 26; Curtius, ix. 10; Plutarch, Alex. 66.  
2 Curtius, ix. 10; Diodor. xvii. 166; Plutarch, Alex. 67. Arrian (vi. 28) found this festal progress mentioned in some authorities, but not in others. Neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus mentioned it. Accordingly Arrian refuses to believe it. There may have been exaggerations or falsities as to the details of the march; but as a general fact, I see no sufficient ground for disbelieving it. A season of excessive licence to the soldiers, after their extreme suffering in Gedrosia, was by no means unnatural to grant. Moreover, it corresponds to the general conception of the returning march of Dionysus in antiquity, while the imitation of that god was quite in conformity with Alexander’s turn of sentiment.

I have already remarked, that the silence of Ptolemy and Aristobulus is too strongly insisted on, both by Arrian and by others, as a reason for disbelieving affirmations respecting Alexander. Arrian and Curtius (x. 1) differ in their statements about the treatment of Kleander. According to Arrian, he was put to death; according to Curtius, he was spared from death, and simply put in prison, in consequence of the important service which he had rendered by killing Parmenio with his own hand; while 600 of his accomplices and agents were put to death.

3 Nearchus had begun his voyage about the end of September, or beginning of October (Arrian, Indic. 21; Strabo, xv. p. 721).  
4 Arrian, vi. 28, 7; Arrian, Indica, c. 33–37.
convenient, as it was now the winter season; but Alexander himself, with the lighter divisions of his army, took the more direct mountain road from Karmania to Pasargadae and Persepolis. Visiting the tomb of Cyrus the Great, founder of the Persian empire, he was incensed to find it violated and pillaged. He caused it to be carefully restored, put to death a Macedonian named Polymachus as the offender, and tortured the Magian guardians of it for the purpose of discovering accomplices, but in vain. Orsinés, satrap of Persis, was however accused of connivance in the deed, as well as of various acts of murder and spoliation: according to Curtius, he was not only innocent, but had manifested both good faith and devotion to Alexander; in spite of which he became a victim of the hostility of the favourite eunuch Bagoas, who both poisoned the king's mind with calumnies of his own, and suborned other accusers with false testimony. Whatever may be the truth of the story, Alexander caused Orsinés to be hanged; naming as satrap Peukéstés, whose favour was now high, partly as comrade and preserver of the king in his imminent danger at the citadel of the Malli—partly from his having adopted the Persian dress, manners, and language, more completely than any other Macedonian.

It was about February, in 324 B.C., that Alexander marched out of Persis to Susa. During this progress, at the point where he crossed the Pasitigris, he was again joined by Nearchus, who having completed his circumnavigation of the world, had returned to join Alexander in Susiana, on his return march, in the month of February.
from the mouth of the Indus to that of the Euphrates, had sailed back with the fleet from the latter river and come up the Pasitigris. It is probable that the division of Hephaestion also rejoined him at Susa, and that the whole army was there for the first time brought together, after the separation in Karmania.

In Susa and Susiana Alexander spent some months. For the first time since his accession to the throne, he had now no military operations in hand or in immediate prospect. No enemy was before him, until it pleased him to go in quest of a new one; nor indeed could any new one be found, except at a prodigious distance. He had emerged from the perils of the untrodden East, and had returned into the ordinary localities and conditions of Persian rule, occupying that capital city from whence the great Achaemenid kings had been accustomed to govern the Western as well as the Eastern portions of their vast empire. To their post, and to their irritable love of servility, Alexander had succeeded; but bringing with him a restless energy such as none of them except the first founder Cyrus had manifested—and a splendid military genius, such as was unknown alike to Cyrus and to his successors.

In the new position of Alexander, his principal subjects of uneasiness were, the satraps and the Macedonian soldiers. During the long interval (more than five years) which had elapsed since he marched eastward from Hyrkania in pursuit of Bessus, the satraps had necessarily been left much to themselves. Some had imagined that he would never return; an anticipation noway unreasonable, since his own impulse towards forward march was so insatiate, that he was only constrained to return by the resolute opposition of his own soldiers; moreover his dangerous wound among the Malli, and his calamitous march through Gedrosia, had given rise to reports of his death, credited for some time even by Olympias and Kleopatra in Macedonia. Under these uncertainties, some satraps stood accused of having pillaged rich temples, and committed acts of violence towards individuals. Apart from all criminality, real or alleged, several of them, also, had taken into pay

1 Arrian, vii. 5, 9; Arrian, Indica, c. 42. The voluntary death of Kalamus the Indian Gymnosophist must have taken place at Susa (where Diodorus places it—xvii. 107), and not in Persia; for Nearchus was seemingly present at the memorable scene of the funeral pile (Arrian, vii. 3, 9)—and he was not with Alexander in Persia.

2 Plutarch, Alexand. 68.
bodies of mercenary troops, partly as a necessary means of authority in their respective districts, partly as a protection to themselves in the event of Alexander's decease. Respecting the conduct of the satraps and their officers, many denunciations and complaints were sent in, to which Alexander listened readily and even eagerly, punishing the accused with indiscriminate rigour, and resenting especially the suspicion that they had calculated upon his death. Among those executed, were Abulites, satrap of Susiana, with his son Oxathres; the latter was even slain by the hands of Alexander himself, with a sarissa—the dispensation of punishment becoming in his hands an outburst of exasperated temper. He also despatched peremptory orders to all the satraps, enjoining them to dismiss their mercenary troops without delay. This measure produced considerable effect on the condition of Greece—about which I shall speak in a subsequent chapter. Harpalus, satrap of Babylon (about whom also more, presently), having squandered large sums out of the revenues of the post upon ostentatious luxury, became terrified when Alexander was approaching Susiana, and fled to Greece with a large treasure and a small body of soldiers. Serious alarm was felt among all the satraps and officers, innocent

1 Arrian, vii. 4, 2-5; Diodor, xvii. 108; Curtius, x. 1, 7. "Ut superavit esse praecedens ad iudicandum supplicia, item ad deteriora credendum." (Curtius, x. 1, 39).
2 Plutarch, Alex. 68.
3 Diodor, xvii. 106-111.
4 Among the accusations which reached Alexander against this satrap, we are surprised to find a letter addressed to him (ευ τɿ πός Ἀλεξάνδρον εὐπορότα) by the Greek historian Theopompus, who set forth with indignation the extravagant gifts and honours heaped by Harpalus upon his two successive mistresses—Pythoniké and Glykera; celebrated Hetere from Athens. These proceedings Theopompus describes as insults to Alexander (Theopompus ap. Athenaeus, xiii, p. 386-386; Fragment. 277, 278 ed. Didot.).

The satyrical drama called Ἀγὴ, represented before Alexander at a period subsequent to the flight of Harpalus, cannot have been represented (as Athenaeus states it to have been) on the banks of the Hydaspes, because Harpalus did not make his escape until he was frightened by the approach of Alexander returning from India. At the Hydaspes, Alexander was still on his outward progress; very far off, and without any idea of returning. It appears to me that the words of Athenaeus respecting this drama—ἐστί τοῦ Ἰωνίου Ἁγηνικῶν ἱπτων ἐκ τοῦ Ἡδασπανοῦ τοῦ ποταμοῦ (xii. p. 585)—involve a mistake or misreading; and that it ought to stand ἐκ τοῦ Ἡδασπανοῦ τοῦ ποταμοῦ. I may remark that the words Μεδερ γενικῶν Ἴνα Χάρπαλος, after Harpalus had fled. The Dionysia were the month Elaphebolion; now Alexander did not fight Porus on the Hydaspes until the succeeding month Munychion at the earliest—and probably later. And even if we suppose (which is not probable) that he reached the Hydaspes in Elaphebolion, he would have no leisure to celebrate dramas and a Dionysiac festival, while the army of Porus was waiting for him on the opposite bank. Moreover it is no way probable that, on the return of Hydaspes, he had any actors or choruses, or means of celebrating dramas at all.
as well as guilty. That the most guilty were not those who fared worst, we may see by the case of Kleomenes in Egypt, who remained unmolested in his government, though his iniquities were no secret.¹

Among the Macedonian soldiers, discontent had been perpetually growing, from the numerous proofs which they witnessed that Alexander had made his election for an Asiatic character, and abnegated his own country. Besides his habitual adoption of the Persian costume and ceremonial, he now celebrated a sort of national Asiatic marriage at Susa. He had already married the captive Roxana in Baktria; he next took two additional wives—Statira, daughter of Darius—and Parysatis, daughter of the preceding king Ochus. He at the same time caused eighty of his principal friends and officers, some very reluctantly, to marry (according to Persian rites) wives selected from the noblest Persian families, providing dowries for all of them.² He made presents besides, to all those Macedonians who gave in their names as having married Persian women. Splendid festivities³ accompanied these nuptials, with honorary rewards distributed to favourites and meritorious officers. Macedonians and Persians, the two imperial races, one in Europe, the other in Asia, were thus intended to be amalgamated. To soften the aversion of the soldiers generally towards these Asiatising marriages, Alexander issued proclamation that he would himself discharge their debts, inviting all who owed money to give in their names with an intimation of the sums due. It was known that the debtors were numerous; yet few came to enter their names. The soldiers suspected the proclamation as a stratagem, intended for the purpose of detecting such as were spendthrifts, and obtaining a pretext for punishment; a remarkable evidence how little confidence or affection Alexander now inspired, and how completely the sentiment entertained towards him was that of fear mingled with admiration. He himself was much hurt at their mistrust, and openly complained of it; at the same time proclaiming that paymasters and tables should be planted openly in the camp,

¹ Arrian, vii. 18, 2; vii. 23, 9-13.
² Arrian, vii. 4, 6-9. By these two marriages, Alexander thus engrafted himself upon the two lines of antecedent Persian kings. Ochus was of the Persian kings, see Phylarchus ap. Atheneus, xii. p. 539.
⁴ Arrian, vii. 6, 8. καὶ τὸν γάμον γάμους.
and that any soldier might come and ask for money enough to pay his debts, without being bound to give in his name. Assured of secrecy, they now made application in such numbers that the total distributed was prodigiously great; reaching, according to some, to 10,000 talents—according to Arrian, not less than 20,000 talents or 4,600,000£ sterling.¹

Large as this donative was, it probably gave but partial satisfaction, since the most steady and well-conducted soldiers could have received no benefit, except in so far as they might choose to come forward with fictitious debts. A new mortification moreover was in store for the soldiers generally. There arrived from the various satrapies— even from those most distant, Sogdiana, Baktria, Aria, Drangiana, Arachosia, &c.—contingents of young and fresh native troops, amounting in total to 30,000 men; all armed and drilled in the Macedonian manner. From the time when the Macedonians had refused to cross the river Hyphasis and march forward into India, Alexander saw, that for his large aggressive schemes it was necessary to disband the old soldiers, and to organise an army at once more fresh and more submissive. He accordingly despatched orders to the satraps to raise and discipline new Asiatic levies, of vigorous native youths; and the fruit of these orders was now seen.² Alexander reviewed the new levies, whom he called the Epigoni, with great satisfaction. He moreover incorporated many native Persians, both officers and soldiers into the Companion-cavalry, the most honourable service in the army; making the important change of arming them with the short Macedonian thrusting-pike in place of the missile Persian javelin. They were found such apt soldiers, and the genius of Alexander for military organisation was so consummate, that he saw himself soon released from his dependence on the Macedonian veterans; a change evident enough to them as well as to him.³

The novelty and success of Nearchus in his exploring voyage had excited in Alexander an eager appetite for naval operations. Going on board his fleet in the Pasitigris (the Karun, the river on the east side of Susa), he sailed in person down to the Persian Gulf, surveyed the coast as far as the mouth of the Tigris, and then sailed up the latter river as far as Opis. Hephaestion meanwhile, commanding the

¹ Arrian, vii. 5; Plutarch, Alex. 70; Curtius, x. 2, 9; Diodor. xvi. 199. Diodor. xvii. 108. It must have taken some time to get together and discipline these young troops; Alexander must therefore have sent the orders from India.

² Arrian, vi. 6.
army, marched by land in concert with this voyage, and came back to Opis, where Alexander disembarked.¹

Sufficient experiment had now been made with the Asiatic levies to enable Alexander to dispense with many of his Macedonian veterans. Calling together the army, he intimated his intention of sending home those who were unfit for service, either from age or wounds, but of allotting to them presents at departure sufficient to place them in an enviable condition, and attract fresh Macedonian substitutes. On hearing this intimation, all the long-standing discontent of the soldiers at once broke out. They felt themselves set aside, as worn out and useless,—and set aside, not to make room for younger men of their own country, but in favour of those Asiatics into whose arms their king had now passed. They demanded with a loud voice that he should dismiss them all—advising him by way of taunt to make his future conquests along with his father Ammon. These manifestations so incensed Alexander, that he leaped down from the elevated platform on which he had stood to speak, rushed with a few of his guards among the crowd of soldiers, and seized or caused to be seized thirteen of those apparently most forward, ordering them immediately to be put to death. The multitude were thoroughly overawed and reduced to silence, upon which Alexander remounted the platform and addressed them in a speech of considerable length. He boasted of the great exploits of Philip, and of his own still greater: he affirmed that all the benefit of his conquests had gone to the Macedonians, and that he himself had derived from them nothing but a double share of the common labours, hardships, wounds, and perils. Reproaching them as base deserters from a king who had gained for them all these unparalleled acquisitions, he concluded by giving discharge to all—commanding them forthwith to depart.²

After this speech—teeming (as we read it in Arrian) with that remorse and humiliation of the soldier—Alexander hurried away into the Waters Palace, where he remained shut up for two days without admitting any one except his immediate attendants. His guards departed along with him, leaving the discontented soldiers stupefied and motionless. Receiving no farther orders, nor any of the accustomed military indications,³ they were left in

¹ Arrian, vii. 7.
² Arrian, vii. 9, 10; Plutarch, Alex. 1; Curtius, x. 2; Justin, xii. 11.
³ See the description given by Tacitus (Hist. ii. 29) of the bringing round of the Vitellian army,—which had muti-
the helpless condition of soldiers constrained to resolve for themselves, and at the same time altogether dependent upon Alexander whom they had offended. On the third day, they learnt that he had convened the Persian officers, and had invested them 'with the chief military commands, distributing the newly-arrived Epigoni into divisions of infantry and cavalry, all with Macedonian military titles, and passing over the Macedonians themselves as if they did not exist. At this news the soldiers were overwhelmed with shame and remorse. They rushed to the gates of the palace, threw down their arms, and supplicated with tears and groans for Alexander's pardon. Presently he came out, and was himself moved to tears by seeing their prostrate deportment. After testifying his full reconciliation, he caused a solemn sacrifice to be celebrated, coupled with a multitudinous banquet of mixed Macedonians and Persians. The Grecian prophets, the Persian magi, and all the guests present, united in prayer and libation for fusion, harmony, and community of empire, between the two nations.  

This complete victory over his own soldiers was probably as gratifying to Alexander as any one gained during his past life; carrying as it did a consoling retribution for the memorable stoppage on the banks of the Hyphasis, which he had neither forgotten nor forgiven. He selected 10,000 of the oldest and most exhausted among the soldiers to be sent home under Kraterus, giving to each full pay until the time of arrival in Macedonia, with a donation of one talent besides. He intended that Kraterus, who was in bad health, should remain in Europe as viceroy of Macedonia, and that Antipater should come out to Asia with a reinforcement of troops. Pursuant to this resolution, the 10,000 soldiers were now singled out for return, and separated from the main army. Yet it does not appear that they actually did return, during the ten months of Alexander's remaining life.

nied against the general Fabius Valens: — "Tum Alphenus Varus, prefectus castrorum, delinquente paulatim additio, addit consilium — vetitis obire vigilias centurionibus, omisso tubo sono, quo miles ad belli munia cibum. Ignavus torpere cuncti, circumspectare inter se auctoriti, et ad iussas, quod nemo reserit; pariter; silentio, patientia, postremo precibus et lacrymis veniam quaerant.

Ut vero deformis et flens, et

ferunt." Compare also the narrative in Xenophon (Anab., i. 3) of the embarrassment of the Ten Thousand Greeks at Targas, when they at first refused to obey Klearchus and march against the Great King.

1 Arrian, vii. 11.

2 Arrian, vii. 12, 1-7; Justin, xii. 12. Kraterus was especially popular with the Macedonian soldiers, because he had always opposed, as much as he dared, the Oriental transformation of Alexander (Plutarch, Eumenes, 4).
Of the important edict issued this summer by Alexander to the Grecian cities, and read at the Olympic festival in July—directing each city to recall its exiled citizens—I shall speak in a future chapter. He had now accomplished his object of organising a land force half Macedonian, half Asiatic. But since the expedition of Nearchus, he had become bent upon a large extension of his naval force also; which was indeed an indispensable condition towards his immediate projects of conquering Arabia, and of pushing both nautical exploration and aggrandisment from the Persian Gulf round the Arabian coast. He despatched orders to the Phenician ports, directing that a numerous fleet should be built; and that the ships should then be taken to pieces, and conveyed across to Thapsakus on the Euphrates, from whence they would sail down to Babylon. At that place, he directed the construction of other ships from the numerous cypress trees around—as well as the formation of an enormous harbour in the river at Babylon, adequate to the accommodation of 1000 ships of war. Mikkalos, a Greek of Klazomenae, was sent to Phenicia with 500 talents, to enlist, or to purchase, seamen for the crews. It was calculated that these preparations (probably under the superintendence of Nearchus) would be completed by the spring, for which period contingents were summoned to Babylon for the expedition against Arabia.¹

In the mean time, Alexander himself paid a visit to Ekbatana, the ordinary summer residence of the Persian kings. He conducted his army by leisurely marches, reviewing by the way the ancient regal parks of the celebrated breed called Nisian horses—now greatly reduced in number.²

On the march, a violent altercation occurred between his personal favourite, Hephaestion,—and his secretary, Eumenes, the most able, dexterous, and long-sighted man in his service. Eumenes, as a Greek of Kardia, had been always regarded with slight and jealousy by the Macedonian officers, especially by Hephaestion: Alexander now took pains to reconcile the two, experiencing no

¹ Arrian, vii, 19. He also sent an officer named Herakleidés to the shores of the Caspian Sea, with orders to construct ships and make a survey of that sea (vii, 16).

² Arrian, vii, 13, 2; Diodor. xvii, 110. How leisurely the march was, may be seen in Diodorus.
difficulty with Eumenes, but much with Hephaestion. During his stay at Ekbatana, he celebrated magnificent sacrifices and festivities, with gymnastic and musical exhibitions, which were further enlivened, according to the Macedonian habits, by banquets and excessive wine-drinking. Amidst these proceedings, Hephaestion was seized with a fever. The vigour of his constitution emboldened him to neglect all care or regimen, so that in a few days the disease carried him off. The final crisis came on suddenly, and Alexander was warned of it while sitting in the theatre; but though he instantly hurried to the bedside, he found Hephaestion already dead. His sorrow for this loss was unbounded, manifesting itself in excesses suitable to the general violence of his impulses, whether of affection or of antipathy. Like Achilles mourning for Patroklos, he cast himself on the ground near the dead body, and remained there wailing for several hours; he refused all care, and even food, for two days; he cut his hair close, and commanded that all the horses and mules in the camp should have their manes cut close also; he not only suspended the festivities, but interdicted all music and every sign of joy in the camp; he directed that the battlements of the walls belonging to the neighbouring cities should be struck off; he hung, or crucified, the physician Glaukias, who had prescribed for Hephaestion; he ordered that a vast funeral pile should be erected at Babylon, at a cost given to us as 10,000 talents (2,300,000£), to celebrate the obsequies; he sent messengers to the oracle of Ammon, to inquire whether it was permitted to worship Hephaestion as a god. Many of those around him, accommodating themselves to this passionate impulse of the ruler, began at once to show a sort of worship towards the deceased, by devoting to him themselves and their arms; of which Eumenes set the example, conscious of his own personal danger, if Alexander should suspect him of being pleased at the death of his recent rival. Perdikkas was instructed to convey the body in solemn procession to Babylon, there to be burnt in state when preparations should be completed.

Arrian, vii. 13, 1; Plutarch, Eumenes, 2.

When Masistius was slain in the Persian army commanded by Macedonius in Euboeia, the manes of the horses were cut, as token of mourning (Herodot, ix. 24); compare also Plutarch, Pelopidas, 33; and Euripid, Alkestis, 442.
Alexander stayed at Ekbatana until winter was at hand, seeking distraction from his grief in exaggerated splendour of festivals and ostentation of life. His temper became so much more irascible and furious, that no one approached him without fear, and he was propitiated by the most extravagant flatteries. At length he roused himself and found his true consolation, in gratifying the primary passions of his nature—fighting and man-hunting. Between Media and Persis, dwell the tribes called Kossei, amidst a region of lofty, trackless, inaccessible mountains. Brave and predatory, they had defied the attacks of the Persian kings. Alexander now conducted against them a powerful force, and in spite of increased difficulties arising from the wintry season, pushed them from point to point, following them into the loftiest and most impenetrable recesses of their mountains. These efforts were continued for forty days, under himself and Ptolemy, until the entire male population was slain; which passed for an acceptable offering to the manes of Hephaestion.

Not long afterwards, Alexander commenced his progress to Babylon; but in slow marches, farther retarded by various foreign embassies which met him on the road. So widely had the terror of his name and achievements been spread, that several of these envoys came from the most distant regions. There were some from the various tribes of Libya—from Carthage—from Sicily and Sardinia—from the Illyrians and Thracians—from the Lucanians, Bruttians, and Tuscaus, in Italy—nay, even (some affirmed) from the Romans, as yet a people of moderate power. But there were

1 See the curious extracts from Ephipnus the Chalcidian.—seemingly a contemporary, if not an eye-witness (ap. Athenae. xii, p. 537, 381)—οὕς μὲν ἐν δείπνῳ καὶ κατηχεῖ πάντας ὑπὸ δέους τοὺς παρόντας ἀφόρητος γὰρ (Alexander) καὶ φονικότ᾽ ἐδόκει γὰρ εἶναι μελαγχυλικός, &c.

2 I translate here, literally, Plutarch's expression—Τοῦ δὲ πένθους παραγωγὰ τὰ πολέμου χρόνου εἶπεν ἔντι θῆραν καὶ κυνηγεῖσιν ἔνθρον διὰ τῶν Κοσσαίων ἔως κατετρισσότων, πάντων ἡμῖν ἀργοφάτων ἔξεσθε (Plutarch, Alexander). Ἡφαίστειος ἐναγωγῶς ἔκαλεσι (Plutarch, Alex.). Compare Polyæus, iv, 3, 31.

3 Arrian, vii. 13; Plutarch, Alex., 72; Diodor, xvii. 111. This general slaughter, however, can only be true of portions of the Kossean name; for Kosseans occur in after years (Diodor, xix. 19).

4 Pliny, H. N. iii. 9. The story in Strabo, v. p. 222, can hardly apply to Alexander the Great. Livy (ix. 18) conceives that the Romans knew nothing of Alexander even by report, but this appears to me not credible.

On the whole, though the point is doubtful, I incline to believe the assertion of a Roman embassy to Alexander. Nevertheless, there were various false statements which afterwards became current about it—one of which may be seen in Mommsen's history of the Pontic.
other names yet more surprising—Æthiopians, from the extreme south, beyond Egypt—Scythians from the north, beyond the Danube—Iberians and Gauls, from the far west, beyond the Mediterranean Sea. Legates also arrived from various Grecian cities, partly to tender congratulations and compliments upon his matchless successes, partly to remonstrate against his sweeping mandate for the general restoration of the Grecian exiles. It was remarked that these Grecian legates approached him with wreaths on their heads, tendering golden wreaths to him,—as if they were coming into the presence of a god? The proofs which Alexander received, even from distant tribes with names and costumes unknown to him, of fear for his enmity and anxiety for his favour, were such as had never been shown to any historical person, and such as entirely to explain his superhuman arrogance.

In the midst of this exuberant pride and good fortune, however, dark omens and prophecies crowded upon him as he approached Babylon. Of these the most remarkable was, the warning of the Chaldean priests, who apprised him, soon after he crossed the Tigris, that it would be dangerous for him to enter that city, and exhorted him to remain outside of the gates. At first he was inclined to obey; but his scruples were overruled, either by arguments from the Greek sophist Anaxarchus, or by the shame of shutting himself out from the most memorable city of the empire, where his great naval preparations were now going on. He found Nearchus with his fleet, who had come up from the mouth of the river,—and also the ships directed to be built in Phenicia, which had come down the river from Thapsakus, together with large numbers of seafaring men to serve aboard. The ships of cypress-wood, and the large docks, which he had ordered to be constructed at Babylon, were likewise in full progress. He lost no time in concerting with Nearchus the details of an expedition into Arabia.

Herkaleia ap. Photium, Cod. 224; Orelli Fragment. Memnon, p. 36. Kleitarchus (contemporary of Alexander), whom Pliny quotes, can have had no motive to insert falsely the name of Romans, which in his time was no wise important.

1 Arrian, vii. 15; Justin, xii. 13; Diodor, xvii. 113. The story mentioned by Justin in another place (xxi. 6) is probably referable to this last season of Alexander's career. A Carthaginian named Hamilkar Rhodanus was sent by his city to Alexander; really as an emissary to acquaint himself with the king's real designs, which occasioned to the Carthaginians serious alarm—but under colour of being an exile tendering his services. Justin says that Parmenio introduced Hamilkar—which must, I think, be an error.

2 Arrian, vii. 19, 1; vii. 23, 3.

3 Arrian, vii. 19, 5-12; Diodor, xvii. 118.
and the Persian Gulf, by his land force and naval force co-operating. From various naval officers, who had been sent to survey the Persian Gulf, and now made their reports, he learnt, that though there were no serious difficulties within it or along its southern coast, yet to double the eastern cape which terminated that coast—to circumnavigate the unknown peninsula of Arabia—and thus to reach the Red Sea—was an enterprise perilous at least, if not impracticable. But to achieve that which other men thought impracticable, was the leading passion of Alexander. He resolved to circumnavigate Arabia as well as to conquer the Arabians, from whom it was sufficient offence that they had sent no envoys to him. He also contemplated the foundation of a great maritime city in the interior of the Persian Gulf, to rival in wealth and commerce the cities of Phoenicia.

Amidst preparations for this expedition—and while the immense funeral pile destined for Hephestion was being built—Alexander sailed down the Euphrates to the great dyke called Pallakopas, about ninety miles below Babylon; a sluice constructed by the ancient Assyrian kings, for the purpose of being opened when the river was too full, so as to let off the water into the interminable marshes stretching out near the western bank. The sluice being reported not to work well, he projected the construction of a new one somewhat farther down. He then sailed through the Pallakopas in order to survey the marshes, together with the tombs of the ancient Assyrian kings which had been erected among them. Himself steering his vessel, with the kausia on his head, and the regal diadem above it, he passed some time among these lakes and swamps, which were so extensive that his fleet lost the way among them. He stayed long enough also to direct, and even commence, the foundation of a new city, in what seemed to him a convenient spot.

On returning to Babylon, Alexander found large reinforcements arrived there—partly under Philoxenus, Menander, and Menidas, second century after the Christian era, Arabia had never been circumnavigated, from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea—at least so far as his knowledge extended.

Even in the time of Arrian, in the second century after the Christian era, the Persian Gulf, and now made their reports, he learnt, that though there were no serious difficulties within it or along its southern coast, yet to double the eastern cape which terminated that coast—to circumnavigate the unknown peninsula of Arabia—and thus to reach the Red Sea—was an enterprise perilous at least, if not impracticable. But to achieve that which other men thought impracticable, was the leading passion of Alexander. He resolved to circumnavigate Arabia as well as to conquer the Arabians, from whom it was sufficient offence that they had sent no envoys to him. He also contemplated the foundation of a great maritime city in the interior of the Persian Gulf, to rival in wealth and commerce the cities of Phoenicia.

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On returning to Babylon, Alexander found large reinforcements arrived there—partly under Philoxenus, Menander, and Menidas,
from Lydia and Karia—partly 20,000 Persians, under Peukeséstés
the satrap. He caused these Persians to be incorporated
in the files of the Macedonian phalanx. According to
the standing custom, each of these files was sixteen deep,
and each soldier was armed with the long pike or sarissa
wielded by two hands; the lochage, or front-rank man,
being always an officer receiving double pay, of great
strength and attested valour—and those second and third
in the file, as well as the rearmost man of all, being
likewise strong and good men, receiving larger pay
than the rest. Alexander, in his new arrangement, retained
the first three ranks and the rear rank unchanged, as well as the
same depth of file; but he substituted twelve Persians in place
of the twelve Macedonians who followed after the third-rank
man; so that the file was composed first of the lochage and two
other chosen Macedonians, each armed with the sarissa—then
of twelve Persians armed in their own manner with bow or
javelin—lastly, of a Macedonian with his sarissa bringing up the
rear.¹ In this Macedonian-Persian file, the front would have only
three projecting pikes, instead of five, which the ordinary Mace-
donian phalanx presented; but then, in compensation, the Persian
soldiers would be able to hurl their javelins at an advancing enemy,
on the heads of their three front-rank men. The supervening
death of Alexander prevented the actual execution of this reform,
interesting as being his last project for amalgamating Persians
and Macedonians into one military force.

Besides thus modifying the phalanx, Alexander also passed in
review his fleet, which was now fully equipped. The
Splendid obsequies of Hephaestion should be celebrated. This
was the last act which remained for him to fulfil. The splendid
funeral pile stood ready—two hundred feet high, occupying a
square area, of which the side was nearly one furlong, loaded
with costly decorations from the zeal, real and simulated, of the
Macedonian officers. The invention of artists was exhausted, in
long discussions with the king himself, to produce at all cost an
exhibition of magnificence singular and stupendous. The outlay
(probably with addition of the festivals immediately following) is

¹ Arrian, vii. 23, 5. Even when performing the purely military operation of passing these soldiers in review, the regal throne, surrounded by Asiatics forming the purely military operation, his principal officers sat uponouches with silver feet, near to him inspecting their exercise, and deter-
mining their array.—Alexander sat upon the regal throne, surrounded by Asiatics
forming the purely military operation, his principal officers sat upon
ouches with silver feet, near to him inspecting their exercise, and deter-
mining their array.—Alexander sat upon

stated at 1,000 talents, or 2,760,000L. sterling. 1 Alexander awaited the order from the oracle of Ammon, having sent thither messengers to inquire what measure of reverential honour he might properly and piously show to his departed friend. 2 The answer was now brought back, intimating that Hephaestion was to be worshipped as a Hero—the secondary form of worship, not on a level with that paid to the Gods. Delighted with this divine testimony to Hephaestion, Alexander caused the pile to be lighted, and the obsequies celebrated, in a manner suitable to the injunctions of the oracle. 3 He farther directed that magnificent chapels or sacred edifices should be erected for the worship and honour of Hephaestion, at Alexandria in Egypt,—at Pella in Macedonia, and probably in other cities also. 4

Respecting the honours intended for Hephaestion at Alexandria, he addressed to Kleomenes the satrap of Egypt a despatch which becomes in part known to us. I have already stated that Kleomenes was among the worst of the satraps; having committed multiplied public crimes, of which Alexander was not uninformed. The regal despatch enjoined him to erect in commemoration of Hephaestion a chapel on the terra firma of Alexandria, with a splendid turret in the islet of Pharos; and to provide besides that all mercantile written contracts, as a condition of validity, should be inscribed with the name of Hephaestion. Alexander concluded thus:—"If on coming I find the Egyptian temples and the chapels of Hephaestion completed in the best manner, I will forgive you for all your past crimes; and in future, whatever magnitude of crime you may commit, you shall suffer no bad treatment from me."

This despatch strikingly illustrates how much the wrong

1 Diodorus, xvii. 115; Plutarch, Alex. 72.
2 Arrian, vii. 23, 8.
3 Diodor. xvii. 114, 115: compare Arrian, vii. 14, 16; Plutarch, Alex. 73.
4 Arrian, vii. 23, 10–13; Diodor. xviii. 4.

Diodorus speaks indeed, in this passage, of the πυρὰ or funeral pile in honour of Hephaestion, as if it were among the vast expenses included in the memoranda left by Alexander (after his decease) of prospective schemes. But the funeral pile had already been erected at Babylon, as Diodorus himself had informed us. What Alexander left unexecuted at his decease, but intended to execute if he had lived, was the splendid edifices and chapels in Hephaestion's honour—as we see by Arrian, vii. 23, 10. And Diodorus must be supposed to allude to these intended sacred buildings, though he has inadvertently spoken of the funeral pile. Kraterus, who was under orders to return to Macedonia, was to have built one at Pella.

The Olynthian Ephippus had composed a book περὶ τῆς Ἡφαστίωνος καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου ταφῆς, of which there appear four or five citations in Athenaeus. He dwelt especially on the luxurious habits of Alexander, and on his unmeasured potations—common to him with other Macedonians.

5 Arrian, vii. 23, 9–14. Καὶ Κλεομήνη ἀνδρὶ κακῷ, καὶ πολλὰ ἀδικήματα ἀδικήσαντι ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ, ἐπιστέλλει ἐπιστολὴν... Καὶ ἦν ἐν τοῖς γαβρίους τοῖς οἷς ἔγαγε τὰ γράμματα τὸ ἱερὸ τὸ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καλὸς κατεκτημένον καὶ τὰ
doings of satraps were secondary considerations in his view, compared with splendid manifestations towards the Gods, and personal attachment towards friends.

The intense sorrow felt by Alexander for the death of Hephaestion—not merely an attached friend, but of the same age and exuberant vigour as himself—laid his mind open to gloomy forebodings from numerous omens, as well as to jealous mistrust even of his oldest officers. Antipater especially, no longer protected against the calumnies of Olympias by the support of Hephaestion, fell more and more into discredit; whilst his son Kassander, who, had recently come into Asia with a Macedonian reinforcement, underwent from Alexander during irascible moments much insulting violence.

In spite of the dissuasive warning of the Chaldean priests, Alexander had been persuaded to distrust their sincerity, and had entered Babylon, though not without hesitation and uneasiness. However, when, after having entered the town, he went out of it again safely on his expedition for the survey of the lower Euphrates, he conceived himself to have exposed them as deceitful alarmists, and returned to the city with increased confidence, for the obsequies of his deceased friend.

The sacrifices connected with these obsequies were on the most prodigious scale. Victims enough were offered to furnish a feast for the army, who also received ample distributions of wine. Alexander presided in person at the feast, and abandoned himself to conviviality like the rest. Already full of wine, he was per-
suaded by his friend Medius to sup with him, and to pass the
whole night in yet farther drinking, with the boisterous
indulgence called by the Greeks Kémus or Revelry. Having slept off his intoxication during the next day, he
in the evening again supped with Medius, and spent a
second night in the like unmeasured indulgence. It
appears that he already had the seeds of fever upon him,
which was so fatally aggravated by this intemperance
that he was too ill to return to his palace. He took the
bath, and slept in the house of Medius; on the next morning, he
was unable to rise. After having been carried out on a couch
to celebrate sacrifice (which was his daily habit), he was obliged
to lie in bed all day. Nevertheless he summoned the generals
to his presence, prescribing all the details of the impending expedi-
tion, and ordering that the land-force should begin its march on
the fourth day following, while the fleet, with himself aboard,
would sail on the fifth day. In the evening, he was carried on a
couch across the Euphrates into a garden on the other side, where
he bathed and rested for the night. The fever still continued, so
that in the morning, after bathing and being carried out to perform
the sacrifices, he remained on his couch all day, talking and playing
at dice with Medius; in the evening, he bathed, sacrificed again,
and ate a light supper, but endured a bad night with increased
fever. The next two days passed in the same manner, the fever
becoming worse and worse; nevertheless Alexander still sum-
noned Nearchus to his bedside, discussed with him many points
about his maritime projects, and repeated his order that the fleet
should be ready by the third day. On the ensuing morning the
fever was violent; Alexander reposed all day in a bathing-house
in the garden, yet still calling in the generals to direct the filling
up of vacancies among the officers, and ordering that the arma-
ment should be ready to move. Throughout the two next days,
his malady became hourly more aggravated. On the second of the
two, Alexander could with difficulty support the being lifted out

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1 Arrian, vii. 24, 25. Diodorus states (xvii. 117) that Alexander, on this
convivial night, swallowed the contents
of a large goblet called the cup of
Héraklès, and felt very ill after it; a
statement repeated by various other
writers of antiquity, and which I see no
reason for discrediting, though some
modern critics treat it with contempt. To drink to intoxication at a funeral,
was required as a token of respectful
sympathy towards the deceased—see the
last words of the Indian Kalanus before
he ascended the funeral pile—Plutarch,
The Royal Ephemerides, or Court Jour-
nal, attested only the general fact of his
large potations and the long sleep which
followed them; see Athenæus, x. p.
434. "To drink to intoxication at a funeral,"
of bed to perform the sacrifice; even then, however, he continued to give orders to the generals about the expedition. On the morrow, though desperately ill, he still made the effort requisite for performing the sacrifice; he was then carried across from the garden-house to the palace, giving orders that the generals and officers should remain in permanent attendance in and near the hall. He caused some of them to be called to his bedside; but though he knew them perfectly, he had by this time become incapable of utterance. One of his last words spoken is said to have been, on being asked to whom he bequeathed his kingdom, "To the strongest;" one of his last acts was, to take the signet ring from his finger, and hand it to Perdikkas.¹

For two nights and a day he continued in this state, without either amendment or repose. Meanwhile the news of his malady had spread through the army, filling them with grief and consternation. Many of the soldiers, eager to see him once more, forced their way into the palace, and were admitted unarmed. They passed along by the bedside, with all the demonstrations of affliction and sympathy: Alexander knew them, and made show of friendly recognition as well as he could; but was unable to say a word. Several of the generals slept in the temple of Serapis, hoping to be informed by the God in a dream whether they ought to bring Alexander into it as a suppliant to experience the divine healing power. The God informed them in their dream, that Alexander ought not to be brought into the temple—that it would be better for him to be left where he was. In the afternoon he expired—June 323 B.C.—after a life of thirty-two years and eight months—and a reign of twelve years and eight months.²

¹ These last two facts are mentioned by Arrian (vii, 26, 5), and Diodorus (xvii, 177), and Justin (xii, 15); but they found no place in the Court Journal. Curtius (x, v. 4) gives them with some enlargement.

² The details, respecting the last illness of Alexander, are peculiarly authentic, being extracted both by Arrian and by Plutarch, from the Ephemerides Regiae, or short Court Journal; which was habitually kept by his secretary Eumenes, and another Greek named Diodon (Atheneo, x, p. 434); see Arrian, vii, 25, 26; Plutarch, Alex. 76.

It is surprising that throughout all the course of this malady, no mention is made of any physician as having been consulted. No advice was asked; if we except the application to the temple of Serapis, during the last day of Alexander's life. A few months before, Alexander had hanged or crucified the physician who attended Hephaestion in his last illness. Hence it seems probable that he either despised or mistrusted medical advice, and would not permit any to be invoked. His views must have been much altered since his dangerous fever at Tarsus, and the successful treatment of it by the Akarnanian physician Philippus.
The death of Alexander, thus suddenly cut off by a fever in the plenitude of health, vigour, and aspirations, was an event impressive as well as important in the highest possible degree, to his contemporaries far and near. When the first report of it was brought to Athens, the orator Demades exclaimed—"It cannot be true: if Alexander were dead, the whole habitable world would have smelt of his caress."1 This coarse, but emphatic comparison, illustrates the immediate, powerful, and wide-reaching impression produced by the sudden extinction of the great conqueror. It was felt by each of the many remote envoys who had so recently come to propitiate this far-shooting Apollo—by every man among the nations who had sent these envoys—throughout Europe, Asia, and Africa, as then known,—to affect either his actual condition or his probable future. The first growth and development of Macedonia, during the twenty-two years preceding the battle of Chaeronea, from an embarrassed secondary state into the first of all known powers, had excited the astonishment of contemporaries, and admiration for Philip's organizing genius. But the achievements of Alexander, during his twelve years of reign, throwing Philip into the shade, had been on a scale so much grander and vaster, and so completely without serious reverse or even interruption, as to transcend the measure, not only of human expectation, but almost of human belief. The Great King (as the King of

c enchanted Alexander's death is here a plain fact satisfactorily made out, yet a different story was circulated some time afterwards, and gained partial credit (Plutarch, De Invictiis, p. 38), that he had been poisoned. The poison was said to have been provided by Aristotle,—sent over to Asia by Antipater through his son Cassander,—and administered by Lollas (another son of Antipater), Alexander's cup-bearer (Arrian, vii. 27, 2; Curtius, x. 10, 17; Dio, xvii, 118; Justin, xii, 15). It is quite natural that fever and intemperance (which latter moreover was frequent with Alexander) should not be regarded as causes sufficiently marked and impressive to explain a decease at once so unexpected and so momentous. There seems ground for supposing, however, that the report was intentionally fomented, if not originally broached, by the party-enemies of Antipater and Cassander—especially by the rancorous Olympias. The violent
Persia was called by excellence) was, and had long been, the type of worldly power and felicity, even down to the time when Alexander crossed the Hellespont. Within four years and three months from this event, by one stupendous defeat after another, Darius had lost all his Western Empire, and had become a fugitive eastward of the Caspian Gates, escaping captivity at the hands of Alexander only to perish by those of the satrap Bessus. All antecedent historical parallels—the ruin and captivity of the Lydian Croesus, the expulsion and mean life of the Syracusan Dionysius, both of them impressive examples of the mutability of human condition,—sank into trifles compared with the overthrow of this towering Persian colossus. The orator Aeschines expressed the genuine sentiment of a Grecian spectator, when he exclaimed (in a speech delivered at Athens shortly before the death of Darius)—

What is there among the list of strange and unexpected events, that has not occurred in our time? Our lives have transcended the limits of humanity; we are born to serve as a theme for incredible tales to posterity. Is not the Persian king—who dug through Athos and bridged the Hellespont,—who demanded earth and water from the Greeks,—who dared to proclaim himself in public epistles master of all mankind from the rising to the setting sun—is not he now struggling to the last, not for dominion over others, but for the safety of his own person?  

Such were the sentiments excited by Alexander's career even in the middle of 330 B.C., more than seven years before his death. During the following seven years, his additional achievements had carried astonishment yet farther. He had mastered, in defiance of fatigue, hardship, and combat, not merely all the eastern half of the Persian empire, but unknown Indian regions beyond its easternmost limits. Besides Macedonia, Greece, and Thrace, he possessed all that immense treasure and military force which had once rendered the Great King so formidable. By no contemporary man had any such power ever been known or conceived. With the turn of imagination then prevalent, many were doubtless disposed to take

\[\text{Translation of the Greek text:}\]

\[\text{Toigártōi tīn anelpíston kai ἀναιμήκοισθαι ἄνδρα ἥμων ἀν γέγονεν! ἄν γάρ βιον ἦν ἀδρήστων βεβηθᾶν, ἀλλὰ εἰς παραθελονταί τεὶς ἀθέμαροι ἔφημεν. Οὐδὲ μὲν τῶν Περσῶν βασιλεύον, ὁ τῶν Ἀθηνών διορίσας καὶ τῶν Ἐλλήσποντων ἕτερος, ὁ τῆς γης καὶ ἔδωρ τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ καὶ τῆς σωτηρίας.}

\[\text{Compare the striking fragment, of a like tenor, of the lost work of the Phalerian Demetrius—Περὶ τῆς τύχης—Fragment. Histor. Graecor. vol. ii. p. 368.}\]
him for a 'God on earth, as Grecian spectators had once supposed with regard to Xerxes, when they beheld the innumerable Persian host crossing the Hellespont.  

Exalted to this prodigious grandeur, Alexander was at the time of his death little more than thirty-two years old—the age at which a citizen of Athens was growing into important commands; ten years less than the age for a consul at Rome; two years younger than the age at which Timour first acquired the crown, and began his foreign conquests.  

His extraordinary bodily powers were unabated; he had acquired a large stock of military experience; and, what was still more important, his appetite for farther conquest was as voracious, and his readiness to purchase it at the largest cost of toil or danger, as complete, as it had been when he first crossed the Hellespont. Great was his past career had been, his future achievements, with such increased means and experience, were likely to be yet greater. His ambition would have been satisfied with nothing less than the conquest of the whole habitable world as then known; and if his life had been prolonged, he would probably have accomplished it. Nowhere (so far as our knowledge reaches) did there reside any military power capable of making head against him; nor were his soldiers, when he commanded them, daunted or baffled by any extremity of cold, heat, or fatigue. The patriotic feelings of Livy dispose him to maintain that Alexander, had he invaded Italy and assailed Romans or Sammites, would have failed and perished like his relative Alexander of Epirus. But this conclusion cannot be accepted. If we grant the courage and discipline of the Roman infantry to have been equal to the best infantry of Alexander's army, the same cannot be said of the Roman cavalry as compared with the Macedonian Companions. Still less is it likely that a Roman consul, annually changed, would have been found a match for Alexander

1 Herod. vii. 56.  
2 Cicero, Philippic. v. 17, 48.  
4 This is the remark of his great admirer Arrian, vii. 1, 6.  
5 Livy, ix. 17-19. A discussion of Alexander's chances against the Romans—extremely interesting and beautiful, though the case appears to me very partially set forth. I agree with Niebuhr in dissenting from Livy's result; and with Plutarch in considering it as one of the boons of Fortune to the Romans, that Alexander did not live long enough to attack them (Plutarch De Fortunâ Romanar, p. 326). Livy however had good reasons for complaining of these Greek authors (he calls them "levissimi ex Graecis"), who said the Romans would have quailed before the terrible reputation of Alexander, and submitted without resistance. Assuredly his victory over them would have been dearly bought.
in military genius and combinations; nor, even if personally equal, would he have possessed the same variety of troops and arms, each effective in its separate way, and all conspiring to one common purpose—nor the same unbounded influence over their minds in stimulating them to full effort. I do not think that even the Romans could have successfully resisted Alexander the Great; though it is certain that he never throughout all his long marches encountered such enemies as they, nor even such as Samnites and Lucanians—combining courage, patriotism, discipline, with effective arms both for defence and for close combat.

Among all the qualities which go to constitute the highest military excellence, either as a general or as a soldier, none was wanting in the character of Alexander. Together with his own chivalrous courage—sometimes indeed both excessive and unseasonable, so as to form the only military defect which can be fairly imputed to him—we trace in all his operations the most careful dispositions taken beforehand, vigilant precaution in guarding against possible reverse, and abundant resource in adapting himself to new contingencies. Amidst constant success, these precautionary combinations were never discontinued. His achievements are the earliest recorded evidence of scientific military organization on a large scale, and of its overwhelming effects. Alexander overawes the imagination more than any other personage of antiquity, by the matchless development of all that constitutes effective force—as an individual warrior, and as organizer and leader of armed masses; not merely the blind impetuosity ascribed by Homer to Ares, but also the intelligent, methodized, and all-subduing compression which he personifies in Athénè. But all his great qualities were fit for use only against enemies; in which category indeed were numbered all mankind, known and unknown, except those who chose to submit to him. In his Indian campaigns, amidst tribes of utter strangers, we perceive that not only those who stand on their defence, but also those who abandon their property and flee to the mountains, are alike pursued and slaughtered.

Apart from the transcendent merits of Alexander as a soldier and a general, some authors give him credit for grand and beneficent views on the subject of imperial government, and for

1 Alexander of Epirus is said to have remarked, that he, in his expeditions into Italy, had fallen upon the θηρίανωτερος or chamber of the men; while his nephew (Alexander the Great), in invading Asia, had fallen upon the γυναικοθηρίανωτερος or chamber of the women (Aelus Gallus, xvii, 21; Curtius, viii. 1, 37).
intentions highly favourable to the improvement of mankind. I see no ground for adopting this opinion. As far as we can venture to anticipate what would have been Alexander’s future, we see nothing in prospect except years of ever-repeated aggression and conquest, not to be concluded until he had traversed and subjugated all the inhabited globe. The acquisition of universal dominion—conceived not metaphorically, but literally, and conceived with greater facility in consequence of the imperfect geographical knowledge of the time—was the master-passion of his soul. At the moment of his death, he was commencing fresh aggression in the south against the Arabians, to an indefinite extent; while his vast projects against the western tribes in Africa and Europe, as far as the Pillars of Héraclès, were consigned in the orders and memoranda confidentially communicated to Kraterus. Italy, Gaul, and Spain, would have been successively attacked and conquered; the enterprises proposed to him when in Baktria by the Chorasmian prince Pharamanxus, but postponed then until a more convenient season, would have been next taken up, and he would have marched from the Danube northward round the Lusine and Palaus Meotis against the Scythians and the tribes of Caucasus. There remained moreover the Asiatic regions east of the Hyphasis, which his soldiers had refused to enter upon, but which he certainly would have invaded at a future opportunity, were it only to efface the poignant humiliation of having been compelled to relinquish his proclaimed purpose. Though this sounds like romance and hyperbole, it was nothing more than the real insatiate aspiration of Alexander, who looked upon every new acquisition mainly as a capital for acquiring more: “You are a man like all of us, Alexander (said the naked Indian to him)—except that you abandon your home like a meddlesome destroyer, to invade the most distant regions; enduring hardship yourself, and inflicting hardship upon others.” Now, how an empire thus boundless and heterogeneous, such as no prince has ever yet realized, could have been administered with any superior

1 Arrian, vii. 28, 5.
2 Diodor. xiii. 4.
3 Arrian, iv. 15, 11.
4 Arrian, vii. 10, 12. Τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς, ἤ τι δὲ μὲν ἔγω, ἕπλησθος ἤ τυχὲ, αὐτὸν κτᾶσθαι τις καὶ ἀλέξανδρος. Compare vii. 1, 3–7, vii. 15, 9, and the speech made by Alexander to his soldiers on the banks of the Hyphasis when he was trying to persuade them to march forward, v. 26 seq. We must remem-
advantages to subjects, it would be difficult to show. The mere task of acquiring and maintaining—of keeping satraps and tribute-gatherers in authority as well as in subordination—of suppressing resistances ever liable to recur in regions distant by months of march would occupy the whole life of a world-conqueror, without leaving any leisure for the improvements suited to peace and stability, if we give him credit for such purposes in theory.

But even this last is more than can be granted. Alexander's acts indicate that he desired nothing better than to take up the traditions of the Persian empire; a tribute-levying and army-levying system, under Macedonians, in large proportion, as his instruments; yet partly also under the very same Persians who had administered before, provided they submitted to him. It has indeed been extolled among his merits that he was thus willing to reappoint Persian grandees (putting their armed force however under the command of a Macedonian officer)—and to continue native princes in their dominions, if they did willing homage to him, as tributary subordinates. But all this had been done before him by the Persian kings, whose system it was to leave the conquered princes undisturbed, subject only to the payment of tribute, and to the obligation of furnishing a military contingent when required. In like manner Alexander's Asiatic empire would thus have been composed of an aggregate of satrapies and dependent principalities, furnishing money and soldiers: in other respects, left to the discretion of local rule, with occasional extreme inflictions of punishment, but no systematic examination or control. Upon this, the condition of Asiatic empire in all ages, Alexander would have grafted one special improvement: the military organization of the empire, feeble under the Achamenid princes, would have been greatly strengthened by his genius, and by the able officers formed in his school, both for foreign aggression and for home control.

The Persian empire was a miscellaneous aggregate, with no strong feeling of nationality. The Macedonian conqueror who

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1 Arrian, vii. 4, 4, 5.
2 Herodot. iii. 15. Alexander offered to Phokion (Plutarch. Phok. 12) his choice between four Asiatic cities, of which (that is, of any one of them) he was to enjoy the revenues; just as Artaxerxes Longimanus had acted towards Themistokles in recompense for his treason. Phokion refused the offer. See the punishment of Sisamnés by Kambyses (Herodot. v. 25).
3 See the punishment of Sisamnés by
4 The rhetor Aristidès, in his Encomium on Rome, has some good remarks on the character and ascendency of Alexander, exercised by will and personal authority, as contrasted with the systematic and legal working of the Roman empire (Orat. xvi. p. 332-360, vol. i, ed. Dindorf).
seized its throne was still more indifferent to national sentiment. He was neither Macedonian nor Greek. Though the absence of this prejudice has sometimes been counted to him as a virtue, it only made room, in my opinion, for prejudices still worse. The substitute for it was an exorbitant personality and self-estimation, manifested even in his earliest years, and inflamed by extraordinary success into the belief in divine parentage; which, while setting him above the idea of communion with any special nationality, made him conceive all mankind as subjects under one common sceptre to be wielded by himself. To this universal empire the Persian king made the nearest approach, according to the opinions then prevalent. Accordingly Alexander, when victorious, accepted the position and pretensions of the overthrown Persian court as approaching most nearly to his full due. He became more Persian than either Macedonian or Greek. While himself adopting, as far as he could safely venture, the personal habits of the Persian court, he took studied pains to transform his Macedonian officers into Persian grandees, encouraging and even forcing intermarriages with Persian women according to Persian rites. At the time of Alexander's death, there was comprised, in his written orders given to Kraterus, a plan for the wholesale transportation of inhabitants both out of Europe into Asia, and out of Asia into Europe, in order to fuse these populations into one by multiplying intermarriages and intercourse. Such reciprocal translation of peoples would have been felt as eminently odious, and could not have been accomplished without coercive authority. It is rash to speculate upon unexecuted purposes; but, as far as we can judge, such compulsory mingling of the different races promises nothing favourable to the happiness of any of them, though it might serve as an imposing novelty and memento of imperial omnipotence.

In respect of intelligence and combining genius, Alexander was

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1 Xenoph. Cyrop. viii. 6, 21; Anab. 1, 7, 9; Herodot. vii. 8, 16; compare Arran. v. 26, 4–10.

2 Diodor. xviii. 4. Πρὸς δὲ τούτων πάλαιν ενυποκειμονιος καὶ σωμάτων μεταγαγόες εις την Ασίαν εἰς την Εὔρωπην, καὶ κατὰ τούτων εἰς την Εὐρώπην εἰς την Ασίαν, διὸς τὶς μεγίστας ἡπειρος παῖς ἡγεμόνιας καὶ ταῖς ἐθνικαίς εἰς κοινὴν ὁμοσδασίαν καὶ συγγενείαν φιλίαν καταστήσας.

3 See the effect produced upon the Ionians by the false statement of Histories (Herod. vi. 3) with Wesseling's note—and the eagerness of the Paeonians to return (Herod. v. 98; also Justin. viii. 5).

4 Antipater afterwards intended to transport the Illyrians in mass from their own country into Asia, if he had succeeded in conquering them (Diodor. xvii. 25). Compare Pausanias (i. 9, 8–10) about the forcible measures used by Lysimachus, in transporting new inhabitants, at Ephesus and Lysimachia.
Hellenic to the full; in respect of disposition and purpose, no one could be less Hellenic. The acts attesting his Oriental violence of impulse, unmeasured self-will, and exaction of reverence above the limits of humanity—have been already recounted. To describe him as a son of Hellas, imbued with the political maxims of Aristotle, and bent on the systematic diffusion of Hellenic culture for the improvement of mankind—is, in my judgement, an estimate of his character contrary to the evidence. Alexander is indeed said to have invited suggestions from Aristotle as to the best mode of colonizing; but his temper altered so much, after a few years of Asiatic conquest, that he came not only to lose all deference for Aristotle's advice, but even to hate him bitterly.

Moreover, though the philosopher's full suggestions have not been preserved, yet we are told generally that he recommended Alexander to behave to the Greeks as a leader or president, and to the Barbarians (non-Hellenes) as a master: a distinction substantially coinciding with that pointed out by Burke in his speeches at the beginning of the American war, between the principles of government proper to be followed by British and by the American colonies, and in British India. No Greek thinker believed the Asiatics to be capable of that free civil polity upon which Aristotle had doubtless more authorities before him than we possess. Among other eulogists of Alexander, it is sufficient to name Droysen—in his two works, both of great historical research—Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen—und Geschichte des Helenismus oder der Bildung des Hellenistischen Staaten Systems (Hamburg, 1843). See especially the last and most recent work, p. 27 seqq., p. 531 seqq.—and elsewhere passim.


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3. Plutarch, Alex. 55-74.


5. Aristotle. Polit. i. 1, 5; vii. 6, 1. See the memorable comparison drawn by Aristotle (Polit. vii. 6) between the
which the march of every Grecian community was based. Aristotle did not wish to degrade the Asiatics below the level to which they had been accustomed, but rather to preserve the Greeks from being degraded to the same level. Now Alexander recognised no such distinction as that drawn by his preceptor. He treated Greeks and Asiatics alike, not by elevating the latter, but by degrading the former. Though he employed all indiscriminately as instruments, yet he presently found the free speech of Greeks, and even of Macedonians, so distasteful and offensive, that his preferences turned more and more in favour of the servile Asiatic sentiment and customs. Instead of hellenizing Asia, he was tending to asiatize Macedonia and Hellas. His temper and character, as modified by a few years of conquest, rendered him quite unfit to follow the course recommended by Aristotle towards the Greeks—quite as unfit as any of the Persian kings, or as the French Emperor Napoléon, to endure that partial frustration, compromise, and smart from free criticism, which is inseparable from the position of a limited chief. Among a multitude of subjects more diverse-coloured than even the army of Xerxes, it is quite possible that he might have turned his power towards the improvement of the rudest portions. We are told (though the fact is difficult to credit, from his want of time) that he abolished various barbarisms of the Hyrkanians, Arachosians, and Sogdians. But Macedonians as well as Greeks would have been pure losers by being absorbed into an immense Asiatic aggregate.

Plutarch states that Alexander founded more than seventy new cities in Asia. So large a number of them is neither verifiable nor probable, unless we either reckon up simple military posts, or borrow from the list of foundations.

Number of new cities founded in Asia by Alexander.

Europeans and Asiatics generally. He pronounces the former to be courageous and energetic, but wanting in intelligence or powers of political combination; the latter to be intelligent, and clever in contrivance, but destitute of courage. Neither of them have more than a "one-legged aptitude" (φύσιν μονόκωλον); the Greek alone possesses both the courage and the intelligence united. The Asiatics are condemned to perpetual subjection; the Greeks might govern the world, could they but combine in one political society.

Isokrates ad Philippum, Or. v. p. 85, a. 18. ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν πείθειν πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας σύμφερον, τὸ δὲ βιάζεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους χρήσιμον.

1 Plutarch, Fortun. Alex. M. p. 328. The stay of Alexander in these countries was however so short, that even with the best will he could not have enforced the suppression of any inveterate customs.

2 Plutarch, Fortun. Al. M. p. 328. Plutarch mentions, a few lines afterwards, Seleukeia in Mesopotamia, as if he thought that it was among the cities established by Alexander himself. This shows that he has not been exact in distinguishing foundations made by Alexander, from those originated by Seleukus and other Diadochi. The elaborate article of Droysen (in the Appendix to his Geschichte des Hellenismus, p. 588–651) ascribes to
really established by his successors. Except Alexandria in Egypt, none of the cities founded by Alexander himself can be shown to have attained any great development. Nearly all were planted among the remote, warlike, and turbulent peoples eastward of the Caspian Gates. Such establishments were really fortified posts to hold the country in subjection: Alexander lodged in them detachments from his army, but none of these detachments can well have been large, since he could not afford materially to weaken his army, while active military operations were still going on, and while farther advance was in contemplation. More of these settlements were founded in Sogdiana than elsewhere; but respecting the Sogdian foundations, we know that the Greeks whom he established there, chained to the spot only by fear of his power, broke away in mutiny immediately on the news of his death. Some Greek soldiers in Alexander's army on the Jaxartes or the Hydaspes, sick and weary of his interminable marches, might prefer being enrolled among the colonists of a new city on one of these unknown rivers, to the ever-repeated routine of exhausting duty. But it is certain that no volunteer emigrants would go forth to settle at distances such as their imaginations could hardly conceive. The absorbing appetite of Alexander was conquest, to the East, West, South, and North; the cities which he planted were established, for the most part, as garrisons to maintain his most distant and most precarious acquisitions. The purpose of

Alexander the largest plans of colonization in Asia, and enumerates a great number of cities alleged to have been founded by him. But in regard to the majority of these foundations, the evidence upon which Droysen grounds his belief that Alexander was the founder, appears to me altogether slender and unsatisfactory. If Alexander founded so many cities as Droysen imagines, how does it happen that Arrian mentions only so comparatively small a number? The argument derived from Arrian's silence, for rejecting what is affirmed by other ancients respecting Alexander, is indeed employed by modern authors (and by Droysen himself among them), far oftener than I think warrantable. But if there be any one proceeding of Alexander more than another, in respect of which the silence of Arrian ought to make us suspicious—it is the foundation of a new colony; a solemn act, requiring delay and multiplied regulations, intended for perpetuity, and redounding to the honour of the founder. I do not believe in any colonies founded by Alexander, beyond those comparatively few which Arrian mentions, except such as rest upon some other express and good testimony. Whoever will read through Droysen's list, will see that most of the names in it will not stand this test. The short life, and rapid movements, of Alexander, are of themselves the strongest presumption against his having founded so large a number of colonies.

1 Diodor. xvii. 99; xviii. 7, Curtius, ix. 7, 1. Curtius observes (vii. 10, 15) respecting Alexander's colonies in Sogdiana—that they were founded "velut ferci dominitarum gentium; uma originis sive obivia servitant, quibus imporvavant."

2 See the plain-spoken outburst of the Thurian Antileon, one of the soldiers in Xenophon's Ten Thousand Greeks, when the army reached Trapezus (Xen. Anab. v. 1, 2).
colonization was altogether subordinate; and that of hellenizing Asia, so far as we can see, was not even contemplated, much less realized.

This process of hellenizing Asia—in so far as Asia was ever hellenized—which has often been ascribed to Alexander, was in reality the work of the Diadochi who came after him; though his conquests doubtless opened the door and established the military ascendency which rendered such a work practicable. The position, the aspirations, and the interests of these Diadochi—Antigonus, Ptolemy, Seleukus, Lysimachus, &c.—were materially different from those of Alexander. They had neither appetite nor means for new and remote conquest; their great rivalry was with each other; each sought to strengthen himself near home against the rest. It became a matter of fashion and pride with them, not less than of interest, to found new cities immortalising their family names. These foundations were chiefly made in the regions of Asia near and known to Greeks, where Alexander had planted none. Thus the great and numerous foundations of Seleukus Nikator and his successors covered Syria, Mesopotamia, and parts of Asia Minor. All these regions were known to Greeks, and more or less tempting to new Grecian immigrants—not out of reach or hearing of the Olympic and other festivals, as the Jaxartes and the Indus were. In this way a considerable influx of new Hellenic blood was poured into Asia during the century succeeding Alexander—probably in great measure from Italy and Sicily, where the condition of the Greek cities became more and more calamitous—besides the numerous Greeks who took service as individuals under these Asiatic kings. Greeks, and Macedonians speaking Greek, became predominant, if not in numbers, at least in importance, throughout most of the cities in Western Asia. In particular, the Macedonian military organization, discipline, and administration, was maintained systematically among these Asiatic kings. In the account of the battle of Magnesia, fought by the Seleukid king Antiochus the Great against the Romans in 190 B.C., the Macedonian phalanx, constituting the main force of his Asiatic army, appears in all its completeness, just as it stood under Philip and Perseus in Macedonia itself.  

When it is said however that Asia became hellenized under Alexander's successors, the phrase requires explanation. Hellenism, properly so called—the aggregate of habits, sentiments, energies, and intelligence, manifested by the Greeks during their

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1 Appian, Syriac. 32.
epoch of autonomy\(^1\)—never passed over into Asia; neither the highest qualities of the Greek mind, nor even the entire character of ordinary Greeks. This genuine Hellenism could not subsist under the over-ruling compression of Alexander, nor even under the less irresistible pressure of his successors. Its living force, productive genius, self-organizing power, and active spirit of political communion, were stifled, and gradually died out. All that passed into Asia was a faint and partial resemblance of it, carrying the superficial marks of the original. The administration of the Greco-Asiatic kings was not Hellenic (as it has been sometimes called), but completely despotic, as that of the Persians had been before. Whoever follows their history, until the period of Roman dominion, will see that it turned upon the tastes, temper, and ability of the prince, and on the circumstances of the regal family. Viewing their government as a system, its prominent difference, as compared with their Persian predecessors, consisted in their retaining the military traditions and organization of Philip and Alexander; an elaborate scheme of discipline and manoeuvring, which could not be kept up without permanent official grades and a higher measure of intelligence than had ever been displayed under the Achamenid kings, who had no military school or training whatever. Hence a great number of individual Greeks found employment in the military as well as in the civil service of these Greco-Asiatic kings. The intelligent Greek, instead of a citizen of Hellas, became the instrument of a foreign prince; the details of government were managed to a great degree by Greek officials, and always in the Greek language.

Moreover, besides this, there was the still more important fact of the many new cities founded in Asia by the Seleukids and the other contemporary kings. Each of these cities had a considerable infusion of Greek and Macedonian citizens, among the native Orientals located there, often brought by compulsion from neighbouring villages. In what numerical ratio these two elements

\(^1\) This is the sense in which I have always used the word *Hellenism*, throughout the present Work.

With Droysen, the word *Hellenismus* — *Das Hellenistische Staatsystems* — is applied to the state of things which followed upon Alexander's death; to the aggregate of kingdoms into which Alexander's conquests became distributed, having for their point of similarity the common use of Greek speech, a certain proportion of Greeks both as inhabitants and as officers, and a partial streak of Hellenic culture. This sense of the word (if admissible at all) must at any rate be constantly kept in mind, in order that it may not be confounded with *hellenism* in the stricter meaning.
of the civic population stood to each other, we cannot say. But the Greeks and Macedonians were the leading and active portion, who exercised the greatest assimilating force, gave imposing effect to the public manifestations of religion, had wider views and sympathies, dealt with the central government, and carried on that contracted measure of municipal autonomy which the city was permitted to retain. In these cities the Greek inhabitants, though debarred from political freedom, enjoyed a range of social activity suited to their tastes. In each, Greek was the language of public business and dealing; each formed a centre of attraction and commerce for an extensive neighbourhood; all together, they were the main Hellenic, or quasi-Hellenic, element in Asia under the Greco-Asiatic kings, as contrasted with the rustic villages, where native manners, and probably native speech, still continued with little modification. But the Greeks of Antioch, or Alexandria, or Seleucia, were not like citizens of Athens or Thebes, nor even like men of Tarentum or Ephesus. While they communicated their language to Orientals, they became themselves substantially orientalized. Their feelings, judgements, and habits of action, ceased to be Hellenic. Polybius, when he visited Alexandria, looked with surprise and aversion on the Greeks there resident, though they were superior to the non-Hellenic population, whom he considered worthless. Greek social habits, festivals, and legends, passed with the Hellenic settlers into Asia; all becoming amalgamated and transformed so as to suit a new Asiatic abode. Important social and political consequences turned upon the diffusion of the language, and upon the establishment of such a common medium of communication throughout Western Asia. But after all, the hellenized Asiatic was not so much a Greek as a foreigner with Grecian speech, exterior varnish, and superficial manifestations; distinguished fundamentally from those Greek citizens with whom the present history has been concerned. So he would have been considered by Sophokles, by Thucydides, by Socrates.

1 Strabo, xii. p. 727. ο άρχον Πολλιον γεγονω εν τη πόλει (Alexandria), βελτιωτεται την ταιτην κατάστασιν, &c. The Museum of Alexandria (with its library) must be carefully distinguished from the city and the people. It was an artificial institution, which took its rise altogether from the personal taste and munificence of the earlier Ptolemies, especially the second. It was one of the noblest and most useful institutions recorded in history, and forms the most honourable monument of what Droysen calls the Hellenistic period, between the death of Alexander and the extension of the Roman empire into Asia. But this Museum, though situated at Alexandria, had no peculiar connexion with the city or its population; it was a College of literary Fellows (if we may employ a modern word) congregated out of various Grecian towns. Eratosthenes, Callimachus, Aristarchus, Aristarchus, were not natives of Alexandria.
Thus much is necessary, in order to understand the bearing of Alexander's conquests, not only upon the Hellenic population, but upon Hellenic attributes and peculiarities. While crushing the Greeks as communities at home, these conquests opened a wider range to the Greeks as individuals abroad; and produced—perhaps the best of all their effects—a great increase of intercommunication, multiplication of roads, extension of commercial dealing, and enlarged facilities for the acquisition of geographical knowledge. There already existed in the Persian empire an easy and convenient royal road (established by Darius son of Hystaspes, and described as well as admired by Herodotus) for the three months' journey between Sardis and Susa; and there must have been another regular road from Susa and Ecbatana to Baktria, Sogdiana, and India. Alexander, had he lived, would doubtless have multiplied on a still larger scale the communications both by sea and land between the various parts of his world-empire. We read that among the gigantic projects which he was contemplating when surprised by death, one was, the construction of a road all along the northern coast of Africa, as far as the Pillars of Héraklès. He had intended to found a new maritime city on the Persian Gulf, at the mouth of the Euphrates, and to incur much outlay for regulating the flow of water in its lower course. The river would probably have been thus made again to afford the same conveniences, both for navigation and irrigation, as it appears to have furnished in earlier times under the ancient Babylonian kings. Orders had been also given for constructing a fleet to explore the Caspian Sea. Alexander believed that sea to be connected with the Eastern Ocean, and intended to make it his point of departure for circumnavigating the eastern limits of Asia, which country yet remained for him to conquer. The voyage already performed by Nearchus, from the mouth of the Indus to that of the Euphrates, was in those days a splendid maritime achievement; to which another still greater was on the point of being added—the circumnavigation of Arabia from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea; though here we

1 Diodor. xviii, 4. Pausanias (ii, 1, 5) observes that Alexander wished to cut through Mount Mimas (in Asia Minor), but that this was the only one, among all his undertakings, which did not succeed. "So difficult is it (he goes on) to put force upon the divine arrangements," ῥὴ Ἀθηναῖος. He wished to cut through the isthmus between Teos and Klazomenae, so as to avoid the navigation round the cliffs of Minos (εἰσόης τοὺς νησίδας Μύκαιον Ναυταρια—Aristophan. Nub. 274) between Chios and Erythrae. Probably this was among the projects suggested to Alexander in the last year of his life. We have no other information about it.

2 Arrian, v. 26, 2.
must remark, that this same voyage (from the mouth of the Indus round Arabia into the Red Sea) had been performed in thirty months, a century and a half before, by Skylax of Karyanda, under the orders of Darius son of Hystaspes; yet, though recorded by Herodotus, forgotten (as it would appear) by Alexander and his contemporaries. This enlarged and systematic exploration of the earth, combined with increased means of communication among its inhabitants, is the main feature in Alexander's career which presents itself as promising real consequences beneficial to humanity.

We read that Alexander felt so much interest in the extension of science, that he gave to Aristotle the immense sum of 800 talents in money, placing under his directions several thousand men, for the purpose of prosecuting zoological researches. These exaggerations are probably the work of those enemies of the philosopher who decryed him as a pensioner of the Macedonian court; but it is probable enough that Philip, and Alexander in the early part of his reign, may have helped Aristotle in the difficult process of getting together facts and specimens for observation—from esteem towards him personally, rather than from interest in his discoveries. The intellectual turn of Alexander was towards literature, poetry, and history. He was fond of the Iliad especially, as well as of the Attic tragedians; so that Harpalus, being directed to send some books to him in Upper Asia, selected as the most acceptable packet various tragedies of Aischylus, Sophokles, and Euripides, with the dithyrambic poems of Telestes and the histories of Phlistus.
Even in 334 B.C., when Alexander first entered upon his Asiatic campaigns, the Grecian cities, great as well as small, had been robbed of all their free agency, and existed only as appendages of the kingdom of Macedonia. Several of them were occupied by Macedonian garrisons, or governed by local despots who leaned upon such armed force for support. There existed among them no common idea or public sentiment, formally proclaimed and acted on, except such as it suited Alexander’s purpose to encourage. The miso-Persian sentiment—once a genuine expression of Hellenic patriotism, to the recollection of which Demosthenés was wont to appeal, in animating the Athenians to action against Macedonia, but now extinct and supplanted by nearer apprehensions—had been converted by Alexander to his own purposes, as a pretext for headship, and a help for ensuring submission during his absence in Asia. Greece had become a province of Macedonia; the affablé of the Greeks (observes Aristotle in illustrating a philosophical discussion) are “in the hands of the king.” A public synod of the Greeks sat from time to time at Corinth; but it represented only philo-Macedonian sentiment; all that we know of its proceedings consisted in congratulations to Alexander on his victories. There is no Grecian history of public or political import; there are no facts except the local and municipal details of each city—“the streets and fountains which we are repairing, and the battlements which we are whitening,” to use a phrase of Demosthenés—the good management of the Athenian finances by the orator Lykurgus, and the contentions of orators respecting private disputes or politics of the past.

But though Grecian history is thus stagnant and suspended during the first years of Alexander’s Asiatic campaigns, it might at any moment have become animated with an active spirit of self-
 emancipation, if he had experienced reverses, or if the Persians had administered their own affairs with skill and vigour. I have already stated, that during the first two years of the war, the Persian fleet (we ought rather to say, the Phoenician fleet in the Persian service) had a decided superiority at sea. Darius possessed untold treasures which might have indefinitely increased that superiority and multiplied his means of transmarine action, had he chosen to follow the advice of Memnon, by acting vigorously from the sea and strictly on the defensive by land. The movement or quiescence of the Greeks therefore depended on the turn of affairs in Asia; as Alexander himself was well aware.

During the winter of 334-333 B.C., Memnon with the Persian fleet appeared to be making progress among the islands in the Aegean, and the anti-Macedonian Greeks were expecting him farther westward in Euboea and Peloponnesus. Their hopes being dashed by his unexpected death, and still more by Darius's abandonment of the Memnonian plans, they had next to wait for the chance of what might be achieved by the immense Persian land-force. Even down to the eve of the battle of Issus, Demosthenes and others (as has already been mentioned) were encouraged by their correspondents in Asia to anticipate success for Darius even in pitched battle. But after the great disaster at Issus, during a year and a half (from November 333 B.C. to March or April 331 B.C.), no hope was possible. The Persian force seemed extinct, and Darius was so paralysed by the captivity of his family, that he suffered even the citizens of Tyre and Gaza to perish in their gallant efforts of defence, without the least attempt to save them. At length, in the spring of 331 B.C., the prospects again appeared to improve. A second Persian army, countless like the first, was assembling eastward of the Tigris; Alexander advanced into the interior, many weeks' march from the shores of the Mediterranean, to attack them; and the Persians doubtless transmitted encouragements with money to enterprising men in Greece, in hopes of provoking auxiliary movements. Presently (October 331 B.C.) came the catastrophe at Arbela; after which no demonstration against Alexander could have been attempted with any reasonable hope of success.

Such was the varying point of view under which the contest in Asia presented itself to Greek spectators, during the three years

1 Arrian, ii. 1. 2 Alschinès cont. Ktesiph. 552.
and a half between the landing of Alexander in Asia and the battle of Arbela. As to the leading states in Greece, we have to look at Athens and Sparta only; for Thebes had been destroyed and demolished as a city; and what had been once the citadel of the Kadmeia was now a Macedonian garrison. Moreover, besides that garrison, the Boeotian cities, Orchomenus, Platea, &c., were themselves strongholds of Macedonian dependence; being hostile to Thebes of old, and having received among themselves assignments of all the Theban lands. In case of any movement in Greece, therefore, Antipater, the viceroy of Macedonia, might fairly count on finding in Greece interested allies, serving as no mean check upon Attica.

At Athens, the reigning sentiment was decidedly pacific. Few were disposed to brave the prince who had just given so fearful an evidence of his force by the destruction of Thebes and the enslavement of the Thebans. Ephialtés and Charidémus, the military citizens at Athens most anti-Macedonian in sentiment, had been demanded as prisoners by Alexander, and had withdrawn to Asia, there to take service with Darius. Other Athenians, men of energy and action, had followed their example, and had fought against Alexander at the Granikus, where they became his prisoners, and were sent to Macedonia to work in fetters at the mines. Ephialtés perished at the siege of Halikarnassus, while defending the place with the utmost gallantry; Charidémus suffered a more unworthy death from the shameful sentence of Darius. The anti-Macedonian leaders who remained at Athens, such as Demostrénés and Lykurgus, were not generals or men of action, but statesmen and orators. They were fully aware that submission to Alexander was a painful necessity, though they watched not the less anxiously for any reverse which might happen to him, such as to make it possible for Athens to head a new struggle on behalf of Grecian freedom.

But it was not Demostrénés or Lykurgus who now guided the general policy of Athens. For the twelve years between the destruction of Thebes and the death of Alexander, Phokion and Demadés were her ministers for foreign affairs; two men of totally


2 Pausanias, i. 25, 4.

3 "Since Macedonian dominion became paramount (observes Demosthenés, De Coronâ, p. 331), Alcmeonés and men of his stamp are in full ascendency and influence—I am impotent: there is no place at Athens for free citizens and counsellors, but only for men who do what they are ordered, and flatter the ruling potentate."
opposite characters, but coinciding in pacific views, and in looking
to the favour of Alexander and Antipater as the principal
end to be attained. Twenty Athenian triremes were
sent to act with the Macedonian fleet, during Alexander's
first campaign in Asia; these, together with the Athenian
prisoners taken at the Granicus, served to him farther
as a guarantee for the continued submission of the
Athenians generally. There can be no doubt that the pacific
policy of Phokion was now prudent and essential to Athens,
though the same cannot be said (as I have remarked in the
proper place) for his advocacy of the like policy twenty years
before, when Philip's power was growing and might have been
arrested by vigorous opposition. It suited the purpose of Anti-
pater to ensure his hold upon Athens by frequent presents to
Demodcs, a man of luxurious and extravagant habits. But
Phokion, incorruptible as well as poor to the end, declined all
similar offers, though often made to him, not only by Antipater,
but even by Alexander.

It deserves particular notice, that though the Macedonising
policy was now decidedly in the ascendent—accepted,
even by dissentients, as the only course admissible under
the circumstances, and confirmed the more by each suc-
cessive victory of Alexander—yet statesmen, like Ly-
kurgus and Demosthenes, of notorious anti-Macedonian
sentiment, still held a conspicuous and influential posi-
tion, though of course restricted to matters of internal
administration. Thus Lykurgus continued to be the
real acting minister of finance, for three successive Panathenaic
intervals of four years each, or for an uninterrupted period of
twelve years. He superintended not merely the entire collec-
tion, but also the entire disbursement of the public revenue; ren-
dering strict periodical account, yet with a financial authority
greater than had belonged to any statesman since Perikles. He
improved the gymnasia and stadia of the city—multiplied the
donatives and sacred furniture in the temples,—enlarged, or con-
structed anew, docks and arsenals,—provided a considerable stock
of arms and equipments, military as well as naval—and maintained
four hundred triremes in a seaworthy condition, for the protection
of Athenian commerce. In these extensive functions he was never
superseded, though Alexander at one time sent to require the

1 Arrian, i. 29, 8. 2 Plutarch, Phokion, 30.
surrender of his person, which was refused by the Athenian people. The main cause of his firm hold upon the public mind, was, his known and indisputable pecuniary probity, wherein he was the parallel of Phokion.

As to Demosthenes, he did not hold any such commanding public appointments as Lykurgus; but he enjoyed great esteem and sympathy from the people generally, for his marked line of public counsel during the past. The proof of this is to be found in one very significant fact. The indictment, against Ktesiphon's motion for crowning Demosthenes, was instituted by Aeschines, and official entry made of it before the death of Philip—which event occurred in August 336 B.C. Yet Aeschines did not venture to bring it on for trial until August 330 B.C., after Antipater had subdued the ill-fated rising of the Lacedaemonian king Agis; and even at that advantageous moment, when the macedonisers seemed in full triumph, he signally failed. We thus perceive, that though Phokion and Demades were now the leaders of Athenian affairs, as representing a policy which every one felt to be unavoidable—yet the preponderant sentiment of the people went with Demosthenes and Lykurgus. In fact, we shall see that after the Lamian war, Antipater thought it requisite to subdue or punish this sentiment by disfranchising or deporting two-thirds of the citizens. It seems however that the anti-Macedonian statesmen were very cautious of giving offence to Alexander, between 334 and 330 B.C. Ktesiphon accepted a mission of condolence to Kleopatra, sister of Alexander, on the death of her husband Alexander of Epirus; and Demosthenes stands accused of having sent humble and crouching letters to Alexander (the Great) in Phenicia, during the spring of 331 B.C. This assen-

1 See the remarkable decree in honour of Lykurgus, passed by the Athenian people seventeen or eighteen years after his death, in the archonship of Amoxiratès, B.C. 307 (Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt, p. 652). The reciting portion of this decree, consisting four-fifths of the whole, goes over the public conduct of Lykurgus, and is very valuable.

2 Plutarch, Phokion, 28.
tion of \( \text{AE} \text{schinês, though not to be trusted as correct, indicates the general prudence of Demosthenês as to his known and formidable enemy.}^{1}

It was not from Athens, but from Sparta, that anti-Macedonian movements now took rise. In the decisive battle unsuccessfully fought by Athens and Thebes at Charoncia against Philip, the Spartans had not been concerned. Their king Archidamus,—who had been active conjointly with Athens in the Sacred War, trying to uphold the Phokians against Philip and the Thebans, — had afterwards withdrawn himself from Central Greece to assist the Tarantine in Italy, and had been slain in a battle against the Messapians.\(^2\) He was succeeded by his son Agis, a brave and enterprising man, under whom the Spartans, though abstaining from hostilities against Philip, resolutely declined to take part in the synod at Corinth, whereby the Macedonian prince was nominated Leader of the Greeks; and even persisted in the same denial on Alexander's nomination also. When Alexander sent to Athens three hundred panplies after his victory at the Granikus, to be dedicated in the temple of Athêne, he expressly proclaimed in the inscription, that they were dedicated "by Alexander and the Greeks, excepting the Lacedaemonians."\(^3\) Agis took the lead in trying to procure Persian aid for anti-Macedonian operations in Greece. Towards the close of summer 333 B.C., a little before the battle of Issus, he visited the Persian admirals at Chios, to solicit men and money for intended action in Peloponnesus.\(^4\) At that moment, they were not zealous in the

\(^1\) \( \text{AE} \text{schinês (adv. Ktesiph. p. 655) mentions this mission of Ktesiphon to Klaipôn. He also (in the same oration, p. 536) charges Demosthenês with having sent letters to Alexander, solicit-}

\(^2\) Plutarch, Camill. 19; Diodor. xvi. 88; Plutarch, Agis, 3.

\(^3\) Arrian, i. 16, 11: compare Pausan. vii. 10, 1.

\(^4\) Arrian, ii. 13, 4.
direction of Greece, anticipating (as most Asiatics then did) the complete destruction of Alexander in Kilikia. As soon, however, as the disaster of Issus became known, they placed at the disposal of Agis thirty talents and ten triremes; which he employed, under his brother Agesilaus, in making himself master of Crete—feeling that no movement in Greece could be expected at such a discouraging crisis. Agis himself soon afterwards went to that island, having strengthened himself by a division of the Greek mercenaries who had fought under Darius at Issus. In Crete, he appears to have had considerable temporary success; and even in Peloponnesus, he organized some demonstrations which Alexander sent Amphoterus with a large naval force to repress, in the spring of 331 B.C. At that time, Phenicia, Egypt, and all the naval mastery of the Aegean, had passed into the hands of the conqueror, so that the Persians had no direct means of acting upon Greece. Probably Amphoterus recovered Crete, but he had no land-force to attack Agis in Peloponnesus.

In October 331 B.C., Darius was beaten at Arbela and became a fugitive in Media, leaving Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis, with the bulk of his immense treasures, as a prey to the conqueror during the coming winter. After such prodigious accessions to Alexander’s force, it would seem that any anti-Macedonian movement, during the spring of 330 B.C., must have been obviously hopeless and even insane. Yet it was just then that King Agis found means to enlarge his scale of operations in Peloponnesus, and prevailed on a considerable body of new allies to join him. As to himself personally, he and the Lacedaemonians had been previously in a state of proclaimed war with Macedonia, and therefore incurred little
additional risk; moreover, it was one of the effects of the Asiatic disasters to cast back upon Greece small bands of soldiers who had hitherto found service in the Persian armies. These men willingly came to Cape Tænarus to enlist under a warlike king of Sparta; so that Agis found himself at the head of a force which appeared considerable to Peloponnesians, familiar only with the narrow scale of Grecian war-muster, though insignificant as against Alexander or his viceroy in Macedonia.1 An unexpected ray of hope broke out from the revolt of Memnon, the Macedonian governor of Thrace. Antipater was thus compelled to withdraw some of his forces to a considerable distance from Greece; while Alexander, victorious as he was, being in Persis or Media, east of Mount Zagros, appeared in the eyes of a Greek to have reached the utmost limits of the habitable world.2 Of this partial encouragement Agis took advantage, to march out of Lakonia with all the troops, mercenary and native, that he could muster. He called on the Peloponnesians for a last effort against Macedonian dominion, while Darius still retained all the eastern half of his empire, and while support from him in men and money might yet be anticipated.3

Respecting this war, we know very few details. At first, a flush of success appeared to attend Agis. The Eleians, the Achaæans (except Pelléne), the Arcadians (except Megalopolis) and some other Peloponnesians, joined his standard; so that he was enabled to collect an army stated at 20,000 foot and 2000 horse. Defeating the first Macedonian forces sent against him, he proceeded to lay siege to Megalopolis; which city, now as previously, was the stronghold of Macedonian influence in the peninsula, and was probably occupied by a Macedonian garrison. An impulse mani-

330 B.C.), who afterwards fell into the hands of Alexander (Arrian, iii. 24, 7), these men could hardly have known of the prostration of their country at home. I suppose the victory of Antipater to have taken place about June 330 B.C.—and the Peloponnesian armament of Agis to have been got together about three months before (March 330 B.C.).

Mr. Clinton (Fast, H. App. c. 4, p. 234) discusses the chronology of this event, but in a manner which I cannot think satisfactory. He seems inclined to put it some months earlier. I see no necessity for construing the dictum ascribed to Alexander (Plutarch, Agesilans, 15) as proving close coincidence of time between the battle of Arbela and the final defeat of Agis.

1 Alexander in Media, when informed of the whole affair after the death of Agis, spoke of it with contempt as a battle of frogs and mice, if we are to believe the dictum of Plutarch, Agesilans, 15.

2 Læcinês adv. Kreisiphont. p. 553, 6, 6 Ἀλέξανδρος ἐξὼ τῆς ἀρκτού καὶ τῆς οἰκουμένης ἐλέγω δὲν πάντως μεθειστῆ-κεῖν, &c.

3 Diodor. xvii. 62; Deimarchus cont. Demosth. s. 35.
fested itself at Athens in favour of active sympathy, and equipment of a fleet to aid this anti-Macedonian effort. It was resisted by Phokion and Demadês, doubtless upon all views of prudence, but especially upon one financial ground, taken by the latter, that the people would be compelled to forego the Theoric distribution. Even Demosthenes himself, under circumstances so obviously discouraging, could not recommend the formidable step of declaring against Alexander—though he seems to have indulged in the expression of general anti-Macedonian sympathies, and to have complained of the helplessness into which Athens had been brought by past bad policy. Antipater, closing the war in Thrace on the best terms that he could, hastened into Greece with his full forces, and reached Peloponnesus in time to relieve Megalopolis, which had begun to be in danger. One decisive battle, which took place in Arcadia, sufficed to terminate the war. Agis and his army, the Lacedaemonians especially, fought with gallantry and desperation, but were completely defeated. Five thousand of their men were slain, including Agis himself; who, though covered with wounds, disdained to leave the field, and fell resisting to the last. The victors, according to one account, lost 3500 men; according to another, 1000 slain, together with a great many wounded. This was a greater loss than Alexander had sustained either at Issus or at Arbela; a plain proof, that Agis and his companions, however unfortunate in the result, had manifested courage worthy of the best days of Sparta.

The allied forces were now so completely crushed, that all submitted to Antipater. After consulting the philo-Macedonian synod at Corinth, he condemned the Acheans and Eleians to pay 120 talents to Megalopolis, and exacted from the Tegeans the punishment of those among their leading men who had advised the war. But he would not take upon him to determine the treatment of the Lacedaemonians without special reference to Alexander. Reço
quire from them fifty hostages, he sent up to Alexander in Asia some Lacedaemonian envoys or prisoners, to throw themselves on his mercy. We are told that they did not reach the king until a long time afterwards, at Baktra; what he decided about Sparta generally, we do not know.

The rising of the Thebans, not many months after Alexander's accession, had been the first attempt of the Greeks to emancipate themselves from Macedonian dominion; this enterprise of Agis was the second. Both unfortunately had been partial, without the possibility of any extensive or organized combination beforehand; both ended miserably, riveting the chains of Greece more powerfully than ever. Thus was the self-defensive force of Greece extinguished piecemeal. The scheme of Agis was in fact desperate from the very outset, as against the gigantic power of Alexander; and would perhaps never have been undertaken, had not Agis himself been already compromised in hostility against Macedonia, before the destruction of the Persian force at Issus. This unfortunate prince, without any superior ability (so far as we know), manifested a devoted courage and patriotism worthy of his predecessor Leonidas at Thermopylae; whose renown stands higher, only because the banner which he upheld ultimately triumphed. The Athenians and Aetolians, neither of whom took part with Agis, were now left, without Thebes and Sparta, as the two great military powers of Greece; which will appear presently, when we come to the last struggle for Grecian independence—the Lamian war; better combined and more promising, yet not less disastrous in its result.

Though the strongest considerations of prudence kept Athens quiet during this anti-Macedonian movement in Peloponnesus, a powerful sympathy must have been raised among her citizens while the struggle was going on. Had Agis gained the victory over Antipater, the Athenians might probably have declared in his favour; and although no independent position could have been permanently maintained against so overwhelming an enemy as Alexander, yet considering that he was thoroughly occupied and far in the interior of Asia, Greece might have held out against Antipater for an interval not inconsiderable. In the face of such eventualities, the fears of the Macedonising statesmen now in power at Athens, the hopes of their opponents, and the reciprocal antipathies of both, must have become unusually manifest; so that the

2 Curtius, vii. 4, 32.
reaction afterwards, when the Macedonian power became more irresistible than ever, was considered by the enemies of Demosthenes to offer a favourable opportunity for ruining and dishonouring him.

To the political peculiarity of this juncture we owe the judicial contest between the two great Athenian orators; the memorable accusation of Aeschines against Ktesiphon, for having proposed a crown to Demosthenes—and the still more memorable defence of Demosthenes, on behalf of his friend as well as of himself. It was in the autumn or winter of 337–336 B.C., that Ktesiphon had proposed this vote of public honour in favour of Demosthenes, and had obtained the (probouleuma) preliminary acquiescence of the senate; it was in the same Attic year, and not long afterwards, that Aeschines attacked the proposition under the Graphé Paranomón, as illegal, unconstitutional, mischievous, and founded on false allegations. More than six years had thus elapsed since the formal entry of the accusation; yet Aeschines had not chosen to bring it to actual trial; which indeed could not be done without some risk to himself, before the numerous and popular judicature of Athens. Twice or thrice before his accusation was entered, other persons had moved to confer the same honour upon Demosthenes, and had been indicted under the

1 Among the various documents, real or pretended, inserted in the oration of Demosthenes De Corona, there appears one (p. 266) purporting to be the very decree moved by Ktesiphon; and another (p. 241.) purporting to be the accusation preferred by Aeschines. I have already stated that I agree with Drayson in mistrusting all the documents annexed to this oration; all of them bear the name of wrong archons, most of them names of unknown archons; some of them do not fit the place in which they appear. See my preceding Chaps. LXXXIX., XC.

2 We know from the statement of Aeschines himself that the motion of Ktesiphon was made after the appointment of Demosthenes to be one of the inspectors of the fortifications of the city; and that this appointment took place in the last month of the archon Cherondas (June 337 B.C.); see Aeschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 421–424. We also know that the accusation of Aeschines against Ktesiphon was preferred before the assassination of Philip, which took place in August 336 B.C. (Aeschin. ib. p. 612, 613). It thus appears that the motion of Ktesiphon (with the probouleuma which preceded it) must have occurred some time during the autumn or winter of 337–336 B.C.—that the accusation of Aeschines must have been handed in shortly after it—and that this accusation cannot have been handed in at the date borne by the pseudo-document, p. 245—the month Elaphebolion of the archon Cherondas, which would be anterior to the appointment of Demosthenes. Moreover, whoever compares the so-called motion of Ktesiphon, as it stands inserted in Demosth. De Corona, p. 256, with the words in which Aeschines himself says, Ktesiph. p. 631, ἐδεικνύε τὰ δικαία ταυτά θεοτοκοῦ τοῦ θεοτοκοῦ, see also p. 426 describes the exordium of that motion, will see that it cannot be genuine.

3 Demosthenes De Corona, p. 255, 302, 303, 310. He says (p. 267–331.) that he had been crowned **officium** (τοῦ προϊσταμένου) by the Athenians and other Greek citizens. The crown which he received on the motion of Aristokles (after the successes against Philip
Graphê Paranomôn; but with such signal ill success, that their accusers did not obtain so much as one-fifth of the suffrages of the Dikasts, and therefore incurred (under the standing regulation of Attic law) a penalty of 1000 drachmae. The like danger awaited Æschinês; and although, in reference to the illegality of Ktesiphon's motion (which was the direct and ostensible purpose aimed at under the Graphê Paranomôn), his indictment was grounded on special circumstances such as the previous accusers may not have been able to show, still it was not his real object to confine himself within this narrow and technical argument. He intended to enlarge the range of accusation, so as to include the whole character and policy of Demosthenês; who would thus, if the verdict went against him, stand publicly dishonoured both as citizen and as politician. Unless this latter purpose were accomplished, indeed, Æschinês gained nothing by bringing the indictment into court; for the mere entry of the indictment would have already produced the effect of preventing the probouleuma from passing into a decree, and the crown from being actually conferred. Doubtless Ktesiphon and Demosthenês might have forced Æschinês to the alternative of either dropping his indictment or bringing it into the Dikastery. But this was a forward challenge, which, in reference to a purely honorary vote, they had not felt bold enough to send; especially after the capture of Thebes in 335 B.C., when the victorious Alexander demanded the surrender of Demosthenês with several other citizens.

In this state of abeyance and compromise—Demosthenês enjoying the inchoate honour of a complimentary vote from the Senate, Æschinês intercepting it from being matured into a vote of the people—both the vote and the indictment had remained for rather more than six years. But the accuser now felt encouraged to push his indictment to trial under the reactionary party feeling, following on abortive anti-Macedonian hopes, which succeeded to the complete victory of Antipater over Agis, and which brought about the accusation of anti-Macedonian citizens in Naxos, Thasos, and other Grecian cities also.1 Amidst the fears prevalent that the victor would carry his resentment still farther, Æschinês could now urge that Athens was disgraced by having adopted or even approved the policy of Demosthenês,2 and that an emphatic con-
demnition of him was the only way of clearing her from the charge of privity with those who had raised the standard against Macedonian supremacy. In an able and bitter harangue, Ἀσχινῆς first shows that the motion of Ktesiphon was illegal, in consequence of the public official appointments held by Demosthenes at the moment when it was proposed—next he enters at large into the whole life and character of Demosthenes, to prove him unworthy of such an honour, even if there had been no formal grounds of objection. He distributes the entire life of Demosthenes into four periods, the first ending at the peace of 346 B.C. between Philip and the Athenians—the second, ending with the breaking out of the next ensuing war in 311–310 B.C.—the third, ending with the disastcr at Chaeroneia—the fourth, comprising all the time following. Throughout all the four periods, he denounces the conduct of Demosthenes as having been corrupt, treacherous, cowardly, and ruinous to the city. What is more surprising still—he expressly charges him with gross subservience both to Philip and to Alexander, at the very time when he was taking credit for a patriotic and intrepid opposition to them.

That Athens had undergone sad defeat and humiliation, having been driven from her independent and even presidential position into the degraded character of a subject Macedonian city, since the time when Demosthenes first began political life—was a fact but too indisputable. Ἀσχινῆς ever makes this a part of his case; arraigning the traitorous mismanagement of Demosthenes as the cause of so melancholy a revolution, and denouncing him as candidate for public compliment on no better plea than a series of public calamities. Having thus animadverted on the conduct of Demosthenes prior to the battle of Chaeroneia, Ἀσχινῆς proceeds to the more recent past, and contends that Demosthenes cannot be sincere in his pretended enmity to Alexander, because he has let slip three successive occasions, all highly favourable, for instigating Athens to hostility against the Macedonians. Of these three occasions, the earliest was, when Alexander first crossed into Asia; the
second, immediately before the battle of Issus; the third, during the flush of success obtained by Agis in Peloponnnesus. On none of these occasions did Demosthenes call for any public action against Macedonia; a proof (according to AEschinés) that his anti-Macedonian professions were insincere.

I have more than once remarked, that considering the bitter enmity between the two orators, it is rarely safe to trust the unsupported allegation of either against the other. But in regard to the last-mentioned charges advanced by AEschinés, there is enough of known fact, and we have independent evidence, such as is not often before us, to appreciate him as an accuser of Demosthenes. The victorious career of Alexander, set forth in the preceding chapters, proves amply that not one of the three periods, here indicated by AEschinés, presented even decent encouragement for a reasonable Athenian patriot to involve his country in warfare against so formidable an enemy. Nothing can be more frivolous than these charges against Demosthenes, of having omitted promising seasons for anti-Macedonian operations. Partly for this reason, probably, Demosthenes does not notice them in his reply; still more, perhaps, on another ground, that it was not safe to speak out what he thought and felt about Alexander. His reply dwells altogether upon the period before the death of Philip. Of the boundless empire subsequently acquired, by the son of Philip, he speaks only to mourn it as a wretched visitation of fortune, which has desolated alike the Hellenic and the barbaric world—in which Athens has been engulfed along with others—and from which even those faithless and trimming Greeks, who helped to aggrandize Philip, have not escaped better than Athens, nor indeed so well.

I shall not here touch upon the Demosthenic speech De Coronâ in a rhetorical point of view, nor add anything to those encomiums which have been pronounced upon it with one voice, both in ancient and in modern times, as the unapproachable masterpiece of Grecian oratory. To this work it belongs as a portion of Grecian history; a retrospect of the efforts made by a patriot and a statesman to uphold the dignity of Athens and the autonomy of the Grecian world, against a dangerous aggressor from without. How these efforts were directed, and how they lamentably failed, has been recounted in my preceding chapters. Demosthenes here passes them in review, replying to the crimina-

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tions against his public conduct during the interval of ten years, between the peace of 346 B.C. (or the period immediately preceding it) and the death of Philip. It is remarkable, that though professing to enter upon a defence of his whole public life, he nevertheless can afford to leave unnoticed that portion of it which is perhaps the most honourable to him—the early period of his first Philippics and Olynthiacs—when, though a politician as yet immature and of no established footing, he was the first to decry in the distance the perils threatened by Philip’s aggrandisement, and the loudest in calling for timely and energetic precautions against it, in spite of apathy and murmurs from older politicians as well as from the general public. Beginning with the peace of 346 B.C., Demosthenes vindicates his own share in the antecedents of that event against the charges of Aeschinés, whom he denounces as the cause of all the mischief; a controversy which I have already tried to elucidate in a former chapter. Passing next to the period after that peace—to the four years first of hostile diplomacy, then of hostile action, against Philip, which ended with the disaster of Charoneia—Demosthenes is not satisfied with simple vindication. He reasserts this policy as matter of pride and honour, in spite of its results. He congratulates his countrymen on having manifested a Pan-hellenic patriotism worthy of their forefathers, and takes to himself only the credit of having been forward to proclaim and carry out this glorious sentiment common to all. Fortune has been adverse; yet the vigorous anti-Macedonian policy was no mistake; Demosthenes swears it by the combatants of Marathon, Platæa and Salamis. To have had a foreign dominion obtruded upon Greece, is an overwhelming calamity; but to have had this accomplished without strenuous resistance on the part of Athens, would have been calamity aggravated by dishonour.

Conceived in this sublime strain, the reply of Demosthenes to his rival has an historical value, as a funeral oration of extinct Athenian and Grecian freedom. Six years before, the orator had been appointed by his countrymen to deliver the usual public oration over the warriors slain at Charoneia. That speech is now lost, but it probably touched upon the same topics. Though the sphere of action, of every Greek city as well

1 Demosthen. De Corona, p. 227. ἐλευθερίας καὶ σωτηρίας κίνδυνον ἀράμενοι μέλλων τοῦ τε ἰδίου βίον παντὸς, ὡς —οἱ μὲ τοὺς Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντας έοικε, λόγον διδάσκαι ήμερον καὶ τῶν τῶν προγόνων καὶ τοὺς Ἐ Πλαταιᾶς κουρῆ πελετησμένων, &c.

2 Demosth. De Corona, p. 297. ἀλλ᾽ ἢαμαχήσοντας, &c., the oath so often οὐκ ἔτειν, οὐκ ἔτειν ὑπὸς ἡμάρτει, cited and admired.

Εὐθεία Ἀθηναίων, τῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀπάτης
as of every Greek citizen, was now cramped and confined by irresistible Macedonian force, there still remained the sentiment of full political freedom and dignity enjoyed during the past—the admiration of ancestors who had once defended it successfully—and the sympathy with leaders who had recently stood forward to uphold it, however unsuccessfully. It is among the most memorable facts in Grecian history, that in spite of the victory of Philip at Chaeroneia—in spite of the subsequent conquest of Thebes by Alexander, and the danger of Athens after it—in spite of the Asiatic conquests which had since thrown all Persian force into the hands of the Macedonian king—the Athenian people could never be persuaded either to repudiate Demosthenès, or to disclaim sympathy with his political policy. How much art and ability was employed, to induce them to do so, by his numerous enemies, the speech of Aischinès is enough to teach us. And when we consider how easily the public sicken of schemes which end in misfortune—how great a mental relief is usually obtained by throwing blame on unsuccessful leaders—it would have been no matter of surprise, if, in one of the many prosecutions wherein the fame of Demosthenès was involved, the Dikasts had given a verdict unfavourable to him. That he always came off acquitted, and even honourably acquitted, is a proof of rare fidelity and steadiness of temper in the Athenians. It is a proof that those noble, patriotic, and Pan-hellenic sentiments, which we constantly find inculcated in his orations, throughout a period of twenty years, had sunk into the minds of his hearers; and that amidst the many general allegations of corruption against him, loudly proclaimed by his enemies, there was no one well-ascertained fact which they could substantiate before the Dikastery.

The indictment now preferred by Aischinès against Ktesiphon only procured for Demosthenès a new triumph.* When the suffrages of the Dikasts were counted, Aischinès did not obtain so much as one-fifth. He became therefore liable to the customary fine of 1000 drachmae. It appears that he quitted Athens immediately, without paying the fine, and retired into Asia, from whence he never returned. He is said to have opened a rhetorical school at Rhodes, and to have gone into the interior of Asia during the last year of Alexander's life (at the time when that monarch was ordaining on the Grecian cities compulsory restoration of all their exiles), in order to procure assistance for returning to Athenès. This project was disappointed by Alexander's death.1

1 See the various lives of Aischinès—in Westermann, Scriptores Biographici, pp. 268, 269.
We cannot suppose that Aischinés was unable to pay the fine of 1000 drachmae, or to find friends who would pay it for him. It was not therefore legal compulsion, but the extreme disappointment and humiliation of so signal a defeat, which made him leave Athens. We must remember that this was a gratuitous challenge sent by himself; that the celebrity of the two rivals had brought together auditors, not merely from Athens, but from various other Grecian cities; and that the effect of the speech of Demosthenés in his own defence—delivered with all his perfection of voice and action, and not only electrifying hearers by the sublimity of its public sentiment, but also full of admirably managed self-praise, and contemptuous bitterness towards his rival—must have been inexpressibly powerful and commanding. Probably the friends of Aischinés became themselves angry with him for having brought the indictment forward. For the effect of his defeat must have been that the vote of the Senate which he indicted, was brought forward and passed in the public assembly; and that Demosthenés must have received a public coronation. In no other way, under the existing circumstances of Athens, could Demosthenés have obtained so emphatic a compliment. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that such a mortification was insupportable to Aischinés. He became disgusted with his native city. We read that afterwards, in his rhetorical school at Rhodes, he one day declaimed, as a lesson to his pupils, the successful oration of his rival, De Corona. Of course it excited a burst of admiration. “What, if you had heard the beast himself speak it!”—exclaimed Aischinés.

From this memorable triumph of the illustrious orator and defendant, we have to pass to another trial—a direct accusation brought against him, from which he did not escape so successfully. We are compelled here to jump over five years and a half (August 330 B.C. to January 324 B.C.) during which we have no information about Grecian history; the interval between Alexander’s march into Baktria and his return to Persis and Susiana. Displeased with the conduct of the satraps during his absence, Alexander put to death or punished several, and directed the rest to disband without delay the mercenary soldiers whom they had taken into pay. This peremptory
order filled, both Asia and Europe with roving detachments of unprovided soldiers, some of whom sought subsistence in the Grecian islands and on the Lacedaemonian southern coast, at Cape Tanarus in Laconia.

It was about this period (the beginning of 324 B.C.) that Harpalus, the satrap of Babylonia and Syria, becoming alarmed at the prospect of being punished by Alexander for his ostentatious prodigalities, fled from Asia into Greece, with a considerable treasure and a body of 5000 soldiers. While satrap, he had invited into Asia, in succession, two Athenian women as mistresses, Pythioniké and Glykera, to each of whom he was much attached, and whom he entertained with lavish expense and pomp. On the death of the first, he testified his sorrow by two costly funereal monuments to her memory; one at Babylon, the other in Attica, between Athens and Eleusis. With Glykera he is said to have resided at Tarsus in Kilikia—to have ordered that men should prostrate themselves before her, and address her as queen—and to have erected her statue along with his own at Rhossus, a seaport on the confines of Kilikia and Syria. To please these mistresses, or perhaps to ensure a retreat for himself in case of need, he had sent to Athens profuse gifts of wheat for distribution among the people, for which he had received votes of thanks with the grant of Athenian citizenship. Moreover he had consigned to Chariklé, son-in-law of Phokion, the task of erecting the monument in Attica to the honour of Pythioniké, with a large remittance of money for the purpose. The profit or embezzlement arising out of this expenditure secured to him the goodwill of Chariklé—a man very different from his father-in-law, the honest and austere Phokion. Other Athenians were probably conciliated by various presents, so that when Harpalus the treasure brought out of Asia by Harpalus was 5000 talents.

1 Diodor, xvii, 108. He states the treasure brought out of Asia by Harpalus as 5000 talents.

2 See the fragments of the letter or pamphlet of Theopompus addressed to Alexander, while Harpalus was still at Tarsus, and before his flight to Athens. Theopompus speaks in the present tense—καὶ ἐγὼ (Harpalus) ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀδωνισίακα δρᾷ (Glykera), ἄς. Kleistarchus stated these facts, as well as Themistocles (Athen. ibid.).

3 Athenaeus, xiii. p. 596—the extract from the satirical drama called Agón, represented before Alexander at Susa, in the Dionysiac festival or early months of 324 B.C.

4 Plutarch, Phokion, 22; Pausanias, i. 37, 4; Dikaearchus Fragment, 72. ed. Didot.

Plutarch's narrative is misleading, inasmuch as it seems to imply that Harpalus gave this money to Chariklé after his arrival at Athens. We know from Theopompus (Fr. 277) that the monument had been finished some time before Harpalus quitted Asia. Plutarch treats it as a mean structure, unworthy of the sum expended on it; but both Dikaearchus and Pausanias describe it as stately and magnificent.
Harpalus found it convenient to quit Asia, about the beginning of 324 B.C., he had already acquired some hold both on the public of Athens and on some of her leading men. He sailed with his treasure and his armament straight to Cape Sunium in Attica, from whence he sent to ask shelter and protection in that city.¹

The first reports transmitted to Asia appear to have proclaimed that the Athenians had welcomed Harpalus as a friend and ally, thrown off the Macedonian yoke, and prepared for a war to re-establish Hellenic freedom. Such is the colour of the case, as presented in the satyric drama called Agén, exhibited before Alexander in the Dionysiac festival at Susa, in February or March 324 B.C. Such news, connecting itself in Alexander’s mind with the recent defeat of Zopyrion in Thrace and other disorders of the disbanded mercenaries, incensed him so much, that he at first ordered a fleet to be equipped, determining to cross over and attack Athens in person.² But he was presently calmed by more correct intelligence, certifying that the Athenians had positively refused to espouse the cause of Harpalus.³

The fact of such final rejection by the Athenians is quite indisputable. But it seems, as far as we can make out from imperfect evidence, that this step was not taken without debate, nor without

1 Curtius, x, 2, 1.
2 Curtius, x, 2, 1. "Igitur triginta navibus Sunium transmittunt" (Harpalus and his company), "unde portum urbis petere decreverunt. His cogniti, rex Harpalo Atheniensibusque juxta infestis, classem parari jubet, Athenas protinus petiturus." Compare Justin, xii. 5, 7—who mentions this hostile intention in Alexander’s mind, but gives a different account of the cause of it.

The extract from the drama Agén (given in Athenæus, xiii. p. 596) represents the reports which excited this anger of Alexander. It was said that Athens had repudiated her slavery, with the abundance which she had before enjoyed under it,—to enter upon a struggle for freedom, with the certainty of present privations and future ruin:—

A. ὅτε μὲν ἔφασκον (the Athenians) δοῦλον ἐκτῆσθαι βίον, ἱκανὸν ἐδείπνουσιν’ viv δὲ, τὸν χίδροπα μόνον καὶ τὸν μάραθον ἔσθονσι, πυροὺς δ’ οὐ μάλα.

B. καὶ μὴ ἄκουσα μυριάδας τῶν Ἀρταλοῦν

I conceive this drama Agén to have been represented on the banks of the Chouspes (not the Hydaspes—see my note in the Chapter immediately preceding), that is, at Susa, in the Dionysia of 324 B.C. It is interesting as a record of the feelings of the time.

Nevertheless the impression, that Alexander was intending to besiege Athens, must have prevailed in the army for several months longer, during the autumn of 324 B.C., when he was at Ecbatana. Ephippus the historian, in recounting the flatteries addressed to Alexander at Ecbatana, mentions the rhodomontade of a soldier named Gor- gus—Γόργος ὁ ὁπλοφύλαξ Ἀλέξανδρον Ἀμαμwpọ τῶν στεφανῶν τρισχιλιαίων, καὶ διὰ τοῦ Α’ Α’ Α’ ἄρης τολορκής, μυριάς πανσπλαίς καὶ ταῖς θασίς καταπληκτικάς καὶ πάθω τὰς ἄλλους βελείς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ικώνις (Ephippus ap. Athenæum, xii. p. 538. Fragment. 3. ed. Didot.).
symptoms of a contrary disposition, sufficient to explain the rumours first sent to Alexander. The first arrival of Harpalus with his armament at Sunium, indeed, excited alarm, as if he were coming to take possession of Peiræus; and the admiral Philoklês was instructed to adopt precautions for defence of the harbour.¹ But Harpalus, sending away his armament to Crete or to Taenarus, solicited and obtained permission to come to Athens, with a single ship and his own personal attendants. What was of still greater moment, he brought with him a large sum of money, amounting, we are told, to upwards of 700 talents, or more than 160,000L. We must recollect that he was already favourably known to the people by large presents of corn, which had procured for him a vote of citizenship. He now threw himself upon their gratitude as a suppliant seeking protection against the wrath of Alexander; and while entreating from the Athenians an interference so hazardous to themselves, he did not omit to encourage them by exaggerating the means at his own disposal. He expatiated on the universal hatred and discontent felt against Alexander, and held out assurance of being joined by powerful allies, foreign as well as Greek, if once a city like Athens would raise the standard of liberation.² To many Athenian patriots, more ardent than long-sighted, such appeals inspired both sympathy and confidence. Moreover Harpalus would of course purchase every influential

¹ Deinarchus adv. Philokl. s. 1. φησκον καλωσεν "Αρπαλον εις τον Πειραια καταλειναι στρατηθηνευτην μενος, ουδεν τοι νεωρια και την Μουνυχιαν κεχειροτονη- μενος, &c. Deinarchus adv. Aristog- toton, s. 4. δι παρ' "Αρπαλον λαβειν χρηματα ετοκλιμευει, δε ηπειρησεν καταληψιαιν την πολιν ιδρων, &c.

² See the new and interesting, though unfortunately scanty, fragments of the oration of Hyperides against Demosthenes, published and elucidated by Mr. Churchill Babington from a recently discovered Egyptian papyrus (Cambridge, 1850). From the language thus used by Hyperides in his accusation, we are made to perceive what prospects he (and of course Harpalus, upon whose authority he must have spoken) had held out to the people when the case was first under discussion. The fragment here cited is complete as to the main sense, not requiring very great help from conjecture. In some of the other fragments, the conjectural restorations of Mr. Babington, though highly probable and judicious, form too large a proportion of the whole to admit of our citing them with confidence as testimony.
partisan who would accept a bribe; in addition to men like Chariklès, who were already in his interest. His cause was espoused by Hyperidês, an earnest anti-Macedonian citizen, and an orator second only to Demosthenês. There seems good reason for believing that, at first, a strong feeling was excited in favour of taking part with the exile; the people not being daunted even by the idea of war with Alexander.

Phokion, whom Harpalus vainly endeavoured to corrupt, resisted of course the proposition of espousing his cause. And Demosthenês also resisted it, not less decidedly, from the very outset. Notwithstanding all his hatred of Macedonian supremacy, he could not be blind to the insanity of declaring war against Alexander. Indeed those who study his utterances throughout, will find his counsels quite as much distinguished for prudence as for vigorous patriotism. His prudence on this occasion, however, proved injurious to his political position; for while it incensed Hyperidês and the more sanguine anti-Macedonians, it probably did not gain for himself anything beyond a temporary truce from his old macedonising opponents.

The joint opposition of politicians so discordant as Demosthenês and Phokion, prevailed over the impulse which the partisans of Harpalus had created. No decree could be obtained in his favour. Presently however the case was complicated by the coming of envoys from Antipater and Olympias in Macedonia, requiring that he should be surrendered. The like requisition was also addressed by the Macedonian admiral Philoxenus, who arrived with a small squadron from Asia. These demands were refused, at the instance of Phokion no less than of Demosthenês. Nevertheless the prospects of Macedonian vengeance were now brought in such fearful proximity before the people, that all disposition to support Harpalus gave way to the necessity of propitiating Alexander. A decree was passed to arrest Harpalus, and to place all his money under sequestration in the acropolis, until special directions could be received from Alexander; to whom, apparently, envoys were sent, carrying with them the slaves

1 Pollux, x. 159.
2 Plutarch, De Viris Illustribus, p. 531. τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ὡρμημένων Ἡρπάλῳ βοηθεῖν, καὶ κορυσσόντων ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἀλέξανδρου, ἐξαιρόμενον ἐπὶ τοῦ Φιλοξενοῦ, καὶ τῶν ἑπὶ Βαλακῶν πραγμάτων Ἀλέξανδρου στρατηγῶν ἐκπλήγητος δὲ τοῦ δήμου, καὶ σωπάτως διὰ τῶν φίλων, ὁ Δημοσθένης—Τί ποιήσουσιν, πρὸς τὸν ἁλίκνον ἰδόντες, καὶ μὴ δυνάμενοι πρὸς τὸν λύχνον ἀντιβλέπειν;
3 Plutarch, Phokion, c. 21; Plutarch, Demosthen. 25.
4 Diodor, xvii. 108.
of Harpalus to be interrogated by him, and instructed to solicit a lenient sentence at his hands. Now it was Demosthenés who moved these decrees for personal arrest and for sequestration of the money; whereby he incurred still warmer resentment from Hyperidés and the other Harpalian partisans, who denounced him as a subservient creature of the all-powerful monarch. Harpalus was confined, but presently made his escape; probably much to the satisfaction of Phokion, Demosthenés, and every one else; for even those who were most anxious to get rid of him would recoil from the odium and dishonour of surrendering him, even under constraint, to a certain death. He fled to Krete, where he was soon after slain by one of his own companions.

At the time when the decrees for arrest and sequestration were passed, Demosthenés requested a citizen near him to ask Harpalus publicly in the assembly, what was the amount of his money, which the people had just resolved to impound. Harpalus answered, 720 talents; and Demosthenés proclaimed this sum to the people, on the authority of Harpalus, dwelling with some emphasis upon its magnitude. But when the money came to be counted in the acropolis, it was discovered that there was in reality no more than 350 talents. Now it is said that Demosthenés did not at once communicate to the people this prodigious deficiency in the real sum as compared with the announcement of Harpalus, repeated in the public assembly by himself. The impression prevailed, for how long a time we do not know, that 720

1 Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 69. ἐὰν τοὺς παῖδας κατατείμηθη (Alexander) πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς τῶν εἰς δαυτὸν ἀνακοινωμένους, καὶ τοῦτον ἐξει τὴν ἀληθείαν πυθέσθαι, &c. &c.

2 See the fragment cited in a preceding note from the oration of Hyperidés against Demosthenés. That it was Demosthenés who moved the decree for depositing the money in the acropolis, we learn also from one of his other accusers—the citizen who delivered the speech composed by Deinarchus (adv. Demosthen. sect. 68, 71, 89)—ἐγρα-ψευνῦτο δὲ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ Δημο-στένη ὡς δηλόντι δικαίου τοῦ πράγματος ἀφέαντες, ἐπειδὴ καθήμενος κάτω ὑπὸ τῇ κατατομῇ, ἐκείλευσε. ... τὸν χορευτὴν ἐρωτῆσαι τὸν ἀρπαλὸν ὄνομα εἰς τὰ χρήματα τὰ διπλασίαμεν εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν δὲ τὴν κρίναιν ἑαυτὸν ἐκταποδίαν, &c.

3 This material fact, of the question publicly put to Harpalus in the assembly by some one at the request of Demosthenés, appears in the Fragments of Hyperidés, p. 5, 7, 9, ed. Babington—καθήμενος κάτω ὑπὸ τῇ κατατομῇ, ἐκεί-λευσε. ... τὸν χορευτὴν ἐρωτῆσαι τὸν ἀρπαλὸν ὄνομα εἰς τὰ χρήματα τὰ διπλασίαμεν εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν δὲ τὴν κρίναιν ἑαυτὸν ἐκταποδίαν, &c. &c.

4 The term κατατομὴ (see Mr. Babington’s note) “designates a broad passage occurring at intervals between the concentrically arranged benches of seats in a theatre, and running parallel with them.”
Harpalian talents had actually been lodged in the acropolis; and when the truth became at length known, great surprise and outcry were excited. 1 It was assumed that the missing half of the sum set forth must have been employed in corruption; and suspicions prevailed against almost all the orators, Demosthenes and Hyperides both included.

In this state of doubt, Demosthenes moved that the Senate of Areopagus should investigate the matter and report who were the presumed delinquents 2 fit to be indicted before the Dikastery; he declared in the speech accompanying his motion that the real delinquents, whoever they might be, deserved to be capitally punished. The Areopagites delayed their report for six months, though Demosthenes is said to have called for it with some impatience. Search was made in the houses of the leading orators, excepting only one who was recently married. 3 At length the report appeared, enumerating several names of citizens chargeable with the appropriation of this money, and specifying how much had been taken by each. Among these names were Demosthenes himself, charged with 20 talents—Demades charged with 6000 golden staters—and other citizens, with different sums attached to their names. 4 Upon this report, ten 5 public accusers were appointed to prosecute the indictment against the persons specified, before the Dikastery. Among the accusers was Hyperides, whose name had not been comprised in the Areopagitic report. Demosthenes was brought to trial first of all the persons accused, before a numerous Dikastery of 1500 citizens, 6 who confirmed the report of the Areopagites, found him guilty, and condemned him to pay fifty talents.

1 Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 846. In the life of Demosthenes given by Phuleius (Cod. 265. p. 494) it is stated that only 308 talents were found.

2 That this motion was made by Demosthenes himself, is a point strongly pressed by his accuser Deinarchus—adv. Demosth. s. 5. 62. 84, &c.; compare also the Fragm. of Hyperides, p. 59, ed. Babington.

Deinarchus, in his looser rhetoric, tries to put the case as if Demosthenes had proposed to recognize the sentence of the Areopagus as final and peremptory, and as if he stood therefore condemned upon the authority invoked by himself. But this is refuted sufficiently by the mere fact that the trial was instituted afterwards; besides that it is repugnant to the judicial practice of Athens.

3 Plutarch, Demosth. 26. We learn from Deinarchus (adv. Demosth. s. 46) that the report of the Areopagites was not delivered until after an interval of six months. About their delay and the impatience of Demosthenes, see Fragm. Hyperides, pp. 12–33, ed. Babington.

Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 92. See the Fragm. of Hyperides in Mr. Babington, p. 18.

4 Deinarchus adv. Aristogeiton, s. 6. Stratokles was one of the accusers.

to the state. Not being able to discharge this large fine, he was put in prison; but after some days he found means to escape, and fled to Trezen in Peloponnesus, where he passed some months as a dispirited and sorrowing exile, until the death of Alexander. What was done with the other citizens included in the Areopagitic report, we do not know. It appears that Demadès—who was among those comprised, and who is especially attacked, along with Demosthenè, by both Hyperidès and Deinarchus—did not appear to take his trial, and therefore must have been driven into exile; yet if so, he must have speedily returned, since he seems to have been at Athens when Alexander died. Philoklès and Aristogeiton were also brought to trial as being included by the Areopagus in the list of delinquents; but how their trial ended, does not appear.

This condemnation and banishment of Demosthenès—unquestionably the greatest orator, and one of the greatest citizens, in Athenian antiquity—is the most painful result of the debates respecting the exile Harpalus. Demosthenès himself denied the charge; but unfortunately we possess neither his defence, nor the facts alleged in evidence against him; so that our means of forming a positive conclusion are imperfect. At the same time, judging from the circumstances as far as we know them, there are several which go to show his innocence, and none which tend to prove him guilty. If we are called upon to believe that he received money from Harpalus, we must know for what service the payment was made. Did Demosthenès take part with Harpalus, and advise the Athenians to espouse his cause? Did he even keep silence, and abstain from advising them to reject the propositions? Quite the reverse. Demosthenès was from the beginning a declared opponent of Harpalus, and of all measures for supporting his cause. Plutarch indeed tells an anecdote—that Demosthenès began by opposing Harpalus, but that presently he was fascinated by the beauty of a golden cup among the Harpalian treasures. Harpalus, perceiving his admiration, sent to him on the ensuing night the golden cup, Plutarch, Demost., 28.

In the second and third Epistles ascribed to Demosthenès (p. 1470, 1483, 1485), he is made to state, that he alone had been condemned by the Dikastery, because his trial had come on first—that Aristogeiton and all the others tried were acquitted, though the charge against all was the same, and the evidence against all was the same also—viz., nothing more than the simple report of the Areopagus. As I agree with those who hold these epistles to be probably spurious, I cannot believe, on such authority alone, that all the other persons tried were acquitted—a fact highly improbable in itself.
together with twenty talents, which Demosthenes accepted. A few days afterwards, when the cause of Harpalus was again debated in the public assembly, the orator appeared with his throat enveloped in woollen wrappers, and affected to have lost his voice; upon which the people, detecting this simulated inability as dictated by the bribe which had been given, expressed their displeasure partly by sarcastic taunts, partly by indignant murmuring. So stands the anecdote in Plutarch. But we have proof that it is untrue. Demosthenes may indeed have been disabled by sore-throat from speaking at some particular assembly; so far the story may be accurate. But that he desisted from opposing Harpalus (the real point of the allegation against him) is certainly not true; for we know, from his accusers Deinarchus and Hyperides, that it was he who made the final motion for imprisoning Harpalus and sequestrating the Harpalian treasure in trust for Alexander. In fact, Hyperides himself denounces Demosthenes, as having, from subservience to Alexander, closed the door against Harpalus and his prospects. Such direct and continued opposition is a conclusive proof that Demosthenes was neither paid nor bought by Harpalus. The only service which he rendered to the exile was, by refusing to deliver him to Antipater, and by not preventing his escape from imprisonment. Now in this refusal even Phokion concurred; and probably the best Athenians, of all parties, were desirous of favouring the escape of an exile whom it would have been odious to hand over to a Macedonian executioner. Insofar as it was a crime not to have prevented the escape of Harpalus, the crime was committed as much by Phokion as by Demosthenes; and indeed more, seeing that Phokion was one of the generals, exercising the most important administrative duties—while Demosthenes was only an orator and mover in the assembly. Moreover, Harpalus had no means of requiting the persons, whoever they were, to whom he owed his escape; for the same motion which decreed his arrest, decreed also the sequestration of his money, and thus removed it from his own control.


2 See the fragment of Hyperides in Mr. Babington's edition, pp. 37, 38 (a fragment already cited in a preceding note), insisting upon the prodigious mischief which Demosthenes had done by his decree for arresting (σύλληψις) Harpalus.

3 In the Life of Demosthenes apud Photium (Cod. 285), the service alleged to have been rendered by him to Harpalus, and for which he was charged with having received 1000 Darics, is put as I have stated it in the text—Demosthenes first spoke publicly against
The charge therefore made against Demosthenes by his two accusers,—that he received money from Harpalus,—is one which all the facts known to us tend to refute. But this is not quite the whole case. Had Demosthenes the means of embezzling the money, after it had passed out of the control of Harpalus? To this question also we may reply in the negative, so far as Athenian practice enables us to judge.

Demosthenes had moved, and the people had voted, that these treasures should be lodged, in trust for Alexander, in the acropolis; a place where all the Athenian public money was habitually kept—in the back chamber of the Parthenon. When placed in that chamber, these new treasures would come under the custody of the officers of the Athenian exchequer; and would be just as much out of the reach of Demosthenes as the rest of the public money. What more could Phokion himself have done to preserve the Harpalian fund intact, than to put it in the recognized place of surety? Then, as to the intermediate process, of taking the money from Harpalus up to the acropolis, there is no proof,—and in my judgement no probability,—that Demosthenes was at all concerned in it. Even to count, verify, and weigh, a sum of above 80,000— not in bank notes or bills of exchange, but subdivided in numerous and heavy coins (staters, darics, tetradrachms), likely to be not even Attic, but Asiatic—must have been a tedious duty requiring to be performed by competent reckoners, and foreign to the habits of Demosthenes. The officers of the Athenian treasury must have gone through this labour, providing the slaves or mules requisite for carrying so heavy a burden up to the acropolis. Now we have ample evidence, from the remaining Inscriptions, that the details of transferring and verifying the public property, at Athens, were performed habitually with laborious accuracy. Least of all would such accuracy be found wanting in the case of the large Harpalian treasure, where

receiving Harpalus, but presently Δαρε-κοὺς χιλίους (ὡς, φασί) λαβὼν πρὸς τοὺς ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ λέγοντας μετάτετο (then follow the particular acts whereby this alleged change of sentiment was manifested, which particular acts are described as follows)—καὶ θουλακιάν τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων ἀντιπάτρων προκοπία τῶν Δαρείου ἀντιτέκτων, τὰ τῇ ἱπταλείᾳ χρή- ματα εἰς ἀνάφυλα ὑμηγίσθησαν ἀποθέσθαι, μηδὲ τῷ δημῷ τῶν ἄριστῶν αὐτῶν αποθε-
the very passing of the decree implied great fear of Alexander. If Harpalus, on being publicly questioned in the assembly—What was the sum to be carried up into the acropolis,—answered by stating the amount which he had originally brought, and not that which he had remaining—Demosthenes might surely repeat that statement immediately after him, without being understood thereby to bind himself down as guarantee for its accuracy. An adverse pleader, like Hyperides, might indeed turn a point in his speech—"You told the assembly that there were 700 talents, and now you produce no more than half"—but the imputation wrapped up in these words against the probity of Demosthenes, is utterly groundless. Lastly, when the true amount was ascertained, to make report thereof was the duty of the officers of the treasury. Demosthenes could learn it only from them; and it might certainly be proper in him, though in no sense an imperative duty, to inform himself on the point, seeing that he had unconsciously helped to give publicity to a false statement. The true statement was given; but we neither know by whom, nor how soon.

Reviewing the facts known to us, therefore, we find them all tending to refute the charge against Demosthenes. This accusatory conclusion will certainly be strengthened by reading the accusatory speech composed by Deinarchus; which is mere virulent invective, barren of facts and evidentiary substance, and running over all the life of Demosthenes for the preceding twenty years. That the speech of Hyperides is full of shameful inconsistencies. 1


In p. 26 of the same Fragments, we find Hyperides reproaching Demosthenes for not having kept effective custody over the person of Harpalus; for not having proposed any decree providing a special custody; for not having made known beforehand, or prosecuted afterwards, the negligence of the ordinary gaolers. This is to make Demosthenes responsible for the performance of all the administrative duties of the city; for the good conduct of the treasurers and the gaolers. We must recollect that Hyperides had been the loudest advocate of Harpalus, and had done all he could to induce the Athenians to adopt the cause of that exile against Alexander. One of the charges (already cited from his speech) against Demosthenes is, that Demosthenes prevented this from being accomplished. Yet here is another charge from the same speaker, to the effect that Demosthenes did not keep Harpalus under effective custody for the sword of the Macedonian executioner! The line of accusation taken by Hyperides is full of shameful inconsistencies. 2

2 In the Life of Demosthenes (Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt, p. 846), the charge of corruption against him is made to rest chiefly on the fact, that he did not make this communication to the people—καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μὴν τῶν ἀνακωμοθέτων μεμυκώνας μὴν τῶν φυλασσόντων ἤμελεν, &c. The biographer apud Photius seems to state it as if Demosthenes did not communicate the amount, at the time when he proposed the decree of sequestration. This last statement we are enabled to contradict, from the testimony of Hyperides.
Periêdes also was of the like desultory character, the remaining fragments indicate. Even the report made by the Areopagus contained no recital of facts—no justificatory matter—nothing except a specification of names with the sums for which each of them was chargeable. It appears to have been made ex parte, as far as we can judge—that is, made without hearing these persons in their own defence, unless they happened to be themselves Areopagites. Yet this report is held forth both by Hyperiêdes and Deinarchus as being in itself conclusive proof which the Dikasts could not reject. When Demosthenês demanded, as every defendant naturally would, that the charge against him should be proved by some positive evidence, Hyperiêdes sets aside the demand as nothing better than cavil and special pleading.

One farther consideration remains to be noticed. Only nine months after the verdict of the Dikastery against Demosthenês, Alexander died. Presently the Athenians and other Greeks rose against Antipater in the struggle called the Lamian war. Demosthenês was then recalled; received from his countrymen an enthusiastic welcome, such as had never been accorded to any returning exile since the days of Alkibiadês; took a leading part in the management of the war; and perished, on its disastrous termination, along with his accuser Hyperiêdes.

Such speedy revolution of opinion about Demosthenês, contains the conclusion which seems to me suggested by the other circumstances of the case—that the verdict against him was not judicial, but political; growing out of the embarrassing necessities of the time.

There can be no doubt that Harpalus, to whom a declaration of active support from the Athenians was


This monstrous sentence creates a strong presumption in favour of the defendant,—and a still stronger presumption against the accuser. Compare Demarchus adv. Demosth. s. 5, 7. The biographer apud Photius states that Hyperiêdes and four other orators procured (κατεσκεύασαν) the condemnation of Demosthenês by the Areopagus.
matter of life and death, distributed various bribes to all consenting recipients, who could promote his views,—and probably even to some who simply refrained from opposing them; to all, in short, except pronounced opponents. If we were to judge from probabilities alone, we should say that Hyperidès himself, as one of the chief supporters, would also be among the largest recipients. Here was abundant bribery—notorious in the mass, though perhaps untraceable in the detail—all consummated during the flush of promise which marked the early discussions of the Harpalian case. When the tide of sentiment turned,—when fear of Macedonian force became the overwhelming sentiment,—when Harpalus and his treasures were impounded in trust for Alexander—all these numerous receivers of bribes were already compromised and alarmed. They themselves probably, in order to divert suspicion, were among the loudest in demanding investigation and punishment against delinquents. Moreover, the city was responsible for 700 talents to Alexander, while no more than 350 were forthcoming. It was indispensable that some definite individuals should be pronounced guilty and punished, partly in order to put down the reciprocal criminations circulating through the city, partly in order to appease the displeasure of Alexander about the pecuniary deficiency. But how to find out who were the guilty? There was no official Prosecutor-general; the number of persons suspected would place the matter beyond the reach of private accusations; perhaps the course recommended by Demosthenès himself was the best, to consign this preliminary investigation to the Areopagites.

Six months elapsed before these Areopagites made their report. Now it is impossible to suppose that all this time could have been spent in the investigation of facts,—and if it had been, the report when published would have contained some trace of these facts, instead of embodying a mere list of names and sums. The probability is, that their time was passed quite as much in party-discussions as in investigating facts; that dissident parties were long in coming to an agreement whom they should sacrifice; and that when they did agree, it was a political rather than a judicial sentence, singling out Demosthenès as a victim highly acceptable to Alexander, and embodying Demadès also, by way of com-

1 The biographer of Hyperidès (Plu- starch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 48) tells us that he was the only orator who kept himself un bribed; the comic writer Timoklès names Hyperidès along with Demo-
promise, in the same list of delinquents—two opposite politicians, both at the moment obnoxious. I have already observed that Demosthenes was at that time unpopular with both the reigning parties; with the philo-Macedonians from long date, and not without sufficient reason; with the anti-Macedonians, because he had stood prominent in opposing Harpalus. His accusers count upon the hatred of the former against him, as a matter of course; they recommend him to the hatred of the latter, as a base creature of Alexander. The Dikasts doubtless included men of both parties; and as a collective body, they might probably feel, that to ratify the list presented by the Areopagus was the only way of finally closing a subject replete with danger and discord.

Such seems the probable history of the Harpalian transactions. It leaves Demosthenes innocent of corrupt profit, not less than Phokion; but to the Athenian politicians generally, it is noway creditable; while it exhibits the judicial conscience of Athens as under pressure of dangers from without, worked upon by party-intrigues within.¹

During the half year and more which elapsed between the arrival of Harpalus at Athens and the trial of Demosthenes, one event at least of considerable moment occurred in Greece. Alexander sent Nikanor to the Greek cities, directing that the exiles should be recalled, and that every Greek city should recall all its citizens that were in exile, except such as were under the taint of impiety. The rescript, which was publicly read at the festival by the herald who had gained the prize for loudness of voice, was heard with the utmost enthusiasm by 20,000 exiles, who had mustered there from intimations that such a step was intended. It ran thus: “King Alexander to the exiles out of the Greek cities. We have not been authors of your banishment, but we will be authors of your restoration to your native cities. We have written to Antipater about this matter, directing him to apply force to such cities as will not recall you of your own accord.”²

It is plain that many exiles had been pouring out their com-

¹ We read in Pausanias (ii. 33, 4) that the Macedonian admiral, Philoxenus, having afterwards seized one of the slaves of Harpalus, learnt from him the names of those Athenians whom his master had corrupted; and that Demosthenes was not among them. ² Diodor. xix. 8.
plaints and accusations before Alexander, and had found him a willing auditor. But we do not know by what representations this rescript had been procured. It would seem that Antipater had orders farther, to restrain or modify the confederacies of the Achaean and Arcadian cities; and to enforce not merely recall of the exiles, but restitution of their properties.

That the imperial rescript was dictated by mistrust of the tone of sentiment in the Grecian cities generally, and intended to fill each city with devoted partisans of Alexander—we cannot doubt. It was on his part a high-handed and sweeping exercise of sovereignty—setting aside the conditions under which he had been named leader of Greece—disdaining even to inquire into particular cases, and to attempt a distinction between just and unjust sentences—overruling in the mass the political and judicial authorities in every city. It proclaimed with bitter emphasis the servitude of the Hellenic world. Exiles restored under the coercive order of Alexander were sure to look to Macedonia for support, to despise their own home authorities, and to fill their respective cities with enfeebling discord. Most of the cities, not daring to resist, appear to have yielded a reluctant obedience; but both the Athenians and Aetolians are said to have refused to execute the order. It is one evidence of the disgust raised by the rescript at Athens, that Demosthenes is severely reproached by Deinarchus, because, as chief of the Athenian Theury or sacred legation to the Olympic festival, he was seen there publicly consorting and in familiar converse with Nikanor.

In the winter or early spring of 328 B.C., several Grecian cities sent envoys into Asia to remonstrate with Alexander against the measure; we may presume that the Athenians were among them, but we do not know whether the remonstrance produced any effect. There appears to have been considerable discontent in Greece during this winter and spring (323 B.C.). The disbanded soldiers out of Asia still maintained a camp at Tanarus; where Leo-

1 See the Fragments of Hyperidès, p. 36, ed. Babington.
2 Curtius, x. 2, 6.
3 Curtius, x. 2, 6. The statement of Diodorus (xviii. 8)—that the rescript was popular and acceptable to all Greeks, except the Athenians and Aetolians—cannot be credited. It was popular, doubtless, with the exiles themselves, and their immediate friends.
5 Diodor. xviii. 113. There seem to have been cases in which Alexander interfered with the sentences of the Athenian Dikastery against Athenian citizens: see the case of a man liberated from a judicial fine at his instance. Pseudo-Demosthenes, Epistol. 3. p. 1480.
sthenés, an energetic Athenian of anti-Macedonian sentiments, accepted the command of them, and even attracted fresh mercenary soldiers from Asia, under concert with various confederates at Athens, and with the Aetolians. Of the money, said to be 5000 talents, brought by Harpalus out of Asia, the greater part had not been taken by Harpalus to Athens, but apparently left with his officers for the maintenance of the troops who had accompanied him over.

Such was the general position of affairs when Alexander died at Babylon in June 323 B.C. This astounding news, for which no one could have been prepared, must have become diffused throughout Greece during the month of July. It opened the most favourable prospects to all lovers of freedom and sufferers by Macedonian dominion. The imperial military force resembled the gigantic Polyphemus after his eye had been blinded by Odysseus: Alexander had left no competent heir, nor did any one imagine that his vast empire could be kept together in effective unity by other hands. Antipater in Macedonia was threatened with the defection of various subject neighbours.

No sooner was the death of Alexander indisputably certified, than the anti-Macedonian leaders in Athens vehemently instigated the people to declare themselves first champions of Hellenic freedom, and to organise a confederacy throughout Greece for that object. Demosthenés was BC, 323

Effect produced in Greece by the death of Alexander.  

The Athenians declare themselves champions of the liberation of Greece, in spite of Phokion's opposition.  

1 Diodor, xvii. 111; compare xviii. 21.  

Pausanias (i. 25, 5; viii. 52, 2) affirms that Leosthenés brought over 50,000 of these mercenaries from Asia into Peloponnese, during the lifetime of Alexander, and against Alexander's will. The number here given seems incredible; but it is probable enough that he induced some to come across. —Justin (xii. 5) mentions that armed resistance was prepared by the Athenians and Aetolians against Alexander himself during the latter months of his life, in reference to the mandate enjoining recall of the exiles. He seems to overstate the magnitude of their doings, before the death of Alexander.  

2 A striking comparison made by the orator Demades (Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 181).  

3 See Frontinus, Stratagem, ii. 11, 4.  

4 Plutarch, Phokion. 28. In the Fragments of Dexippus, there appear short extracts of two speeches, seemingly composed by that author in his history of these transactions; one which he ascribes to Hyperidés instigating the war, the other to some unknown speaker, supposed by C. Müller to be Phokion, against it (Fragm. Hist. Græc. vol. iii, p. 668).
Phokion, but the mass of the citizens were fired by the animating recollection of their ancestors and by the hopes of reconquering Grecian freedom. A vote was passed, publicly proclaiming their resolution to that effect. It was decreed that 200 quadriremes and 40 triremes should be equipped; that all Athenians under 40 years of age should be in military requisition; and that envoys should be sent round to the various Grecian cities, earnestly invoking their alliance in the work of self-emancipation. Phokion, though a pronounced opponent of such warlike projects, still remained at Athens, and still, apparently, continued in his functions as one of the generals. But Pythens, Kallimedes, and others of his friends, fled to Antipater, whom they strenuously assisted in trying to check the intended movement throughout Greece.

Leosthenés, aided by some money and arms from Athens, put himself at the head of the mercenaries assembled at Tenedos, and passed across the Gulf into Ætolia. Here he was joined by the Ætolians and Akarnanians, who eagerly entered into the league with Athens for expelling the Macedonians from Greece. Proceeding onward towards Thermopylae and Thessaly, he met with favour and encouragement almost everywhere. The cause of Grecian freedom was espoused by the Phokians, Lokrians, Dorians, Æmianes, Athamæans, and Dolopecs; by most of the Malians, Ætolians, Thessalians, and Achaæans of Phthiötes; by the inhabitants of Leukas, and by some of the Molossians. Promises were also held out of cooperation from various Illyrian and Thracian tribes. In Peloponnesus, the Argeians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians, Trozcnians, Eleians, and Messenians, enrolled themselves in the league, as well as the Karystians in Euboea. These adhesions were partly procured by Hyperidès and other Athenian envoys, who visited the several cities; while Pythens and other envoys were going round in like

1 Diodor, xviii. 10. Diodorus states that the Athenians sent the Harpalian treasures to the aid of Leosthenés. He seems to fancy that Harpalus had brought to Athens all the 5000 talents which he had carried away from Asia; but it is certain, that no more than 700 or 720 talents were declared by Harpalus in the Athenian assembly—and of these only half were really forthcoming. Moreover, Diodorus is not consistent with himself, when he says afterwards (xviii. 10) that Thimbros, who killed Harpalus in Crete, got possession of the Harpalian treasures and mercenaries, and carried them over to Kyrênä in Africa.

2 It is to this season, apparently, that the anecdote (if true) must be referred. —The Athenians were eager to invade Bосotia unseasonably; Phokion, as general, of eighty years old, kept them back, by calling out the citizens of sixty years old and upwards for service, and offering to march himself at their head (Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Precept. p. 818).

3 Diodor. xviii. 11; Pausanias, i. 25, 4.
manner to advocate the cause of Antipater. The two sides were thus publicly argued by able pleaders before different public assemblies. In these debates, the advantage was generally on the side of the Athenian orators, whose efforts moreover were powerfully seconded by the voluntary aid of Demosthenes, then living as an exile in Peloponnesus.

To Demosthenes the death of Alexander, and the new prospect of organizing an anti-Macedonian confederacy with some tolerable chance of success, came more welcome than to any one else. He gladly embraced the opportunity of joining and assisting the Athenian envoys, who felt the full value of his energetic eloquence, in the various Peloponnesian towns. So effective was the service which he thus rendered to his country, that the Athenians not only passed a vote to enable him to return, but sent a trireme to fetch him to Peireus. Great was the joy and enthusiasm on his arrival. The archons, the priests, and the entire body of citizens, came down to the harbour to welcome his landing, and escorted him to the city. Full of impassioned emotion, Demosthenes poured forth his gratitude for having been allowed to see such a day, and to enjoy a triumph greater even than that which had been conferred on Alkibiades on returning from exile; since it had been granted spontaneously, and not extorted by force. His fine could not be remitted consistently with Athenian custom; but the people passed a vote granting to him fifty talents as superintendent of the periodical sacrifice to Zeus Soter; and his execution of this duty was held equivalent to a liquidation of the fine. 1

What part Demosthenes took in the plans or details of the war, we are not permitted to know. Vigorous operations were now carried on, under the military command of Leosthenes. The confederacy against Antipater included a larger assemblage of Hellenic states than that which had resisted Xerxes in 480 B.C. Nevertheless, the name of Sparta does not appear in the list. It was a melancholy drawback to the chances of Greece, in this her last struggle for emancipation, that the force of Sparta had been altogether crushed in the gallant but ill-concerted effort of Agis against Antipater seven years before, and had not since recovered. The great stronghold of Macedonian interest, in the interior of Greece, 2

1 Plutarch, Demosth. 27.
was Boeotia. Platea, Orchomenus, and the other ancient enemies of Thebes, having received from Alexander the domain once belonging to Thebes herself, were well aware that this arrangement could only be upheld by the continued pressure of Macedonian supremacy in Greece. It seems probable also that there were Macedonian garrisons in the Kadmeia—in Corinth—and in Megalopolis; moreover, that the Arcadian and Achæan cities had been Macedonized by the measures taken against them under Alexander's orders in the preceding summer; for we find no mention made of these cities in the coming contest. The Athenians equipped a considerable land-force to join Leosthenès at Thermopylae; a citizen force of 5000 infantry and 500 cavalry, with 2000 mercenaries besides. But the resolute opposition of the Boeotian cities hindered them from advancing beyond Mount Kithaeron, until Leosthenès himself, marching from Thermopylae to join them with a part of his army, attacked the Boeotian troops, gained a complete victory, and opened the passage. He now proceeded with the full Hellenic muster, including Etolians and Athenians, into Thessaly to meet Antipater, who was advancing from Macedonia into Greece at the head of the force immediately at his disposal—13,000 infantry and 600 cavalry—and with a fleet of 110 ships of war cooperating on the coast.

Antipater was probably not prepared for this rapid and imposing assemblage of the combining Greeks at Thermopylae, nor for the energetic movements of Leosthenès. Still less was he prepared for the defection of the Thessalian cavalry, who, having always formed an important element in the Macedonian army, now lent their strength to the Greeks. He despatched urgent messages to the Macedonian commanders in Asia—Kraterus, Leonnatus, Philotas, &c., soliciting reinforcements; but in the mean time he thought it expedient to accept the challenge of Leosthenès. In the battle which ensued, however, he was completely defeated, and even cut off from the possibility of retreating into Macedonia. No better resource was left to him than the fortified town of Lamia (near to the river Spercheius, beyond the southern border of Thessaly), where he calculated on holding out until relief came from Asia.

1 See the Fragments of Hyperidès, p. 36, ed. Babington. καὶ περὶ τοὺς κοινοὺς συλλόγους Ἀχαιῶν τε καὶ Ἀρκα- δῶν... We do not know what was done to these district confederacies, but it seems that some considerable change was made in them, at the time when Alexander's decree for restoring the exiles was promulgated. Diodor. xviii. 13.
Leosthenés immediately commenced the siege of Lamia, and pressed it with the utmost energy, making several attempts to storm the town. But its fortifications were strong, with a garrison ample and efficient—so that he was repulsed with considerable loss. Unfortunately he possessed no battering train nor engineers, such as had formed so powerful an element in the military successes of Philip and Alexander. He therefore found himself compelled to turn the siege into a blockade, and to adopt systematic measures for intercepting the supply of provisions. In this he had every chance of succeeding, and of capturing the person of Antipater. Hellenic prospects looked bright and encouraging; nothing was heard in Athens and the other cities except congratulations and thanksgivings. Phokion, on hearing the confident language of those around him, remarked—"The stadium (or short course) has been done brilliantly; but I fear we shall not have strength to hold out for the long course." At this critical moment, Leosthenés, in inspecting the blockading trenches, was wounded on the head by a large stone, projected from one of the catapults on the city-walls, and expired in two days. A funeral oration in his honour, as well as in that of the other combatants against Antipater, was pronounced at Athens by Hyperidès.

The death of this eminent general, in the full tide of success, was a hard blow struck by fortune at the cause of Grecian freedom. For the last generation, Athens had produced several excellent orators, and one who combined splendid oratory with wise and patriotic counsels. But during all that time, none of her citizens, before Leosthenés, had displayed military genius and ardour along with Panhellenic purposes. His death appears to have saved Antipater from defeat and captivity. The difficulty was very great, of keeping together a miscellaneous army of Greeks, who, after the battle, easily persuaded themselves that the war was finished, and desired to go home—perhaps under promise of returning. Even during the lifetime of Leosthenés, the Aetolians, the most powerful contingent of the army, had obtained leave to go home, from some domestic urgency, real or pretended. When he was slain, there was no second in command; nor, even if there

1 Plutarch, Phokion, 23, 24.  
2 Plutarch, Phokion, a, 23; Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præcept. p. 803. *  
3 Diodor, xviii, 12, 12.  
4 A fine fragment of the Λόγος Ἐπίταφιος by Hyperidès is preserved in Stobæus, Tit. 124, vol. iii. p. 618. It is gratifying to learn that a large additional portion of this oration has been recently brought from Egypt in a papyrus, and is about to be published by Mr. Churchill Bellingham.  
5 Diodor, xviii. 13-15.
had been, could the personal influence of one officer be transferred to another. Reference was made to Athens, where, after some debate, Antiphilus was chosen commander, after the proposition to name Phokion had been made and rejected. But during this interval, there was no authority to direct military operations, or even to keep the army together. Hence the precious moments for rendering the blockade really stringent, were lost, and Antipater was enabled to maintain himself until the arrival of Leonnatus from Asia to his aid. How dangerous the position of Antipater was, we may judge from the fact, that he solicited peace, but was required by the besiegers to surrender at discretion—with which condition he refused to comply.

Antiphilus appears to have been a brave and competent officer. But before he could reduce Lamia, Leonnatus with a Macedonian army had crossed the Hellespont from Asia, and arrived at the frontiers of Thessaly. So many of the Grecian contingents had left the camp, that Antiphilus was not strong enough at once to continue the blockade and to combat the relieving army. Accordingly, he raised the blockade, and moved off by rapid marches to attack Leonnatus apart from Antipater. He accomplished this operation with vigour and success. Through the superior efficiency of the Thessalian cavalry under Menon, he gained an important advantage in a cavalry battle over Leonnatus, who was himself slain; and the Macedonian phalanx, having its flanks and rear thus exposed, retired from the plain to more difficult ground, leaving the Greeks masters of the field with the dead bodies. On the very next day, Antipater came up, bringing the troops from Lamia, and took command of the defeated army. He did not however think it expedient to renew the combat, but withdrew his army from Thessaly into Macedonia, keeping in his march the high ground, out of the reach of cavalry.

During the same time generally as these operations in Thessaly, it appears that war was carried on actively by sea. We hear of a descent by Mikion with a Macedonian fleet at Rhamnus on the eastern coast of Attica, repulsed by Phokion; also of a Macedonian fleet, of 240 sail, under Kleitus, engaging in two battles with the Athenian fleet under Phokion, 24; Diodor. xvii, 11; Plutarch, Phokion, 26. Plutarch, Phokion, 25; Diodor. xviii, 14, 15; compare Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 1; Diodor. xviii, 15.
Eetion, near the islands called Echinades, at the mouth of the Acheléus, on the western Ætolian coast. The Athenians were defeated in both actions, and great efforts were made at Athens to build new vessels for the purpose of filling up the losses sustained. Our information is not sufficient to reveal the purposes or details of these proceedings. But it seems probable that the Macedonian fleet were attacking Ætolia through Eniade, the citizens of which town had recently been expelled by the Ætolians; and perhaps this may have been the reason why the Ætolian contingent was withdrawn from Thessaly.

In spite of such untoward events at sea, the cause of Panhellenic liberty seemed on the whole prosperous. Though the capital opportunity had been missed, of taking Antipater captive in Lamia, still he had been expelled from Greece, and was unable, by means of his own forces in Macedonia, to regain his footing. The Grecian contingents had behaved with bravery and unanimity in prosecution of the common purpose; and what had been already achieved was quite sufficient to justify the rising, as a fair risk, promising reasonable hopes of success. Nevertheless Greek citizens were not like trained Macedonian soldiers. After a term of service not much prolonged, they wanted to go back to their families and properties, hardly less after a victory than after a defeat. Hence the army of Antipholus in Thessaly became much thinned, though still remaining large enough to keep back the Macedonian forces of Antipater, even augmented as they had been by Leonnatus—and to compel him to await the still more powerful reinforcement destined to follow under Kraterus.

In explaining the relations between these three Macedonian commanders—Antipater, Leonnatus, and Kraterus—it is necessary to go back to June 323 B.C., the period of Alexander's death, and to review the condition into which his vast and mighty empire had fallen. I shall do this briefly, and only so far as it bears on the last struggles and final subjugation of the Grecian world.

On the unexpected death of Alexander, the camp at Babylon with its large force became a scene of discord. He left no offspring, except a child named Heraklès, by his mistress Barsiné. Roxana, one of his wives, was indeed pregnant; and amidst the uncertainties of the moment, the first disposition of many was to await the birth of her

1 Diodor, xviii. 15. 2 Diodor, xviii. 8. 3 Diodor, xviii. 17.
child. She herself, anxious to shut out rivalry, caused Statira, the queen whom Alexander had last married, to be entrapped and assassinated along with her sister.\(^1\) There was however at Babylon a brother of Alexander, named Aridaeus (son of Philip by a Thessalian mistress),\(^1\) already of full age though feeble in intelligence, towards whom a still larger party leaned. In Macedonia, there were Olympias, Alexander’s mother—Kleopatra, his sister, widow of the Epirotic Alexander—and Kynane,\(^2\) another sister, widow of Amyntas (cousin of Alexander the Great, and put to death by him); all of them disposed to take advantage of their relationship to the deceased conqueror, in the scramble now opened for power.

After a violent dispute between the cavalry and the infantry at Babylon, Aridaeus was proclaimed king under the name of Philip Aridaeus. Perdikkas was named as his guardian and chief minister; among the other chief officers, the various satrapies and fractions of the empire were distributed. Egypt and Libya were assigned to Ptolemy; Syria to Laomedon; Kilikia to Philotas; Pamphylia, Lykia; and the greater Phrygia, to Antigonus; Karia, to Asander; Lydia, to Menander; the Ilethespontine Phrygia, to Leonnatus; Kappadokia and Paphlagonia, to the Kardian Eumenes; Media, to Pithon. The eastern satrapies were left in the hands of the actual holders.

In Europe, the distributors gave Thrace with the Chersonese to Lysimachus; the countries west of Thrace, including (along with Illyrians, Triballi, Agrianes, and Epirots) Macedonia and Greece, to Antipater and Kraterus.\(^3\) We thus find the Grecian cities handed over to new masters, as fragments of the vast intestate estate left by Alexander. The empty form of convening and consulting a synod of deputies at Corinth, was no longer thought necessary.

All the above-named officers were considered as local lieutenants, administering portions of an empire one and indivisible under Aridaeus. The principal officers who enjoyed central authority, bearing on the entire empire, were, Perdikkas, chiliarch of the horse (the post occupied by Hephaestion until his death), a sort of vizir,\(^4\) and

1 Plutarch, Alexand, 77.
2 Arrian, De Rebus post Alexandrum, vi. ap. Photium, Cod. 92.
4 Arrian and Dexippus—De Re, post Alex. ut supra: compare Diodor, xviii. 48.
federacy, and that he would receive no propositions except from each city severally. Upon this the Grecian commanders at once resolved to continue the war, and to invoke reinforcements from their countrymen. But their own manifestation of timidity had destroyed the chance that remained of such reinforcements arriving. While Antipater commenced a vigorous and successful course of action against the Thessalian cities separately, the Greeks became more and more dispirited and alarmed. City after city sent its envoys to entreat peace from Antipater, who granted lenient terms to each, reserving only the Athenians and Aetolians. In a few days, the combined Grecian army was dispersed; Antipholes with the Athenians returned into Attica; Antipater followed them southward as far as Bœotia, taking up his quarters at the Macedonian post on the Kadmeia, once the Hellenic Thebes—within two days' march of Athens.1

Against the overwhelming force thus on the frontiers of Attica, the Athenians had no means of defence. The principal anti-Macedonian orators, especially Demosthenes and Hyperides, retired from the city at once, seeking sanctuary in the temples of Kalauria and Agina. Phokion and Demades, as the envoys most acceptable to Antipater, were sent to Kadmeia as bearers of the submission of the city, and petitioners for lenient terms. Demades is said to have been at this time disfranchised and disqualified from public speaking—having been indicted and found guilty thrice (some say seven times) under the Graphé Paromorē; but the Athenians passed a special vote of relief, to enable him to resume his functions of citizen. Neither Phokion nor Demades, however, could prevail upon Antipater to acquiesce in anything short of the surrender of Athens at discretion; the same terms as Leosthenes had required from Antipater himself at Lamia. Kraterus was even bent upon marching forward into Attica, to dictate terms under the walls of Athens; and it was not without difficulty that Phokion obtained the abandonment of this intention; after which he returned to Athens with the answer. The people having no choice except to throw themselves on the mercy of Antipater,2 Phokion and

1 Diodor. xviii. 17; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 26.
2 Demochares, the nephew of Demosthenes, who had held a bold language and taken active part against Antipater throughout the Lamian war, is said to have delivered a public harangue recommending resistance even at this last moment. At least such was the story connected with his statue,
Demadés came back to Thebes to learn his determination. This time, they were accompanied by the philosopher Xenokratés—the successor of Plato and Speusippus, as presiding teacher in the school of the Academy. Though not a citizen of Athens, Xenokratés had long resided there; and it was supposed that his dignified character and intellectual eminence might be efficacious in mitigating the wrath of the conqueror. Aristotle had quitted Athens for Chalkis before this time; otherwise he, the personal friend of Antipater, would have been probably selected for this painful mission. In point of fact, Xenokratés did no good, being harshly received, and almost put to silence, by Antipater. One reason of this may be, that he had been to a certain extent the rival of Aristotle; and it must be added, to his honour, that he maintained a higher and more independent tone than either of the other envoys.¹

According to the terms dictated by Antipater, the Athenian's were required to pay a sunf equal to the whole cost of the war; to surrender Demosthenés, Hyperidés, and seemingly at least two other anti-Macedonian orators; to receive a Macedonian garrison in Munychia; to abandon their democratical constitution, and disfranchise all their poorer citizens. Most of these poor men were to be transported from their homes, and to receive new lands on a foreign shore. The Athenian colonists in Samos were to be dispossessed and the island retransferred to the Samian exiles and natives.

It is said that Phokion and Demadés *heard these terms with satisfaction, as lenient and reasonable. Xenokratés entered against them the strongest protest which the occasion admitted,² when he said—"If Antipater looks upon us as slaves, the terms are moderate; if as freemen, they are severe." To Phokion's entreaty, that the introduction of the garrison might be dispensed with, Antipater replied in the negative, intimating that the garrison would be not less serviceable to Phokion himself than to the Macedonians; while Kallimedon also, an Athenian exile there present, repelled the proposition with scorn. Respecting the island of Samos, Antipater was prevailed upon to allow a special reference to the imperial authority.

¹ Plutarch, Phokion, 27; Diodor. xvii. 18.
² Plutarch, Phokion, 27. Of μὴν ὃν δὲν ἔλλα ρᾶ θεον ἐκάκης ὡς φιλανθρώποι ταῖς διαλύσεις, πλὴν τοῦ ἐνεκρόντων, &c. Pausanias ἕκκεν ἑποίμα (vii. 10, 1); but Antipater was dissuaded from granting more lenient terms, lest he be dissuaded from doing so by Domadés.
If Phokion thought these terms lenient, we must imagine that he expected a sentence of destruction against Athens, such as Alexander had pronounced and executed against Thebes. Under no other comparison can they appear lenient. Out of 21,000 qualified citizens of Athens, all those who did not possess property to the amount of 2000 drachmæ were condemned to disfranchisement and deportation. The number below this prescribed qualification, who came under the penalty, was 12,000, or three-fifths of the whole. They were set aside as turbulent, noisy democrats; the 9000 richest citizens, the "party of order," were left in exclusive possession, not only of the citizenship, but of the city. The condemned 12,000 were deported out of Attica, some to Thrace, some to the Illyrian or Italian coast, some to Libya or the Kyrenaic territory. Besides the multitude banished simply on the score of comparative poverty, the marked anti-Macedonian politicians were banished also, including Agnonidès, the friend of Demosthenès, and one of his earnest advocates when accused respecting the Harpalian treasures. At the request of Phokion, Antipater consented to render the deportation less sweeping than he had originally intended, so far as to permit some exiles, Agnonidès among the rest, to remain within the limits of Peloponnesus. We shall see him presently contemplating a still more wholesale deportation of the Ætolian people.

It is deeply to be lamented that this important revolution, not only cutting down Athens to less than one-half of her citizen population, but involving a deportation fraught with individual hardship and suffering, is communicated to us only in two or three sentences of Plutarch and Diodorus, without any details from contemporary observers. It is called by Diodorus a return to the Solonian constitution; but the comparison disgraces the name of that admirable

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2 Diodor. xvii. 18. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἄνω τῆς παρίδος ἕξοντες περὶ ἐννακισχιλίον κατοικεῖν, ὧν ἣν δισμυρίων, which seems a mistake) καὶ διαχιλιών μετεστάθησαν ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος, 
Diodorus and Plutarch (c. 29) mention that, Antipater assigned residences in Thrace for the expatriated. Those who went beyond the Keraunian mountains must have gone either to the Illyrian coast, Apollonia or Epidamnus—or to the Gulf of Tarentum. Those who went beyond Temaridès would probably be sent to Libya: see Thucydides, vii. 19, 10; vii. 50, 2.
lawgiver, whose changes, taken as a whole, were prodigiously liberal and enfranchising, compared with what he found established. The deportation ordained by Antipater must indeed have brought upon the poor citizens of Athens a state of suffering in foreign lands analogous to that which Solon describes as having preceded his Sciasachtheia, or measure for the relief of debtors.\(^1\) What rules the nine thousand remaining citizens adopted for their new constitution, we do not know. Whatever they did, must now have been subject to the consent of Antipater and the Macedonian garrison, which entered Munychia, under the command of Menyllus, on the twentieth day of the month Boedromion (September), rather more than a month after the battle of Kramon. The day of its entry presented a sorrowful contrast. It was the day on which, during the annual ceremony of the mysteries of Eleusinian Déméter, the multitudinous festal procession of citizens escorted the God Iacchus from Athens to Eleusis.\(^2\)

One of the earliest measures of the nine thousand was to condemn to death, at the motion of Demadès, the distinguished anti-Macedonian orators who had already fled—Demosthenes, Hyperidès, Aristonikus, and Himereus, brother of the citizen afterwards celebrated as Demetrius the Phalerean. The three last having taken refuge in Ægina, and Demosthenes in Kalauria, all of them were out of the reach of an Athenian sentence, but not beyond that of the Macedonian sword. At this miserable season, Greece was full of similar exiles, the anti-Macedonian leaders out of all the cities which had taken part in the Lamian war. The officers of Antipater, called in the language of the time the Exile-Hunters,\(^3\) were everywhere on the look-out to seize these proscribed men; many of the orators, from other cities as well as from Athens, were slain; and there was no refuge except the mountains of Ætolia for any of them.\(^4\) One of these officers, a Thurian named Archias, who had once been a tragic actor, passed over with a company of Thracian soldiers to Ægina, where he seized the three Athenian orators—Hyperidès, Demosthenes, and Aristonikus, and brought them back to Athens to be tried for treason against the state.

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\(^1\) Plutarch, Phokion, 28.

\(^2\) Plutarch, Phokion, 28.


\(^4\) Polybius, ix. 29, 30. This is stated as a matter of traditional pride, by an Ætolian speaker more than a century afterwards. In the speech of his Akarnanian opponent, there is nothing to contradict it—while the fact is in itself highly probable. See Westermann, Geschichte der Beredsamkeit in Griechenland, ch. 71.
Aristonikus, and Himereus—dragging them out of the sanctuary of the Aëakion or chapel of Aëakus. They were all sent as prisoners to Antipater, who had by this time marched forward with his army to Corinth and Kleonae in Peloponnesus. All were there put to death, by his order. It is even said, and on respectable authority, that the tongue of Hyperidés was cut out before he was slain; according to another statement, he himself bit it out—being put to the torture, and resolving to make revelation of secrets impossible. Respecting the details of his death, there were several different stories.\(^1\)

Having conducted these prisoners to Antipater, Archias proceeded with his Thracians to Kalauria in search of Demosthenés. The temple of Poseidon there situated, in which the orator had taken sanctuary, was held in such high veneration that Archias, hesitating to drag him out by force, tried to persuade him to come forth voluntarily, under promise that he should suffer no harm. But Demosthenés, well aware of the fate which awaited him, swallowed poison in the temple, and when the dose was beginning to take effect, came out of the sacred ground, expiring immediately after he had passed the boundary. The accompanying circumstances were recounted in several different ways.\(^2\) Eratosthenés (to whose authority I lean) affirmed that Demosthenés carried the poison in a ring round his arm; others said that it was suspended in a linen bag round his neck; according to a third story, it was contained in a writing-quill, which he was seen to bite and suck, while composing a last letter to Antipater. Amidst these contradictory details, we can only affirm as certain, that the poison which he had provided beforehand preserved him from the sword of Antipater, and perhaps from having his tongue cut out. The most remarkable assertion was that of Democharés, nephew of Demosthenés, made in his harangues at Athens a few years afterwards. Democharés asserted that his uncle had not taken poison, but had been softly withdrawn from the world by

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\(^{1}\) Plutarch, Demosthen. 28; Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 849; Photius, p. 496.

\(^{2}\) Plutarch, Demosth. 30. τῶν 3\textsuperscript{ο} ἀκλων, δια μεγαφωβείς τι περὶ αὐτοί, ταῖς διαφορέσ οὐν ἀπαγαγον ἐπεξελθεῖν, &c.

The taunts on Archias's profession, as an actor, and as an indifferent actor, which Plutarch puts into the mouth of Demosthenés (c. 29), appear to me not worthy either of the man or of the occasion; nor were they sufficiently avouched to induce me to transcribe them. Whatever bitterness of spirit Demosthenés might choose to manifest, at such a moment, would surely be vented on the chief enemy, Antipater; not, upon the mere instrument.
a special providence of the Gods, just at the moment essential to rescue him from the cruelty of the Macedonians. It is not less to be noted, as an illustration of the vein of sentiment afterwards prevalent, that Archias the Exile-Hunter was affirmed to have perished in the utmost dishonour and wretchedness.

The violent deaths of these illustrious orators, the disfranchisement and deportation of the Athenian Demos, the suppression of the public Dikasteries, the occupation of Athens by a Macedonian garrison, and of Greece generally by Macedonian Exile-Hunters—are events belonging to one and the same calamitous tragedy, and marking the extinction of the autonomous Hellenic world.

Of Hyperidés as a citizen we know only the general fact, that he maintained from first to last, and with oratorical ability inferior only to Demosthenès, a strenuous opposition to Macedonian dominion over Greece; though his persecution of Demosthenès respecting the Harpalian treasure appears (as far as it comes before us) discreditable.

Of Demosthenès, we know more—enough to form a judgement of him both as citizen and statesman. At the time of his death he was about sixty-two years of age, and we have before us his first Philippic, delivered thirty years before (352-351 B.C.). We are thus sure, that even at that early day, he took a sagacious and provident measure of the danger which threatened Grecian liberty from the energy and encroachments of Philip. He impressed upon his countrymen this coming danger, at a time when the older and more influential politicians either could not or would not see it; he called aloud upon his fellow-citizens for personal service and pecuniary contributions, enforcing the call by all the artifices of consummate oratory, when such distasteful propositions only entailed unpopularity upon himself. At the period when Demosthenès first addressed these earnest appeals to his countrymen, long before the fall of Olynthus, the power of Philip, though formidable, might have been kept perfectly well within the limits of Macedonia and Thrace; and would probably have been so kept, had Demosthenès possessed in 351 B.C. as much public influence as he had acquired ten years afterwards, in 341 B.C.

Throughout the whole career of Demosthenès as a public adviser, down to the battle of Châroneia, we trace the same combination of earnest patriotism with wise and long-sighted policy.

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1 Plutarch, Demost. 39; Plutarch, Arrian, De Rebus post Alex. vi. ap. Vit. X. Orat. p. 846; Photius, p. 494; Photium, Cod. 92.
During the three years' war which ended with the battle of Chaeonia, the Athenians in the main followed his counsel; and disastrous as were the ultimate military results of that war, for which Demosthenes could not be responsible—its earlier periods were creditable and successful, its general scheme was the best that the case admitted, and its diplomatic management universally triumphant. But what invests the purposes and policy of Demosthenes with peculiar grandeur, is, that they were not simply Athenian, but in an eminent degree Panhellenic also. It was not Athens alone that he sought to defend against Philip, but the whole Hellenic world. In this he towers above the greatest of his predecessors for half a century before his birth—Perikles, Archidamus, Agesilaus, Epaminondas; whose policy was Athenian, Spartan, Theban, rather than Hellenic. He carries us back to the time of the invasion of Xerxes and the generation immediately succeeding it, when the struggles and sufferings of the Athenians against Persia were consecrated by complete identity of interest with collective Greece. The sentiments to which Demosthenes appeals throughout his numerous orations, are those of the noblest and largest patriotism; trying to inflame the ancient Grecian sentiment, of an autonomous Hellenic world, as the indispensable condition of a dignified and desirable existence—but inculcating at the same time that these blessings could only be preserved by toil, self-sacrifice, devotion of fortune, and willingness to brave hard and steady personal service.

From the destruction of Thebes by Alexander in 335 B.C., to the Lamian war after his death, the policy of Athens neither was nor could be conducted by Demosthenes. But condemned as he was to comparative inefficacy, he yet rendered material service to Athens, in the Harpalian affair of 324 B.C. If, instead of opposing the alliance of the city with Harpalus, he had supported it as warmly as Hyperides—the exaggerated promises of the exile might probably have prevailed, and war would have been declared against Alexander. In respect to the charge of having been corrupted by Harpalus, I have already shown reasons for believing him innocent. The Lamian war, the closing scene of his activity, was not of his original suggestion, since he was in exile at its commencement. But he threw himself into it with unre-
served ardour, and was greatly instrumental in procuring the large number of adhesions which it obtained from so many Grecian states. In spite of its disastrous result, it was, like the battle of Chæroneia, a glorious effort for the recovery of Grecian liberty, undertaken under circumstances which promised a fair chance of success. There was no excessive rashness in calculating on distractions in the empire left by Alexander—on mutual hostility among the principal officers—and on the probability of having only to make head against Antipater and Macedonia, with little or no reinforcement from Asia. Disastrous as the enterprise ultimately proved, yet the risk was one fairly worth incurring, with so noble an object at stake; and could the war have been protracted another year, its termination would probably have been very different. We shall see this presently when we come to follow Asiatic events. After a catastrophe so ruinous, extinguishing free speech in Greece, and dispersing the Athenian Demos to distant lands, Demosthenes himself could hardly have desired, at the age of sixty-two, to prolong his existence as a fugitive beyond sea.

Of the speeches which he composed for private litigants, occasionally also for himself, before the Dikastery—and of the numerous stimulating and admonitory harangues, on the public affairs of the moment, which he had addressed to his assembled countrymen, a few remain for the admiration of posterity. These harangues serve to us, not only as evidence of his unrivalled excellence as an orator, but as one of the chief sources from which we are enabled to appreciate the last phase of free Grecian life, as an acting and working reality.
CHAPTER XCVI.

FROM THE LAMIAN WAR TO THE CLOSE OF THE HISTORY OF FREE HELLAS AND HELLENISM.

The death of Demosthenës, with its tragical circumstances recounted in my last chapter, is on the whole less melancholy than the prolonged life of Phokion, as agent of Macedonian supremacy in a city half-depopulated, where he had been born a free citizen, and which he had so long helped to administer as a free community. The dishonour of Phokion's position must have been aggravated by the distress in Athens, arising both out of the violent deportation of one-half of its free citizens, and out of the compulsory return of the Athenian settlers from Samos; which island was now taken from Athens, after she had occupied it forty-three years, and restored to the Samian people and to their recalled exiles, by a rescript of Perdikkas in the name of Arideus. Occupying this obnoxious elevation, Phokion exercised authority with his usual probity and mildness. Exerting himself to guard the citizens from being annoyed by disorders on the part of the garrison of Munychia, he kept up friendly intercourse with its commander Menyllus, though refusing all presents both from him and from Antipater. He was anxious to bestow the gift of citizenship upon the philosopher Xenokratês, who was only a metic, or resident non-freeman; but Xenokratês declined the offer, remarking, that he would accept no place in a constitution against which he had protested as envoy. This mark of courageous independence, not a little remarkable while the Macedonians were masters of the city, was a tacit reproach to the pliant submission of Phokion.

Throughout Peloponnesus, Antipater purged and remodelled the cities, Argos, Megalopolis, and others, as he had done at Athens;
installing in each an oligarchy of his own partisans—sometimes with a Macedonian garrison—and putting to death, deporting, or expelling, hostile, or intractable, or democratic citizens. Having completed the subjugation of Peloponnesus, he passed across the Corinthian Gulf to attack the Aetolians, now the only Greeks remaining unsubdued. It was the purpose of Antipater, not merely to conquer this warlike and rude people, but to transport them in mass across into Asia, and march them up to the interior deserts of the empire. His army was too powerful to be resisted on even ground, so that all the more accessible towns and villages fell into his hands. But the Aetolians defended themselves bravely, withdrew their families into the high towns and mountain tops of their very rugged country, and caused serious loss to the Macedonian invaders. Nevertheless, Kraterus, who had carried on war of the same kind with Alexander in Sogdiana, manifested so much skill in seizing the points of communication, that he intercepted all their supplies and reduced them to extreme distress, amidst the winter which had now supervened. The Aetolians, in spite of bravery and endurance, must soon have been compelled to surrender from cold and hunger, had not the unexpected arrival of Antigonus from Asia communicated such news to Antipater and Kraterus, as induced them to prepare for marching back to Macedonia, with a view to the crossing of the Hellespont and operating in Asia. They concluded a pacification with the Aetolians—postponing till a future period their design of deporting that people—and withdrew into Macedonia; where Antipater cemented his alliance with Kraterus by giving to him his daughter Phila in marriage.

Another daughter of Antipater, named Nikaa, had been sent over to Asia not long before, to become the wife of Perdikkas. That general, acting as guardian or prime minister to the kings of Alexander's family (who are now spoken of in the plural number, 1 Diodor. xviii. 55, 56, 57, 68, 69. 2 Diodor. xviii. 26, διεγιτοκότες ὕστερον αὐτοὺς καταπολεμῆσαι, καὶ μεταστῆσαι παβοικίους εἰς τὴν ἐρημίαν καὶ ποῤῥωτάτω τῆς ᾿Ασίας κδιμένην χώραν. 3 Diodor. xviii. 25. δειγμωνέστε ἔστερον αὐτοὺς κατακολυμήσας, καὶ μετα- στῆσαι παρακίκιον ἄταντας εἰς τὴν ἑρημίαν καὶ νοθωτάς τῆς ᾿Ασίας κλιμάτων χώρας. 4 Diodor. xviii. 18-25.)

1 Diodor. xviii. 55, 56, 57, 68, 69. 2 Diodor. xviii. 26, διεγιτοκότες ὕστερον αὐτοὺς καταπολεμῆσαι, καὶ μεταστῆσαι παβοικίους εἰς τὴν ἐρημίαν καὶ ποῤῥωτάτω τῆς ᾿Ασίας κδιμένην χώραν. 3 Diodor. xviii. 25. δειγμωνέστε ἔστερον αὐτοὺς κατακολυμήσας, καὶ μετα- στῆσαι παρακίκιον ἄταντας εἰς τὴν ἑρημίαν καὶ νοθωτάς τῆς ᾿Ασίας κλιμάτων χώρας. 4 Diodor. xviii. 18-25.)
since Roxana had given birth to a posthumous son called Alexander, and made king jointly with Philip Aridaeus), had at first sought close combination with Antipater, demanding his daughter in marriage. But new views were presently opened to him by the intrigues of the princesses at Pella—Olympias, with her daughter Kleopatra, the widow of the Molossian Alexander—who had always been at variance with Antipater, even throughout the life of Alexander—and Kynanê (daughter of Philip by an Illyrian mother, and widow of Amyntas, first cousin of Alexander, but slain by Alexander’s order) with her daughter Eurydike. It has been already mentioned that Kleopatra had offered herself in marriage to Leonnatus, inviting him to come over and occupy the throne of Macedonia: he had obeyed the call, but had been slain in his first battle against the Greeks, thus relieving Antipater from a dangerous rival. The first project of Olympias being thus frustrated, she had sent to Perdikkas proposing to him a marriage with Kleopatra. Perdikkas had already pledged himself to the daughter of Antipater; nevertheless he now debated whether his ambition would not be better served by breaking his pledge, and accepting the new proposition. To this step he was advised by Eumenês, his ablest friend and coadjutor, steadily attached to the interest of the regal family, and withal personally hated by Antipater. But Alketas, brother of Perdikkas, represented that it would be hazardous to provoke openly and immediately the wrath, of Antipater. Accordingly Perdikkas resolved to accept Nikaa for the moment, but to send her away after no long time, and take Kleopatra; to whom secret assurances from him were conveyed by Eumenês. Kynanê also (daughter of Philip and widow of his nephew Amyntas), a warlike and ambitious woman, had brought into Asia her daughter Eurydike for the purpose of espousing the king Philip Aridaeus. Being averse to this marriage, and probably instigated by Olympias also, Perdikkas and Alketas put Kynanê to death. But the indignation excited among the soldiers by this deed was so furious as to menace their safety, and they were forced to permit the marriage of the king with Eurydike.  

1 Diodor. xviii. 23; Arrian, De Rebus Alketas, but gives a somewhat different post Alex. vi. ap. Phot. Cod. 92. explanation of her purpose in passing Diodorus alludes to the murder of Kynanê or Kyna, in another place (xix. 52).  

Compare Polyenus, viii. 60—who mentions the murder of Kynanê by Alketas, but gives a somewhat different about Kynanê, see Duris, Fragm. 24, in Fragment. Hist. Græc. vol. ii. p. 473; Athenæ. xiii. p. 580.
All these intrigues were going on throughout the summer of 322 B.C., while the Lamian war was still effectively prosecuted by the Greeks. About the autumn of the year, Antigonus (called Monophtalmus), the satrap of Phrygia, detected these secret intrigues of Perdikkas, who, for that and other reasons, began to look on him as an enemy, and to plot against his life. Apprised of his danger, Antigonus made his escape from Asia into Europe, to acquaint Antipater and Kraterus with the hostile manoeuvres of Perdikkas; upon which news, the two generals, immediately abandoning the Aetolian war, withdrew their army from Greece for the more important object of counteracting Perdikkas in Asia.

To us, these contests of the Macedonian officers belong only so far as they affect the Greeks. And we see, by the events just noticed, how unpropitious to the Greeks were the turns of fortune, throughout the Lamian war: the grave Ghar, in the interest of Grecian liberty, not for the actual combatants only, but for their posterity also. Until the battle of Kranon and the surrender of Athens, everything fell out so as to relieve Antipater from embarrassment, and impart to him double force. The intrigues of the princesses at Pella, who were well known to hate him, first raised up Leonnatus, next Perdikkas, against him. Had Leonnatus lived, the arm of Antipater would have been at least weakened, if not paralysed; had Perdikkas declared himself earlier, the forces of Antipater must have been withdrawn to oppose him, and the battle of Kranon would probably have had a different issue. As soon as Perdikkas became hostile to Antipater, it was his policy to sustain and seek alliance with the Greeks, as we shall find him presently doing with the Aetolians. Through causes thus purely accidental, Antipater obtained an interval of a few months, during which his hands were not only free, but armed with new and unexpected strength from Leonnatus and Kraterus, to close the Lamian war. The disastrous issue of that war was therefore in great part the effect of casualties, among which we must include the death of Leosthenes himself. Such issue is not

1 The fine lines of Lucan (Phars. vii, 610) on the effects of the battle of Pharsalus, may be cited here:—

Vincitur his gladitis omnis, quae serviet, atax.
Proxima quid sobolea, aut quid meruerit nepotes?

In regnum nam semper? &c.

2 Diodor. viii. 38. 'Antipatrou πέρε' eis tēn 'Aσιαν διαβεβηκότος, Διττωλοὺς τὰς εἰς τὴν Ἀττιλιαν κατὰ τὰς πρὸς Περδίκκαν συν.

τήν ἔστρατους εἰς τὴν Θετικαλαίαν, &c.
to be regarded as proving that the project was desperate or illconceived on the part of its promoters, who had full right to reckon, among the probabilities of their case, the effects of discord between the Macedonian chiefs.

In the spring of 321 B.C., Antipater and Kraterus, having concerted operations with Ptolemy governor of Egypt, crossed into Asia and began their conflict with Perdikkas; who himself, having the kings along with him, marched against Egypt to attack Ptolemy; leaving his brother Alketas, in conjunction with Eumenés as general, to maintain his cause in Kappadokia and Asia Minor. Alketas, discouraged by the adverse feeling of the Macedonians generally, threw up the enterprise as hopeless. But Eumenés, though embarrassed and menaced in every way by the treacherous jealousy of his own Macedonian officers, and by the discontent of the soldiers against him as a Greek—and though compelled to conceal from these soldiers the fact that Kraterus, who was popular among them, commanded on the opposite side—displayed nevertheless so much ability that he gained an important victory, in which both Neoptolemus and Kraterus perished. Neoptolemus was killed by Eumenés with his own hand, after a personal conflict desperate in the extreme and long doubtful, and at the cost of a severe wound to himself. After the victory, he found Kraterus still alive, though expiring from his wound. Deeply afflicted at the sight, he did his utmost to restore the dying man; and when this proved to be impossible, caused his dead body to be honourably shrouded and transmitted into Macedonia for burial.

This new proof of the military ability and vigour of Eumenés, together with the death of two such important officers as Kraterus and Neoptolemus, proved ruinous to the victor himself, without serving the cause in which he fought. Perdikkas his chief did not live to hear of it. That general was so overbearing and tyrannical in his demeanour towards the other officers—and withal so unsuccessful in his first operations against Ptolemy on the Pelusiac branch of the Nile—that his own army mutinied and slew him. His troops

1. Plutarch, Eumenés, 7; Cornel. Nepos, Eumenés, c. 4. Eumenés had trained a body of Asiatic and Thracian cavalry to fight in close combat with the short pike and sword of the Macedonian Companions—relinquishing the javelin, the missiles, and the alternation of charging and retiring, usual to Asiatics.

2. Arrian, ap. Photium, Cod. 92; Justin, xiii, 8; Diodor. xviii. 33.

3. Diodor. xviii. 36.
joined Ptolemy, whose conciliatory behaviour gained their goodwill. Only two days after this revolution, a messenger from Eumenès reached the camp, announcing his victory and the death of Kraterus. Had this intelligence been received by Perdikkas himself at the head of his army, the course of subsequent events might have been sensibly altered. Eumenès would have occupied the most commanding position in Asia, as general of the kings of the Alexandrine family, to whom both his interests and his feelings attached him. But the news arriving, at the moment when it did, caused throughout the army only the most violent exasperation against him; not simply as ally of the odious Perdikkas, but as cause of death to the esteemed Kraterus. He, together with Alketas and fifty officers, was voted by the soldiers a public enemy. No measures were kept with him henceforward by Macedonian officers or soldiers. At the same time several officers attached to Perdikkas in the camp, and also Atalanta his sister, were slain.¹

By the death of Perdikkas, and the defection of his soldiers, complete preponderance was thrown into the hands of Antipater, Ptolemy, and Antigonus. Antipater was invited to join the army, now consisting of the forces both of Ptolemy and Perdikkas united. He was there invested with the guardianship of the persons of the kings, and with the sort of ministerial supremacy previously held by Perdikkas. He was however exposed to much difficulty, and even to great personal danger, from the intrigues of the princess Eurydiké, who displayed a masculine boldness in publicly haranguing the soldiers—and from the discontent of the army, who claimed presents, formerly promised to them by Alexander, which there were no funds to liquidate at the moment. At Triparadisus in Syria, Antipater made a second distribution of the satrapies of the empire; somewhat modified, yet coinciding in the main with that which had been drawn up shortly after the death of Alexander. To Ptolemy was assured Egypt and Libya—to Antigonus, the Greater Phrygia, Lykia, and Pamphylia—as each had had before.²

Antigonus was placed in command of the principal Macedonian army in Asia, to crush Eumenès and the other chief adherents of Perdikkas; most of whom had been condemned to death by a vote of the Macedonian army. After a certain interval, Antipater himself, accompanied by the kings, returned to Macedonia, having eluded by artifice a renewed demand on the part of his soldiers for the promised presents. The war of Antigonus, first against

¹ Plutarch, Eumenès, 8; Cornel. | ² Diodor. xvi. 39. Arrian, ap. Pho- Nepos, Eumenès, 4; Diodor. xvi. 37, 37. tium.
Eumenès in Kappadokia, next against Alketas and the other partisans of Perdikkas in Pisidia, lasted for many months, but was at length successfully finished. Eumenès, beset by the constant treachery and insubordination of the Macedonians, was defeated and driven out of the field. He took refuge with a handful of men in the impregnable and well-stored fortress of Nora in Kappadokia, where he held out a long blockade, apparently more than a year, against Antigonus.

Before the prolonged blockade of Nora had been brought to a close, Antipater, being of very advanced age, fell into sickness, and presently died. One of his latest acts was, to put to death the Athenian orator Demades, who had been sent to Macedonia as envoy to solicit the removal of the Macedonian garrison at Munychia. Antipater had promised, or given hopes, that if the oligarchy which he had constituted at Athens maintained unshaken adherence to Macedonia, he would withdraw the garrison. The Athenians endeavoured to prevail on Phokion to go to Macedonia as solicitor for the fulfilment of this promise; but he steadily refused. Demades, who willingly undertook the mission, reached Macedonia at a moment very untoward for himself. The papers of the deceased Perdikkas had come into possession of his opponents; and among them had been found a letter written to him by Demades, inviting him to cross over and rescue Greece from her dependence "on an old and rotten warp"—meaning Antipater. This letter gave great offence to Antipater—the rather, as Demades is said to have been his habitual pensioner—and still greater offence to his son Kassander; who caused Demades with his son to be seized—first killed the son in the immediate presence and even embrace of the father—and then slew the father himself, with bitter invective against his ingratitude. All the accounts which we read depict Demades, in general terms, as a prodigal spendthrift and a venal and corrupt politician. We have no ground for

1 Arrian, De Rebus post Alexandr. lib. ix. 10. ap. Photium, Cod. 92; Diodor. xviii. 39, 40, 46; Plutarch, Eumenès, 3, 4.
2 Plutarch, Eumenès, 10, 11; Cornel. Nepos, Eumenès, c. 5; Diodor. xviii. 41.
3 Plutarch, Phokion, 30; Diodor. xviii. 43; Plutarch, Demosth. 31.

In the life of Phokion, Plutarch has written inadvertently Antigonus instead of Perdikkas.

It is not easy to see, however, how Deinarchus can have been the accuser of Demades on such a matter—as Arrian and Plutarch state. Arrian seems to put the death of Demades too early, from his anxiety to bring it into immediate juxtaposition with the death of Demosthenes, whose condemnation Demades had proposed in the Athenian assembly.
questioning this statement: at the same time we have no specific facts to prove it.

Antipater by his last directions appointed Polysperchon, one of Alexander's veteran officers, to be chief administrator, with full powers on behalf of the imperial dynasty; while he assigned to his own son Kassander only the second place, as Chiliarch or general of the body-guard. He thought that this disposition of power would be more generally acceptable throughout the empire, as Polysperchon was older and of longer military service than any other among Alexander's generals. Moreover, Antipater was especially afraid of letting dominion fall into the hands of the princesses; all of whom—Olympias, Kleopatra, and Furrydike—were energetic characters; and the first of the three (who had retired to Epirus from enmity towards Antipater) furious and implacable.

But the views of Antipater were disappointed from the beginning, because Kassander would not submit to the second place, nor tolerate Polysperchon as his superior. Immediately after the death of Antipater, but before it became publicly known, Kassander despatched Nikanor with pretended orders from Antipater to supersede Menyllus in the government of Munychia. To this order Menyllus yielded. But when after a few days the Athenian public came to learn the real truth, they were displeased with Phokion for having permitted the change to be made—assuming that he knew the real state of the facts, and might have kept out the new commander. Kassander, while securing this important post in the hands of a confirmed partisan, affected to acquiesce in the authority of Polysperchon, and to occupy himself with a hunting-party in the country. He at the same time sent confidential adherents to the Hellespont and other places in furtherance of his schemes; and especially to contract alliance with Antigonus in Asia and with Ptolemy in Egypt. His envoys being generally well received, he himself soon quitted Macedonia suddenly, and went to concert measures with Antigonus in Asia. It suited the policy of Ptolemy, and still more that of Antigonus, to aid him against Polysperchon and the imperial dynasty. On the death of Antipater, Antigonus had resolved to make himself the real sove-

1 Diod. xviii. 48.
2 Diod. xix. 11.
3 Plutarch, Phokion, 31. Diodorus
4 Diodor. xvii. 54.
reign of the Asiatic Alexandrine empire, possessing as he did the most powerful military force within it.

Even before this time the imperial dynasty had been a name rather than a reality; yet still a respected name. But now, the preference shown to Polysperchon by the deceased Antipater, and the secession of Kassander, placed all the great real powers in active hostility against the dynasty. Polysperchon and his friends were not blind to the difficulties of their position. The principal officers in Macedonia having been convened to deliberate, it was resolved to invite Olympias out of Epirus, that she might assume the tutelage of her grandson Alexander (son of Roxana)—to place the Asiatic interests of the dynasty in the hands of Eumenès, appointing him to the supreme command—and to combat Kassander in Europe, by assuring to themselves the general goodwill and support of the Greeks. This last object was to be obtained by granting to the Greeks general enfranchisement, and by subverting the Antipatian oligarchies and military governments now paramount throughout the cities.

The last hope of maintaining the unity of Alexander's empire in Asia, against the counter-interests of the great Macedonian officers, who were steadily tending to divide and appropriate it—now lay in the fidelity and military skill of Eumenès. At his disposal Polysperchon placed the imperial treasures and soldiers in Asia; especially the brave, but faithless and disorderly, Argyraspides. Olympias also addressed to him a pathetic letter, asking his counsel as the only friend and saviour to whom the imperial family could now look. Eumenès replied by assuring them of his devoted adherence to their cause. But he at the same time advised Olympias not to come out of Epirus into Macedonia; or if she did come, at all events to abstain from vindictive and cruel proceedings. Both these recommendations, honourable as well to his prudence as to his humanity, were disregarded by the old queen. She came into Macedonia to take the management of affairs; and although her imposing title, of mother to the great conqueror, raised a strong favourable feeling, yet her multiplied executions of the Antipatian partisans excited fatal enmity against a dynasty already tottering. Nevertheless Eumenès, though his advice had been disregarded, devoted himself in Asia with unshaken fidelity to the Alexandrine family, resisting the most

1 Diodor. xviii. 49-58.
tempting invitations to take part with Antigonus against them. His example contributed much to keep alive the same active sentiment in those around him; indeed, without him, the imperial family would have had no sincere or commanding representative in Asia. His gallant struggles, first in Kilikia and Phenicia, next (when driven from the coast), in Susiana, Persis, Media, and Parzatakene—continued for two years against the greatly preponderant forces of Ptolemy, Antigonus, and Seleukus, and against the never-ceasing treachery of his own officers and troops. They do not belong to Grecian history. They are however among the most memorable exploits of antiquity. While, even in a military point of view, they are hardly inferior to the combinations of Alexander himself—they evince, besides, a flexibility and aptitude such as Alexander neither possessed nor required, for overcoming the thousand difficulties raised by traitors and mutineers around him. To the last, Eumenés remained unsubdued. He was betrayed to Antigonus by the base and venal treachery of his own soldiers, the Macedonian Argyraspides.

For the interests of the imperial dynasty (the extinction of which we shall presently follow), it is perhaps to be regretted that they did not abandon Asia at once, at the death of Antipater, and concentrate their attention on Macedonia alone, summoning over

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1 Plutarch, Eumenés, 11, 12; Cornelius Nepos, Eumenés, c. 6; Diodor. xvii. 58-62.
2 Diodor. xvii. 58. ἤκε δὲ καὶ παρ᾽ Ὀλυμπιάδος αὐτῷ γράμματα, δευμένης καὶ λεπαρούσης βοηθεῖν τοῖς βασιλεύσι καὶ εὐφράτου τῶν φίλων, καὶ δυνάμεων ἀπολελείφασθαι τὸν ἥρωα τῆς βασιλείας oikias.


The details respecting Eumenés may be considered probably as depending on unusually good authority. His friend Hieronymus of Kardia had written a copious history of his own time; which, though now lost, was accessible both to Diodorus and Plutarch. Hieronymus was serving with Eumenés, and was taken prisoner along with him by Antigonus; who spared him and treated him well, while Eumenés was put to death (Diodor. xix. 44). Plutarch had also read letters of Eumenés (Plut. Eum. 11).

* Diodor. xviii. 63-74; xix. 11, 17, 32, 44.
* Plutarch (Rumenes, 16-18), Cornelius Nepos (10-13), and Justin (xiv. 3, 4) describe in considerable detail the touching circumstances attending the tradition and capture of Eumenés. On this point Diodorus is more brief; but he recounts at much length the preceding military operations between Eumenés and Antigonus (xix. 17, 32, 44).

The original source of these particulars must probably be, the history of Hieronymus of Kardia, himself present, who has been copied, more or less accurately, by others.
Eumenès to aid them. To keep together in unity the vast aggregate of Asia was manifestly impracticable, even with his consummate ability. Indeed we read that Olympias wished for his presence in Europe, not trusting any one but him as protector of the child Alexander. ¹ In Macedonia, apart from Asia, Eumenès, if the violent temper of Olympias had permitted him, might have upheld the dynasty; which, having at that time a decided interest in conciliating the Greeks, might probably have sanctioned his sympathies in favour of free Hellenic community. ²

On learning the death of Antipater, most of the Greek cities had sent envoys to Pella. ³ To all the governments of these cities, composed as they were of his creatures, it was a matter of the utmost moment to know what course the new Macedonian authority would adopt. Polysperchon, persuaded that they would all adhere to Kassander, and that his only chance of combating that rival was by enlisting popular sympathy and interests in Greece, or at least by subverting these Antipatrian oligarchies—drew up in conjunction with his counsellors a proclamation which he issued in the name of the dynasty.

After reciting the steady goodwill of Philip and Alexander towards Greece, he affirmed that this feeling had been interrupted by the untoward Lamian war, originating with some ill-judged Greeks, and ending in the infliction of many severe calamities upon the various cities. But all these severities (he continued) had proceeded from the generals (Antipater and Kraterus): the kings were now determined to redress them. It was accordingly proclaimed that the political constitution of each city should be restored, as it had stood in the times of Philip and Alexander; that before the thirtieth of the month Xanthikus, all those who had been condemned to banishment, or deported, by the generals, should be recalled and received back; that their properties should be restored, and past sentences against them rescinded; that they should live in amnesty as to the past, and good feeling as to the future, with the remaining citizens. From this act of recall were excluded, the exiles of Amphissa, Trikka, Pharkadon, and Herakleia, together with a certain number of Megalopolitans, implicated in one particular conspiracy. In the particular case of those cities, the governments of which had been denounced as hostile by Philip

¹ Plutarch, Eumenès, 13; Diodor, xvi. 58.
² Plutarch, Eumenès, 3.
³ Diodor, xxiv. 55. εἶδεν οὖν τὸν ἀντὶ τῶν πόλεων παρόντας προσβεντας προσκαλεσάμενοι, &c.
or Alexander, special reference and consultation was opened with Pella, for some modification to meet the circumstances. As to Athens, it was decreed that Samos should be restored to her, but not Orépus; in all other respects she was placed on the same footing as in the days of Philip and Alexander. “All the Greeks (concluded this proclamation) shall pass decrees, forbidding every one either to bear arms or otherwise act in hostility against us—on pain of exile and confiscation of goods, for himself and his family. On this and on all other matters, we have ordered Polysperchon to take proper measures. Obey him—as we have before written to you to do; for we shall not omit to notice those who on any point disregard our proclamation.”

Such was the new edict issued by the kings, or rather by Polysperchon in their names. It directed the removal of all the garrisons, and the subversion of all the oligarchies, established by Antipater after the Lamian war. It ordered the recall of the host of exiles then expelled. It revived the state of things prevalent before the death of Alexander—which indeed itself had been, for the most part, an aggregate of macedonizing oligarchies interspersed with Macedonian garrisons. To the existing Antipatran oligarchies, however, it was a deathblow; and so it must have been understood by the Grecian envoys—including probably deputations from the exiles, as well as envoys from the civic governments—to whom Polysperchon delivered it at Pella.

Not content with the general edict, Polysperchon addressed special letters to Argos and various other cities, commanding that the Antipatran leading men should be banished with confiscation of property, and in some cases put to death; the names being probably furnished to him by the exiles. Lastly, as it was clear that such stringent measures could not be executed without force,—the rather as these oligarchies would be upheld by Kassander from without—Polysperchon resolved to conduct a large military force into Greece; sending thither first, however, a considerable detachment, for immediate operations, under his son Alexander.

To Athens; as well as to other cities, Polysperchon addressed

1 Diodor. xviii. 56. In this chapter the proclamation is given verbatim. For the exceptions made in respect to Amphissa, Trikka, Herakleia, &c., we do not know the grounds.

Reference is made to prior edicts of the kings—ὅκειτ ὅν, καθαρός ἤτις καὶ πρῶτον ἐγραφάμει, ἀκούετε τοῦτον (Πολυσπέρχοντος). Those words must allude to written answers given to particular cities, in reply to special applications. No general proclamation, earlier than this, can have been issued since the death of Antipater.

Diod. xviii. 57.
special letters, promising restoration of the democracy and recall of the exiles. At Athens, such change was a greater revolution than elsewhere, because the multitude of exiles and persons deported had been the greatest. To the existing nine thousand Athenian citizens, it was doubtless odious and alarming; while to Phokion with the other leading Antipatriots, it threatened not only loss of power, but probably nothing less than the alternative of flight or death. The state of interests at Athens, however, was now singularly novel and complicated. There were the Antipatriots and the nine thousand qualified citizens. There were the exiles, who, under the new edict, speedily began re-entering the city, and reclaiming their citizenship as well as their properties. Polysperchon and his son were known to be soon coming with a powerful force. Lastly, there was Nikanor, who held Munychia with a garrison, neither for Polysperchon, nor for the Athenians, but for Kassander; the latter being himself also expected with a force from Asia. Here then were several parties; each distinct in views and interests from the rest—some decidedly hostile to each other.

The first contest arose between the Athenians and Nikanor respecting Munychia; which they required him to evacuate, pursuant to the recent proclamation. Nikanor on his side returned an evasive answer, promising compliance as soon as circumstances permitted, but in the mean time entreating the Athenians to continue in alliance with Kassander, as they had been with his father Antipater. He seems to have indulged hopes of prevailing on them to declare in his favour—and not without plausible grounds, since the Antipatriot leaders and a large proportion of the nine thousand citizens could not but dread the execution of Polysperchon’s edict. And he had also, what was of still greater moment—the secret connivance and support of Phokion: who put himself in intimate relation with Nikanor, as he had before done with Menyllus—and who had greater reason than any one else to dread the edict of Polysperchon. At a public assembly held in Peiraeus to discuss the subject, Nikanor even ventured to present himself in person in the company and under the introduction of Phokion, who was everywhere, and that Phokion was the leading person of that oligarchy at Athens.

1 Plutarch, Phokion, 32. The opinion of Plutarch, however, that Polysperchon intended this measure as a mere trick to ruin Phokion, is only correct so far—that Polysperchon wished to put down the Antipatriot oligarchies everywhere, and that Phokion was the leading person of that oligarchy at Athens.

2 Diodor, xviii. 64.

3 Plutarch, Phokion, 31.
anxious that the Athenians should entertain the proposition of alliance with Kassander. But with the people, the prominent wish was to get rid altogether of the foreign garrison, and to procure the evacuation of Munychia—for which object, of course, the returned exiles would be even more anxious than the nine thousand. Accordingly, the assembly refused to hear any propositions from Nikanor; while Derkyllus with others even proposed to seize his person. It was Phokion who ensured to him the means of escaping; even in spite of serious wrath from his fellow-citizens, to whom he pleaded, that he had made himself guarantee for Nikanor's personal safety.1

Foreseeing the gravity of the impending contest, Nikanor had been secretly introducing fresh soldiers into Munychia. And when he found that he could not obtain any declared support from the Athenians, he laid a scheme for surprising and occupying the town and harbour of Peiræus, of which Munychia formed the adjoining eminence and harbour on the southern side of the little peninsula. Notwithstanding all his precautions, it became known to various Athenians that he was tampering with persons in Peiræus, and collecting troops in the neighbouring isle of Salamis. So much anxiety was expressed in the Athenian assembly for the safety of Peiræus, that a decree was passed, enjoining all citizens to hold themselves in arms for its protection, under Phokion as general.

Nevertheless Phokion, disregarding such a decree, took no precautions, affirming that he would himself be answerable for Nikanor. Presently that officer, making an unexpected attack from Munychia and Salamis, took Peiræus by surprise, placed both the town and harbour under military occupation, and cut off its communication with Athens by a ditch and palisade. On this palpable aggression, the Athenians rushed to arms. But Phokion as general damped their ardour, and even declined to head them in an attack for the recovery of Peiræus before Nikanor should have had time to strengthen himself in it. He went however, with Konon (son of Timotheus), to remonstrate with Nikanor, and to renew the demand that he should evacuate, under the recent proclamation, all the posts which he held in garrison. But Nikanor would give no other answer, except that he held his commission from Kassander, to whom they must address their application.2

He thus again tried to bring Athens into communication with Kassander.

1 Plutarch, Phokion, 33.
2 Diodorus, xviii. 64; Plutarch, Phokion, 32; Cornelius Nepos, Phokion, 2.
The occupation of Peiræus in addition to Munychia was a serious calamity to the Athenians, making them worse off than they had been even under Antipater. Peiræus, rich, active, and commercial, containing the Athenian arsenal, docks, and muniments of war, was in many respects more valuable than Athens itself; for all purposes of war, far more valuable. Kassander had now an excellent place of arms, and base, which Munychia alone would not have afforded, for his operations in Greece against Polysperchon; upon whom therefore the loss fell hardly less severely than upon the Athenians. Now Phokion, in his function as general, had been forewarned of the danger, might have guarded against it, and ought to have done so. This was a grave dereliction of duty, and admits of hardly any other explanation except that of treasonable connivance. It seems that Phokion, foreseeing his own ruin and that of his friends in the triumph of Polysperchon and the return of the exiles, was desirous of favouring the seizure of Peiræus by Nikanor, as a means of constraining Athens to adopt the alliance with Kassander; which alliance indeed would probably have been brought about, had Kassander reached Peiræus by sea sooner than the first troops of Polysperchon by land. Phokion was here guilty, at the very least, of culpable neglect, and probably of still more culpable treason, on an occasion seriously injuring both Polysperchon and the Athenians; a fact which we must not forget, when we come to read presently the bitter animosity exhibited against him.¹

The news, that Nikanor had possessed himself of Peiræus, produced a strong sensation. Presently arrived a letter addressed to him by Olympias herself, commanding him to surrender the place to the Athenians, upon whom she wished to confer entire autonomy. But Nikanor declined obedience to her order, still waiting for support from Kassander. The arrival of Alexander (Polysperchon's son) with a body of troops, encouraged the Athenians to believe that he was come to assist in carrying Peiræus by force.

¹ Cornelius Nepos, Phokion, 2. "Concedit autem maxime uno crimine: quod cum spum eum summum caset imperium populi, et Nicanderum, Cassandri prefectum, insidiari Pirco Atheniensium, a Derchilo moventur: idemque postularet, ut provideret, ne commissibus civitas privaretur—huile, audien'se populio, Phokion negavit esse periculum, sequa ejus rei obсидem fore pollicitas est. Neque ita multo post Nicander Pirco est potitus. Ad quem recuperandum eum populos armatus concurreret, ille non modo neminem ad armas vocavit, sed ne armatis quidem processe voluit, sine quo Athenae omnino esse non possunt."
for the purpose of restoring it to them. Their hopes however were again disappointed. Though encamped near Peireus, Alexander made no demand for the Athenian forces to cooperate with him in attacking it; but entered into open parley with Nikanor, whom he endeavoured to persuade or corrupt into surrendering the place. When this negotiation failed, he resolved to wait for the arrival of his father, who was already on his march towards Attica with the main army. His own force unassisted was probably not sufficient to attack Peireus; nor did he choose to invoke assistance from the Athenians, to whom he would then have been compelled to make over the place when taken, which they so ardently desired. The Athenians were thus as far from their object as ever; moreover, by this delay the opportunity of attacking the place was altogether thrown away; for Kassander with his armament reached it before Polysperchon.

It was Phokion and his immediate colleagues who induced Alexander to adopt this insidious policy; to decline reconquering Peireus for the Athenians, and to appropriate it for himself. To Phokion, the reconstitution of autonomous Athens, with its democracy and restored exiles, and without any foreign controlling force—was an assured sentence of Alexander against the Athenians, not having been able to obtain protection from the foreign force of Nikanor and Kassander, he and his friends resolved to throw themselves upon that of Alexander and Polysperchon. They went to meet Alexander as he entered Attica—represented the impolicy of his relinquishing so important a military position as Peiraus, while the war was yet unfinished,—and offered to cooperate with him for this purpose, by proper management of the Athenian public. Alexander was pleased with these suggestions, accepted Phokion with the others as his leading adherents at Athens, and looked upon Peiraus as a capture to be secured for himself. Numerous returning Athenian exiles accompanied Alexander's army. It seems that Phokion was desirous of admitting the troops, along with the exiles, as friends and allies within the walls of Athens, so as to make Alexander master of the city—but that this project was impracticable, in consequence of the mistrust created among the Athenians by the parleys of Alexander with Nikanor.

1 Diodor, xviii, 65; Plutarch, Phokion, 33.
2 Diodor, xviii, 65. Τῶν γὰρ Ἀντιπάρων ἠγγειαρὸν φίλων τοὺς (ὑπήρχον) καὶ οἱ περὶ Φωκίωνα φοβούντοι μὲνοι τὰς ἐκ τῶν νόμων τιμωρίας ἵνα ἐνέπηρεν Ἀλεξάνδρου, καὶ διδάκτος τῷ συμφέρον, ἔπεισαν αὐτὸν ἵνα καταπολέμῃ τὰ φρουρία, καὶ μὴ παραδίδοναι τρίτα Αθηναίοις, μεχρὶ δὲν ὁ Ἀθανάθηρος καταπαλαίκησον.
3 Plutarch, Phokion, 33; Diod. xviii.
The strategic function of Phokion, however, so often conferred and re-conferred upon him—and his power of doing either good or evil—now approached its close. As soon as the returning exiles found themselves in sufficient numbers, they called for a revision of the list of state-officers, and for the re-establishment of the democratical forms. They passed a vote to depose those who had held office under the Antipatian oligarchy, and who still continued to hold it down to the actual moment. Among these Phokion stood first: along with him were his son-in-law Chariklès, the Phalerean Demetrius, Kallimédon, Nikoklès, Thudippus, Hegemon, and Philoklès. These persons were not only deposed, but condemned, some to death, some to banishment and confiscation of property. Demetrius, Chariklès, and Kallimédon sought safety by leaving Attica; but Phokion and the rest merely went to Alexander's camp, throwing themselves upon his protection on the faith of the recent understanding. Alexander not only received them courteously, but gave them letters to his father Polysperchon, requesting safety and protection for them, as men who had embraced his cause, and who were still eager to do all in their power to support him. Armed with these letters, Phokion and his companions went through Bœotia and Phokis to meet Polysperchon on his march southward. They were accompanied by Deinarchus and by a Platean named Solon, both of them passing for friends of Polysperchon.

The Athenian democracy, just reconstituted, which had passed the recent condemnatory votes, was disquieted at the news that Alexander had espoused the cause of Phokion and had recommended the like policy to his father. It was possible that Poly-
Phokion might seek, with his powerful army, both to occupy Athens and to capture Peiraeus, and might avail himself of Phokion (like Antipater after the Lamian war) as a convenient instrument of government. It seems plain that this was the project of Alexander, and that he counted on Phokion as a ready auxiliary in both. Now the restored democrats, though owing their restoration to Polysperchon, were much less compliant towards him than Phokion had been. Not only they would not admit him into the city, but they would not even acquiesce in his separate occupation of Munychia and Peiraeus. On the proposition of Agnonides and Archestratus, they sent a deputation to Polysperchon accusing Phokion and his comrades of high treason; yet at the same time claiming for Athens the full undiminished benefit of the late regal proclamation—autonomy and democracy, with restoration of Peiraeus and Munychia free and ungarrisoned.

The deputation reached Polysperchon at Pharyges in Phokis, as early as Phokion's company, which had been detained for some days at Elateia by the sickness of Deinarchus. That delay was unfortunate for Phokion; had he seen Polysperchon, and presented the letter of Alexander, before the Athenian accusers arrived, he might probably have obtained a more favourable reception. But as the arrival of the two parties was nearly simultaneous, Polysperchon heard both of them at the same audience, before King Philip Aridaeus in his throne with the gilt ceiling above it.

When Agnonides—chief of the Athenian deputation, and formerly friend and advocate of Demosthenes in the Harpalian cause—found himself face to face with Phokion and his friends, their reciprocal invectives at first produced nothing but confusion; until Agnonides himself exclaimed—"Pack us all into one cage and send us back to Athens to receive judgement from the Athenians." The king laughed at this observation, but the bystanders around insisted upon more orderly proceedings, and Agnonides then set forth the two demands of the Athenians—condemnation of Phokion and his friends, partly as accomplices of Antipater, partly as having betrayed Peiraeus to Nikanor—and the full benefit of the late regal proclamation to Athens. Now, on the last of these two heads,

1 Diodor. xviii. 66.
2 Plutarch, Phokion, 33; Cornel. Nepos, Phokion, 3. "Hic (Phokion), ab Agnonide accusatus, quod Pireum Nicanor prodidisset, ex consiliis sententia, in custodiae conjunctus, Athenas deductus est, ut, ibi de eo legisbus fieret judicium." Plutarch says that Polysperchon, before he gave this hearing to both
Polysperchon was noway disposed to yield—nor to hand over Peireus to the Athenians as soon as he should take it. On this matter, accordingly, he replied by refusal or evasion. But he was all the more disposed to satisfy the Athenians on the other matter—the surrender of Phokion; especially as the sentiment now prevalent at Athens evinced clearly that Phokion could not be again useful to him as an instrument. Thus disposed to sacrifice Phokion, Polysperchon heard his defence with impatience, interrupted him several times, and so disgusted him, that he at length struck the ground with his stick, and held his peace. Hegemon, another of the accused, was yet more harshly treated. When he appealed to Polysperchon himself, as having been personally cognizant of his (the speaker's) good dispositions towards the Athenian people (he had been probably sent to Pella, as envoy for redress of grievances under the Antipatric oligarchy), Polysperchon exclaimed—"Do not utter falsehoods against me before the king." Moreover, king Philip himself was so incensed, as to start from his throne and snatch his spear; with which he would have run Hegemon through,—imitating the worst impulses of his illustrious brother—had he not been held back by Polysperchon. The sentence could not be doubtful. Phokion and his companions were delivered over as prisoners to the Athenian deputation, together with a letter from the king, intimating that in his conviction they were traitors, but that he left them to be judged by the Athenians, now restored to freedom and autonomy.1

The Macedonian Kleitus was instructed to convey them to Athens as prisoners under a guard. Mournful was the spectacle as they entered the city; being carried along the Kerameikus in carts, through sympathising friends and an embittered multitude, until they reached the theatre, wherein the assembly was to be convened. That assembly was composed of every one who chose to enter, and is said to have contained many foreigners and slaves. But it would have been fortunate for Phokion had such really been the case; for foreigners and slaves had no cause of antipathy towards him. The assembly was mainly composed of parties, ordered the Corinthian Deinarchus to be tortured and to be put to death. Now the person so named cannot be Deinarchus, the logographer—of whom we have some specimens remaining, and who was alive even as late as 293 B.C.—though he too was a Corinthian. Either, therefore, there were two Corinthians, both bearing this same name (as Westermann supposes—Gesch. der Boretsamkeit, sect. 72), or the statement of Plutarch must allude to an order given, but not carried into effect—which latter seems to me most probable.

1 Plutarch, Phokion, 33, 34; Diodor. xviii. 66.
Phokion’s keenest enemies, the citizens just returned from exile or deportation; among whom may doubtless have been intermixed more or less of non-qualified persons, since the lists had probably not yet been verified. When the assembly was about to be opened, the friends of Phokion moved, that on occasion of so important a trial, foreigners and slaves should be sent away. This was in every sense an impolitic proceeding; for the restored exiles, chiefly poor men, took it as an insult to themselves, and became only the more embittered, proclaiming against the oligarchs who were trying to exclude them.

It is not easy to conceive stronger grounds of exasperation than those which inflamed the bosoms of these returned exiles. We must recollect that at the close of the Lamian war, the Athenian democracy had been forcibly subverted. Demosthenes and its principal leaders had been slain, some of them with antecedent cruelties; the poorer multitude, in number more than half of the qualified citizens, had been banished or deported into distant regions. To all the public shame and calamity, there was thus superadded a vast mass of individual suffering and impoverishment, the mischiefs of which were very imperfectly healed, even by that unexpected contingency which had again thrown open to them their native city. Accordingly, when these men returned from different regions, each hearing from the rest new tales of past hardship, they felt the bitterest hatred against the authors of the Antipatrian revolution; and among these authors Phokion stood distinctly marked. For although he had neither originated nor advised these severities, yet he and his friends, as administering the Antipatrian government at Athens, must have been agents in carrying them out, and had rendered themselves distinctly liable to the fearful penalties pronounced by the psephism of Demophantus, consecrated by an oath taken by Athenians generally, against any one who should hold an official post after the government was subverted.

When these restored citizens thus saw Phokion brought before them, for the first time after their return, the common feeling of antipathy against him burst out, in furious manifestations. Agnonides the principal accuser, supported by Epikurus and Demophilus, found their denunciations welcomed and even anticipated, when they arraigned Phokion as a criminal who had lent his hand.

Andokides de Mysteriis, sect. 96; Lykurgus adv. Leokrat, s. 127.

Not the eminent philosopher so named.
to the subversion of the constitution,—to the sufferings of his deported fellow-citizens,—and to the holding of Athens in subjection under a foreign potentate; in addition to which, the betrayal of Peiræus to Nikanor\(^1\) constituted a new crime; fastening on the people the yoke of Kassander, when autonomy had been promised to them by the recent imperial edict. After the accusation was concluded, Phokion was called on for his defence; but he found it impossible to obtain a hearing. Attempting several times to speak, he was as often interrupted by angry shouts; several of his friends were cried down in like manner; until at length he gave up the case in despair; and exclaimed, "For myself, Athenians, I plead guilty; I pronounce against myself the sentence of death for my political conduct: but why are you to sentence these men near me, who are not guilty?" "Because they are your friends, Phokion"—was the exclamation of those around. Phokion then said no more; while Agnonidès proposed a decree, to the effect, that the assembled people should decide by show of hands, whether the persons now arraigned were guilty or not; and that if declared guilty, they should be put to death. Some persons present cried out, that the penalty of torture ought to precede death; but this savage proposition, utterly at variance with Athenian law in respect to citizens, was repudiated not less by Agnonidès than by the Macedonian officer Kleitus. The decree was then passed; after which the show of hands was called for. Nearly every hand in the assembly was held up in condemnation; each man even rose from his seat to make the effect more imposing; and some went so far as to put on wreaths in token of triumph. To many of them doubtless, the gratification of this intense and unanimous vindictive impulse,—in their view not merely legitimate, but patriotic,—must have been among the happiest moments of life.\(^2\)

After sentence, the five condemned persons, Phokion, Nikoklès, Thudippus, Hegemon, and Pythoklès, were consigned to and his the supreme magistrates of Police, called The Eleven, and led to prison for the purpose of having the customary dose of poison administered. Hostile bystanders ran alongside, taunting and reviling them. It is even said that one man planted himself in the front, and spat upon Phokion; who

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\(^1\) Cornel. Nepos, Phok. 4. "Plurimi senectute steterat."
\(^2\) Diodor. xviii. 66, 67; Plutarch, Deisid. 60. 67; Plutarch, Thucyd. 34, 35; Cornelius Nepos, quad adversus populi commoda in Phokion, 2, 3.
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turned to the public officers and exclaimed—"Will no one check this indecent fellow?" This was the only emotion which he manifested; in other respects, his tranquillity and self-possession were resolutely maintained, during this soul-subduing march from the theatre to the prison, amidst the wailings of his friends, the broken spirit of his four comrades, and the fiercest demonstrations of antipathy from his fellow-citizens generally. One ray of comfort presented itself as he entered the prison. It was the nineteenth of the month Munychion, the day on which the Athenian Horsemen or Knights (the richest class in the city, men for the most part of oligarchical sentiments) celebrated their festal procession with wreaths on their heads in honour of Zeus. Several of these horsemen halted in passing, took off their wreaths, and wept as they looked through the gratings of the prison.

Being asked whether he had anything to tell his son Phokus, Phokion replied—"I tell him emphatically, not to hold memory of the Athenians." The draught of hemlock was then administered to all five—to Phokion last. Having been condemned for treason, they were not buried in Attica; nor were Phokion's friends allowed to light a funeral pile for the burning of his body; which was carried out of Attica into the Megarid, by a hired agent named Konopion, and there burnt by fire obtained at Megara. The wife of Phokion, with her maids, poured libations and marked the spot by a small mound of earth; she also collected the bones and brought them back to Athens in her bosom, during the secrecy of night. She buried them near her own domestic hearth, with this address—"Beloved Hestia, I confide to thee these relics of a good man. Restore them to his own family vault, as soon as the Athenians shall come to their senses." 1

1 Plutarch, Phokion, 36, 37. Two other anecdotes are recounted by Plutarch, which seem to be of doubtful authenticity. Nikoklés entreated that he might be allowed to swallow his potion before Phokion; upon which the latter replied—"Your request, Nikoklés, is sad and mournful; but as I have never yet refused you anything throughout my life, I grant this also." After the four first had drunk, all except Phokion, no more hemlock was left; upon which the gaoler said that he would not prepare any more, unless twelve drachmas of money were given to him to buy the material. Some hesitation took place, until Phokion asked one of his friends to supply the money, sarcastically remarking, that it was hard if a man could not even die gratis at Athens. As to the first of these anecdotes—if we read, in Plato's Phaedon (152-155), the details of the death of Sokratés,—we shall see that death by hemlock was not caused instantaneously, but in a gradual and painless manner; the person who had swallowed the potion being desired to walk about for some time, until his legs grew heavy, and then to lie down in bed, after which he gradually chilled and became insensible, first in the extremities, next in the vital centres. Under these circumstances, the question—which of the persons condemned should swallow the
After a short time (we are told by Plutarch) the Athenians did thus come to their senses. They discovered that Phokion had been a faithful and excellent public servant, repented of their severity towards him, celebrated his funeral obsequies at the public expense, erected a statue in his honour, and put to death Agnonidés by public judicial sentence; while Epikurus and Demophilus fled from the city and were slain by Phokion’s son.1

These facts are ostensibly correct; but Plutarch omits to notice the real explanation of them. Within two or three months after the death of Phokion, Kassander, already in possession of Peiræus and Munychia, became also master of Athens; the oligarchical or Phokionic party again acquired predominance; Demetrius the Phalerean was recalled from exile, and placed to administer the city under Kassander, as Phokion had administered it under Antipater.

No wonder, that under such circumstances, the memory of Phokion should be honoured. But this is a very different thing from spontaneous change of popular opinion respecting him. I see no reason why such change of opinion should have occurred, nor do I believe that it did occur. The Dēmos of Athens, banished and deported in mass, had the best ground for hating Phokion, and were not likely to become ashamed of the feeling. Though he was personally mild and incorruptible, they derived no benefit from these virtues. To them it was of little moment that he should steadily refuse all presents from Antipater, when he did Antipater’s work gratuitously. Considered as a judicial trial, the last scene of Phokion before the people in the theatre is nothing better than a cruel imposture; considered as a manifestation of public opinion already settled, it is one for which the facts of the past supplied ample warrant.

first of the five potions—could be of very little moment. Then, as to the alleged niggardly stock of hemlock in the Athenian prison—what would have been the alternative, if Phokion’s friend had not furnished the twelve drachmas? Would he have remained in confinement, without being put to death? Certainly not; for he was under capital sentence. Would he have been put to death by the sword or some other unexpensive instrument? This is at variance with the analogy of Athenian practice. If there be any truth in the story, we must suppose that the Eleven had allotted to this gaoler a stock of hemlock (or the price thereof) really adequate to five potions, but that he by accident or awkwardness had wasted a part of it, so that it would have been necessary for him to supply the deficiency out of his own pocket. From this embarrassment he was rescued by Phokion and his friend; and Phokion’s sarcasm touches upon the strangeness of a man being called upon to pay for his own execution.

1 Plutarch, Phokion, 38.
We cannot indeed read without painful sympathy the narrative of an old man above eighty,—personally brave, mild, and superior to all pecuniary temptation, so far as his positive administration was concerned,—perishing under an intense and crushing storm of popular execration. But when we look at the whole case—when we survey, not merely the details of Phokion's administration, but the grand public objects which those details subserved, and towards which he conducted his fellow-citizens—we shall see that this judgement is fully merited. In Phokion's patriotism—for so doubtless he himself sincerely conceived it—no account was taken of Athenian independence; of the autonomy or self-management of the Hellenic world; of the conditions, in reference to foreign kings, under which alone such autonomy could exist. He had neither the Pan-hellenic sentiment of Aristides, Callikratidas, and Demosthenes—nor the narrower Athenian sentiment, like the devotion of Agesilæus to Sparta, and of Epaminondas to Thebes. To Phokion it was indifferent whether Greece was an aggregate of autonomous cities, with Athens as first or second among them—or one of the satrapies under the Macedonian kings. Now this was among the most fatal defects of a Grecian public man. The sentiment in which Phokion was wanting, lay at the bottom of all those splendid achievements which have given to Greece a substantive and preeminent place in the history of the world. Had Themistokles, Aristides, and Leonidas resembled him, Greece would have passed quietly under the dominion of Persia. The brilliant, though chequered, century and more of independent polities which succeeded the repulse of Xerxes would never have occurred. It was precisely during the fifty years of Phokion's political and military influence, that the Greeks were degraded from a state of freedom, and Athens from ascendency as well as freedom, into absolute servitude. Insofar as this great public misfortune can be imputed to any one man—to no one was it more ascribable than to Phokion. He was stratēgos during most of the long series of years when Philip's power was growing; it was his duty to look ahead for the safety of his countrymen, and to combat the yet immature giant. He heard the warnings of Demosthenes, and he possessed exactly those qualities which were wanting to Demosthenes—military energy and aptitude. Had he lent his influence to inform the short-sightedness, to stimulate the inertia, to direct the armed efforts, of his countrymen, the kings of Macedon might have been kept within their own limits, and the future history of Greece
might have been altogether different. Unfortunately, he took the opposite side. He acted with Aeschinés and the philippizers; without receiving money from Philip, he did gratuitously all that Philip desired—by nullifying and sneering down the efforts of Demosthenés and the other active politicians. After the battle of Chaeroneia, Phokion received from Philip first, and from Alexander afterwards, marks of esteem not shown towards any other Athenian. This was both the fruit and the proof of his past political action—anti-Hellenic as well as anti-Athenian. Having done much, in the earlier part of his life, to promote the subjugation of Greece under the Macedonian kings, he contributed somewhat, during the latter half, to lighten the severity of their dominion; and it is the most honourable point in his character that he always refrained from abusing their marked favour towards himself, for purposes either of personal gain or of oppression over his fellow-citizens. Alexander not only wrote letters to him, even during the plenitude of imperial power, in terms of respectful friendship, but tendered to him the largest presents—at one time the sum of 100 talents, at another time the choice of four towns on the coast of Asia Minor, as Xerxes gave to Themistokles. He even expressed his displeasure when Phokion, refusing everything, consented only to request the liberation of three Grecian prisoners confined at Sardis.

The Lamian war, and its consequences, were Phokion's ruin. He continued at Athens, throughout that war, freely declaring his opinion against it; for it is to be remarked, that in spite of his known macedonizing politics, the people neither banished nor degraded him, but contented themselves with following the counsels of others. On the disastrous termination of the war, Phokion undertook the thankless and dishonourable function of satrap under Antipater at Athens, with the Macedonian garrison at Munychia to back him. He became the subordinate agent of a conqueror who not only slaughtered the chief Athenian orators, but disfranchised and deported the Demos in mass. Having accepted partnership and responsibility in these proceedings, Phokion was no longer safe except under the protection of a foreign prince. After the liberal proclamation issued in the name of the Macedonian kings, permitting the return of the banished Demos, he sought safety for himself, first by that treasonable connivance which enabled Nikanor to seize the Peireus, next by courting Polysperchon the enemy of Nikanor. A voluntary expatriation

1 Plutarch, Phokion, 18; Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 188.
(along with his friend the Phalerean Demetrius) would have been less dangerous, and less discreditable, than these manoeuvres, which still farther darkened the close of his life, without averting from him, after all, the necessity of facing the restored Demos. The intense and unanimous wrath of the people against him is an instructive, though a distressing spectacle. It was directed, not against the man or the administrator—for in both characters Phokion had been blameless, except as to the last collusion with Nikanor in the seizure of the Peiræus—but against his public policy. It was the last protest of extinct Grecian freedom, speaking as it were from the tomb in a voice of thunder, against that fatal system of mistrust, inertia, self-seeking, and corruption, which had betrayed the once autonomous Athens to a foreign conqueror.

I have already mentioned that Polysperchon with his army was in Phokis when Phokion was brought before him, on his march towards Peloponnesus. Perhaps he may have been detained by negotiation with the Aitolians, who embraced his alliance. At any rate, he was tardy in his march, for before he reached Attica, Kassander arrived at Peiræus to join Nikanor with a fleet of thirty-five ships and 4000 soldiers obtained from Antigonus. On learning this fact, Polysperchon hastened his march also, and presented himself under the walls of Athens and Peiræus with a large force of 20,000 Macedonians, 4000 Greek allies, 1000 cavalry, and sixty-five elephants; animals which were now seen for the first time in European Greece. He at first besieged Kassander in Peiræus, but finding it difficult to procure subsistence in Attica for so numerous an army, he marched with the larger portion into Peloponnesus, leaving his son Alexander with a division to make head against Kassander. Either approaching in person the various Peloponnesian towns—or addressing them by means of envoys—he enjoined the subversion of the Antipatrian oligarchies, and the restoration of liberty and free speech to the mass of the citizens. In most of the towns, this revolution was accomplished; but in Megalopolis, the oligarchy held out; not only forcing Polysperchon to besiege the city, but even defending it against him successfully. He made two or three attempts to storm it, by moveable towers, by undermining the walls, and even by the aid of elephants; but he was repulsed in all of them.

1 Diodor. xix. 35. 2 Diodor. xviii. 69. 3 Diodor. xviii. 70, 71.
and obliged to relinquish the siege with considerable loss of reputation. His admiral Kleitus was soon afterwards defeated in the Propontis, with the loss of his whole fleet, by Nikanor (whom Kassander had sent from Peiræus) and Antigonus.  

After these two defeats, Polysperchon seems to have evacuated Peloponnesus, and to have carried his forces across the Corinthian Gulf into Epirus, to join Olympias. His party was greatly weakened all over Greece, and that of Kassander proportionally strengthened. The first effect of this was, the surrender of Athens. The Athenians in the city, including all or many of the restored exiles, could no longer endure that complete severance from the sea, to which the occupation of Peiræus and Munychia by Kassander had reduced them. Athens without a port was hardly tenable; in fact, Peiræus was considered by its great constructor, Themistoklès, as more indispensable to the Athenians than Athens itself. The subsistence of the people was derived in large proportion from imported corn, received through Peiræus; where also the trade and industrial operations were carried on, most of the revenue collected, and the arsenals, docks, ships, &c. of the state kept up. It became evident that Nikanor, by seizing on the Peiræus, had rendered Athens disarmed and helpless; so that the irreparable mischief done by Phokion, in conniving at that seizure, was felt more and more every day. Hence the Athenians, unable to capture the port themselves, and hopeless of obtaining it through Polysperchon, felt constrained to listen to the partisans of Kassander, who proposed that terms should be made with him. It was agreed that they should become friends and allies of Kassander; that they should have full enjoyment of their city, with the port Peiræus, their ships, and revenues; that the exiles and deported citizens should be readmitted; that the political franchise should for the future be enjoyed by all citizens who possessed 1000 drachmæ of property and upwards; that Kassander should hold Munychia with a governor and garrison, until the war against Polysperchon was brought to a close; and that he should also name some one Athenian citizen, in whose hands the supreme government of the city should be vested. Kassander named Demetrius the Phaleran (ὦ, a Greek of the Déme Phalerum), one of the colleagues of Phokion; who had gone into voluntary exile since the death of Antipater, but had recently returned.  

1 Diodor. xviii. 72.  
2 Thucyd. i. 93.  
3 Diodor. xvii. 74.
This convention restored substantially at Athens the Antipatrian government; yet without the severities which had marked its original establishment—and with some modifications in various ways. It made Kassander virtually master of the city (as Antipater had been before him), by means of his governing nominee, upheld by the garrison, and by the fortification of Munychia; which had now been greatly enlarged and strengthened,1 holding a practical command over Peiræus, though that port was nominally relinquished to the Athenians. But there was no slaughter of orators, no expulsion of citizens; moreover, even the minimum of 1000 drachmae, fixed for the political franchise, though excluding the multitude, must have been felt as an improvement compared with the higher limit of 2000 drachmai prescribed by Antipater. Kassander was not, like his father, at the head of an overwhelming force, master of Greece. He had Polysperchon in the field against him with a rival army and an established ascendency in many of the Grecian cities; it was therefore his interest to abstain from measures of obvious harshness towards the Athenian people.

Towards this end his choice of the Phalerean Demetrius appears to have been judicious. That citizen continued to administer Athens, as satrap or despot under Kassander, for ten years. He was an accomplished literary man, friend both of the philosopher Theophrastus, who had succeeded to the school of Aristotle—and of the rhetor Deinarchus. He is described also as a person of expensive and luxurious habits; towards which he devoted the most of the Athenian public revenue, 1200 talents in amount, if Duris is to be believed. His administration is said to have been discreet and moderate. We know little of its details, but we are told that he made sumptuary laws, especially restricting the cost and ostentation of funerals.2 He himself extolled his own decennial period as one of abundance and flourishing commerce at Athens.3 But we learn from others, and the fact is highly pro-

1 See the notice of Munychia, as it stood ten years afterwards (Diodor. xx. 45).
2 Cicero, De Legg. ii. 28, 66; Strabo, ix. p. 388; Pausanias, i. 25, 5. τῇ τε Ἀθηναίως ἐπονεί ταύτα Δημή
mochares, nephew of the orator Demo-
bible, that it was a period of distress and humiliation, both at Athens and in other Grecian towns; and that Athenians, as well as others, welcomed new projects of colonization (such as that of Ophellas from Kyréné) not simply from prospects of advantage, but also as an escape from existing evils.  

What forms of nominal democracy were kept up during this interval, we cannot discover. The popular judicature must have been continued for private suits and accusations, since Deinarchus is said to have been in large practice as a logographer, or composer of discourses for others. But the fact that three hundred and sixty statues were erected in honour of Demetrius while his administration was still going on, demonstrates the gross flattery of his partisans, the subjecttion of the people, and the practical abolition of all free-spoken censure or pronounced opposition. We learn that, in some one of the ten years of his administration, a census was taken of the inhabitants of Attica; and that there were numbered, 21,000 citizens, 10,000 metics, and 400,000 slaves.  

Athens, was the political opponent of Demetrius Phalereus, whom he reproached with these boasts about commercial prosperity, when the liberty and dignity of the city were overthrown. To such boasts of Demetrius Phalereus probably belongs the statement cited from him by Strabo (iii. p. 147) about the laborious works in the Attic mines at Laureium.  

This census is a very interesting fact; but our information respecting it is miserably scanty, and Mr. Clinton's interpretation of the different numbers is open to some remark. He cannot be right, I think, in saying—"The 21,000 Athenians express those who had votes in the assembly, or all the males above the age of twenty years; the 10,000 metics described also the males of full age. When the women and children are computed, the total free population will be about 127,660; and 400,000 slaves, added to this total, will give about 527,660 for the total population of Attica." See also the Appendix to F. H. p. 390 seq.
Of this important enumeration we know the bare fact, without its special purpose, or even its precise date. Perhaps some of those citizens, who had been banished or deported at the close of the Lamian war, may have returned and continued to reside at Athens. But there still seems to have remained, during all the continuance of the Kassandrian oligarchy, a body of adverse Athenian exiles, watching for an opportunity of overthrowing it, and seeking aid for that purpose from the Peloponnesians and others.  

The acquisition of Athens by Kassander, followed up by his capture of Panaktum and Salamis, and seconded by his moderation towards the Athenians, procured for him considerable support in Peloponnesus, whether he proceeded with his army. Many of the cities, intimidated or persuaded, joined him and deserted Polysperchon; while the Spartans, now feeling for the first time their defenceless condition, thought it prudent to surround their city with walls. This fact, among many others contemporaneous, testifies emphatically, how the characteristic sentiments of the Hellenic autonomous world were now dying out everywhere. The maintenance of Sparta as an unwalled city, was one of the deepest and most cherished of the Lykurgean traditions; a standing proof of the fearless bearing and self-confidence of the Spartans against dangers from without. The erection of the walls showed their own conviction, but too well borne out by the real circumstances it, is not likely to have been sought.

Then again, Mr. Clinton interprets the three numbers given, upon two principles totally distinct. The two first numbers (citizens and metics), he considers to designate only males of full age; the third number, of oiketai, he considers to include both sexes and all ages.

This is a conjecture which I think very doubtful, in the absence of further knowledge. It implies that the enumerators take account of the slave women and children — but that they take no account of the free women and children, wives and families of the citizens and metics. The number of the free women and children are wholly unrecorded, on Mr. Clinton's supposition. Now if, for the purposes of the census, it was necessary to enumerate the slave women and children — it surely would be not less necessary to enumerate the free women and children.

The word oiketai sometimes means, not slaves only, but the inmates of a family generally—free as well as slave. If such be its meaning here (which however there is not evidence enough to affirm), we eliminate the difficulty of supposing the slave women and children to be enumerated—and the free women and children not to be enumerated.

We should be able to reason more confidently, if we knew the purpose for which the census had been taken — whether with a view to military or political measures—to finance and taxation—or to the question of subsistence and importation of foreign corn (see Mr. Clinton's Fast. H. ad ann. 444 B.C., about another census taken in reference to imported corn).

2 Diodor, xviii. 75.
3 Justin, xiv. 5; Diodor, xviii. 75
4 Pausan. vii. 8, 3; Pausan. i. 25, 5.
around them, that the pressure of the foreigner had become so
overwhelming as not to leave them even safety at home.

The warfare between Kassander and Polysperchon became now
embrotted by a feud among the members of the Macedonan imperial family. King Philip Arideus and his
wife Eurydikē, alarmed and indignant at the restoration
of Olympias which Polysperchon was projecting, solicited
aid from Kassander, and tried to place the force of Mace-
donan at his disposal. In this however they failed.

Olympias, assisted not only by Polysperchon, but by the
Epirotic prince Α'eakidēs, made her entry into Macedonia
out of Epirus, apparently in the autumn of 317 B.C. She brought with her Roxana and her child—the widow
and son of Alexander the Great. The Macedonian
soldiers, assembled by Philip Arideus and Eurydikē to resist her,
were so overawed by her name and the recollection of Alexander,
that they refused to fight, and thus ensured to her an easy victory. Philip and Eurydikē became her prisoners; the former she caused
to be slain; to the latter she offered only an option between the
sword, the halter, and poison. The old queen next proceeded to
satisfy her revenge against the family of Antipater. One hundred
leading Macedonians, friends of Kassander, were put to death,
together with his brother Nikanor; while the sepulchre of his
deceased brother Iollas, accused of having poisoned Alexander the
Great, was broken up.

During the winter, Olympias remained thus completely pre-
dominant in Macedonia; where her position seemed
strong, since her allies the Α'tolians were masters of
the pass at Thermopylae, while Kassander was kept
employed in Peloponnesus by the force under Alexander,
son of Polysperchon. But Kassander, disengaging him-
self from these embarrassments, and eluding Thermo-
pyle by a maritime transit to Thessaly, seized the Per-
rhæbian passes before they had been put under guard,
and entered Macedonia without resistance. Olympias,
having no army competent to meet him in the field, was forced to
shut herself up in the maritime fortress of Pydna, with Roxana,
the child Alexander, and Thessalonikē daughter of her late husband
Philip son of Amyntas. Here Kassander blocked her up for
several months by sea as well as by land, and succeeded in defeat-

1 Diodor. xix. 11; Justin, x. 14, 4; Pausanias, i. 11, 4.
2 Diodor. xix. 36.
ing all the efforts of Polysperchon and Aëakidès to relieve her. In the spring of the ensuing year (316 B.C.), she was forced by intolerable famine to surrender. Kassander promised her nothing more than personal safety, requiring from her the surrender of the two great fortresses, Pella and Amphipolis, which made him master of Macedonia. Presently, however, the relatives of those numerous victims, who had perished by order of Olympias, were encouraged by Kassander to demand her life in retribution. They found little difficulty in obtaining a verdict of condemnation against her from what was called a Macedonian assembly. Nevertheless, such was the sentiment of awe and reverence connected with her name, that no one except these injured men themselves could be found to execute the sentence. She died with a courage worthy of her rank and domineering character. Kassander took Thessalphomiek to wife—confined Roxana with the child Alexander in the fortress of Amphipolis—where (after a certain interval) he caused both of them to be slain.

While Kassander was thus master of Macedonia—and while the imperial family were disappearing from the scene in that country—the defeat and death of Eumenès (which happened nearly at the same time as the capture of Olympias) removed the last faithful partisan of that family in Asia. But at the same time, it left in the hands of Antigonus such overwhelming preponderance throughout Asia, that he aspired to become vicar and master of the entire Alexandrine empire, as well as to avenge upon Kassander the extirpation of the regal family. His power appeared indeed so formidable, that Kassander of Macedonia, Lysimachus of Thrace, Ptolemy of Egypt, and Seleucus of Babylonia, entered into a convention, which gradually ripened into an active alliance, against him.

During the struggles between these powerful princes, Greece appears simply as a group of subject cities, held, garrisoned, grasped at, or coveted, by all of them. Polysperchon, abandoning all hopes in Macedonia after the death of Olympias, had been forced to take refuge among the Ätolians, leaving his son Alexander to make the best struggle that he could in Peloponnesus; so that Kassander was now decidedly preponderant throughout the Hellenic regions.

1 Diodor. xix. 50, 51; Justin, xiv. 5; Pausan. i. 25, 5; ix. 7, 1. According to Diodor, and Pausan, Eumenès was still alive (Diodor. xix. 2). Even immediately before the death of Olympias, Aristomenes, governor of

2 Diodor. xix. 50; Justin. xiv. 5; Pausan. i. 25, 5; ix. 7, 1. Even immediately before the death of Olympias, Aristomenes, governor of
After fixing himself on the throne of Macedonia, he perpetuated his own name by founding, on the isthmus of the peninsula of Pallené and near the site where Potidæa had stood, the new city of Kassandreia; into which he congregated a large number of inhabitants from the neighbourhood, and especially the remnant of the citizens of Olynthus and Potidæa,—towns taken and destroyed by Philip more than thirty years before. He next marched into Peloponnesus with his army against Alexander son of Polysperchon. Passing through Boeotia, he undertook the task of restoring the city of Thebes, which had been destroyed twenty years previously by Alexander the Great, and had ever since existed only as a military post on the ancient citadel called Kadmeia. The other Boeotian towns, to whom the old Theban territory had been assigned, were persuaded or constrained to relinquish it; and Kassander invited from all parts of Greece the Theban exiles or their descendants. From sympathy with these exiles, and also with the ancient celebrity of the city, many Greeks, even from Italy and Sicily, contributed to the restoration. The Athenians, now administered by Demetrius Phalereus under Kassander's supremacy, were particularly forward in the work; the Messenians and Megalopolitans, whose ancestors had owed so much to the Theban Epaminondas, lent strenuous aid. Thebes was re-established in the original area which it had occupied before Alexander's siege; and was held by a Kassandrian garrison in the Kadmeia, destined for the mastery of Boeotia and Greece.

After some stay at Thebes, Kassander advanced towards Peloponnesus. Alexander (son of Polysperchon) having fortified the Isthmus, he was forced to embark his troops with his elephants at Megara, and cross over the Saronic Gulf to Epidaurus. He dispossessed Alexander of Green Argos, of Messenia, and even of his position on the Isthmus, where he left a powerful detachment, and then returned to Macedonia. His increasing power raised both apprehension and hatred in the bosom of Antigonus, who endeavoured to come to terms with him, but in vain. Kassander preferred the alliance with Ptolemy, Seleukus, and Lysimachus—against Antigonus, who was now master of...
nearly the whole of Asia, inspiring common dread to all of them. Accordingly, from Asia to Peloponnesus, with arms and money, Antigonus dispatched the Milesian Aristodemos to strengthen Alexander against Kassander; whom he farther denounced as an enemy of the Macedonian name, because he had slain Olympias, imprisoned the other members of the regal family, and re-established the Olynthian exiles. He caused the absent Kassander to be condemned by what was called a Macedonian assembly, upon these and other charges.

Antigonus farther proclaimed, by the voice of this assembly, that all the Greeks should be free, self-governing, and exempt from garrisons or military occupation. It was expected that these brilliant promises would enlist partisans in Greece against Kassander; accordingly Ptolemy, ruler of Egypt, one of the enemies of Antigonus, thought fit to issue similar proclamations a few months afterwards, tendering to the Greeks the same boon from himself. These promises, neither executed, nor intended to be executed, by either of the kings, appear to have produced little or no effect upon the Greeks.

The arrival of Aristodemus in Peloponnesus had re-animated the party of Alexander (son of Polysperchon), against whom Kassander was again obliged to bring his full forces from Macedonia. Though successful against Alexander at Argos, Orchomenus and other places, Kassander was not able to crush him, and presently thought it prudent to gain him over. He offered to him the separate government of Peloponnesus, though in subordination to himself; Alexander accepted the offer, becoming Kassander's ally—and carried on war, jointly with him, against Aristodemos, with varying success, until he was presently assassinated by some private enemies. Nevertheless his widow Kratesipolis, a woman of courage and energy, still maintained herself in considerable force at Sikyon. Kassander's most obstinate enemies were the Aetolians, of whom we now first hear formal mention as a substantive confederacy. These Aetolians became the allies of Antigonus as they had been before of Polysperchon, extending their predatory ravages even as far as Attica. Protected against foreign garrisons, partly by their rude and fierce habits, partly by their mountainous territory, they were almost the only Greeks who

1 Diodor. xix. 57.
2 Diodor. xix. 61.
3 Diodor. xix. 62.
4 Diodor. xix. 63, 64.
5 Diodor. xix. 62, 67.
6 Diodor. xix. 66, Ἀριστοδήμους, ἔπη τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Ἀιτωλῶν δικαίων λογισάμενος, ἔφτειρεν τὰ πλήθη βρᾶτον τοῖς Ἀντιγόνου πράγμασιν, &c.
could still be called free. Kassander tried to keep them in check through their neighbours the Akarnanians, whom he induced to adopt a more concentrated habit of residence, consolidating their numerous petty townships into a few considerable towns,—Stratus, Sauria, and Agrinum—convenient posts for Macedonian garrisons. He also made himself master of Leukas, Apollonia, and Epidamnus, defeating the Illyrian king Glaukias, so that his dominion now extended across from the Thermaic to the Adriatic Gulf. His general Philippus gained two important victories over the Aetolians and Epirots, forcing the former to relinquish some of their most accessible towns.

The power of Antigonus in Asia underwent a material diminution, by the successful and permanent establishment which Seleukus now acquired in Babylonia; from which event the era of the succeeding Seleukidae takes its origin. In Greece, however, Antigonus gained ground on Kassander. He sent thither his nephew Ptolemy with a large force to liberate the Greeks, or in other words, to expel the Kassandrian garrisons; while he at the same time distracted Kassander's attention by threatening to cross the Hellespont and invade Macedonia. This Ptolemy (not the Egyptian) expelled the soldiers of Kassander from Euboea, Boeotia, and Phokis. Chalkis in Euboea was at this time the chief military station of Kassander; Thebes (which he had recently re-established) was in alliance with him; but the remaining Boeotian towns were hostile to him. Ptolemy, having taken Chalkis—the citizens of which he conciliated by leaving them without any garrison—together with Oropus, Eretria, and Karystus—entered Attica, and presented himself before Athens. So much disposition to treat with him was manifested in the city, that Demetrius the Phalerean was obliged to gain time by pretending to open negotiations with Antigonus, while Ptolemy withdrew from Attica. Nearly at the same epoch, Apollonia, Epidamnus, and Leukas, found means, assisted by an armament from Korkyra, to drive out Kassander's garrisons, and to escape from his dominion. The affairs of Antigonus were now prospering in Greece, but they were much thrown back by the discontent and treachery of his admiral Telesphorus, who seized Elis and even plundered the sacred treasures of Olympia. Ptolemy presently put him down, and restored these treasures to the God.

1 Diodor. xix. 67, 68; Justin xv. 2. Diodor. xix. 74. Diodor. xix. 77, 78, 89. Diodor. xix. 87.
2 See Brandt, Geschichte des Althelischen Volkes und Bundes, p. 378 (Berlin, 1844).
In the ensuing year, a convention was concluded between Antigonus on one side—and Kassander, Ptolemy (the Egyptian) and Lysimachus, on the other, whereby the supreme command in Macedonia was guaranteed to Kassander, until the maturity of Alexander son of Roxana; Thrace being at the same time assured to Lysimachus, Egypt to Ptolemy, and the whole of Asia to Antigonus. It was at the same time covenanted by all, that the Hellenic cities should be free. Towards the execution of this last clause, however, nothing was actually done. Nor does it appear that the treaty had any other effect, except to inspire Kassander with increased jealousy about Roxana and her child; both of whom (as has been already stated) he caused to be secretly assassinated soon afterwards, by the governor Glaukias, in the fortress of Amphipolis, where they had been confined. The forces of Antigonus, under his general Ptolemy, still remained in Greece. But this general presently (310 B.C.) revolted from Antigonus, and placed them in cooperation with Kassander; while Ptolemy of Egypt, accusing Antigonus of having contravened the treaty by garrisoning various Grecian cities, renewed the war and the triple alliance against him.

Polysperchon,—who had hitherto maintained a local dominion over various parts of Peloponnese, with a military force distributed in Messene and other towns,—was now encouraged by Antigonus to espouse the cause of Héraklès (son of Alexander by Barsiné), and to place him on the throne of Macedonia in opposition to Kassander. This young prince Héraklès, now seventeen years of age, was sent to Greece from Pergamus in Asia, and his pretensions to the throne were assisted not only by a considerable party in Macedonia itself, but also by the Aetolians. Polysperchon invaded Macedonia, with favourable prospects of establishing the young prince; yet he thought it advantageous to accept treacherous propositions from Kassander, who offered to him partnership in the sovereignty of Macedonia, with an independent army and dominion in Peloponnese. Polysperchon, tempted by these offers, assassinated the young prince Héraklès, and withdrew his army towards Peloponnese. But he found such unexpected opposition, in his march through Boeotia, from Boeotians and Peloponnesians, that he was forced to take up

1 Diodor, xix. 105.
2 Diodor, xxi. 105.
3 Diodor, xx. 19.
4 Messene was garrisoned by Polysperchon (Diodor, xix. 64).
his winter quarters in Lokris (309 B.C.). From this time forward, as far as we can make out, he commanded in Southern Greece as subordinate ally or partner of Kassander; whose Macedonian dominion, thus confirmed, seems to have included Acharnania and Amphiloquia on the Ambrakian Gulf, together with the town of Ambrakia itself, and a supremacy over many of the Epirots.

The assassination of Héraklēs was speedily followed by that of Kleopatra, sister of Alexander the Great, and daughter of Philip and Olympias. She had been for some time at Sardis, nominally at liberty, yet under watch by the governor, who received his orders from Antigonus; she was now preparing to quit that place, for the purpose of joining Ptolemy in Egypt, and of becoming his wife. She had been invoked as auxiliary, or courted in marriage, by several of the great Macedonian chiefs, without any result. Now, however, Antigonus, afraid of the influence which her name might throw into the scale of his rival Ptolemy, caused her to be secretly murdered as she was preparing for her departure; throwing the blame of the deed on some of her women, whom he punished with death. All the relatives of Alexander the Great (except Thessalonikē wife of Kassander, daughter of Philip by a Thessalian mistress) had now successively perished, and all by the orders of one or other among his principal officers. The imperial family, with the prestige of its name, thus came to an end.

Ptolemy of Egypt now set sail for Greece with a powerful armament. He acquired possession of the important cities—Sikyon and Corinth—which were handed over to him by Kratesipolis, widow of Alexander son of Polysperchon. He then made known by proclamation his purpose as a liberator, inviting aid from the Peloponnesian cities themselves against the garrisons of Kassander. From some he received encouraging answers and promises; but none of them made any movement, or seconded him by armed demonstrations. He thought it prudent therefore to conclude a truce with Kassander and retire from Greece, leaving however secure garrisons in Sikyon and Corinth. The Grecian cities had now become tame and passive. Feeling their own incapacity of self-

1 Diodor. xx. 28; Trogus Pompeius—Prolug. ad Justin, xiv.; Justin, xiv. 2.
2 Diodor. xx. 100-103; Plutarch, Lykiasimus (Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 12).
3 Diodor. xx. 37: compare Justin, Pyrrhus, 6; King Pyrrhus was of xiii. 6; xiv. 1.
4 Diodor. xx. 37.
defence, and averse to auxiliary efforts, which brought upon them enmity without any prospect of advantage—they awaited only the turns of foreign interference and the behests of the potentates around them.

The Grecian ascendency of Kassander, however, was in the following year exposed to a graver shock than it had ever yet encountered—by the sudden invasion of Demetrius called Poliorketès, son of Antigonus. This young prince, sailing from Ephesus with a formidable armament, contrived to conceal his purposes so closely, that he actually entered the harbour of Peiræus (on the 26th of the month Thargelion—May) without expectation, or resistance from any one; his fleet being mistaken for the fleet of the Egyptian Ptolemy. The Phalerean Demetrius, taken unawares, and attempting too late to guard the harbour, found himself compelled to leave it in possession of the enemy, and to retire within the walls of Athens; while Dionysius, the Kassandrian governor, maintained himself with his garrison in Munychia, yet without any army competent to meet the invaders in the field. This accomplished Phalerean, who had administered for ten years as the viceroy and with the force of Kassander, now felt his position and influence at Athens overthrown, and even his personal safety endangered. He with other Athenians went as envoys on the ensuing day to ascertain what terms would be granted. The young prince ostentatiously proclaimed, that it was the intention of his father Antigonus and himself to restore and guarantee to the Athenians unqualified freedom and autonomy. Hence the Phalerean Demetrius foresaw that his internal opponents, condemned as they had been to compulsory silence during the last ten years, would now proclaim themselves with irresistible violence, so that there was no safety for him except in retreat. He accordingly asked and obtained permission from the invader to retire to Thebes, from whence he passed over soon after to Ptolemy in Egypt. The Athenians in the city declared in favour of Demetrius Poliorketès; who however refused to enter the walls until he should have besieged and captured Munychia, as well as Megara, with their Kassandrian garrisons. In a short time he accomplished both these objects. Indeed energy, skill, and effective use of engines, in besieging fortified places, were among the most conspicuous features in his character; procuring for him the surname whereby he is known to history. He proclaimed the Megarians free, levelling to the ground the fortifications of Munychia, as an
earnest to the Athenians that they should be relieved for the future from all foreign garrison.¹

After these successes, Demetrius Poliorcetès made his triumphant entry into Athens. He announced to the people, in formal assembly, that they were now again a free democracy, liberated from all dominion either of soldiers from abroad or oligarchs at home. He also promised them a farther boon from his father Antigonus and himself—150,000 medimni of corn for distribution, and ship-timber in quantity sufficient for constructing 100 triremes. Both these announcements were received with grateful exultation. The feelings of the people were testified not merely in votes of thanks and admiration towards the young conqueror, but also in effusions of unmeasured and exorbitant flattery. Stratoklès (who has already been before us as one of the accusers of Dinosthenès in the Harpalian affair) with others exhausted their invention in devising new varieties of compliment and adulation. Antigonus and Demetrius were proclaimed to be not only kings, but Gods and Saviours: a high priest of these Saviours was to be annually chosen, after whom each successive year was to be named (instead of being named after the first of the nine Archons, as had hitherto been the custom), and the dates of decrees and contracts commemorated; the month Munychion was renamed as Demetrian—two new tribes, to be called Antigonis and Demetrias, were constituted in addition to the preceding ten;—the annual senate was appointed to consist of 600 members instead of 500; the portraits and exploits of Antigonus and Demetrius were to be woven, along with those of Zeus and Athénè, into the splendid and voluminous robe periodically carried in procession, as an offering at the Panathenaic festival; the spot of ground where Demetrius had alighted from his chariot, was consecrated with an altar erected in honour of Demetrius Katebates or the Descender. Several other similar votes were passed, recognizing, and worshipping as Gods, the Saviours Antigonus and Demetrius. Nay, we are told that temples or altars were voted to Phila-Aphrodité, in honour of Phila wife of Demetrius; and a like compliment was paid to his two mistresses, Leanea and Lamia. Altars are said to have been also dedicated to Ademantus and others, his convivial companions or flatterers.² At the

¹ Philochor. Fragm. 144, ed. Didot;
² Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9, 8. The occupation of Pæreus by Demetrius Poliorcetès is related some-what differently by Polyænus, iv. 7, 6. Diodor. xx. 47; Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9, 8; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diodor.
same time the numerous statues, which had been erected in honour of the Phalerean Demetrius during his decennial government, were overthrown, and some of them even turned to ignoble purposes, in order to cast greater scorn upon the past ruler. The demonstrations of servile flattery at Athens, towards Demetrius Phalorctes, were in fact so extravagantly overdone, that he himself is said to have been disgusted with them, and to have expressed contempt for these degenerate Athenians of his own time.

In reviewing such degrading proceedings, we must recollect that thirty-one years had now elapsed since the battle of Cheroneia, and that during all this time the Athenians had been under the practical ascendency, and constantly augmenting pressure, of foreign potentates. The sentiment of this dependence on Macedonia had been continually strengthened by all the subsequent events—by the capture and destruction of Thebes, and the subsequent overwhelming conquests of Alexander—by the deplorable conclusion of the Lamian war, the slaughter of the free-spoken orators, the death of the energetic military leaders, and the deportation of Athenian citizens—lastly, by the continued presence of a Macedonian garrison in Peiræus or Munique. By Phokion, Demetrius Phalerus, and the other leading statesmen of this long period, submission to Macedonia had been inculcated as a virtue, while the recollection of the dignity and grandeur of old autonomous Athens had been effaced or denounced as a mischievous dream. The fifteen years between the close of the Lamian war and the arrival of Demetrius Poliorctes (322-307 B.C.), had witnessed no free play, nor public discussion and expression, of conflicting opinions; the short period during which Phokion was condemned must be excepted, but that lasted only long enough to give room for the outburst of a preconceived but suppressed antipathy.

During these thirty years, of which the last half had been an aggravation of the first, a new generation of Athenians had grown up, accustomed to an altered phase of political existence. How few of those who received Demetrius Poliorctes (322-307 B.C.), had witnessed no free play, nor public discussion and expression, of conflicting opinions; the short period during which Phokion was condemned must be excepted, but that lasted only long enough to give room for the outburst of a preconceived but suppressed antipathy.

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1 Diogen. Laert. v. 77. Among the numerous literary works (all lost) of the Phalerean Demetrius, one was entitled "Athenaiou katakratheia" (ib. v. 22).
3 Tacitus, Annal. i. 3. "Juniors post Artaxerxum victoriam seniores plebeiae inter bellam civitatis, nati: quotanquis quisque reprobus, qui republicam vidisset?"
citizens who yet retained courage and patriotism to struggle again for their freedom after the death of Alexander, how many must have perished with Leosthenés in the Lamian war! The Athenians of 307 B.C. had come to conceive their own city, and Hellas generally, as dependent first on Kassander, next on the possible inter- 
tervention of his equally overweening rivals, Ptolemy, Antigonus, Lysimachus, &c. If they shook off the yoke of one potentate, it could only be by the protectorate of another. The sentiment of political self-reliance and autonomy had fled; the conception of a 
citizen military force, furnished by confederate and co-operating 
cities, had been superseded by the spectacle of vast standing armics, organized by the heirs of Alexander and of his traditions.

Two centuries before (510 B.C.), when the Lacedaemonians 
expelled the despot Hippias and his mercenaries from 
Athens, there sprang up at once among the Athenian 
people a forward and devoted patriotism, which made 
them willing to brave, and competent to avert, all 
dangers in defence of their newly-acquired liberty.1 At 
that time, the enemies by whom they were threatened, 
were Lacedaemonians, Thebans, Aéginaeans, Chalkidians, and the 
like (for the Persian force did not present itself until after some 
interval, and attacked not Athens alone, but Greece collectively). 
These hostile forces, though superior in number and apparent 
value to those of Athens, were yet not so disproportionate as to 
engender hopelessness and despair. Very different were the facts in 307 B.C., when Demetrius Poliorkétes removed the Kassandrian 
mercenaries with their fortress Munychia, and proclaimed Athens 
free. To maintain that freedom by their own strength—in opposition to the evident superiority of organized force residing in the 
potentates around, one or more of whom had nearly all Greece under military occupation,—was an enterprise too hopeless to have 
been attempted even by men such as the combatants of Marathon 
or the contemporaries of Periklés. "Who would be free, them- 
selves must strike the blow!" but the Athenians had not force 
enough to strike it; and the liberty proclaimed by Demetrius 
Poliorkétes was a boon dependent upon him for its extent and even 
for its continuance. The Athenian assembly of that day was held 
under his army as masters of Attica, as it had been held a few 
months before under the controlling force of the Phalerean Demetrius together with the Kassandrian governor of Munychia; and the most fulsome votes of adulation proposed in honour of Deme-

1 Herodotus, v. 78.
trius Poliorcetès by his partisans, though perhaps disapproved by many, would hardly find a single pronounced opponent.

One man, however, there was, who ventured to oppose several of the votes—the nephew of Demosthenès—Demochares, who deserves to be commemorated as the last known spokesman of free Athenian citizenship. We know only that such were his general politics, and that his opposition to the obsequious rhetor Stratokles ended in banishment, four years afterwards. He appears to have discharged the functions of general during this period—to have been active in strengthening the fortifications and military equipment of the city—and to have been employed in occasional missions.

The altered politics of Athens were manifested by impeachment against Demetrius Phalereus and other leading partisans of the late Kassandrian government. He and many others had already gone into voluntary exile; when their trials came on, they were not forthcoming, and all were condemned to death. But all those who remained, and presented themselves for trial, were acquitted; so little was there of reactionary violence on this occasion. Stratokles also proposed a decree, commemorating the orator Lykurgus (who had been dead about seventeen years) by a statue, an honorary inscription, and a grant of maintenance in the Prytaneum to his eldest surviving descendant. Among those who accompanied the

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1 Plutarch, Demet., 24.
2 Polybius, xii. 13; Decretum apud Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 551.
4 Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 812-852. Lykurgus at his death (about 324 B.C.) left three sons, who are said, shortly after his death, to have been denounced by Menescechmus, indicted by Thrasykles, and put in prison ("handed over to the Eleven"). But Demochares, a disciple of Theophrastus, stood forward on their behalf; and Demochares, then in banishment at Troizen, wrote emphatic remonstrances to the Athenians against such unworthy treatment of the sons of a distinguished patriot. Accordingly the Athenians soon repented and released them. This is what we find stated in Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 842. The third of the so-called Demosthenic Epistles purports to be the latter written on this subject by Demosthenes.

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The harsh treatment of the sons of Lykurgus (whatever it may have amounted to, and whatever may have been its ground, certainly did not last long; for in the next page of the very same Plutarchian life (p. 843), an account was given of the family of Lykurgus, which was ancient and sacerdotal; and it is there stated that his sons after his death fully sustained the dignified position of the family. On what ground they were accused, we cannot make out. According to the Demosthenic epistle (which epistles I have before stated that I do not believe to be authentic), it was upon some allegation, which, if valid at all, ought to have been urged against Lykurgus himself during his life (p. 1477, 1478); but Lykurgus had always been honourably acquitted, and always held thoroughly estimable, up to the day of his death (p. 1758). Hyperides exerted his eloquence on behalf of the sons of Lykurgus. A fragment, of considerable interest, from
Phalerean Demetrion into exile was the rhetor or logographer Deinarchus. 4

The friendship of this obnoxious Phalerean, and of Kassander also, towards the philosopher Theophrastus, seems to have been one main cause which occasioned the enactment of a restrictive law against the liberty of philosophising. It was decreed, on the proposition of a citizen named Sophokles, that no philosopher should be allowed to open a school or teach, except under special sanction obtained from a vote of the Senate and people. Such was the disgust and apprehension occasioned by the new restriction, that all the philosophers with one accord left Athens. This spirited protest, against authoritative restriction on the liberty of philosophy and teaching, found responsive sympathy among the Athenians. The celebrity of the schools and professors was in fact the only characteristic mark of dignity still remaining to them—when their power had become extinct, and when even their independence and free constitution had degenerated into a mere name. It was moreover the great temptation for young men, coming from all parts of Greece, to visit Athens. Accordingly, a year had hardly passed, when Philon—impeaching Sophokles the author of the law, under the Graphé Paranomion—prevailed on the Dikastery to find him guilty, and condemn him to a fine of five talents. The restrictive law being thus repealed, the philosophers returned.1 It is remarkable that Democles stood forward as one of its advocates; defending Sophokles against the accuser Philon. From scanty notices remaining of the speech of Democles, we gather that, while censuring the opinions no less than the characters of Plato and Aristotle, he denounced yet more bitterly their pupils, as being for the most part ambitious, violent, and treacherous men. He cited by name several among them, who had subverted the freedom of their respective cities, and committed gross outrages against their fellow-citizens.2

his oration, has been preserved by Apianus (ap. Wall. Rhetor. Græc. ix. p. 545), Τοπερίδης ὁπρ Λυκοφιργον λέγων. Tινα φθοσουσιν οι παρόντεσιν ευκυριον των τάφων; οὕτω ἔβρω μὲν εὐφρωνός, ταξιδεύtechnical t υ ἐκ το δοκήσας τών χρημάτων εὑρες πόρους, ϕιλοδομεῖς δὲ το διατροφα τὸ φίλον, νῦ νεόν, τριήρεις ἐποίησεν κατ' αὐτόν καὶ ἄλλα πόλεις ἐδοξασάσθην, καὶ τῶν παιδῶν ἔτησις εἰσῆναι. This fragment of Hyperides was pointed out to my notice by Mr. Churchill Babington, the editor of the recently-discovered portions of Hypocrites.

1 Diogen. Laert. v. 38. It is perhaps to this return of the philosophers that the φυγάδων κάθοδος mentioned by Philochorus, as foreshadowed by the omen in the Acropolis, alludes (Philo-

2 See the few fragments of Democles collected in Fragmenta Histori-

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celis collected in Fragmenta Histori-
Athenian envoys were despatched to Antigonus in Asia, to testify the gratitude of the people, and communicate the recent complimentary votes. Antigonus not only received them graciously, but sent to Athens, according to the promise made by his son, a large present of 150,000 mediumi of wheat, with timber sufficient for 100 ships. He at the same time directed Demetrius to convene at Athens a synod of deputies from the allied Grecian cities, where resolutions might be taken for the common interests of Greece. It was his interest at this moment to raise up a temporary self-sustaining authority in Greece, for the purpose of upholding the alliance with himself, during the absence of Demetrius; whom he was compelled to summon into Asia with his army—requiring his services for the war against Ptolemy in Syria and Cyprus.

The following three years were spent by Demetrius—1. In victorious operations near Cyprus, defeating Ptolemy and making himself master of that island; after which Antigonus and Demetrius assumed the title of kings, and the example was followed by Ptolemy, in Egypt—by Lysimachus, in Thrace—and by Seleukus, in Babylonia, Mesopotamia, and Syria—thus abolishing even the titular remembrance of Alexander’s family. 2. In an unsuccessful invasion of Egypt by land and sea, repulsed with great loss. 3. In the siege of Rhodes. The brave and intelligent citizens of this island resisted for more than a year the most strenuous attacks and the most formidable siege-equipments of Demetrius Poliorcetês. All their efforts however would have been vain had they not been assisted by large reinforcements and supplies from Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Kassander. Such are the conditions under which even the most resolute and intelligent Greeks can now retain their circumscribed sphere of autonomy. The siege was at length terminated by a compromise; the Rhodians submitted to enrol themselves as allies of Demetrius, yet under proviso not to

p. 445, with the notes of Carl Muller. See likewise Athenaeus, xiii. 610, with the fragment from the comic writer Alexis. It is there stated that Lysimachus also, king of Thrace, had banished the philosophers from his dominions.

Diemochares might find (besides the persons named in Athenaeus, v. 215, xi. 508) other authentic examples of pupils of Plato and Isocrates who had been atrocious and sanguinary tyrants in their native cities—see the case of Klearchus of Herakleia, Mennon ap. Photium, Cod. 224, cap. 1. Chion and Leonides, the two young citizens who slew Klearchus, and who persisted in endeavouring to liberate their country—were also pupils of Plato (Justin, xvi. 5). In fact, aspiring youths, of all varieties of purpose, were likely to seek this mode of improvement. Alexander the Great, too, the very impersonation of subduing force, had been the pupil of Aristotle. 1 Diodor. xx. 46. 2 Diodor. xx. 53; Plutarch, Demetri.
Towards the latter they carried their grateful devotion so far, as to erect a temple to him, called the Ptolemaeum, and to worship him (under the sanction of the oracle of Ammon) as a God. 2 'Amidst the rocks and shoals through which Grecian cities were now condemned to steer, menaced on every side by kings more powerful than themselves, and afterwards by the giant-republic of Rome—the Rhodians conducted their political affairs with greater prudence and dignity than any other Grecian city.

Shortly after the departure of Demetrius from Greece to Cyprus, Kassander and Polyæchus renewed the war in Peloponnesus and its neighbourhood. 3 We make out no particulars respecting this war. The Ætolians were in hostility with Athens, and committed annoying depredations. 4 The fleet of Athens, repaired or increased by the amber received from Antigonus, was made to furnish thirty quadriremes to assist Demetrius in Cyprus, and was employed in certain operations near the island of Amorgos, wherein it suffered defeat. 5

But we can discover little respecting the course of the war, except that Kassander gained ground upon the Athenians, and that about the beginning of 303 B.C. he was blockading, or threatening to blockade, Athens. The Athenians invoked the aid of Demetrius Poliorcetes, who, having recently concluded an accommodation with the Rhodians, came again across from Asia, with a powerful fleet and army, to Aulis in Boeotia. 6 He was received at Athens with demonstrations of honour equal or superior to those which had marked his previous visit. He seems to have passed a year and a half, partly at Athens, partly in military operations carried successfully over many parts of Greece. He compelled the Boeotians to evacuate the Euboan city of Chalkis, and to relinquish their alliance with Kassander. He drove that prince out of Attica—expelled his garrisons from the two frontier fortresses of Amorgos, Stratokleus (the complaisant orator who moved the votes of flattery towards Demetrius and Antigonus) is said to have announced it first as a victory, to the great joy of the people. Presently evidences of the defeat arrived, and the people were angry with Stratokleus. "What harm has happened to you?—(replied he)—have you not had two days of pleasure and satisfaction?" This is at any rate a very good story.

1 Diodor. xx. 99. Probably this proviso extended also to Lysimachus and Kassander (both of whom had assisted Rhodes) as well as to Ptolemy—though Diodorus does not expressly say so.
2 Diodor. xx. 100.
3 Diodor. xx. 100.
4 That the Ætolians were just now most vexing enemies to Athens, may be seen by the Ithyllalic ode addressed to Demetrius Poliorcetes (Athensius, vi. 3. 252).
5 Diodor. xx. 50; Plutarch, Demetra.
6 In reference to this defeat near Amorgos, Stratokleus (the complaisant orator who moved the votes of flattery towards Demetrius and Antigonus) is said to have announced it first as a victory, to the great joy of the people. Presently evidences of the defeat arrived, and the people were angry with Stratokleus. "What harm has happened to you?—(replied he)—have you not had two days of pleasure and satisfaction?" This is at any rate a very good story.

Diodor. xx. 100; Plutarch, Demetra.
Attica,—Phylé and Panaktum—and pursued him as far as Thermopylae. He captured, or obtained by bribing the garrisons, the important towns of Corinth, Argos, and Sikyon; mastering also Aegium, Bura, all the Arcadian towns (except Mantinea), and various other towns in Peloponnesus. He celebrated, as president, the great festival of the Heraea at Argos; on which occasion he married Dsidameia, sister of Pyrrhus, the young king of Epirus. He prevailed on the Sikyonians to transfer to a short distance the site of their city, conferring upon the new city the name of Demetrias. At a Grecian synod, convened in Corinth under his own letters of invitation, he received by acclamation the appointment of leader or Emperor of the Greeks, as it had been conferred on Philip and Alexander. He even extended his attacks as far as Leukas and Korkyra. The greater part of Greece seems to have been either occupied by his garrisons, or enlisted among his subordinates.

So much was Kassander intimidated by these successes, that he sent envoys to Asia, soliciting peace from Antigonus; who, however, elate and full of arrogance, refused to listen to any terms short of surrender at discretion. Kassander, thus driven to despair, renewed his applications to Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Seleukus. All these princes felt equally menaced by the power and dispositions of Antigonus—and all resolved upon an energetic combination to put him down.

After uninterrupted prosperity in Greece, throughout the summer of 302 B.C., Demetrius returned from Leukas to Athens, about the month of September, near the time of the Eleusinian mysteries. He was welcomed by festive processions, hymns, peans, choric dances, and bacchanalian odes of joyous congratulation. One of these hymns is preserved, sung by a chorus of Ithyphalli—masked revelers, with their heads and arms encircled by wreaths, clothed in white tunics, and in feminine garments reaching almost to the feet.

This song is curious, as indicating the hopes and fears preva-
The poet, addressing Demetrius as a God, boasts that two of the greatest and best-beloved of all divine beings are visiting Attica at the same moment—Démètér (coming for the season of her mysteries), and Demetrius, son of Poseidon and Aphrodité. “To thee we pray (the hymn proceeds); for other Gods are either afar off—or have no ears—or do not exist—or care nothing about us; but thee we see before us, not in wood or marble, but in real presence. First of all things, establish peace; for thou hast the power—and chastise that Sphinx who domineers, not merely over Thebes, but over all Greece—the Ἀιτωλικός, who (like the old Sphinx) rushes from his station on the rock to snatch and carry away our persons, and against whom we cannot fight. At all times, the Ἀιτωλικοί robbed their neighbours; but now, they rob far as well as near.”

Helpless and subservience towards Demetrius, are yet more remarkable, as betraying a loss of force, a senility, and a consciousness of defenceless and degraded position, such as we are astonished to find publicly proclaimed at Athens. It is not only against the foreign potentates that the Athenians avow themselves incapable of self-defence, but even against the incursions of the Ἀιτωλικοί—Greeks like themselves, though warlike, rude, and restless. When such were the feelings of a people, once the most daring, confident, and organizing—and still the most intelligent—in Greece, we may see that the history of the Greeks as a separate nation or race is reaching its close—and that from henceforward they must become merged in one or other of the stronger currents that surround them.

After his past successes, Demetrius passed some months in enjoyment and luxury at Athens. He was lodged in the Parthenon, being considered as the guest of the Goddess Athéné. But his...
dissolute habits provoked the louder comments, from being indulged in such a domicile; while the violence which he offered to beautiful youths of good family led to various scenes truly tragic. The subservient manifestations of the Athenians towards him, however, continued unabated. It is even affirmed, that, in order to compensate for something which he had taken amiss, they passed a formal decree, on the proposition of Stratokles, declaring that every thing which Demetrius might command was holy in regard to the Gods and just in regard to men. The banishment of Democharés is said to have been brought on by his sarcastic comments upon this decree. In the month Munychion (April) Demetrius mustered his forces and his Gregian allies for a march into Thessaly against Kassander; but before his departure, he was anxious to be initiated in the Eleusinian mysteries. It was however not the regular time for this ceremony; the Lesser Mysteries being celebrated in February, the Greater in September. The Athenians overruled the difficulty by passing a special vote, enabling him to be initiated at once, and to receive, in immediate succession, the preparatory and the final initiation, between which ceremonies a year of interval was habitually required. Accordingly he placed himself disarmed in the hands of the priests, and received both first and second initiation in the month of April, immediately before his departure from Athens.

2. Such is the statement of Plutarch (Demetr. 21); but it seems not in harmony with the rest of the honorary decree, passed on 272 B.C., after the death of Democharés, commemorating his merits by a statue, &c. Plutarch, Vit. X. (p. 850). It is there recited that Democharés rendered services to Athens (fortifying and arming the city, concluding peace and alliance with the Boeotians, &c.) επί τοῦ τετραετοῦ πολέμου, καὶ ἐν τῷ καταλογοτόμῳ τοῦ ἃθμου. Οἱ καταλογοτόμοι τοῦ ἃθμου cannot mean either Demetrius Poliorcetēs, or Stratokles. Moreover, we cannot determine when the "four years' war," or the alliance with the Boeotians, occurred. Neither the discussion of Mr. Clinton (Hist. II. 302 n.c., and Append. p. 380), nor the different hypothesis of Droysen, are satisfactory on this point—see Carl Muller's discussion on the Fragments of Democharés, Fragm. Hist. Gr. v. ii. p. 446.

3. Diodor. xx. 110. παραδοσὶς ἅγου αὐτῶν.
Demetrius conducted into Thessaly an army of 56,000 men; of whom 25,000 were Grecian allies—so extensive was his sway at this moment over the Grecian cities. But after two or three months of hostilities, partially successful, against Kassander, he was summoned into Asia by Antigonus to assist in meeting the formidable army of the allies—Ptolemy, Seleukus, Lysimachus, and Kassander. Before retiring from Greece, Demetrius concluded a truce with Kassander, whereby it was stipulated that the Grecian cities, both in Europe and Asia, should be permanently autonomous and free from garrison or control. This stipulation served only as an honourable pretext for leaving Greece; Demetrius had little expectation that it would be observed. In the ensuing spring was fought the decisive battle of Ipsus in Phrygia (B.C. 300) by Antigonus and Demetrius, against Ptolemy, Seleukus, and Lysimachus; with a large army and many elephants on both sides. Antigonus was completely defeated and slain, at the age of more than eighty years. His Asiatic dominion was broken up, chiefly to the profit of Seleukus, whose dynasty became from henceforward ascendent, from the coast of Syria eastward to the Caspian Gates and Parthia; sometimes, though imperfectly, farther eastward, nearly to the Indus.

The effects of the battle of Ipsus were speedily felt in Greece. The Athenians passed a decree proclaiming themselves neutral, and excluding both the belligerent parties from Attica. Demetrius was called Boédromion—after which, the Greater Mysteries (which belonged to the latter month) were forthwith celebrated. The comic writer Philippides said of Stratoklés, that he had pressed the whole year into one single month. This statement of Plutarch has very much the air of a caricature, by Philippides or some other witty man, of the simple decree mentioned by Diodorus—a special licence to Demetrius to be initiated out of season. Compare another passage of Philippides against Stratoklés (Plutarch, Demetr, 12).

Josephus, ii. 111. It must have been probably during this campaign that Demetrius began or projected the foundation of the important city of Demetrias on the Gulf of Magnesia, which afterwards became one of the great strongholds of the Macedonian ascen-
trius, retiring with the remnant of his defeated army, and embarking at Ephesus to sail to Athens, was met on the voyage by Athenian envoys, who respectfully acquainted him that he would not be admitted. At the same time, his wife Déidameia, whom he had left at Athens, was sent away by the Athenians under an honourable escort to Megara, while some ships of war which he had left in the Peiraæus were also restored to him. Demetrius, indignant at this unexpected defection of a city which had recently heaped upon him such fulsome adulation, was still farther mortified by the loss of most of his other possessions in Greece. His garrisons were for the most part expelled, and the cities passed into Kassandrian keeping or dominion. His fortunes were indeed partially restored by concluding a peace with Seleukus, who married his daughter. This alliance withdrew Demetrius to Syria, while Greece appears to have fallen more and more under the Kassandrian parties. It was one of these partisans, Lacharês, who, seconded by Kassander's soldiers, acquired a despotism at Athens such as had been possessed by the Phalerean Demetrius, but employed in a manner far more cruel and oppressive. Various exiles, driven out by his tyranny, invited Demetrius Poliorketês, who passed over again from Asia into Greece, recovered portions of Peloponnesus, and laid siege to Athens. He blocked up the city by sea and land, so that the pressure of famine presently became intolerable. Lacharês having made his escape, the people opened their gates to Demetrius, not without great fear of the treatment awaiting them. But he behaved with forbearance, and even with generosity. He spared them all, supplied them with a large donation of corn, and contented himself with taking military occupation of the city, naming his own friends as magistrates. He put garrisons, however, not only into Peiraæus and Munychia, but also into the hill called Museum, a part of the walled circle of Athens itself. While Demetrius was thus strengthening himself in Greece, he lost all his footing both in Cyprus, Syria, and Kilikia, which passed into the hands of Prolemy and Seleukus. New prospects

1 Plutarch, Demet. 31.
2 Plutarch, Demet. 34, 35; Pausan. i. 20, 5; Pausanias states (i. 20, 2) that a gallant Athenian named Olymphiades (we do not know when) encouraged his fellow-citizens to attack the Museum, Munychia, and Peiraæus; and expelled the Macedonians from all of them. If this be correct, Munychia and Peiraæus must have been afterwards reconquered by the Macedonians; for they were garrisoned as well as Salamis and Sunium) by Antigonus Gonatas (Pausanitas, ii. 8, 5; Plutarch, Aratus, 34).
however were opened to him in Macedonia by the death of Kassander (his brother-in-law, brother of his wife Phila) and the family feuds supervening thereupon. Philippus, eldest son of Kassander, succeeded his father, but died of sickness after something more than a year. Between the two remaining sons, Antipater and Alexander, a sanguinary hostility broke out. Antipater slew his mother Thessalonike, and threatened the life of his brother, who in his turn invited aid both from Demetrias and from the Epirotic king Pyrrhus. Pyrrhus being ready first, marched into Macedonia, and expelled Antipater; receiving as his recompense the territory called Tryphaea (between Epirus and Macedonia), together with Akarnania, Amphipolocia, and the town of Ambrakia, which became henceforward his chief city and residence. Antipater sought shelter in Thrace with his father-in-law Lysimachus; by whose order, however, he was presently slain. Demetrias, occupied with other matters, was more tardy in obeying the summons; but, on entering into Macedonia, he found himself strong enough to dispossess and kill Alexander (who had indeed invited him, but is said to have laid a train for assassinating him), and seized the Macedonian crown; not without the assent of a considerable party, to whom the name and the deeds of Kassander and his sons were alike odious.

Demetrias became thus master of Macedonia, together with the greater part of Greece, including Athens, Megara, and much of Peloponnesus. He undertook an expedition into Boeotia, for the purpose of conquering Thebes; in which attempt he succeeded, not without a double siege of that city, which made an obstinate resistance. He left as viceroy in Boeotia the historian, Hieronymus of Kardia, once the attached friend and fellow-citizen of Eumenês. But Greece as a whole was managed by Antigonus (afterwards called Antigonus Gonatas) son of Demetrias, who maintained his supremacy unshaken during all his father's lifetime; even though Demetrias was deprived of Macedonia by the temporary combination of Lysimachus with Pyrrhus, and afterwards remained (until his death in 283 B.C.) a captive in the hands of Seleukus. After a brief possession of the crown of Macedonia successively by Seleukus, Ptolemy Keraunus, Meleager, Antipater, and Sosthenes—Antigonus Gonatas regained it in 277

1 Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 62. Justin, xvi. 1, 2. 2 Plutarch, Demetr. 31; Dexippus ap. 3 Plutarch, Demetr. 30. Syuvel. p. 264 seq.; Pausan. iv. 7, 8;
His descendants the Antigonid kings maintained it until the battle of Pydna in 168 B.C.; when Perseus, the last of them, was overthrown, and his kingdom incorporated with the Roman conquests.

Of Greece during this period we can give no account, except that the greater number of its cities were in dependence upon Demetrius and his son Antigonus; either under occupation by Macedonian garrisons, or ruled by local despots who leaned on foreign mercenaries and Macedonian support. The spirit of the Greeks was broken, and their habits of combined sentiment and action had disappeared. The invasion of the Gauls indeed awakened them into a temporary union for the defence of Thermopyla in 279 B.C. So intolerable was the cruelty and spoliation of those barbarian invaders, that the cities as well as Antigonus were driven by fear to the efforts necessary for repelling them. A gallant army of Hellenic confederates was mustered. In the mountains of Aetolia and in the neighbourhood of Delphi, most of the Gallic horde with their king Brennus perished. But this burst of spirit did not interrupt the continuance of the Macedonian dominion in Greece, which Antigonus Gonatas continued to hold throughout most of a long reign. He greatly extended the system begun by his predecessors, of isolating each Grecian city from alliances with other cities in its neighbourhood—planting in most of them local despots—and compressing the most important by means of garrisons. Among all Greeks, the Spartans and the Aetolians stood most free from foreign occupation, and were the least crippled in their power of self-action. The Achaean league too developed itself afterwards as a renovated sprout from the ruined tree of Grecian liberty, though never attaining to anything better than a feeble and puny life, nor capable of sustaining itself without foreign aid.

With this after-growth, or half-revival, I shall not meddle. It...
forms the Greece of Polybius, which that author treats, in my
opinion justly, as having no history of its own, but as
an appendage attached to some foreign centre and prin-
cipal among its neighbours—Macedonia, Egypt, Syria,
Rome. Each of these neighbours acted upon the destinies
of Greece more powerfully than the Greeks themselves.
The Greeks to whom these volumes have been devoted
—those of Homer, Archilochus, Solon, Æschylus, Herodotus,
Thucydides, Xenophon, and Demosthenes—present as their most
marked characteristic a loose aggregation of autonomous tribes or
communities, acting and reacting freely among themselves, with
little or no pressure from foreigners. The main interest of the
narrative has consisted in the spontaneous grouping of the different
Hellenic fractions—in the self-prompted coöperations and conflicts
—the abortive attempts to bring about something like an effective
federal organization, or to maintain two permanent rival confed-
eracies—the energetic ambition, and heroic endurance, of men to
whom Hellas was the entire political world. The freedom of
Hellas, the life and soul of this history from its commencement,
disappeared completely during the first years of Alexander’s reign.
After following to their tombs the generation of Greeks contempo-
rary with him, men like Demosthenes and Phokion, born in a state
of freedom—I have pursued the history into that gulf of Grecian
nullity which marks the succeeding century; exhibiting sad evi-
dence of the degrading servility, and suppliant king-worship, into
which the countrymen of Aristides and Perikles had been driven,
by their own conscious weakness under overwhelming pressure from
without.

I cannot better complete that picture than by showing what the
leading democratic citizen became, under the altered
atmosphere which now bedimmed his city. Demochares,
the nephew of Demosthenes, has been mentioned as one
of the few distinguished Athenians in this last genera-
tion. He was more than once chosen to the highest
public offices; he was conspicuous for his free spech,
both as an orator and as an historian, in the face of
powerful enemies; he remained throughout a long life faithfully
attached to the democratical constitution, and was banished for a
time by its opponents. In the year 280 B.C., he prevailed on the
Athenians to erect a public monument, with a commemorative in-
scription, to his uncle Demosthenes. Seven or eight years after-

1 Polybius, i. 3, 4; ii. 37. 2 Polybius, xii. 13.
wards, Demochares himself died, aged nearly eighty. His son Laches proposed and obtained a public decree, that a statue should be erected, with an annexed inscription, to his honour. We read in the decree a recital of the distinguished public services, whereby Demochares merited this compliment from his countrymen. All that the proposer of the decree, his son and fellow-citizen, can find to recite, as ennobling the last half of the father's public life (since his return from exile), is as follows:—1. He contracted the public expenses, and introduced a more frugal management. 2. He undertook an embassy to King Lysimachus, from whom he obtained two presents for the people, one of thirty talents, the other of one hundred talents. 3. He proposed the vote for sending envoys to King Ptolemy in Egypt, from whom fifty talents were obtained for the people. 4. He went as envoy to Antipater, received from him twenty talents, and delivered them to the people at the Eleusinian festival.  

When such begging missions are the deeds for which Athens both employed and recompensed her most eminent citizens, an historian accustomed to the Grecian world as described by Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, feels that the life has departed from his subject, and with sadness and humiliation brings his narrative to a close.

1 See the decree in Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 850. The Antipater here mentioned is the son of Cassander, not the father. There is no necessity for admitting the conjecture of Mr. Clinton (Fast. Hell. App. p. 388) that the name ought to be Antigonus, and not Antipater; although it may perhaps be true that Demochares was on favourable terms with Antigonus Gonatas (Diog. Laert. vii. 14).

CHAPTER XCVII.

SICILIAN AND ITALIAN GREEKS.—AGATHOKLES.

It has been convenient, throughout all this work, to keep the history of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks distinct from that of the Central and Asiatic. We parted last from the Sicilian Greeks, at the death of their champion the Corinthian Timoleon (337 B.C.), by whose energetic exploits, and generous political policy, they had been almost regenerated—rescued from foreign enemies, protected against intestine discord, and invigorated by a large reinforcement of new colonists. For the twenty years next succeeding the death of Timoleon, the history of Syracuse and Sicily is an absolute blank; which is deeply to be regretted, since the position of these cities included so much novelty—so many subjects for debate, for peremptory settlement, or for amicable compromise—that the annals of their proceedings must have been peculiarly interesting. Twenty years after the death of Timoleon, we find the government of Syracuse described as an oligarchy; implying that the constitution established by Timoleon must have been changed either by violence or by consent. The oligarchy is stated as consisting of 600 chief men, among whom Sosistratus and Herakleides appear as leaders. We hear generally that the Syracusans had been engaged in wars, and that Sosistratus either first originated, or first firmly established, his oligarchy, after an expedition undertaken to the coast of Italy, to assist the citizens of Kroton against their interior neighbours and assailants the Bruttians.

Not merely Kroton, but other Grecian cities also on the coast of Italy, appear to have been exposed to causes of danger and decline, similar to those which were operating upon so many other portions of the Hellenic world. Their non-Hellenic neighbours in the interior were growing too powerful and too aggressive to leave them in peace or security. The Messapians, the Lucanians, the Bruttians,

1 See Ch. LXXXV.
2 Diodor. xix. 3. It appears that Diodorus had recounted in his eighteenth Book the previous circumstances of these two leaders; but this part of his narrative is lost: see Weissing’s note.
and other native Italian tribes, were acquiring that increased strength which became ultimately all concentrated under the mighty republic of Rome. I have in my preceding chapters recounted the acts of the two Syracusan despots, the elder and younger Dionysius, on this Italian coast. Though the elder gained some advantage over the Lucanians, yet the interference of both contributed only to enfeeble and humiliate the Italiot Greeks. Not long before the battle of Cheronia (340-338 B.C.), the Tarentines found themselves so hard pressed by the Messapians, that they sent to Sparta, their mother-city, to entreat assistance. The Spartan king Archidamus son of Agesilaus, perhaps ashamed of the nullity of his country since the close of the Sacred War, complied with their prayer, and sailed at the head of a mercenary force to Italy. How long his operations there lasted, we do not know; but they ended by his being defeated and killed, near the time of the battle of Cheronia (338 B.C.).

About six years after this event, the Tarentines, being still pressed by the same formidable neighbours, invoked the aid of the Epirotic Alexander, king of the Molossians, and brother of Olympias. These Epirotes now, during the general decline of Grecian force, rise into an importance which they had never before enjoyed. Philip of Macedon, having married Olympias, not only secured his brother-in-law on the Molossian throne, but strengthened his authority over subjects not habitually obedient. It was through Macedonian interference that the Molossian Alexander first obtained (though subject to Macedonian ascendancy) the important city of Ambrakia; which thus passed out of a free Hellenic community into the capital and seaport of the Epirotic kings. Alexander farther cemented his union with Macedonia by marrying his own niece Kleopatra, daughter of Philip and Olympias. In fact, during the lives of Philip and Alexander the Great, the Epirotic kingdom appears a sort of adjunct to the Macedonian; governed by Olympias either jointly with her brother the Molossian Alexander—or as regent after his death.¹

¹ See Chaps. LXXXIII., LXXXV. ² Diodor. xvi, 86; Plutarch, Camill. ¹9; Pausan. iii, 10, 5. Plutarch even says that the two battles occurred on the same day. ³ The Molossian King Neoptolemus was father both of Alexander (the Epirotic) and of Olympias. But as to the genealogy of the preceding kings, nothing certain can be made out: see Merkler, Darstellung des Landes und der Bewohner von Epeiros, Königsberg, 1844, p. 2-6. ⁴ A curious proof how fully Olympias was queen of Epeiros is preserved in the oration of Hyperides in defence of Eumolpus, recently published by Mr. Babington, p. 12. The Athenians, in obedience to an oracular mandate from the Dodonian Zeus, had sent to Do-
It was about the year after the battle of Issus that the Molossian Alexander undertook his expedition from Italy; 1 doubtless instigated in part by emulation of the Asiatic glories of his nephew and namesake. Though he found enemies more formidable than the Persians at Issus, yet his success was at first considerable. He gained victories over the Messapians, the Lucanians, and the Samnites; he conquered the Lucanian town of Consentia, and the Bruttian town of Tercina; he established an alliance with the Paediculi, and exchanged friendly messages with the Romans. As far as we can make out from scanty data, he seems to have calculated on establishing a comprehensive dominion in the south of Italy, over all its population—over Greek cities, Lucanians, and Bruttians. He demanded and obtained three hundred of the chief Lucanian and Messapian families, whom he sent over as hostages to Epirus. Several exiles of these nations joined him as partisans. He further endeavoured to transfer the congress of the Greco-Italian cities, which had been usually held at the Tarentine colony of Herakleia, to Thurii; intending probably to procure for himself a compliant synod like that serving the purpose of his Macedonian nephew at Corinth. But the tide of his fortune at length turned. The Tarentines became disgusted and alarmed; his Lucanian partisans proved faithless; the stormy weather in the Calabrian Apennines broke up the communication between his different detachments, and exposed them to be cut off in detail. He himself perished, by the hands of a Lucanian exile, in crossing the river Acheron, and near the town of Pandosia. This was held to be a memorable attestation of the prophetic veracity of the oracle; since he had dona a solemn embassy for sacrifice, and had dressed and adorned the statue of Dioné there situated. Olympias addressed a despatch to the Athenians, reproving them for this as a trespass upon her dominions—ὅπερ τούτων ὤμοι τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἔθετε παρ’ Ὀλυμπάδος εἰς ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς, ὡς ἡ χάρα εἰς τὴν Μολοσσίαν αὐτῆς, ἐν ἤ ὧν ἐποιήσαν πρὸς θυσίαν ἢς τῶν ἐκεί σώζεται καὶ τῆς ἱερονομίας. The date of this oration is some period during the life of Alexander the Great—but cannot be more precisely ascertained. After the death of Alexander, Olympias passed much time in Epirus, where she thought herself more secure from the enmity of Antipater (Diodor, xviii. 49). Daula had been one of the most ancient places of pilgrimage for the Hellenic race—especially for the Athenians. The order here addressed to them,—that they should abstain from religious manifestations at this sanctuary—is a remarkable proof of the growing encroachments on free Hellenism; the more so, as Olympias sent offerings to temples at Athens when she chose and without asking permission—we learn this from the same fragment of Hyperides.  

1 Livy (viii. 3-24) places the date of this expedition of the Molossian Alexander eight years earlier; but it is universally recognized that this is a mistake.
received advice from Dodona to beware of Pandosia and Acheron; two names which he well knew, and therefore avoided, in Epirus—but which he had not before known to exist in Italy.  

The Greco-Italian cities had thus dwindled down into a prize to be contested for between the Epirotic kings and the native Italian powers—as they again became, still more conspicuously, fifty years afterwards, during the war between Pyrrhus and the Romans. They were now left to seek foreign aid, where they could obtain it, and to become the prey of adventurers. It is in this capacity that we hear of them as receiving assistance from Syracuse, and that the formidable name of Agathoklēs first comes before us—seemingly about 320 B.C.  

The Syracusan force, sent to Italy to assist the Krotoniates against their enemies the Bruttians, was commanded by a general named Antander, whose brother Agathoklēs served with him in a subordinate command.

To pass over the birth and childhood of Agathoklēs—respecting which romantic anecdotes are told, as about most eminent men—it appears that his father, a Rhegine exile named Karkinus, came from Thera (in the Carthaginian portion of Sicily) to settle at Syracuse, at the time when Timoleon invited and received new Grecian settlers to the citizenship of the latter city. Karkinus was in comparative poverty, following the trade of a potter; which his son Agathoklēs learnt also, being about eighteen years of age when domiciliated with his father at Syracuse. Though starting from this humble beginning, and even notorious for the profligacy and rapacity of his youthful habits, Agathoklēs soon attained a conspicuous position, partly from his own superior personal qualities, partly from the favour of a wealthy Syracusan named Damas. The young potter was handsome, tall, and of gigantic strength; he performed with distinction the military service required from him as a citizen, wearing a panoply so heavy, that no other soldier could fight with it; he was moreover ready, audacious, and emphatic in public harangue. Damas became much attached to him, and not only supplied him profusely with money, but also, when placed in command of a Syracusan army against the Agrigentines, nominated him one of the subordinate officers. In this capacity Agathoklēs acquired great reputation for courage in battle, ability in command, and fluency of speech. Presently Damas died of sickness, leaving

1 Livy, vii. 17-24; Justin, xii. 2; Strabo, vi. p. 280.  
2 Diodor, xix. 3.  
3 Timaeus apud Polybius, xii. 15; Diodor, xix. 2.
a widow without children. Agathoklés married the widow, and thus raised himself to a high fortune and position in Syracuse.1

Of the oligarchy which now prevailed at Syracuse, we have no particulars, nor do we know how it had come to be substituted for the more popular forms established by Timoleon. We hear only generally that the oligarchical leaders, Sosistratus and Herakleides, were unprincipled and sanguinary men.2 By this government an expedition was despatched from Syracuse to the Italian coast, to assist the inhabitants of Kroton against their aggressive neighbours the Brutians. Antander, brother of Agathoklés, was one of the generals commanding this armament, and Agathoklés himself served in it as a subordinate officer. We neither know the date, the duration, nor the issue, of this expedition. But it afforded a fresh opportunity to Agathoklés to display his adventurous bravery and military genius, which procured for him high encomium. He was supposed by some, on his return to Syracuse, to be entitled to the first prize for valour; but Sosistratus and the other oligarchical leaders withheld it from him and preferred another. So deeply was Agathoklés incensed by this refusal, that he publicly inveighed against them among the people, as men aspiring to despotism. His opposition being unsuccessful, and drawing upon him the enmity of the government, he retired to the coast of Italy.

Here he levied a military band of Grecian exiles and Campanian mercenaries, which he maintained by various enterprises for or against the Grecian cities. He attacked Kroton, but was repulsed with loss; he took service with the Tarentines, fought for some time against their enemies, but at length became suspected and dismissed. Next, he joined himself with the inhabitants of Rhegium, assisting in the defence of the town against a Syracusan aggression. He even made two attempts to obtain admission by force into Syracuse, and to seize the government.3 Though repulsed in both of them, he nevertle-

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1 Diodor, xix. 3; Justin, xxii. 1. Justin states the earliest military exploits of Agathoklés to have been against the Attians, not against the Agrigentines.
2 Diodor, xix. 3, 4. Diodorus had written more about this oligarchy in a part of his eighteenth book; which part is not preserved: see Weisseling's note.
3 Diodor, xix. 4; Justin, xxii. 1. "His, occupare imperium Syracusarum voluit; bis in exilium actus est."
4 "In the same manner, the Syracusan exile Hermokratés had attempted to extort by force his return, at the head of 3000 men, and by means of partisans within; he failed and was slain—B.C. 498 (Diodor, xiii. 75)."
less contrived to maintain a footing in Sicily, was appointed general at the town of Morgantiaum, and captured Leontini, within a short distance north of Syracuse. Some time afterwards, a revolution took place at Syracuse, whereby Sosistratus and the oligarchy were dispossessed and exiled with many of their partisans.

Under the new government, Agathoklès obtained his recall, and soon gained increased ascendency. The dispossessed exiles contrived to raise forces, and to carry on a formidable war against Syracuse from without; they even obtained assistance from the Carthaginians, so as to establish themselves at Gela, on the southern confines of the Syracusan territory. In the military operations thus rendered necessary, Agathoklès took a forward part, distinguishing himself among the ablest and most enterprising officers. He tried, with 1000 soldiers, to surprise Gela by night: but finding the enemy on their guard, he was repulsed with loss and severely wounded; yet by an able manœuvre he brought off all his remaining detachment. Though thus energetic against the public enemy, however, he at the same time inspired both hatred and alarm for his dangerous designs, to the Syracusans within. The Corinthian Akestoridés, who had been named general of the city—probably from recollection of the distinguished services formerly rendered by the Corinthian Timoleon—becoming persuaded that the presence of Agathoklès was full of peril to the city, ordered him to depart, and provided men to assassinate him on the road during the night. But Agathoklès, suspecting their design, disguised himself in the garb of a beggar, appointing another man to travel in the manner which would be naturally expected from himself. This substitute was slain in the dark by the assassins, while Agathoklès escaped by favour of his disguise. He and his partisans appear to have found shelter with the Carthaginians in Sicily.

Not long afterwards, another change took place in the government of Syracuse, whereby the oligarchical exiles were recalled, and peace made with the Carthaginians. It appears that a senator...
of 600 was again installed as the chief political body; probably not the same men as before, and with some democratical modifications. At the same time, negotiations were opened, through the mediation of the Carthaginian commander Hamilkar, between the Syracusans and Agathoklés. The mischiefs of intestine conflict, amidst the numerous discordant parties in the city, pressed hard upon every one, and hopes were entertained that all might be brought to agree in terminating them. Agathoklés affected to enter cordially into these projects of amnesty and reconciliation. The Carthaginian general Hamilkar, who had so recently aided Sosistratus and the Syracusan oligarchy, now did his best to promote the recall of Agathoklés, and even made himself responsible for the good and pacific behaviour of that exile. Agathoklés, and the other exiles along with him, were accordingly restored. A public assembly was convened in the temple of Demeter, in the presence of Hamilkar; where Agathoklés swore by the most awful oaths, with his hands touching the altar and statue of the goddess, that he would behave as a good citizen of Syracuse, uphold faithfully the existing government, and carry out the engagements of the Carthaginian mediators—abstaining from encroachments on the rights and possessions of Carthage in Sicily. His oaths and promises were delivered with so much apparent sincerity, accompanied by emphatic harangues, that the people were persuaded to name him general and guardian of the peace, for the purpose of realising the prevailing aspirations towards harmony. Such appointment was recommended (it seems) by Hamilkar.¹

All this train of artifice had been concerted by Agathoklés with Hamilkar, for the purpose of enabling the former to seize the supreme power. As general of the city, Agathoklés had the direction of the military force. Under pretence of marching against some refractory exiles at Erbita in the interior, he got together

¹ The account here given is the best which I can make out from Diodorus (vii, 5), Justin (xxii, 2),—Polyenus (v, 3, 8). The first two allude to the solemn oath taken by Agathoklés—para Sachéis eis tv tv tis Dhimyrrs leiovo upo tov polukov, lwmóvw kathn evantwobw sxeostai tis dhmiourpi—"Tone Hamilcaris expositis inibug i Cercris tactique in obsquia Pomorum jurat." "Jurare in obsquias Pomorum" can hardly be taken to mean that Syracuse was to become subject to Carthage; there was nothing antecedent to justify such a proceeding, nor does anything follow in the sequel which implies it. Compare also the speech which Justin puts into the mouth of Bomilkar when executed for treason by the Carthaginians—"objestana illis (Carthaginibus) in Hamilcarem patrum sumum tacita sultiticia, quod Agathoclem so- cum illis fuixer, quam jobsica, moturit" (xxii, 7). This points to previous collusion between Hamilkar and Agathoklés.
3000 soldiers strenuously devoted to him—mercenaries and citizens of desperate character—to which Hamilcar added a reinforcement of Africans. As if about to march forth, he mustered his troops at daybreak in the Timoleontion (chapel or precinct consecrated to Timoleon), while Peisarchus and Deklēs, two chiefs of the senate already assembled, were invited with forty others to transact with him some closing business. Having these men in his power, Agathoklēs suddenly turned upon them, and denounced them to the soldiers as guilty of conspiring his death. Then, receiving from the soldiers a response full of ardour, he ordered them immediately to proceed to a general massacre of the senate and their leading partisans, with full permission of licentious plunder in the houses of these victims, the richest men in Syracuse. The soldiers rushed into the streets with ferocious joy to execute this order. They slew not only the senators, but many others also, unarmed and unprepared; each man selecting victims personally obnoxious to him. They broke open the doors of the rich, or climbed over the roofs, massacred the proprietors within, and ravished the females. They chased the unsuspecting fugitives through the streets, not sparing even those who took refuge in the temples. Many of these unfortunate sufferers rushed for safety to the gates, but found them closed and guarded by special order of Agathoklēs; so that they were obliged to let themselves down from the walls, in which many perished miserably. For two days Syracuse was thus a prey to the sanguinary, rapacious, and lustful impulses of the soldiery; four thousand citizens had been already slain, and many more were seized as prisoners. The political purposes of Agathoklēs, as well as the passions of the soldiers, being then sated, he arrested the massacre. He concluded this bloody feat by killing such of his prisoners as were most obnoxious to him, and banishing the rest. The total number of expelled or fugitive Syracusans is stated at 6000; who found a hospitable shelter and home at Agrigentum. One act of justice is mentioned, and ought not to be omitted amidst this scene of horror. Deinokrātēs, one among the prisoners, was liberated by Agathoklēs from motives of former friendship: he too, probably, went into voluntary exile.

After a massacre thus perpetrated in the midst of profound peace, and in the full confidence of a solemn act of mutual reconciliation immediately preceding—surpassing the worst deeds of the elder Dionysius, and indeed (we...
might almost say) of all other Grecian despots—Agathoklēs con
vened what he called an assembly of the people. Such of the
citizens as were either oligarchical, or wealthy, or in any way un
friendly to him, had been already either slain or expelled; so that
the assembly probably included few besides his own soldiers.
Agathoklēs—addressing them in terms of congratulation on the
recent glorious exploit, whereby they had purged the city of its
oligarchical tyrants—proclaimed that the Syracusan people had
now reconquered their full liberty. He affected to be weary of
the toils of command, and anxious only for a life of quiet equality
as one among the many; in token of which he threw off his
generals' cloak and put on a common civil garment. But those
whom he addressed, fresh from the recent massacre and plunder,
felt that their whole security depended upon the maintenance of
his supremacy, and loudly protested that they would not accept
his resignation. Agathoklēs, with pretended reluctance, told them,
that if they insisted, he would comply, but upon the peremptory
condition of enjoying a single-handed authority, without any co
leagues or counsellors for whose misdeeds he was to be responsible.
The assembly replied by conferring upon him, with unanimous
acclamations, the post of general with unlimited power, or despot.¹

Thus was constituted a new despot of Syracuse about fifty years
after the decease of the elder Dionysius, and twenty-two
years after Timoleont had rooted out the Dionysian
dynasty, establishing on its ruins a free polity. On
accepting the post, Agathoklēs took pains to proclaim
that he would tolerate no farther massacre or plunder, and that
his government would for the future be mild and beneficent. He
particularly studied to conciliate the poorer citizens, to whom he
promised abolition of debts and a new distribution of lands. How
far he carried out this project systematically, we do not know; but
he conferred positive donations on many of the poor—which he had
abundant means of doing, out of the properties of the numerous
exiles recently expelled. He was full of promises to every one,
displaying courteous and popular manners, and abstaining from all
ostentation of guards, or ceremonial attendants, or a diadem.
He at the same time applied himself vigorously to strengthen his
military and naval force, his magazines of arms and stores, and
his revenues. He speedily extended his authority over all the
territorial domain of Syracuse, with her subject towns, and carried
his arms successfully over many other parts of Sicily.²

¹ Diodor. xix. 9. ² Diodor. xix. 9; Justin, xxii. 2.
The Carthaginian general Hamilkar, whose complicity or connivance had helped Agathokles to this blood-stained elevation, appears to have permitted him without opposition to extend his dominion over a large portion of Sicily, and even to plunder the towns in alliance with Carthage itself. Complaints having been made to Carthage, this officer was superseded, and another general (also named Hamilkar) was sent in his place. We are unable to trace in detail the proceedings of Agathokles during the first years of his despotism; but he went on enlarging his sway over the neighbouring cities, while the Syracusan exiles, whom he had expelled, found a home partly at Agrigentum (under Deimokrates), partly at Messenæ. About the year 311 B.C., we hear that he made an attempt on Messenæ, which he was on the point of seizing, had he not been stopped by the interference of the Carthaginians (perhaps the newly-appointed Hamilkar), who now at length protested against his violation of the convention; meaning (as we must presume, for we know of no other convention) the oath which had been sworn by Agathokles at Syracuse under the guarantee of the Carthaginians. 1 Though thus disappointed at Messenæ, Agathokles seized Abakarnum—where he slew the leading citizens opposed to him,—and carried on his aggressions elsewhere so effectively, that the leaders at Agrigentum, instigated by the Syracusan exiles who harboured, became convinced of the danger of leaving such encroachments unresisted. 2 The people of Agrigentum came to the resolution of taking up arms on behalf of the liberties of Sicily, and allied themselves with Gela and Messenæ for the purpose.

But the fearful example of Agathokles himself rendered them so apprehensive of the dangers from any military leader, at once native and energetic, that they resolved to invite a foreigner. Some Syracusan exiles were sent to Sparta, to choose and invoke some Spartan of eminence and ability, as Archidamus had recently been called to Tarentum—and even more, as Timoleon had been brought from Corinth, with results so signally beneficent. The old Spartan king Kleomenes (of the Eurysthenid race) had a son Akrotatus, then unpopular at

1 Diodor. xix. 65. καθ’ ὃν δὴ χρόνον καὶ Λιβύην. Diodor, xix. 70, μὴ περιορᾷν ἄλγα-

2 Diodor. xix. 71, μὴ περαστίνα Λαγα-

They invite the Spartan Akrotatus to come and lead conflict and failure.
home,¹ and well disposed towards foreign warfare. This prince, without even consulting the Ephors, listened at once to the envoys, and left Peloponnesus with a small squadron, intending to cross by Korkyra and the coast of Italy to Agrigentum. Unfavourable winds drove him as far north as Apollonia, and delayed his arrival at Tarentum; in which city, originally a Spartan colony, he met with a cordial reception, and obtained a vote of twenty vessels to assist his enterprise of liberating Syracuse from Agathoklēs. He reached Agrigentum with favourable hopes, was received with all the honours due to a Spartan prince, and undertook the command. Bitterly did he disappoint his party. He was incompetent as a general; he dissipated in presents or luxuries the money intended for the campaign, emulating Asiatic despotis; his conduct was arrogant, tyrannical, and even sanguinary. The disgust which he inspired was brought to a height, when he caused Sosistratus, the leader of the Syracusan exiles, to be assassinated at a banquet. Immediately the exiles rose in a body to avenge this murder; while Akrotatus, deposed by the Agrigentines, only found safety in flight.²

To this young Spartan prince, had he possessed a noble heart and energetic qualities, there was here presented a career of equal grandeur with that of Timoleon—against an enemy able indeed and formidable, yet not so superior in force as to render success impossible. It is melancholy to see Akrotatus, from simple worthlessness of character, throwing away such an opportunity; at a time when Sicily was the only soil on which a glorious Hellenic career was still open—when no similar exploits were practicable by any Hellenic leader in Central Greece, from the overwhelming superiority of force possessed by the surrounding kings.

The misconduct of Akrotatus broke up all hopes of active operations against Agathoklēs. Peace was presently concluded with the latter by the Agrigentines and their allies, under the mediation of the Carthaginian general Hamilkar. By the terms of this convention, all the Greek cities in Sicily were declared autonomous, yet under the hegemony

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¹ Diodor. xix. 70. After the defeat of Agis by Antipater, the severe Lacidian laws against those who fled from battle had been suspended for the occasion; as had been done before, after the defeat of Leuktra. Akrotatus had been the only person (ADED) who opposed this suspension; whereby he incurred the most violent odium generally, but most especially from the citizens who profited by the suspension. These men carried their hatred so far, that they even attacked, beat him, and conspired against his life (οὗτοι γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ διετέλουν ἐμπιστοφόρους ἄνθρωπου εἰς ἐνεργόν ἀθανάτοις ἐμφησάρξας). This is a curious indication of Spartan manners.

² Diodor. xix. 71.
of Agathoklēs; excepting only Himera, Selinus, and Herakleia, which were actually, and were declared still to continue, under Carthage. Messēné was the only Grecian city standing aloof from this convention; as such, therefore still remaining open to the Syracusan exiles. The terms were so favourable to Agathoklēs, that they were much disapproved at Carthage. Agathoklēs, recognized as chief and having no enemy in the field, employed himself actively in strengthening his hold on the other cities, and in enlarging his military means at home. He sent a force against Messēné, to require the expulsion of the Syracusan exiles from that city, and to procure at the same time the recall of the Messenian exiles, partisans of his own, and companions of his army. His generals extorted these two points from the Messenians. Agathoklēs, having thus broken the force of Messēné, secured to himself the town still more completely, by sending for those Messenian citizens who had chiefly opposed him, and putting them all to death, as well as his leading opponents at Tauromenium. The number thus massacred was not less than six hundred.

It only remained for Agathoklēs to seize Agrigentum. Thither he accordingly marched. But Deinokratēs and the Syracusan exiles, expelled from Messēné, had made themselves heard at Carthage, insisting on the perils to that city from the encroachments of Agathoklēs. The Carthaginians alarmed sent a fleet of sixty sail, whereby ΚΝ ἐμ him, alone Agrigentum, already under siege by Agathoklēs, was preserved. The recent convention was now broken on all sides, and Agathoklēs kept no farther measures with the Carthaginians. He ravaged all their Sicilian territory, and destroyed some of their forts; while the Carthaginians on their side made a sudden descent with their fleet on the harbour of Syracuse. They could achieve nothing more, however, than the capture of one Athenian merchant-vessel, out of two there riding. They disgraced their acquisition by the cruel act (not uncommon in Carthaginian warfare) of cutting off the hands of the captive crew; for which, in a few days, retaliation was exercised upon the crews of some of their own ships, taken by the cruisers of Agathoklēs.

1 Diodor. xix. 71, 72, 102. When the convention specifies Himera, Selinus, and Herakleia, as being under the Carthaginians, this is to be understood as in addition to the primitive Carthaginian settlements of Solus, Panormus, Lilybaeum, &c., about which no question could arise.

2 Diodor. xix. 72: compare a different narrative—Polyænus, v. 15.

3 Diodor. xix. 103. It must be noticed, however, that even Julius Cæsar, in his wars in Gaul, sometimes cut off the hands of his Gallic prisoners taken in arms, whom he called rebels (Bell. Gall. viii. 44).
The defence of Agrigentum now rested principally on the Carthaginians in Sicily, who took up a position on the hill called Eknomus—in the territory of Gela, a little to the west of the Agrigentine border. Here Agathoklès approached to offer them battle—having been emboldened by two important successes obtained over Deinokratès and the Syracusan exiles, near Kentoripa and Gallaria.\(^1\) So superior was his force, however, that the Carthaginians thought it prudent to remain in their camp; and Agathoklès returned in triumph to Syracuse, where he adorned the temples with his recently acquired spoils. The balance of force was soon altered by the despatch of a large armament from Carthage under Hamilkar, consisting of 130 ships of war, with numerous other transport ships, carrying many soldiers—2000 native Carthaginians, partly men of rank—10,000 Africans—1000 Campanian heavy-armed and 1000 Balearic slingers. The fleet underwent in its passage such a storm, that many of the vessels sank with all on board, and it arrived with very diminished numbers in Sicily. The loss fell upon the native Carthaginian soldiers with peculiar severity; insomuch that when the news reached Carthage, a public mourning was proclaimed, and the city walls were hung with black serge.

Those who reached Sicily, however, were quite sufficient to place

\(^1\) Diodor. xix. 103, 104.  
\(^2\) Diodor. xix. 106.
his soldiers upon them, massacred four thousand persons, and compelled the remainder, as a condition of sparing their lives, to bring in to him all their money and valuables. Having by this atrocity both struck universal terror and enriched himself, he advanced onward towards the Carthaginian camp, and occupied a hill called Phalarion opposite to it. The two camps were separated by a level plain or valley nearly five miles broad, through which ran the river Himera.

For some days of the hottest season (the dog-days), both armies remained stationary, neither of them choosing to make the attack. At length Agathokles gained what he thought a favourable opportunity. A detachment from the Carthaginian camp sallied forth in pursuit of some Greek plunderers; Agathokles posted some men in ambush, who fell upon this detachment unawares, threw it into disorder, and pursued it back to the camp. Following up this partial success, Agathokles brought forward his whole force, crossed the river Himera, and began a general attack. This advance not being expected, the Greek assailants seemed at first on the point of succeeding. They filled up a portion of the ditch, tore up the stockade, and were forcing their way into the camp. They were however repulsed by redoubled efforts, and new troops coming up, on the part of the defenders; mainly, too, by the very effective action of the 1000 Balearic slingers in Hamilkar’s army, who hurled stones weighing a pound each, against which the Greek armour was an inadequate defence. Still Agathokles, noway discouraged, caused the attack to be renewed on several points at once, and with apparent success, when a reinforcement landed from Carthage—the expectation of which may perhaps have induced Hamilkar to refrain from any general attack. These new troops joined in the battle, coming upon the rear of the Greeks; who were intimidated and disordered by such unforeseen assailants, while the Carthaginians in their front, animated to more energetic effort, first repulsed them from the camp, and then pressed them vigorously back. After holding their ground for some time against their double enemy, the Greeks at length fled in disorder back to their own camp, recrossing the river Himera. The interval was between four and five miles of nearly level ground, over which they were actively pursued and severely handled by the Carthaginian cavalry. 5000 in number. Moreover, in crossing the river, many of them drank eagerly, from

thirst, fatigue, and the heat of the weather; the saltiness of the water proved so destructive to them, that numerous dead bodies are said to have been found unwounded on the banks. At length they obtained shelter in their own camp, after a loss of 7000 men; while the loss of the victors is estimated at 500.

Agathoklès, after this great disaster, did not attempt to maintain his camp, but set it on fire, and returned to Gela; which was well fortified and provisioned, capable of a long defence. Here he intended to maintain himself against Hamilkar, at least until the Syracusan harvest (probably already begun) should be completed. But Hamilkar, having ascertained the strength of Gela, thought it prudent to refrain from a siege, and employed himself in operations for the purpose of strengthening his party in Sicily. His great victory at the Himera had produced the strongest effect upon many of the Sicilian cities, who were held to Agathoklès by no other bonds except those of fear. Hamilkar issued conciliatory proclamations, inviting them all to become his allies, and marching his troops towards the most convenient points. Presently Kamara, Leontini, Katana, Tauromenium, Messéne, Abakãnum, with several other smaller towns and forts, sent to tender themselves as allies; and the conduct of Hamilkar towards all was so mild and equitable, as to give universal satisfaction. Agathoklès appears to have been thus dispossessed of most part of the island, retaining little besides Gela and Syracuse. Even the harbour of Syracuse was watched by a Carthaginian fleet, placed to intercept foreign supplies. Returning to Syracuse after Hamilkar had renounced all attempts on Gela, Agathoklès collected the corn from the neighbourhood, and put the fortifications in the best state of defence. He had every reason to feel assured that the Carthaginians, encouraged by their recent success, and reinforced by allies from the whole island, would soon press the siege of Syracuse with all their energy; while for himself, hated by all, there was no hope of extraneous support, and little hope of a successful defence.

In this apparently desperate situation, he conceived the idea of a novelty alike daring, ingenious, and effective; surrounded indeed with difficulties in the execution, but promising, if successfully executed, to change altogether the prospects of the war. He resolved to carry a force across from Syracuse to Africa, and attack the Carthaginians on their own soil. No Greek, so far as we know, had ever conceived...
the like scheme before; no one certainly had ever executed it. In the memory of man, the African territory of Carthage had never been visited by hostile foot. It was known that the Carthaginians would be not only unprepared to meet an attack at home, but unable even to imagine it as practicable. It was known that their territory was rich, and their African subjects harshly treated, discontented, and likely to seize the first opportunity for revolting. The landing of any hostile force near Carthage would strike such a blow, as at least to cause the recall of the Carthaginian armament in Sicily, and thus relieve Syracuse; perhaps the consequences of it might be yet greater.

How to execute the scheme was the grand difficulty—for the Carthaginians were superior not merely on land, but also at sea. Agathoklés had no chance except by keeping his purpose secret, and even unsuspected. He fitted out an armament, announced as about to sail forth from Syracuse on a secret expedition, against some unknown town on the Sicilian coast. He selected for this purpose his best troops, especially his horsemen, few of whom had been slain at the battle of the Himera: he could not transport horses, but he put the horsemen aboard with their saddles and bridles, entertaining full assurance that he could procure horses in Africa. In selecting soldiers for his expedition, he was careful to take one member from many different families, to serve as hostage for the fidelity of those left behind. He liberated, and enrolled among his soldiers, many of the strongest and most resolute slaves. To provide the requisite funds, his expedients were manifold; he borrowed from merchants, seized the money belonging to orphans, stripped the women of their precious ornaments, and even plundered the richest temples. By all these proceedings, the hatred as well as fear towards him was aggravated, especially among the more opulent families. Agathoklés publicly proclaimed, that the siege of Syracuse, which the Carthaginians were now commencing, would be long and terrible—that he and his soldiers were accustomed to hardships and could endure them, but that those who felt themselves unequal to the effort might retire with their properties while it was yet time. Many of the wealthier families—to a number stated as 1600 persons—profited by this permission; but as they were leaving the city, Agathoklés set his mercenaries upon them, slew them all, and appropriated their possessions to himself. By such tricks and enormities, he provided funds enough for an armament of sixty

1 Diodor. xx. 4, 5; Justin, xxii. 4. Compare Polyenus, v. 3–5.
ships, well filled with soldiers. Not one of these soldiers knew where they were going; there was a general talk about the madness of Agathoklēs; nevertheless such was their confidence in his bravery and military resource, that they obeyed his orders without asking questions. To act as viceroy of Syracuse during his own absence, Agathoklēs named Antander his brother, aided by an Aitolian officer named Erymnon.

The armament was equipped and ready, without any suspicion on the part of the Carthaginian fleet blockading the harbour. It happened one day that the approach of some corn-ships seduced this fleet into a pursuit; the mouth of the harbour being thus left unguarded, Agathoklēs took the opportunity of striking with his armament into the open sea. As soon as the Carthaginian fleet saw him sailing forth, they neglected the corn-ships, and prepared for battle, which they presumed that he was come to offer. To their surprise, he stood out to sea as fast as he could; they then pushed out in pursuit of him, but he had already got a considerable advance and strove to keep it. Towards nightfall however they neared him so much, that he was only saved by the darkness. During the night he made considerable way; but on the next day there occurred an eclipse of the sun so nearly total, that it became perfectly dark, and the stars were visible. The mariners were so terrified at this phenomenon that all the artifice and ascendancy of Agathoklēs were required to inspire them with new courage. At length, after six days and nights, they approached the coast of Africa. The Carthaginian ships had pursued them at a venture, in the direction towards Africa; and they appeared in sight just as Agathoklēs was nearing the land. Strenuous efforts were employed by the mariners on both sides to touch land first; Agathoklēs secured that advantage, and was enabled to put himself into such a posture of defence that he repulsed the attack of the Carthaginian ships, and secured the disembarkation of his own soldiers, at a point called the Latomiae or Stone-quarries.

After establishing his position ashore, and refreshing his soldiers, the first proceeding of Agathoklēs was to burn his vessels; a proceeding which seemed to carry an air of desperate boldness. Yet in truth the ships were now useless—for, if he was unsuccessful on land, they were not enough to enable him to return in the face of the Carthaginian fleet;

1 Diodor, xx. 4-16.
2 Diodor, xx. 6. Procopias, Bell. Vand. 1. 15. It is here stated, that for nine days' march eastward from Carthage, as far as Juka, the land is ἀλίμενος.
they were even worse than useless, since, if he retained them, it was requisite that he should leave a portion of his army to guard them, and thus enfeebled his means of action for the really important achievements on land. Convening his soldiers in assembly near the ships, he first offered a sacrifice to Démèter and Persephoné—the patron Goddesses of Sicily, and of Syracuse in particular. He then apprised his soldiers, that during the recent crossing and danger from the Carthaginian pursuers, he had addressed a vow to these Goddesses—engaging to make a burnt-offering of his ships in their honour, if they would preserve him safe across to Africa. The Goddesses had granted this boon; they had farther, by favourably responding to the sacrifice just offered, promised full success to his African projects; it became therefore incumbent on him to fulfil his vow with exactness. Torches being now brought, Agathoklès took one in his hand, and mounted on the stern of the admiral’s ship, directing each of the trierarchs to do the like on his own ship. All were set on fire simultaneously, amidst the sound of trumpets, and the mingled prayers and shouts of the soldiers.¹

Though Agathoklès had succeeded in animating his soldiers with a factitious excitement, for the accomplishment of this purpose, yet so soon as they saw the conflagration decided and irrevocable—thus cutting off all their communication with home—their spirits fell, and they began to despair of their prospects. Without allowing them time to dwell upon the novelty of the situation, Agathoklès conducted them at once against the nearest Carthaginian town, called Megalé-Polis.² His march lay for the most part through a rich territory in the highest cultivation. The passing glance which we thus obtain into the condition of the territory near Carthage is of peculiar interest; more especially when con-

¹ This striking scene is described by Diodorus, xx. 7 (compare Justin, xxiii. 6), probably enough copied from Kal-lias, the companion and panegyrist of Agathoklès; see Diodorus, xxi. Fragm. p. 281.

² Megalé-Polis is nowhere else mentioned—but is noted by Forbèz in his list of towns in the Carthaginian territory (Handbuch der Alteren Geographie, sect. 191). Dr. Barth (Wanderungen auf den Küsten Ländern des Mittelmeeres, vol. i. p. 131-133) supposes that Agathoklès landed at an indentation of the coast on the western face of that projecting tongue of land which terminates in Cape Bon (Promontorium Mercuarii), forming the eastern boundary of the Gulf of Carthage. There are stone quarries here, of the greatest extent as well as antiquity. Dr. Barth places Megalé-Polis not far off from this spot, on the same western face of the projecting land, and near the spot afterwards called Mista.

A map, which I have placed in the Appendix, will convey to the reader some idea of the Carthaginian territory.
trasted with the desolation of the same coast, now and for centuries past. The corn-land, the plantations both of vines and olives, the extensive and well-stocked gardens, the size and equipment of the farm-buildings, the large outlay for artificial irrigation, the agreeable country-houses belonging to wealthy Carthaginians, &c., all excited the astonishment, and stimulated the cupidity, of Agathoklēs and his soldiers. Moreover, the towns were not only very numerous, but all open and unfortified, except Carthage itself and a few others on the coast. The Carthaginians, besides having little fear of invasion by sea, were disposed to mistrust their subject cities, which they ruled habitually with harshness and oppression. The Liby-Phenicians appear to have been unused to arms—a race of timid cultivators and traffickers, accustomed to subjection and practised in the deceit necessary for lightening it. Agathoklēs, having marched through this land of abundance, assaulted Megale-Polis without delay. The inhabitants, unprepared for attack, distracted with surprise and terror, made little resistance. Agathoklēs easily took the town, abandoning both the persons of the inhabitants and all the rich property within, to his soldiers; who enriched themselves with a prodigious booty both from town and country—furniture, cattle, and slaves. From hence he advanced farther southward to the town called Tunes (the modern Tunis, at the distance of only fourteen miles southwest of Carthage itself), which he took by storm in like manner. He fortified Tunes as a permanent position; but he kept his main

1 Justin, xxii. 5. "Hoc accedere, quad urbem castellisque Afric non maris cincta, non in montibus posita sint; sed in pannis campis sine nisius munimentis jacent: quas omnes metu excidit facile ad helli societatem pericli possee."

2 Seven centuries and more after these events, we read that the Vandal king Genseric conquered Africa from the Romans—and that he demolished the fortifications of all the other towns except Carthage alone—from the like feeling of mistrust. This demolition materially facilitated the conquest of the Vandal kingdom by Belisarius, two generations afterwards (Procopius, Bello Vandal. i, 5; i, 15).

3 Livy (xxix. 25), in recounting the landing of Scipio in the Carthaginian territory in the latter years of the second Punic war, says, "Emporia ut potent, gubernatarius civit. Fortis annis ager, coque abundantum om-
force united in camp, knowing well that he should presently have
an imposing army against him in the field, and severe battles to
fight. The Carthaginian fleet had pursued Agathoklès during his
crossing from Syracuse, in perfect ignorance of his plans.
When he landed in Africa, on their own territory, and
even burnt his fleet, they at first flattered themselves
with the belief that they held him prisoner. But as soon
as they saw him commence his march in military array
against Megalépolis, they divined his real purposes, and
were filled with apprehension. Carrying off the brazen prow-
ornaments of his burnt and abandoned ships, they made sail for
Carthage, sending forward a swift vessel to communicate first what
had occurred. Before this vessel arrived, however, the landing
of Agathoklès had been already made known at Carthage, where
it excited the utmost surprise and consternation; since no one sup-
posed that he could have accomplished such an adventure without
having previously destroyed the Carthaginian army and fleet in
Sicily. From this extreme dismay they were presently relieved by
the arrival of the messengers from their fleet; whereby they learnt
the real state of affairs in Sicily. They now made the best pre-
parations in their power to resist Agathoklès. Hanno and Bomil-
kar, two men of leading families, were named generals con-
jointly.

They were bitter political rivals,—but this very rivalry was by
some construed as an advantage, since each would serve as a
check upon the other, and as a guarantee to the state; or, what is
more probable, each had a party sufficiently strong to prevent the
separate election of the other. These two generals, unable to
wait for distant succours, led out the native forces of the city,
stated at 40,000 infantry, 1000 cavalry, derived altogether from
citizens and residents—with 2000 war-chariots. They took post
on an eminence (somewhere between Tunès and Carthage) not far

1 Diodor. xx. 8. Compare Polybius,
i. 29, where he describes the first
invasion of the Carthaginian territory
by the Roman consul Regulus. Tunès
was 120 stadia or about fourteen miles
south-east of Carthage (Polyb. i. 67).
The Tab. Peuting. reckons it only ten
miles. It was made the central place
for hostile operations against Carthage,
both by Regulus in the first Punic war
(Polyb. i. 305)—by Matho and Spandius
in the rebellion of the mercenary
soldiers and native Africans against
Carthage, which followed on the close
of the first Punic war (Polyb. i. 73)—
and by the revolted Libyag in 396 B.C.
(Diodor. xiv. 77).

2 Diodor places Tunès at the distance
of 2000 stadia from Carthage, which
must undoubtedly be a mistake. He
calls it Widi Tune: an epithet drawn
from the chalk cliffs adjoining.
from Agathoklês; Bomilkar commanding on the left, where the ground was so difficult that he was unable to extend his front, and was obliged to admit an unusual depth of files; while Hanno was on the right, having in his front rank the Sacred Band of Carthage, a corps of 2500 distinguished citizens, better armed and braver than the rest. So much did the Carthaginians outnumber the invaders—and so confident were they of victory—that they carried with them 20,000 pairs of handcuffs for their anticipated prisoners.

Agathoklês placed himself on the left, with 1000 chosen hoplites inferior round him to combat the Sacred Band; the command of his right he gave to his son Archagathus. His troops—Syraucans, miscellaneous mercenary Greeks, Campanians or Sammites, Tuscans, and Gauls—scarcey equalled in numbers one-half of the enemy. Some of the ships' crews were even without arms—a deficiency which Agathoklês could supply only in appearance, by giving to them the leather cases or wrappers of shields, stretched out upon sticks. The outstretched wrappers thus exhibited looked from a distance like shields; so that these men, stationed in the rear, had the appearance of a reserve of hoplites. As the soldiers however were still discouraged, Agathoklês tried to hearten them up by another device yet more singular, for which indeed he must have made deliberate provision beforehand. In various parts of the camp, he let fly a number of owls, which perched upon the shields and helmets of the soldiers. These birds, the favourite of Athéné, were supposed and generally asserted to promise victory; the minds of the soldiers are reported to have been much reassured by the sight.

The Carthaginian war-chariots and cavalry, which charged first, made little or no impression; but the infantry of their right pressed the Greeks seriously. Especially Hanno, with the Sacred Band around him, behaved with the utmost bravery and forwardness, and seemed to be gaining advantage, when he was unfortunately slain. His death

Diodor. xx. 10-13. See, respecting the Sacred Band of Carthage (which was nearly cut to pieces by Timoleon at the battle of the Crimneus), Diodor. xvi. 80, 81; also this History, Chap. LXXXV.

The amount of native or citizen-force given here by Diodorus (40,000 foot and 1000 horse) seems very great. Our data for appreciating it however are lamentably scanty; and we ought to expect a large total. The population of Carthage is said to have been 700,000 souls; even when it was besieged by the Romans in the third Punic war, and when its power was prodigiously lessened (Strabo, xvii, p. 833), its military magazines, even in that reduced condition, were enormous, as they stood immediately previous to their being given up to the Romans, under the treacherous delusions held out by Rome.
not only discouraged his own troops, but became fatal to the army, by giving opportunity for treason to his colleague Bamilkars. This man had long secretly meditated the project of rendering himself despot of Carthage. As a means of attaining that end, he deliberately sought to bring reverses upon her; and no sooner had he heard of Hanno’s death, than he gave orders for his own wing to retreat. The Sacred Band, though fighting with unshaken valour, were left unsupported, attacked in rear as well as front, and compelled to give way along with the rest. The whole Carthaginian army was defeated and driven back to Carthage. Their camp fell into the hands of Agathoklès, who found among their baggage the very handcuffs which they had brought for fettering their expected captives.

This victory made Agathoklès for the time master of the open country. He transmitted the news to Sicily, by a boat of thirty oars, constructed expressly for the purpose—since he had no ships of his own remaining. Having fortified Tunes, and established it as his central position, he commenced operations along the eastern coast (Zeugitana and Byzakium, as the northern and southern portions of it were afterwards denominated by the Romans) against the towns dependent on Carthage.

In that city, meanwhile, all was terror and despondency in consequence of the recent defeat. It was well known that the African subjects generally entertained nothing but fear and hatred towards the reigning city. Neither the native Libyans or Africans,—nor the mixed race called Liby-Phocnicians, who inhabited the towns—could be depended on if their services were really needed. The distress of the Carthaginians took the form of religious fears and repentance. They looked back with remorse on the impiety of their past lives, and on their omissions of duty towards the Gods. To the Tyrian Heraklès, they had been slack in transmitting the dues and presents required by their religion; a backwardness which they now endeavoured to make up by sending envoys to Tyre, with prayers and supplications, with rich presents, and especially with models in gold and silver of their sacred temples and shrines. Towards Kronus, or Moloch, they also felt that they had conducted themselves sinfully. The worship acceptable to that God required the

1 Diodor. xx. 12. The loss of the Carthaginians was differently given—some authors stated it at 1000 men, others at 6000. The loss in the army

2 Diodor. xx. 17.

3 Diodor. xx. 55.
sacrifice of young children, born of free and opulent parents, and even the choice child of the family. But it was now found out, on investigation, that many parents had recently put a fraud upon the God, by surreptitiously buying poor children, feeding them well, and then sacrificing them as their own. This discovery seemed at once to explain why Kronus had become offended, and what had brought upon them the recent defeat. They made an emphatic atonement, by selecting 200 children from the most illustrious families in Carthage, and offering them up to Kronus at a great public sacrifice; besides which, 300 parents, finding themselves denounced for similar omissions in the past, displayed their repentance by voluntarily immolating their own children for the public safety. The statue of Kronus—placed with outstretched hands to receive the victim tendered to him, with fire immediately underneath,—was fed at that solemnity certainly with 200, and probably with 500, living children.¹ By this monstrous holocaust the full religious duty being discharged, and forgiveness obtained from the God, the mental distress of the Carthaginians was healed.

¹ Diodor. xx. 14. ἠτιῶντο δὲ καὶ τὸν Κρόνον αὐτοῖς ἐναντιοῦσθαι, καθόσον ἐν τοῖς ἐμπρόσθεν χρόνοις θύοντες τούτω τῇ θείᾳ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν κρατίστων, ἔστερον ἡμῶν μισοῖς λάθρα παῖδας καὶ θρεψάντες ἐνέμενον ἐπὶ τὴν θυσίαν καὶ διηθότως γενομένης, εὐθύρησαν τινὲς τὸν καθιερωμένων ὑποβυλιμαίοι γεγονότες· τούτων δὲ λαβόντες ἐννοίαν, καὶ τοὺς πολέμους πρὸς τοῖς τέχευσιν ὄραντες στρατεύετοτα, ἑπισημανόμενοι ὡς καταλεικυτές τὰς ταπαίριας τῶν τιμιῶν τιμα· διορθάσασιν δὲ τὰς ἀργοῖς σπεῦ- δοντας, διακόσιους μὲν τῶν ἐπιφανειο- τῶν παιδίν προκρίναντες ὡς τοὔχων δημοσίων ἄλλοι ὡς ἐν διαβολαῖς ὄντες, ἐκαυνόσις ἐναπλοῖς ὡθοῦν, ὡσοι ἐλάττων ὄντες τρακ- κοκοίνων ἡ δὲ παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἀμέτρητα Κρόνων χαλκοῖς, ἐκτακτώς τὰς χειρὰς ὡς ζητεῖται ἡγεκλείμενας ἐξὶ τὴν γῆν, διότι τὸν ἐκπελευάν τῶν παιδών ἀποκυλιέσθαι καὶ πίπτειν εἰς τὰ ὁχήμα πλήρες παρὰ. Compare Festus ap. Lactantium, Inst. Div. 17.21; Justin, xviii. 6, 12.

In this remarkable passage (the more remarkable because so little information concerning Carthaginian antiquity has reached us), one clause is not perfectly clear, respecting the three hundred who are said to have voluntarily given themselves up, Diodorus means (I apprehend) as Eusebius understood it, that these were fathers who gave up their children (not themselves) to be sacrificed. The victims here mentioned as sacrificed to Kronos were children, not adults (compare Diodor. xiii, 86); nothing is here said about adult victims. Wesseling in his note adheres to the literal meaning of the words, dissenting from Eusebius: but I think that the literal meaning is less in harmony with the general tenor of the paragraph. Instances of self-devotion, by persons torn with remorse, are indeed mentioned: see the case of Imilkon, Diodor. xiv. 76; Justin, xix. 3.

We read in the Fragment of Ennius—"Peni sunt solidi suis sacrificare puellis." see the chapter iv. of Münster's work, Religion der Karthager, on this subject.
Agathoklès had fortified that town, and established a strong camp before it; but he had withdrawn his main force, to prosecute operations against the maritime towns on the eastern coast of the territory of Carthage. Among these towns, he first attacked Neapolis with success, granting to the inhabitants favourable terms. He then advanced farther southwards towards Adrumetum, of which he commenced the siege, with the assistance of a neighbouring Libyan prince named Elymas, who now joined him. While Agathoklès was engaged in the siege of Adrumetum, the Carthaginians attacked his position at Tunis, drove his soldiers out of the fortified camp into the town, and began to batter the defences of the town itself. Apprised of this danger while besieging Adrumetum, but nevertheless reluctant to raise the siege,—Agathoklès left his main army before it, stole away with only a few soldiers and some camp-followers, and conducting them to an elevated spot—half-way between Adrumetum and Tunis, yet visible from both—he caused them to kindle at night upon this eminence a prodigious number of fires. The effect of these fires, seen from Adrumetum on one side and from the army before Tunis on the other, was, to produce the utmost terror at both places. The Carthaginians besieging Tunis fancied that Agathoklès with his whole army was coming to attack them, and forthwith abandoned the siege in disorder, leaving their engines behind. The defenders of Adrumetum, interpreting these fires as evidence of a large reinforcement on its way to join the besieging army, were so discouraged that they surrendered the town on capitulation.

1 Diodor. xx. 17. λάθρα προσῆλθεν ἐπὶ τιμὰ τὸν ἀρχινόμ. ἄδειον ὄρος ταῖς δυναταῖς ἣν αὐτὸν ύπὸ τῶν Ἀδρυμητινῶν καὶ τῶν Καρχηδονίων τῶν ἔπεμεν τόπον νυκτὸς δὲ συντάξας τοῖς στρατιῶταις εἰς πάλιν κοινῷ δόχῳ ἐποίησε, τοῖς μὲν Καρχηδονίοις, ὡς μετὰ μεγάλης δυνάμεως ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς παρατημένοις, τοῖς δὲ πολιορκούμενοις, ὡς ἔλλην δυνάμεως ἕδρα τοῖς πολεμοῖς ἔκει σφυχαῖν παραγεγεγομένης.

2 Diodor. XX. 17. The incident here recounted by Diodorus is curious, but quite distinct and intelligible. He had good authorities before him in his history of Agathoklès. If true, it affords an evidence for determining, within some limits, the site of the ancient Adrumetum, which Mannert and Shaw place at Herkla—while Forlager and Dr. Barth put it near the site of the modern port called Susa, still more to the southward, and at a prodigious distance from Tunis. Other authors have placed it at Hamamat, more to the northward than Herkla, and nearer to Tunis.

Of these three sites, Hamamat is the only one which will consist with the narrative of Diodorus, both the others are too distant. Hamamat is about forty-eight English miles from Tunis (see Barth, p. 184, with his note). This is as great a distance (if not too great) as can possibly be admitted; both Herkla and Susa are very much more distant, and therefore out of the question.

Nevertheless, the other evidence known to us tends apparently to place Adrumetum at Susa, and not at Hamamat (see Barth, p. 142-154; Forbiger, Handb. Geog. p. 815). It is therefore probable that the narrative of Diodorus is not true, or must apply to some
By this same stratagem—if the narrative can be trusted—Agathoklēs both relieved Tunēs, and acquired possession of Adrumetum. Pushing his conquests yet farther south, he besieged and took Thapsus, with several other towns on the coast to a considerable distance southward. He also occupied and fortified the important position called Aspis, on the south-east of the headland Cape Bon, and not far distant from it; a point, convenient for maritime communication with Sicily.

By a series of such acquisitions, comprising in all not less than 200 dependencies of Carthage, Agathoklēs became master along the eastern coast. He next endeavoured to subdue the towns in the interior, into which he advanced as far as several days' march. But he was recalled by intelligence from his soldiers at Tunēs, that the Carthaginians had marched out again to attack them, and had already retaken some of his conquests. Returning suddenly by forced marches, he came upon them by surprise, and drove in their advanced parties with considerable loss; while he also gained an important victory over the Libyan prince Ilymas, who had rejoined the Carthaginians, but was now defeated and slain. The Carthaginians, however, though thus again humbled and discouraged,
still maintained the field, strongly entrenched, between Carthage and Tunés.

Meanwhile the affairs of Agathoklès at Syracuse had taken a turn unexpectedly favourable. He had left the city blocked up partially by sea and with a victorious enemy encamped near it; so that supplies found admission with difficulty. In this condition, Hamilkar, commander of the Carthaginian army, received, from Carthage the messengers announcing their recent defeat in Africa; yet also bringing the brazen prow ornaments taken from the ships of Agathoklès. He ordered the envoys to conceal the real truth, and to spread abroad that Agathoklès had been destroyed with his armament; in proof of which he produced the prow ornaments,—an undoubted evidence that the ships had really been destroyed. Sending envoys with these evidences into Syracuse, to be exhibited to Antander and the other authorities, Hamilkar demanded from them the surrender of the city, under promise of safety and favourable terms; at the same time marching his army close up to it, with the view of making an attack. Antander with others, believing the information and despairing of successful resistance, were disposed to comply; but Erymnon the Aitolian insisted on holding out until they had fuller certainty. This resolution Antander adopted. At the same time, mistrusting those citizens of Syracuse who were relatives or friends of the exiles without, he ordered them all to leave the city immediately, with their wives and families. No less than 8000 persons were expelled under this mandate. They were consigned to the mercy of Hamilkar and his army without; who not only suffered them to pass, but treated them with kindness. Syracuse was now a scene of aggravated wretchedness and despondency; not less from this late calamitous expulsion, than from the grief of those who believed that their relatives in Africa had perished with Agathoklès. Hamilkar had brought up his battering-engines, and was preparing to assault the town, when Nearṭhus, the messenger from Agathoklès, arrived from Africa after a voyage of five days, having under favour of darkness escaped, though only just escaped, the blockading squadron. From him the Syracusan government learnt the real truth, and the victorious position of Agathoklès. There was no farther talk of capitulation; Hamilkar—having tried a partial assault, which was vigorously repulsed,—withdrew his army, and detached from it a reinforcement of 5000 men to the aid of his countrymen in Africa.¹

¹ Dioς. Ψ. 15, 16.
During some months, he seems to have employed himself in partial operations for extending the Carthaginian dominion throughout Sicily. But at length he concerted measures with the Syracusan exile Deinokratés, who was at the head of a numerous body of his exiled countrymen, for a renewed attack upon Syracuse. His fleet already blockaded the harbour, and he now with his army, stated as 120,000 men, destroyed the neighbouring lands, hoping to starve out the inhabitants. Approaching close to the walls of the city, he occupied the Olympicion, or temple of Zeus Olympius, near the river Anapus and the interior coast of the Great Harbour. From hence—probably under the conduct of Deinokratés and the other exiles, well-acquainted with the ground—he undertook by a night-march to ascend the circuitous and difficult mountain track, for the purpose of surprising the fort called Euryalus, at the highest point of Epipolae, and the western apex of the Syracusan lines of fortification. This was the same enterprise, at the same hour, and with the same main purpose, as that of Demosthenés during the Athenian siege, after he had brought the second armament from Athens to the relief of Nikias. Even Demosthenés, though conducting his march with greater precaution than Hamilkar, and successful in surprising the fort of Euryalus, had been driven down again with disastrous loss. Moreover, since his time, this fort Euryalus, instead of being left detached, had been embodied by the elder Dionysius as an integral portion of the fortifications of the city. It formed the apex or point of junction for the two converging walls—one skirting the northern cliff, the other the southern cliff, of Epipolae. The surprise intended by Hamilkar—difficult in the extreme, if at all practicable—seems to have been unskilfully conducted. It was attempted with a confused multitude, incapable of that steady order requisite for night-movements. His troops, losing their way in the darkness, straggled, and even mistook each other for enemies; while the Syracusan guards from Euryalus, alarmed by the noise, attacked them vigorously and put them to the rout. Their loss, in trying to escape down the steep declivity, was prodigious; and Hamilkar himself, making brave efforts to rally them, became prisoner to the Syracusans. What lent peculiar interest

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1 See Ch. IX. of this History; together with the second Plan of Syracuse, annexed to the volume in which that Chapter is contained.
2 For a description of the fortifications added to Syracuse by the elder Dionysius, see Ch. XXXII. of this History; also Plan IV. at the end of the volume.
to this incident, in the eyes of a pious Greek, was that it served to illustrate and confirm the truth of prophecy. Hamilkar had been assured by a prophet that he would sup that night in Syracuse; and this assurance had in part emboldened him to the attack, since he naturally calculated on entering the city as a conqueror. He did indeed take his evening meal in Syracuse, literally fulfilling the augury. Immediately after it, he was handed over to the relatives of the slain, who first paraded him through the city in chains, then inflicted on him the worst tortures, and lastly killed him. His head was cut off and sent to Africa.

The loss and humiliation sustained in this repulse—together with the death of Hamilkar, and the discord ensuing between the exiles under Deinokratés and the Carthaginian soldiers—completely broke up the besieging army. At the same time, the Agrigentines, profiting by the depression both of Carthaginians and exiles, stood forward publicly, proclaiming themselves as champions of the cause of autonomous city government throughout Sicily, under their own presidency, against both the Carthaginians on one side, and the despot Agathoklés on the other. They chose for their general a citizen named Xenodokus, who set himself with vigour to the task of expelling everywhere the mercenary garrisons which held the cities in subjection. He began first with Gela, the city immediately adjoining Agrigentum, found a party of the citizens disposed to aid him, and, in conjunction with them, overthrew the Agathoklean garrison. The Geloans, thus liberated, seconded cordially his efforts to extend the like benefits to others. The popular banner proclaimed by Agrigentum proved so welcome, that many cities eagerly invited her aid to shake off the yoke of the soldiery in their respective citadels, and regain their free governments. Enna, Erbessus, Echetla, Leontini, and Kamarina, were all thus relieved from the dominion of Agathokles; while other cities were in like manner emancipated from the sway of the Carthaginians; and joined the Agrigentine confederacy. The Agathoklean government at Syracuse was not strong enough to

1 Diodor. xx. 29, 30. Cicero (Divinat. i. 24) notices this prophecy and its manner of fulfilment; but he gives a somewhat different version of the events preceding the capture of Hamilkar.

2 Diodor. xx. 30. τὸν δὲ οὖν Αμίλκαν ὅ τιν ἀριστοκράτης συγχέοιτο δεξιόμενοι διάσωσε διὰ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ δεινοὶ πλάκας καὶ αὐτοῦ χρησάμενοι, μετὰ τῆς ἀνέθεται δέμαρα κόσμου.

3 Diodor. xx. 31. διαβοηθείσης δὲ τῆς τῶν Ἀκραγαντότων ἐπιβολῆς κατὰ πάντα τὴν νίκην, ἐνέπεκτον ἐρήμη ταῖς πόλεσι πρὸ τῆς ἐλευθερίας.

4 Enna is nearly in the centre of Sicily; Erbessus is not far to the northeast of Agrigentum; Echetla is placed by Polybius (i. 15) midway between the domain of Syracuse and that of Carthage.

5 Vol. VIII.
resist such spirited manifestations. Syracuse still continued to be blocked up by the Carthaginian fleet; though the blockade was less efficacious, and supplies were now introduced more abundantly than before. 1

The ascendency of Agathoklēs was thus rather on the wane in Sicily; but in Africa, he had become more powerful than ever—not without perilous hazards which brought him occasionally to the brink of ruin. On receiving from Syracuse the head of the captive Hamilkar, he rode forth close to the camp of the Carthaginians, and held it up to their view in triumph; they made respectful prostration before it, but the sight was astounding and mournful to them. 2 While they were thus in despondency, however, a strange vicissitude was on the point of putting their enemy into their hands. A violent mutiny broke out in the camp of Agathoklēs at Tunis, arising out of a drunken altercation between his son Archagathus and an Αἰτωλικός officer named Lykiskus; which ended in the murder of the latter by the former. The comrades of Lykiskus rose in arms with fury to avenge him, calling for the head of Archagathus. They found sympathy with the whole army; who, seizing the opportunity of demanding their arrears of outstanding pay, chose new generals, and took regular possession of Tunis with its defensive works. The Carthaginians, informed of this outbreak, immediately sent envoys to treat with the mutineers, offering to them large presents and double pay in the service of Carthage. Their offer was at first so favourably entertained, that the envoys returned with confident hopes of success; when Agathoklēs, as a last resource, clothed himself in mean garb, and threw himself on the mercy of the soldiers. He addressed them in a pathetic appeal, imploring them not to desert him, and even drew his sword to kill himself before their faces. With such art did he manage this scene, that the feelings of the soldiers underwent a sudden and complete revolution. They not only became reconciled to him, but even greeted him with enthusiasm, calling on him to resume the dress and functions of general, and promising unabated obedience for the future. 3 Agathoklēs gladly obeyed the call, and

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1 Diodor. xx. 32. 2 Postquam immissis lictoribus, Valens coercere seditionem cooptabat ipsum invading (milites), saxa jactunt, fugiunt sequuntur. —Valens, servili veste, apud decurionem equitum tegebat. 3 Compare the description in Tacitus, Hist. ii. 79, of the mutiny in the Vitellian army commanded by Fabius Valens, at Ticinum.
took advantage of their renewed ardour to attack forthwith the Carthaginians; who, expecting nothing less, were defeated with considerable loss.\footnote{Diodor. xx. 34.}

In spite of this check, the Carthaginians presently sent a considerable force into the interior, for the purpose of reconquering or regaining the disaffected Numidian tribes. They met with good success in this enterprise; but the Numidians were in the main faithless and indifferent to both the belligerents, seeking only to turn the war to their own profit. Agathoklès, leaving his son in command at Tunis, followed the Carthaginians into the interior with a large portion of his army. The Carthaginian generals were cautious, and kept themselves in strong position. Nevertheless Agathoklès felt confident enough to assail them in their camp; and after great effort, with severe loss on his own side, he gained an indecisive victory. This advantage however was countervailed by the fact, that during the action the Numidians assailed his camp, slew all the defenders, and carried off nearly all the slaves and baggage. The loss on the Carthaginian side fell most severely upon the Greek soldiers in their pay; most of them exiles under Klibion, and some Syracusan exiles. These men behaved with signal gallantry, and were nearly all slain, either during the battle or after the battle, by Agathoklès.\footnote{Diodor. xx. 39.}

It had now become manifest, however, to this daring invader, that the force of resistance possessed by Carthage was more than he could overcome—that though humbling and impoverishing her for the moment, he could not bring the war to a triumphant close; since the city itself, occupying the isthmus of a peninsula from sea to sea, and surrounded with the strongest fortifications, could not be besieged except by means far superior to his.\footnote{Diodor. xx. 50.} We have already seen, that though he had gained victories and seized rich plunder, he had not been able to provide even regular pay for his soldiers, whose fidelity was consequently precarious. Nor could he expect reinforcements from Sicily; where his power was on the whole declining, though Syracuse itself was in less danger than before. He therefore resolved

\textit{"silentio, patientia, postremo precibus, signisque, in tribunal ferunt."}
to invoke aid from Ophellas at Kyréné, and despatched Orthon as envoy for that purpose.¹

To Kyréné and what was afterwards called its Pentapolis (i.e. the five neighbouring Grecian towns, Kyréné, its port Apollonia, Barka, Teucheira, and Hesperides), an earlier chapter of this History has already been devoted.² Unfortunately information respecting them, for a century and more anterior to Alexander the Great, is almost wholly wanting. Established among a Libyan population, many of whom were domiciliated with the Greeks as fellow-residents, these Kyreneans had imbibed many Libyan habits in war, in peace, and in religion; of which their fine breed of horses, employed both for the festival chariot-matches and in battle, was one example. The Libyan tribes, useful as neighbours, servants, and customers, were frequently also troublesome as enemies. In 113 B.C. we hear accidentally that Hesperides was besieged by Libyan tribes, and rescued by some Peloponnesian hoplites on their way to Syracuse during the Athenian siege.³ About 401 B.C. (shortly after the close of the Peloponnesian war), the same city was again so hard pressed by the same enemies, that she threw open her citizenship to any Greek new-comer who would aid in repelling them. This invitation was accepted by several of the Messenians, just then expelled from Peloponnesus, and proscribed by the Spartans; they went to Africa, but, becoming involved in intestine warfare among the citizens of Kyréné, a large proportion of them perished.⁴ Except these scanty notices, we hear nothing about the Greco-Libyan Pentapolis in relation to Grecian affairs, before the time of Alexander. It would appear that the trade with the native African tribes, between the Gulfs called the Greater and Lesser Syrtis was divided between Kyréné (meaning the Kyrenaic Pentapolis) and Carthage—at a boundary point called the Altars of the Philæni, ennobled by a commemorative legend; immediately east of these Altars was Automala, the westernmost factory of Kyréné.⁵ We cannot doubt that the relations, commercial and otherwise, between Kyréné and Carthage, the two great emporia on the coast of Africa, were constant and often lucrative—though not always friendly.

¹ Diodor. xx. 40.
² See Ch XXVII.
³ See Isokrates, Or. iv. (Philipp.) s. 6, where he speaks of Kyrné as a spot judiciously chosen for colonization; the natives near it being not dangerous, but suited for obedient neighbours and slaves.
⁴ Thucyd. vii. 50.
⁵ Pausan. iv. 26; Diodor. xiv. 34.
In the year 331 B.C., when the victorious Alexander overran Egypt, the inhabitants of Kyréné sent to tender presents and submission to him, and became enrolled among his subjects. We hear nothing more about them until the last year of Alexander's life (324 B.C. to 323 B.C.). About that time, the exiles from Kyréné and Barka, probably enough emboldened by the rescript of Alexander (proclaimed at the Olympic festival of 324 B.C., and directing that all Grecian exiles, except those guilty of sacrilege, should be recalled forthwith), determined to accomplish their return by force. To this end they invited from Kret a officer named Thimbron; who, having slain Harpalus after his flight from Athens (recounted in a previous chapter), had quartered himself in Kret, with the treasure, the ships, and the 6000 mercenaries, brought over from Asia by that satrap. Thimbron willingly carried ever his army to their assistance, intending to conquer for himself a principality in Libya. He landed near Kyréné, defeated the Kyrenean forces with great slaughter, and made himself master of Apollonia, the fortified port of that city, distant from it nearly ten miles. The towns of Barka and Hesperides sided with him; so that he was strong enough to force the Kyreneans to a disadvantageous treaty. They covenanted to pay 500 talents,—to surrender to him half of their war-chariots for his ulterior projects—and to leave him in possession of Apollonia. While he plundered the merchants in the harbour, he proclaimed his intention of subjugating the independent Libyan tribes, and probably of stretching his conquests to Carthage. His schemes were however frustrated by one of his own officers, a Kretan named Mnasiklês; who deserted to the Kyreneans, and encouraged them to set aside the recent convention. Thimbron, after seizing such citizens of Kyréné as happened to be at Apollonia, attacked Kyréné itself, but was repulsed; and the Kyreneans were then bold enough to invade the territory of Barka and Hesperides. To aid these two cities, Thimbron moved his quarters from Apollonia; but during his absence, Mnasiklês contrived to surprise that valuable port; thus mastering at once his base of operations, the station for his fleet, and all the baggage of his soldiers. Thimbron's

1 Arrian, vii. 9, 12; Curtius, iv. 7, 9; Diodor. xvii. 49. It is said that the inhabitants of Kyréné (exact date unknown) applied to Plato to make laws for them, but that he declined. See Thrige, Histor. Cyrénés, p. 191. We should be glad to have this statement better avouched.

2 Diodor. xvii. 108, xviii. 16; Arrian, De Rebus post Alexandr. vi. apud Photius, Cod. 92; Strabo, xvii. p. 837.

3 Diodor. xviii. 19.
fleet could not be long maintained without a harbour. The seamen, landing there and there for victuals and water, were cut off by the native Libyans, while the vessels were dispersed by storms.¹

The Kyreneans, now full of hope, encountered Thimbron in the field, and defeated him. Yet though reduced to distress, he contrived to obtain possession of Teucheira; to which port he invoked as auxiliaries 2500 fresh soldiers, out of the loose mercenary bands dispersed near Cape Tænarus in Peloponnesus. This reinforcement again put him in a condition for battle. The Kyreneans on their side also thought it necessary to obtain succour, partly from the neighbouring Libyans, partly from Carthage. They got together a force stated as 30,000 men, with which they met him in the field. But on this occasion they were totally routed, with the loss of all their generals and much of their army. Thimbron was now in the full tide of success; he pressed both Kyrene and the harbour so vigorously, that famine began to prevail; and sedition broke out among the citizens. The oligarchical men, expelled by the more popular party, sought shelter, some in the camp of Thimbron, some at the court of Ptolemy in Egypt.²

I have already mentioned, that in the partition after the decease of Alexander, Egypt had been assigned to Ptolemy. Seizing with eagerness the opportunity of annexing to it so valuable a possession as the Kyrenaic Pentapolis, this chief sent an adequate force under Ophellas to put down Thimbron and restore the exiles. His success was complete. All the cities in the Pentapolis were reduced; Thimbron, worsted and pursued as a fugitive, was seized in his flight by some Libyans, and brought prisoner to Teucheira; the citizens of which place (by permission of the Olynthian Epikydes, governor for Ptolemy), first tortured him, and then conveyed him to Apollonia to be hanged. A final visit from Ptolemy himself regulated the affairs of the Pentapolis, which were incorporated with his dominions and placed under the government of Ophellas.³

It was thus that the rich and flourishing Kyrene, an interesting portion of the once autonomous Hellenic world, passed like the rest, under one of the Macedonian Diadochi. As the proof and guarantee of this new sovereignty, we find erected within the walls of the city, a strong and completely

¹ Diodor. xvi. 20. ² Diodor. xviii. 21. ³ Arrian, De Rebus post Alex. vi. ap.
detached citadel, occupied by a Macedonian or Egyptian garrison (like Munychia at Athens), and forming the stronghold of the viceroy. Ten years afterwards (B.C. 312) the Kyrenians made an attempt to emancipate themselves and besieged this citadel; but being again put down by an army and fleet which Ptolemy despatched under Agis from Egypt, Kyréné passed once more under the viceroyalty of Ophellas.²

To this viceroy Agathoklès now sent envoys, invoking his aid against Carthage. Ophellas was an officer of consideration and experience. He had served under Alexander, and had married an Athenian wife, Euthydike,—a lineal descendant from Miltiadês the victor of Marathon, and belonging to a family still distinguished at Athens. In inviting Ophellas to undertake jointly the conquest of Carthage, the envoys proposed that he should himself hold it when conquered. Agathoklès (they said) wished only to overthrow the Carthaginian dominion in Sicily, being well aware that he could not hold that island in conjunction with an African dominion.

To Ophellas,³ such an invitation proved extremely seducing. He was already on the look-out for aggrandisement towards the west, and had sent an exploring nautical expedition along the northern coast of Africa, even to some distance round and beyond the Strait of Gibraltar. Moreover, to all military adventurers, both on sea and on land, the season was one of boundless speculative promise. They had before them not only the prodigious career of Alexander himself, but the successful encroachments of the great officers his successors. In the second distribution, made at Triparadeisus, of the Alexandrine empire, Antipater had as-

¹ Diodor. xix. 70. Οἱ Κυρεναίοι . . . τὴν Ἲκραν περιεστρατοπέδευσαν, ἠδυτικα μέλα τὴν φρουρὰν ἀκμαλούσεν, &c.

² Justin (xxii. 7, 4) calls Ophellas "rex Cyrenarum;" but it is noway probable that he had become independent of Ptolemy—as Thrige (Hist. Cyrénæ, p. 214) supposes. The expression in Plutarch (Demetrius, 14), Ὄφελλα τῷ ἀρχων Κυρήνης, does not necessarily imply an independent authority.

³ Diodor. xx. 40.

⁴ From an incidental allusion in Strabo (xvii. p. 826), we learn this fact—that Ophellas had surveyed the whole coast of Northern Africa, to the Strait of Gibraltar, and round the old Pheni-
signed to Ptolemy not merely Egypt and Libya, but also an undefined amount of territory west of Libya, to be afterwards acquired; the conquest of which was known to have been among the projects of Alexander, had he lived longer. To this conquest Ophellas was now specially called, either as the viceroy or the independent equal of Ptolemy, by the invitation of Agathoklēs. Having learnt in the service of Alexander not to fear long marches, he embraced the proposition with eagerness. He undertook an expedition from Kyrēnē on the largest scale. Through his wife's relatives, he was enabled to make known his projects at Athens, where, as well as in other parts of Greece, they found much favour. At this season, the Kassandrian oligarchies were paramount not only at Athens, but generally throughout Greece. Under the prevalent degradation and suffering, there was ample ground for discontent, and no liberty of expressing it; many persons therefore were found disposed either to accept army-service with Ophellas, or to enrol themselves in a foreign colony under his auspices. To set out under the military protection of this powerful chief—to colonize the mighty Carthage, supposed to be already enfeebled by the victories of Agathoklēs—to appropriate the wealth, the fertile landed possessions, and the maritime position, of her citizens—was a prize well calculated to seduce men dissatisfied with their homes, and not well informed of the intervening difficulties.

Under such hopes, many Grecian colonists joined Ophellas at Kyrēnē, some even with wives and children. The total number is stated at 10,000. Ophellas conducted them forth at the head of a well-appointed army of 10,000 infantry, 600 cavalry, and 100 war-chariots; each chariot carrying the driver and two fighting men. Marching with this miscellaneous body of soldiers and colonists, he reached in eighteen days the post of Automole,—the westernmost factory of Kyrēnē. From thence he proceeded westward along the shore between the two Syrtes, in many parts a sandy, trackless desert, without wood and almost without water.
(with the exception of particular points of fertility), and infested by serpents many and venomous. At one time, all his provisions were exhausted. He passed through the territory of the natives called Lotophagi, near the lesser Syrtis; where the army had nothing to eat except the fruit of the lotus, which there abounded. Ophellas met with no enemies; but the sufferings of every kind endured by his soldiers—still more of course by the less hardy colonists and their families—were most distressing. After miseries endured for more than two months, he joined Agathokles in the Carthaginian territory; with what abatement of number, we do not know, but his loss must have been considerable.

Ophellas little knew the man whose invitation and alliance he had accepted. Agathokles at first received him with the warmest protestations of attachment, welcoming the newcomers with profuse hospitality, and supplying to them full means of refreshment and renovation after their past sufferings. Having thus gained the confidence and favourable sympathies of all, he proceeded to turn them to his own purposes. Convening suddenly the most devoted among his own soldiers, he denounced Ophellas as guilty of plotting against his life. They listened to him with the same feelings of credulous rage as the Macedonian soldiers exhibited when Alexander denounced Philotas before them. Agathokles then at once called them to arms, set upon Ophellas unawares, and slew him with his more immediate defenders. Among the soldiers of Ophellas, this act excited horror and indignation, no less than surprise; but Agathokles at length succeeded in bringing them to terms, partly by deceitful pretexts, partly by intimidation: for this unfortunate army, left without any commander or fixed purpose, had no resource except to enter into his service. He thus found himself (like Antipater after the death of Leonnatus) master of a double army, and relieved from a troublesome rival. The colonists of Ophellas—more unfortunate still, since they could be of no service to Agathokles—were put by him on board some merchant vessels, which he was sending to Syra-

The philosopher would hear this fact from some of the Athenians concerned in the expedition.

The entire march of Ophellas must (I think) have lasted longer than two months; probably Diodorus speaks only of the more distressing or middle portion of it when he says—κατὰ τὸν διοφόρον πλεῖον ἢ δύο μῆνα καπνεσθάντας, &c. (xx. 42).

2 Diodor, xx. 42. See the striking description of the miseries of this same march, made by Cato and his Roman troops after the death of Pompey, in Lucan, Pharsalia, ix. 382-940.
3 Diodor, xx. 42; Justin, xxii. 7.
cuse with spoil. The weather becoming stormy, many of these vessels foundered at sea,—some were driven off and wrecked on the coast of Italy—and a few only reached Syracuse. Thus miserably perished the Kyrenean expedition of Ophellas; one of the most commanding and powerful schemes, for joint conquest and colonization, that ever set out from any Grecian city.

It would have fared ill with Agathoklès, had the Carthaginians been at hand, and ready to attack him in the confusion immediately succeeding the death of Ophellas. It would also have fared yet worse with Carthage, had Agathoklès been in a position to attack her during the terrible sedition excited, nearly at the same time, within her walls by the general Bomilkar. This traitor (as has been already stated) had long cherished the design to render himself despot, and had been watching for a favourable opportunity. Having purposely caused the loss of the first battle—fought in conjunction with his brave colleague Hanno, against Agathoklès—he had since carried on the war with a view to his own project (which explains in part the continued reverses of the Carthaginians); he now thought that the time was come for openly raising his standard. Availing himself of a military muster in the quarter of the city called Neapolis, he first dismissed the general body of the soldiers, retaining near him only a trusty band of 500 citizens, and 1000 mercenaries. At the head of these, he then fell upon the unsuspecting city; dividing them into five detachments, and slaughtering indiscriminately the unarmed citizens in the streets, as well as in the great market-place. At first the Carthaginians were astounded and paralysed. Gradually however they took courage, stood upon their defence against the assailants, combated them in the streets, and poured upon them missiles from the house-tops. After a prolonged conflict, the partisans of Bomilkar found themselves worsted, and were glad to avail themselves of the mediation of some elder citizens. They laid down their arms on promise of pardon. The promise was faithfully kept by the victors, except in regard to Bomilkar himself; who was hanged in the market-place, having first undergone severe tortures.

Though the Carthaginians had thus escaped from an extreme peril, yet the effects of so formidable a conspiracy weakened them.
for some time against their enemy without; while Agathoklès, on
the other hand, reinforced by the army from Ῥυρένη, was
stronger than ever. So elate did he feel, that he assumed
the title of King; 1 following herein the example of the
great Macedonian officers, Antigonus, Ptolemy, Seleukus,
Lysimachus, and Kassander; the memory of Alexander
being now discarded, as his heirs had been already
put to death. Agathoklès, already master of nearly all the de-

dpendent towns east and south-east of Carthage, proceeded to carry
his arms to the north-west of the city. He attacked Utica,—
the second city next to Carthage in importance, and older indeed
than Carthage itself—situated on the western or opposite shore of
the Carthaginian Gulf, and visible from Carthage, though distant
from it twenty-seven miles around the Gulf on land. 2 The Uticans
had hitherto remained faithful to Carthage, in spite of her reverses,
and of defection elsewhere. 3 Agathoklès marched into their terri-


tory with such unexpected rapidity (he had hitherto been on the
south-east of Carthage, and he now suddenly moved to the north-
west of that city), that he seized the persons of three hundred
leading citizens, who had not yet taken the precaution of retiring
within the city. Having vainly tried to prevail on the Uticans to
surrender, he assailed their walls, attaching in front of his batter-
ing engines the three hundred Utican prisoners; so that the
citizens, in hurling missiles of defence, were constrained to inflict
death on their own comrades and relatives. They nevertheless
resisted the assault with unshaken resolution; but Agathoklès
found means to force an entrance through a weak part of the
walls, and thus became master of the city. He made it a scene of
indiscriminate slaughter, massacring the inhabitants, armed and

1 There are yet remaining coins—Ἀγα-
θοκλῆς Βαρθλεώς—the earliest Sicilian
coins that bear the name of a prince
(Humphreys, Ancient Coins and Medals,
pi. 50).
2 Strabo, xvii. p. 832; Polyb. i. 73.
3 Polybius (i. 82) expressly states that the inhabitants of Utica, and of
Hippu-Akra (a little farther to the west
than Utica) remained faithful to Car-
thage throughout the hostilities carried
on by Agathoklès. This enables us to
correct the passage wherein Diodorus
describes the attack of Agathoklès upon
Utica (xx. 54)—εἰς μὲν Ἰτυκαίους ἐστρα-
τευσέν τῷ πόλει προσπεσόν, &c. The word
ἡ Ἰτυκαίους ἐστρατεύσεν here is perplexing. It

must mean that the Uticans had re-
volted from Agathoklès; yet Diodorus
has not before said a word about the
Uticans, nor reported that they had
either joined Agathoklès, or been con-
cquered by him. Everything that Dio-
dorus has reported hitherto about
Agathoklès, relates to operations among
the towns east or south-east of Car-
thage.
4 It appears to me that the passage
ought to stand—ἐὰν μὲν Ἰτυκαίους ἐστρα-
τευσέν ἀφεστηκότας, τῷ ὀπὶ τῆς πόλεως προσ-
πεσόν, &c. Polybius.
unarmed, and hanging up the prisoners. He further captured the town of Hippak-Akra, about thirty miles north-west of Utica, which had also remained faithful to Carthage—and which now, after a brave defence, experienced the like pitiless treatment. The Carthaginians, seemingly not yet recovered from their recent shock, did not interfere, even to rescue these two important places; so that Agathoklès, firmly established in Tunes as a centre of operations, extended his African dominion more widely than ever all round Carthage, both on the coast and in the interior; while he interrupted the supplies of Carthage itself, and reduced the inhabitants to great privations. He even occupied and fortified strongly a place called Hippagreta, between Utica and Carthage; thus pushing his posts within a short distance both east and west of her gates.

In this prosperous condition of his African affairs, he thought the opportunity favourable for retrieving his diminished ascendency in Sicily; to which island he accordingly crossed over, with 2000 men, leaving the command in Africa to his son Archagathus. That young man was at first successful, and seemed even in course of enlarging his father's conquests. His general Eumachus overran a wide range of interior Numidia, capturing Toke, Phel- liné, Moschela, Akris, and another town bearing the same name of Hippu-Akra—and enriching his soldiers with a considerable plunder. But, in a second expedition, endeavouring to carry his arms yet farther into the interior, he was worsted in an attack upon a town called Miltiné, and compelled to retreat. We read that he marched through one mountainous region abounding in wild cats—and another, in which there were a great number of apes, who lived in the most tame and familiar manner in the houses with men—being greatly caressed, and even worshipped as Gods.

1 Diodor. xx. 54, 55. In attacking Hippu-Akra (otherwise called Hippo-Zarytus, near the Promontorium Pulchrum, the northernmost point of Africa), Agathoklès is said to have got the better in a naval battle—συναχία περιγενόμενος. This implies that he must have got a fleet superior to the Carthaginians even in their own gulf; perhaps ships seized at Utica. 2 Diodor. xx. 59.

2 Appian distinctly mentions this place Hippagreta as having been fortified by Agathoklès—and distinctly describes it as being between Utica and Carthage (Punic. 110). It cannot therefore be the same place as Hippu-Akra (or Hippo-Zarytus); which was considerably farther from Carthage than Utica was.

3 Diodor. xx. 57, 58. It is vain to attempt to identify the places mentioned as visited and conquered by Eumachus. Our topographical knowledge is altogether insufficient. This second Hippu-Akra is supposed to be the same as Hippo-Regius; Toke may be Tucca Terebinthina, in the southeastern region or Byzakum.
The Carthaginians however had now regained internal harmony and power of action. Their senate and their generals were emulous, both in vigour and in provident combinations, against the common enemy. They sent forth 30,000 men, a larger force than they had yet had in the field; forming three distinct camps, under Hanno, Imilkon, and Adherbal, partly in the interior, partly on the coast. Archagathus, leaving a sufficient guard at Tunis, marched to meet them, distributing his army in three divisions also; two, under himself and Aeschrion, besides the corps under Eumachus in the mountainous region. He was however unsuccessful at all points. Hanno contriving to surprise the division of Aeschrion, gained a complete victory, wherein Aeschrion himself with more than 4000 men were slain. Imilkon was yet more fortunate in his operations against Eumachus, whom he entrapped by simulated flight into an ambuscade, and attacked at such advantage, that the Grecian army was routed and cut off from all retreat. A remnant of them defended themselves for some time on a neighbouring hill, but being without water, nearly all soon perished, from thirst, fatigue, and the sword of the conqueror.

By such reverses, destroying two-thirds of the Agathoklean army, Archagathus was placed in serious peril. He was obliged to concentrate his force in Tunis, calling in nearly all his outlying detachments. At the same time, those Liby-Phenician cities, and rural Libyan tribes, who had before joined Agathokles, now detached themselves from him when his power was evidently declining, and made their peace with Carthage. The victorious Carthaginian generals established fortified camps round Tunis, so as to restrain the excursions of Archagathus; while with their fleet they blocked up his harbour. Presently provisions became short, and much despondency prevailed among the Grecian army. Archagathus transmitted this discouraging news to his father in Sicily, with urgent entreaties that he would come to the rescue.

The career of Agathocles in Sicily, since his departure from Africa, had been chequered, and on the whole unproductive. Just before his arrival in the island, his generals Leptines and Demophilus had gained an important victory over the Agrigentine forces commanded by Xenodokus, who were disabled from keeping the field. This
disaster was a fatal discouragement both to the Agrigentines, and to the cause which they had espoused as champions—free and autonomous city-government with equal confederacy for self-defence, under the presidency of Agrigentum. The outlying cities confederate with Agrigentum were left without military protection, and exposed to the attacks of Leptines, animated and fortified by the recent arrival of his master Agathoklès. That despot landed at Selinus—subdued Herakleia, Therma, and Kephaloidion, on or near the northern coast of Sicily—then crossed the interior of the island to Syracuse. In his march he assaulted Kentoripa, having some partisans within, but was repulsed with loss. At Apollonia, he was also unsuccessful in his first attempt; but being stung with mortification, he resumed the assault next day, and at length, by great efforts, carried the town. To avenge his loss, which had been severe, he massacred most of the citizens, and abandoned the town to plunder.

From hence he proceeded to Syracuse, which he now revisited after an absence of (apparently) more than two years in Africa. During all this interval, the Syracusan harbour had been watched by a Carthaginian fleet, obstructing the entry of provisions, and causing partial scarcity. But there was no blockading army on land; nor had the dominion of Agathoklès, upheld as it was by his brother Antander and his mercenary force, been at all shaken. His arrival inspired his partisans and soldiers with new courage, while it spread terror throughout most parts of Sicily. To contend with the Carthaginian blockading squadron, he made efforts to procure maritime aid from the Tyrrhenian ports in Italy; while on land, his forces were now preponderant—owing to the recent defeat, and broken spirit, of the Agrigentines. But his prospects were suddenly checked by the enterprising move of his old enemy—the Syracusan exile Deinokratès; who made profession of taking up that gonefous policy which the Agrigentines had tacitly let fall—announcing himself as the champion of autonomous city-government, and equal confederacy, throughout Sicily. Deinokratès received ready adhesion from most of the cities belonging to the Agrigentine confederacy—all of them who were alarmed by finding that the

1 Diodor. xx. 56. Of μὲν οὖν Ἀκρα-
γαντωνίων ταύτη τῇ συμφορᾷ περιπεσόντες, διέλυσαν ευαίσθητοι τὴν καλλιστὴν ἐπιβολὴν, τῶν δὲ συμμάχων τὰς τῆς Ἀγριγεντίους ἐξορίας.
2 Απολλονία was a town in the inte-
rior of the island, somewhat to the north-east of Enna (Cicero, Verr. iii. 43).
3 Diodor. xx. 56.
4 Diodor. xx. 62.
5 Diodor. xx. 63.
Onar. XCVII. AGATHOKLES IN SICILY. 623

weakness or fears of their presiding city had left them unprotected
against Agathoklés. He was soon at the head of a powerful
army—20,000 foot, and 1500 horse. Moreover a large proportion
of his army were not citizen militia, but practised soldiers; for the
most part exiles, driven from their homes by the distractions and
violences of the Agathoklean era. For military purposes, both
he and his soldiers were far more strenuous and effective than the
Agrigentines under Xenodokus had been. He not only kept the
field against Agathoklés, but several times offered him battle, which
the despot did not feel confidence enough to accept. Agathoklés
could do no more than maintain himself in Syracuse, while the
Sicilian cities generally were put in security against his aggressions.

Amidst this unprosperous course of affairs in Sicily, Agathoklés
received messengers from his son, reporting the defeats
in Africa. Preparing immediately to revisit that country,
he was fortunate enough to obtain a reinforcement of
Tyrrenian ships of war, which enabled him to overcome
the Carthaginian blockading squadron at the mouth of
the Syracusan harbour. A clear passage to Africa was
thus secured for himself, together with ample supplies of imported
provisions for the Syracusans. Though still unable to combat
Deinokratés in the field, Agathoklés was emboldened by his recent
naval victory to send forth Leptinés with a force to invade
the Agrigentines—the jealous rivals, rather than the allies, of Deino-
kratés. The Agrigentine army—under the general Xenodokus,
whom Leptinés had before defeated—consisted of citizen militia
mustered on the occasion; while the Agathoklean mercenaries,
conducted by Leptinés, had made arms a profession, and were
used to fighting as well as to hardships. Here, as elsewhere in
Greece, we find the civic and patriotic energy trampled down by
professional soldieryship, and reduced to operate only as an obse-
quious instrument for administrative details.

Xenodokus, conscious of the inferiority of his Agrigentine force,
was reluctant to hazard a battle. Driven to this impru-
dence by the taunts of his soldiers, he was defeated a
second time by Leptinés, and became so apprehensive of
the wrath of the Agrigentines, that he thought it expedi-
tent to retire to Gela. After a period of rejoicing, for
his recent victories by land as well as by sea, Agathoklés
passed over to Africa, where he found his son, with the

1 Diodor. xx. 57. καὶ πάντων τοῦτων
2 Diodor. xx. 61, 62.
3 Diodor. xx. 62.
army at Tunès in great despondency and privation, and almost mutiny for want of pay. They still amounted to 6000 Grecian mercenaries, 6000 Gauls, Samnites, and Tyrrenians—1500 cavalry—and not less than 6000 (if the number be correct) Libyan war-chariots. There were also a numerous body of Libyan allies; faithless time-servers, watching for the turn of fortune. The Carthaginians, occupying strong camps in the vicinity of Tunès, and abundantly supplied, awaited patiently the destroying effects of privation and suffering on their enemies. So desperate was the position of Agathoklês, that he was compelled to go forth and fight. Having tried in vain to draw the Carthaginians down into the plain, he at length attacked them in the full strength of their entrenchments. But, in spite of the most strenuous efforts, his troops were repulsed with great slaughter, and driven back to their camp.¹

The night succeeding this battle was a scene of disorder and panic in both camps: even in that of the victorious Carthaginians. The latter, according to the ordinances of their religion, eager to return their heartfelt thanks to the Gods for this great victory, sacrificed to them as a choice offering the handsomest prisoners captured.² During this process, the tent or tabernacle consecrated to the Gods, close to the altar as well as to the general’s tent, accidentally took fire. The tents being formed by mere wooden posts, connected by a thatch of hay or straw both on roof and sides—the fire spread rapidly, and the entire camp was burnt, together with many soldiers who tried to arrest the conflagration. So distracting was the terror occasioned by this catastrophe, that the whole Carthaginian army for the time dispersed; and Agathoklês, had he been prepared, might have destroyed them. But it happened that at the same hour, his own camp was thrown into utter confusion by a different accident, rendering his soldiers incapable of being brought into action.³

His position at Tunès had now become desperate. His Libyan allies had all declared against him, after the recent defeat. He could neither continue to hold Tunès, nor carry away his troops to Sicily; for he had but few vessels, and the Carthaginians were masters at sea. Seeing no resource, he resolved to embark secretly with his younger son, Herakleidês, abandoning Archagathus and the army to

¹ Diodor. xx, 64; Justin. xxi, 8. ² Diodor. xx, 65. See an incident somewhat similar (Herod. vii. 186)—the Persians, in the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, sacrificed the handsomest Grecian prisoner whom they captured on board the first prize-ship that fell into their hands. ³ Diodor, xx, 63, 67.
Their fate. But Archagathus and the other officers, suspecting his purpose, were thoroughly resolved that the man who had brought them into destruction should not thus slip away and betray them. As Agathokles was on the point of going aboard at night, he found himself watched, arrested, and held prisoner, by the indignant soldiery. The whole town now became a scene of disorder and tumult, aggravated by the rumour that the enemy were marching up to attack them. Amidst the general alarm, the guards who had been set over Agathokles, thinking his services indispensable for defence, brought him out with his fetters still on. When the soldiers saw him in this condition, their sentiment towards him again reverted to pity and admiration, notwithstanding his projected desertion; moreover they hoped for his guidance to resist the impending attack. With one voice they called upon the guards to strike off his chains and set him free. Agathokles was again at liberty. But, insensible to everything except his own personal safety, he presently stole away, leaped unperceived into a skiff, with a few attendants, but without either of his sons,—and was lucky enough to arrive, in spite of stormy November weather, on the coast of Sicily.

So terrible was the fury of the soldiers, on discovering that Agathokles had accomplished his desertion, that they slew both his sons, Archagathus and Herakleides. No resource was left but to elect new generals, and make the best terms they could with Carthage. They were still a formidable body, retaining in their hands various other towns besides Tunes; so that the Carthaginians, relieved from all fear of Agathokles, thought it prudent to grant an easy capitulation. It was agreed that all the towns should be restored to the Carthaginians, on payment of 300 talents; that such soldiers as chose to enter into the African service of Carthage, should be received on full pay; but that such as preferred returning to Sicily should be transported thither, with permission to reside in the Carthaginian town of Solus (or Soluntum). On these terms the convention was concluded, and the army finally broken up. Some indeed among the Grecian garrisons, quartered in the outlying posts, being rash enough to dissent and hold out, were besieged and taken by the Carthaginian force. Their commanders were crucified, and the soldiers condemned to rural work as fettered slaves.

1 Diodor. xx. 69; Justin, xiii. 8. το πορημιων, ελαθεν εκπλεκται κατα το de παθος, de eisen, eis elen εν τη δισι της Πλαιδιως, χιμωνος εστηκα, κα τυχενεν δεισιων δε δοτοι. de λαθες κα μετ δληαν εμβας εις. 2 Diodor. xx. 69. 
Thus miserably terminated the expedition of Agathoklès to Africa, after an interval of four years from the time of his landing. By the vana mirantes, who looked out for curious coincidences (probably Timæus), it was remarked that his ultimate flight, with the slaughter of his two sons, occurred exactly on the same day of the year following his assassination of Ophellas. Ancient writers extol, with good reason, the bold and striking conception of transferring the war to Africa, at the very moment when he was himself besieged in Syracuse by a superior Carthaginian force. But while admitting the military resource, skill, and energy of Agathoklès, we must not forget that his success in Africa was materially furthered by the treasonable conduct of the Carthaginian general Bomilkar—an accidental coincidence in point of time. Nor is it to be overlooked, that Agathoklès missed the opportunity of turning his first success to account, at a moment when the Carthaginians would probably have purchased his evacuation of Africa by making large concessions to him in Sicily. He imprudently persisted in the war, though the complete conquest of Carthage was beyond his strength—and though it was still more beyond his strength to prosecute effective war, simultaneously and for a long time, in Sicily and in Africa. The African subjects of Carthage were not attached to her; but neither were they attached to him;—nor, on the long run, did they do him any serious good. Agathoklès is a man of force and fraud—consummate in the use of both. His whole life is a series of successful adventures, and strokes of bold ingenuity to extricate himself from difficulties; but there is wanting in him all predetermined general plan, or measured range of ambition, to which these single exploits might be made subservient.

After his passage from Africa, Agathoklès landed on the western corner of Sicily near the town of Egesta, which was then in alliance with him. He sent to Syracuse for a reinforcement. But he was hard pressed for money; he suspected, or pretended to suspect, the Egestians; and accordingly, on receiving his new force, he employed it...
to commit revolting massacre and plunder in Egesta. The town is reported to have contained 10,000 citizens. Of these Agathoklès caused the poorer men to be for the most part murdered; the richer were cruelly tortured, and even their wives tortured and mutilated, to compel revelations of concealed wealth; the children of both sexes were transported to Italy, and there sold as slaves to the Bruttians. The original population being thus nearly extirpated, Agathoklès changed the name of the town to Dikæopolis, assigning it as a residence to such deserters as might join him. This atrocity, more suitable to Africa than Greece (where the mutilation of women is almost unheard of), was probably the way in which his savage pride obtained some kind of retaliatory satisfaction for the recent calamity and humiliation in Africa. Under the like sentiment, he perpetrated another deed of blood at Syracuse. Having learnt that the soldiers, whom he had deserted at Tunes, had after his departure put to death his two sons, he gave orders to Antander his brother (viceroy of Syracuse), to massacre all the relatives of those Syracusans who had served him in the African expedition. This order was fulfilled by Antander (we are assured) accurately and to the letter. Neither age nor sex—grandisire or infant—wife or mother—were spared by the Agathoklean executioners. We may be sure that their properties were plundered at the same time; we hear of no mutilations.

Still Agathoklès tried to maintain his hold on the Sicilian towns which remained to him; but his cruelties as well as his reverses had produced a strong sentiment against him, and even his general Pasiophilus revolted to join Deinokratès. That exile was now at the head of an army stated at 20,000 men, the most formidable military force in Sicily; so that Agathoklès, feeling the inadequacy of his own means, sent to solicit peace and to offer tempting conditions. He announced his readiness to evacuate Syracuse altogether, and to be content, if two maritime towns on the northern coast of the island—Therma and Kephaloidion—were assigned to his mercenaries and himself. Under this propo-

1 Diodor. xx. 71. We do not know what happened afterwards with this town under its new population. But the old name Egesta was afterwards resumed.
2 Compare the proceedings of the Greco-Libyan princess Phærotimé (of the Battiad family) at Barka (Herodot. iv. 202).
3 Diodor. xx. 72. Hippokratès and Επίκυδης—those Syracusans who, about a century afterwards, induced Hieron of Syracuse to prefer the Carthaginian alliance to the Roman—had resided at Carthage for some time, and served in the army of Hannibal, because their grandfather had been banished from Syracuse as one concerned in killing Archagathus (Polyb. vii. 2).
sition, Deinokratēs, and the other Syracusan exiles, had the opportunity of entering Syracuse, and reconstituting the free city-government. Had Deinokratēs been another Timoleon; the city might now have acquired and enjoyed another temporary sunshine of autonomy and prosperity; but his ambition was thoroughly selfish. As commander of this large army, he enjoyed a station of power and licence such as he was not likely to obtain under the reconstituted city-government of Syracuse. He therefore evaded the proposition of Agathoklēs, requiring still larger concessions: until at length the Syracusan exiles in his own army (partly instigated by emissaries from Agathoklēs himself) began to suspect his selfish projects, and to waver in their fidelity to him. Meanwhile Agathoklēs, being repudiated by Deinokratēs, addressed himself to the Carthaginians, and concluded a treaty with them, restoring or guaranteeing to them all the possessions that they had ever enjoyed in Sicily. In return for this concession, he received from them a sum of money, and a large supply of corn.1

Relieved from Carthaginian hostility, Agathoklēs presently ventured to march against the army of Deinokratēs. The latter was indeed greatly superior in strength, but many of his soldiers were now lukewarm or disaffected, and Agathoklēs had established among them correspondences upon which he could rely. At a great battle fought near Torgium, many of them went over on the field to Agathoklēs, giving to him a complete victory. The army of Deinokratēs was completely dispersed. Shortly afterwards a considerable body among them (4000 men, or 7000 men, according to different statements) surrendered to the victor on terms. As soon as they had delivered up their arms, Agathoklēs, regardless of his covenant, caused them to be surrounded by his own army, and massacred.2

It appears as if the recent victory had been the result of a secret and treacherous compact between Agathoklēs and Deinokratēs; and as if the prisoners massacred by Agathoklēs, were those of whom Deinokratēs wished to rid himself as malcontents; for immediately after the battle, a reconciliation took place between the two. Agathoklēs admitted the other as a sort of partner in his despotism; while Deinokratēs not only brought into the partnership all the military means and strong posts which he had been two years in acquiring, but also betrayed to Agathoklēs the revolted general Pasiphalus, with the town of

1 Diodor. xx. 78, 79. Some said that the Carthaginians was 300 talents. Timæus stated the sum of money paid by the Carthaginians as 150 talents. 2 Diodor. xx. 89.
Gela occupied by the latter. It is noticed as singular, that Agathoklēs, generally faithless and unscrupulous, toward both friends and enemies, kept up the best understanding and confidence with Demokrētēs to the end of his life. 1

The despot had now regained full power at Syracuse, together with a great extent of dominion in Sicily. The remainder of his restless existence was spent in operations of hostility or plunder against more northerly enemies—the Liparaean isles 2—the Italian cities and the Bruttians—the island of Korkyra. We are unable to follow his proceedings in detail. He was threatened with a formidable attack 3 by the Spartan prince Kleonymus, who was invited by the Tarentines to aid them against the Lucanians and Romans. But Kleonymus found enough to occupy him elsewhere, without visiting Sicily. He collected a considerable force on the coast of Italy, undertook operations with success against the Lucanians, and even captured the town of Thurii. But the Romans, now pushing their intervention even to the Tarentine Gulf, drove him off and retook the town; moreover his own behaviour was so tyrannical and profligate, as to draw upon him universal hatred. Returning from Italy to Korkyra, Kleonymus made himself master of that important island, intending to employ it as a base of operations both against Greece and against Italy. 4 He failed however in various expeditions both in the Tarentine Gulf and the Adriatic. Demetrius Poliorketēs and Kassander alike tried to conclude an alliance with him; but in vain. 5 At a subsequent period, Korkyra was besieged by Kassander with a large naval and military force; Kleonymus then retired (or perhaps had previously retired) to Sparta. 6 Kassander, having reduced the island to great straits, was on the point of taking it, when it was relieved by Agathoklēs with a powerful armament. That despot was engaged in operations on the coast of Italy against the Bruttians when his aid to Korkyra

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1 Diodor. xx. 90;
2 Diodor. xx. 101. This expedition of Agathoklēs against the Liparaean isles seems to have been described in detail by his contemporary historian the Syracusan Kallias: see the Fragments of that author, in Didot's Fragmenta Hist. Graec. vol. ii. p. 383. Fragn. 4.
3 Diodor. xx. 104. A curious anecdote appears in the Pseudo-Aristotle, De Mirabilibus (78), respecting two native Italians, Aulus and Calig, who tried to poison Kleonymus at Tarentum, but were detected and put to death by the Tarentines.
4 Diodor. xx. 104; Livy, x. 2. A curious anecdote appears in the Pseudo-Aristotle, De Mirabilibus (78), respecting two native Italians, Aulus and Calig, who tried to poison Kleonymus at Tarentum, but were detected and put to death by the Tarentines. That Agathoklēs, in his operations on the coast of southern Italy, found himself in conflict with the Romans, and that their importance was now strongly felt—we may judge by the fact, that the Syracusan Kallias (contemporary and historian of Agathoklēs) appears to have given details respecting the origin and history of Rome. See the Fragments of Kallias, ap. Didot, Hist. Graec. Fragn. vol. ii. p. 383; Fragn. 5—and Dionys. Hal. Ant. Rom. i. 72.
5 Diodor. xx. 105.
was solicited; he destroyed most part of the Macedonian fleet, and then seized the island for himself. On returning from this victorious expedition to the Italian coast, where he had left a detachment of his Ligurian and Tuscan mercenaries, he was informed that these mercenaries had been turbulent during his absence, in demanding the pay due to them from his grandson Archagathus. He caused them all to be slain, to the number of 2000.

As far as we can trace the events of the last years of Agathoklès, we find him seizing the towns of Kroton and Hipponia in B.C. 300-249, and giving his daughter Lanassa in marriage to the youthful Pyrrhus king of Epirus. At the age of seventy-two, still in the plenitude of vigour as well as of power, he was projecting a fresh expedition against the Carthaginians in Africa, with two hundred of the largest ships of war, when his career was brought to a close by sickness and by domestic enemies.

He proclaimed as future successor to his dominion, his son, named Agathoklès; but Archagathus his grandson (son of Archagathus who had perished in Africa), a young prince of more conspicuous qualities, had already been singled out for the most important command, and was now at the head of the army near Ætna. The old Agathoklès, wishing to strengthen the hands of his intended successor, sent his favoured son Agathoklès to Ætna, with written orders directing that Archagathus should yield up to him the command. Archagathus, now disposed to obey, invited his uncle Agathoklès to a banquet, and killed him; after which he contrived the poisoning of his grandfather the old despot himself. The instrument of his purpose was Mænon; a citizen of Egesta, enslaved at the time when Agathoklès massacred most of the Egestean population. The beauty of his person procured him much favour with Agathoklès; but he had never forgotten, and had always been anxious to avenge, the bloody outrage on his fellow-citizens. To accomplish this purpose, the opportunity was now opened to him, together with a promise of protection, through Archagathus. He accordingly poisoned Agathoklès, as we are told, by means of a medicated quill, handed to him for cleaning his teeth after dinner. Combining together the various accounts,
it seems probable that Agathoklés was at the time sick—that this sickness may have been the reason why he was so anxious to strengthen the position of his intended successor—and that his death was as much the effect of his malady as of the poison. Archagathus, after murdering his uncle, seems by means of his army to have made himself real master of the Syracusan power; while the old despot, defenceless on a sick bed, could do no more than provide for the safety of his Egyptian wife Theoxena and his two young children, by despatching them on shipboard with all his rich moveable treasures to Alexandria. Having secured this object, amidst extreme grief on the part of those around, he expired.

The great lines in the character of Agathoklés are well marked. He was of the stamp of Gelon and the elder Dionysius—a soldier of fortune, who raised himself from the meanest beginnings to the summit of political power—and who, in the acquisition as well as maintenance of that power, displayed an extent of energy, perseverance, and military resource, not surpassed by any one, even of the generals formed in Alexander’s school. He was an adept in that art at which all aspiring men of his age aimed—the handling of mercenary soldiers for the extinction of political liberty and security at home, and for predatory aggrandisement abroad. I have already noticed the opinion delivered by Scipio Africanus—that the elder Dionysius and Agathoklés were the most daring, sagacious, and capable men of action within his knowledge. Apart from this enterprising genius, employed in the service of unmeasured personal ambition, we know nothing of Agathoklés except his sanguinary, faithless, and nefarious dispositions; in which attributes also he stands pre-eminent, above all his known contemporaries, and above nearly all predecessors. Notwithstanding his often-proved perfidy, he seems

1 Justin (xxiii, 2) dwells pathetically on this last parting between Agathoklés and Theoxena. It is difficult to reconcile Justin’s narrative with that of Diodorus; but on this point, so far as we can judge, I think him more credible than Diodorus.

2 Polyb. xv. 35. See above in this History, Ch. LXXXIII.

3 Polybius (ix. 23) says that Agathoklés, though cruel in the extreme at the beginning of his career, and in the establishment of his power, yet became the mildest of men after his power was once established. The latter half of this statement is contradicted by all the particular facts which we know respecting Agathoklés.

As to Timaeus the historian, indeed (who had been banished from Sicily by Agathoklés, and who wrote the history of the latter in five books), Polybius had good reason to censure him, as being unmeasured in his abuse of Agathoklés. For Timaeus not only recounted of Agathoklés numerous acts of nefarious cruelty—acts of course essentially public, and therefore capable of being known—but also told much scandal about his private habits, and represented him (which is still more absurd) as a man vulgar and despicable in point of ability. See the Fragments of Timaeus ap. Histor. Grec. ed. Didot, Pragm. 144-152.

All, or nearly all, the acts of Agathoklés, as described in the preceding pages, have been copied from Diodorus;
to have had a geniality and apparent simplicity of manner (the same is recounted of Caesar Borgia) which amused men and put them off their guard, throwing them perpetually into his trap. 1

Agathoklès, however, though among the worst of Greeks, was yet a Greek. During his government of thirty-two years, the course of events in Sicily continued under Hellenic agency, without the prepoudrant intervention of any foreign power. The power of Agathoklès indeed rested mainly on foreign mercenaries; but so had that of Dionysius and Gelon before him; and he, as well as they, kept up vigorously the old conflict against the Carthaginian power in the island. Grecian history in Sicily thus continues down to the death of Agathoklès; but it continues no longer. After his death, Hellenic power and interests become incapable of self-support, and sink into a secondary and subservient position, overrun by foreigners. Syracuse and the other cities passed from one despot to another, and were torn with discord arising out of the crowds of foreign mercenaries who had obtained footing among them. At the same time, the Carthaginians made increased efforts to push their conquests in the island, without finding any sufficient internal resistance; so that they would have taken Syracuse, and made Sicily their own, had not Pyrrhus, king of Epirus (the son-in-law of Agathoklès) interposed to arrest their progress. From this time forward, the Greeks of Sicily become a prize to be contended for—first between the Carthaginians and Pyrrhus—next, between the Carthaginians and Romans 2—until at length they dwindle into subjects of Rome; corn-growers for the Roman plebs, clients under the patronage of the Roman Marcelli, victims of the rapacity of Verres, and suppliants for the tutelary eloquence of Cicero. The historian of self-acting Hellas loses sight of them at the death of Agathoklès.

who had as good authorities before him as Polybius possessed. Diodorus does not copy the history of Agathoklès from Timæus; on the contrary, he censures Timæus for his exaggerated acrimony and injustice towards Agathoklès, in terms not less forcible than those which Polybius employs (Fragm. xxi. p. 279). Diodorus cites Timæus by name, occasionally and in particular instances; but he evidently did not borrow from that author the main stream of his narrative. He seems to have had before him other authorities—among them some authors whose feelings would lead them to favour Agathoklès—the Syracusan Kallias—and Antander, brother of Agathoklès (xxi. p. 278-282).

1 Diodor. xx. 63.
2 The poet Theokritus (xvi. 75-80) expatiates on the bravery of the Syracusan Hiero II., and on the great war-like power of the Syracusans under him (b.c. 260-240), which he represents as making the Carthaginians tremble for their possessions in Sicily: Personally, Hiero seems to have deserved this praise—and to have deserved yet more praise for his mild and prudent internal administration of Syracuse. But his military force was altogether secondary in the great struggle between Rome and Carthage for the mastery of Sicily.
CHAPTER. XCVIII.

OUTLYING HELLENIC CITIES.

1. IN GAUL AND SPAIN.
2. ON THE COAST OF THE EUXINE.

To complete the picture of the Hellenic world while yet in its period of full life, in freedom and self-action, or even during its decline into the half-life of a dependent condition—we must say a few words respecting some of its members lying apart from the general history, yet of not inconsiderable importance. The Greeks of Massalia formed its western wing; the Pontic Greeks (those on the shores of the Euxine), its eastern; both of them the outermost radiations of Hellenism, where it was always militant against foreign elements, and often adulterated by them. It is indeed little that we have the means of saying; but that little must not be left unsaid.

In my twenty-seventh chapter, I briefly noticed the foundation, and first proceedings of Massalia (the modern Marseilles), on the Mediterranean coast of Gaul or Liguria. This Ionic city, founded by the enterprising Phokaeans of Asia Minor, a little before their own seaboard was subjugated by the Persians, had a life and career of its own, apart from those political events which determined the condition of its Hellenic sisters in Asia, Peloponnesus, Italy, or Sicily. The Massaliots maintained their own relations of commerce, friendship or hostility with their barbaric neighbours, the Ligurians, Gauls, and Iberians, without becoming involved in the larger political confederacies of the Hellenic world. They carried out from their mother-city established habits of adventurous coast-navigation and commercial activity. Their situation, distant from other Greeks and sustained by a force hardly sufficient even for defence, imposed upon them the necessity both of political harmony at home, and of prudence and persuasive agency in their mode of dealing with neighbours. That they were found equal to this necessity, appears sufficiently attested by the
few general statements transmitted in respect to them; though
their history in its details is unknown.

Their city was strong by position, situated upon a promontory
washed on three sides by the sea, well fortified, and possessing a
convenient harbour securely closed against enemies. The domain
around it however appears not to have been large, nor did their
population extend itself much into the interior. The land around
was less adapted for corn than for the vine and the olive; wine
was supplied by the Massaliots throughout Gaul. It was on ship-
board that their courage and skill was chiefly displayed; it was by
maritime enterprise that their power, their wealth, and their colonial
expansion were obtained. In an age when piracy was common,
the Massaliot ships and seamen were effective in attack and defence
not less than in transport and commercial interchange; while their
numerous maritime successes were attested by many trophies adorn-
ing the temples. The city contained docks and arsenals admirably
provided with provisions, stores, arms, and all the various mun-
iments of naval war. Except the Phenicians and Carthaginians,
these Massaliots were the only enterprising mariners in the Western
Mediterranean; from the year 500 B.C. downward, after the energy
of the Ionic Greeks had been crushed, by inland potentates. The
Iberian and Gallic tribes were essentially landsmen, not occupying
permanent stations on the coast, nor having any vocation for the
sea; but the Ligurians, though chiefly mountaineers, were annoying
neighbours to Massalia as well by their piracies at sea as from their
depredations by land. To all these landsmen, however, depredators as they were, the visit of the trader soon made itself felt as a want, both for import and export; and to this want the
Massaliots, with their colonies, were the only ministers, along the
Gulfs of Genoa and Lyons, from Luna (the frontier of Tuscany) to
the Dianium (Cape della Nao) in Spain. It was not until the
first century before the Christian era that they were outstripped in
this career by Narbon, and a few other neighbours, exalted into
Roman colonies.

Along the coast on both sides of their own city, the Massaliots
planted colonies, each commended to the protection, and conse-

1 Casar, Bell. Gall. ii. 1; Strabo, iv. p. 178.
3 Strabo (xii. p. 575) places Massalia
in the same rank as Kyztkus, Rhodes, and Carthage; types of maritime cities
highly and effectively organized.
4 Livy, xli. 18; Polybius, xxx. 4.
6 The oration composed by Demo-
stenes πρὸς Ζηνόθεμιν, relates to an
affair wherein a ship, captain, and mate,
all from Massalia, are found engaged in
the carrying trade between Athens and
Syracuse (Demosth. p. 882 sqq.).
crated by the statue and peculiar rites, of their own patron Goddess, the Ephesian Artemis. 1 Towards the east were Tauroentium, Olbia, Antipolis, Nikaea, and the Portus Monceki; towards the west, on the coast of Spain, were Rhoda, Emporion, Alonê, Hemeroskopium, and Artemision or Dianium. These colonies were established chiefly on outlying capes or sometimes islets, at once near and safe; they were intended more as shelter and accommodation for maritime traffic, and as depôts for trade with the interior,—than for the purpose of spreading inland, and including a numerous outlying population round the walls. The circumstances of Emporion were the most remarkable. That town was built originally on a little uninhabited islet off the coast of Iberia; after a certain interval it became extended to the adjoining mainland, and a body of native Iberians were admitted to joint residence within the new-walled circuit there established. This new circuit however was divided in half by an intervening wall, on one side of which dwelt the Iberians, on the other side the Greeks. One gate alone was permitted, for intercommunication, guarded night and day by appointed magistrates, one of whom was perpetually on the spot. Every night, one third of the Greek citizens kept guard on the walls, or at least held themselves prepared to do so. How long these strict and fatiguing precautions were found necessary, we do not know; but after a certain time they were relaxed and the intervening wall disappeared, so that Greeks and Iberians freely coalesced into one community. 2 It is not often that we are allowed to see so much in detail the early difficulties and dangers of a Grecian colony. Massalia itself was situated under nearly similar circumstances among the rude Ligurian Salycs; we hear of these Ligurians hiring themselves as labourers to dig on the fields of Massaliot proprietors. 3 The various tribes of Ligurians, Gauls, and Iberians extended down to the coast, so that there was no safe road along it, nor any communication except by sea, until the conquests of the Romans in the second and first century before the Christian era. 4

1 Brückner, Histor. Massiliensium, c 7 (Göttingen).
2 Livy, xxxiv. 8; Strabo, iii. p. 160.
3 Strabo, iii. p. 156. A fact told to Poseidonius by a Massaliot proprietor who was his personal friend.
4 Strabo, iv. p. 190.
The government of Massalia was oligarchical, carried on chiefly by a Senate or Great Council of Six Hundred (called Timuchi), elected for life—and by a small council of fifteen, chosen among this larger body to take turn in executive duties. The public habits of the administrators are said to have been extremely vigilant and circumspect; the private habits of the citizens, frugal and temperate—a maximum being fixed by law for dowries and marriage-ceremonies.

They were careful in their dealings with the native tribes, with whom they appear to have maintained relations generally friendly. The historian Ephorus (whose History closed about 340 B.C.) represented the Gauls as especially phil-hellenic; an impression which he could hardly have derived from any but Massaliot informants. The Massaliots (who—like other inhabitants of the first century before Christ were trilingues, speaking Greek, Latin, and Gallic*) contributed to engratify upon these unlettered men a certain refinement and variety of wants, and to lay the foundation of that taste for letters which afterwards became largely diffused throughout the Roman Province of Gaul. At sea, and in traffic, the Phenicians and Carthaginians were their formidable rivals. This was among the causes which threw them betimes into alliance and active cooperation with Rome, under whose rule they obtained favourable treatment, when the blessing of freedom was no longer within their reach.

Enough is known about Massalia to show that the city was a Hellenising genuine specimen of Hellenism and Hellenic influences—acting not by force or constraint, but simply by superior intelligence and activity—by power of ministering to evoked wants which must otherwise have remained unsupplied—and by the assimilating effect of a lettered civilization.

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1 Strabo, iv. p. 181; Cicero, De Repub. xxvii. Fragm. Vacancies in the senate seem to have been filled up from meritorious citizens generally—as far as we can judge by a brief allusion in Aristotle (Polit. vi. 7). From another passage in the same work, it seems that the narrow basis of the oligarchy must have given rise to dissensions (v. 6). Aristotle had included the Massaliots in his lost work Περὶ Πολ. τειῶν.

2 Strabo, l.c. However, one author from whom Atheneus borrowed (xii. p. 528), described the Massaliots as luxurious in their habits.


4 It is to be remembered that Ephorus was a native of the Asiatic Kyme, the immediate neighbour of Phoksea, which was the metropolis of Massalia. The Massaliots never forgot or broke off their connexion with Phoksea: see the statement of their intercession with the Romans on behalf of Phoksea (Justin, xxxvii. 1). Ephorus therefore had good means of learning whatever Massaliot citizens were disposed to communicate.

upon ruder neighbours. This is the more to be noticed as it con-
trasts strikingly with the Macedonian influences which have occupied
so much of the present volume; force admirably organized and
wielded by Alexander, yet still nothing but force. The loss of all
details respecting the history of Massalia is greatly to be lamented;
and hardly less, that of the writings of Pytheas, an intelligent
Massaliotic navigator, who, at this early age (330–320 B.C.), with
an adventurous boldness even more than Phokæan, sailed through
the Pillars of Héraklès and from thence northward along the coast
of Spain, Gaul, Britain, Germany—perhaps yet farther. Probably
no Greek except a Massaliot could have accomplished such a
voyage; which in his case deserves the greater sympathy, as there
was no other reward for the difficulties and dangers braved, except
the gratification of an intelligent curiosity. It seems plain that
the publication of his ‘Survey of the Earth’—much consulted by
Eratosthenes, though the criticisms which have reached us through
Polybius and Strabo dwell chiefly upon its mistakes, real or sup-
posed—made an epoch in ancient geographical knowledge.

From the western wing of the Hellenic world, we pass to the
eastern—the Euxine Sea. Of the Pentapolis on its western
coast south of the Danube (Apollonia, Mesembria, Kal-
latis, Odessus, and probably Istrus)—and of Tyras near
the mouth of the river so called (now Dniester)—we have
little to record; though Istrus and Apollonia were among the
towns whose political constitutions Aristotle thought worthy of his
examination. But Herakleia on the south coast, and Pantikapæum
or Bosporus between the Euxine and the Palus Maotis (now Sea
of Azof), are not thus unknown to history; nor can Sinopè (on the
south coast) and Olbia (on the north-west) be altogether passed
over. Though lying apart from the political headship of Athens

1 See the Fragmenta Pythæn collected
by Arfwedson, Upsal, 1824. He wrote
two works—1. Τῆς Περιόδος, 2. Περὶ
’Ωκεανοῦ. His statements were greatly
esteemed, and often followed, by Erato-
thenes; partially followed by Hippar-
chus; harshly judged by Polybius, whom
Strabo in the main follows. Even by
those who judge him most severely,
Pytheas is admitted to have been a good
mathematician and astronomer (Strabo,
iv. P. 201)—and to have travelled ex-
tensively in person. Like Herodotus,
he must have been forced to report a
great deal on hearsay; and all that he
could do was to report the best hearsay
information which reached him. It is
evident that his writings made an epoch
in geographical inquiries; though they
doubtedly contained numerous inaccu-
racies. See a fair estimate of Pytheas
in Mannert, Geog. der Gr. und Römer,
Introd. i. p. 73–80.

The Massaliotic Codex of Homer,
possessed and consulted among others
by the Alexandrine critics, affords pre-
sumption that the celebrity of Massalia
as a place of Grecian literature and
study, in which character it competed
with Athens towards the commence-
ment of the Roman empire) had its
foundations laid at least in the third
century before the Christian era.

2 Aristotle, Politic. v. 2, 11; v. 5, 2.
or Sparta, all these cities were legitimate members of the Hellenic brotherhood. All supplied spectators and competitors for the Pan-Hellenic festivals—pupils to the rhetors and philosophers—purchasers, and sometimes even rivals, to the artists. All too were (like Massalia and Kyrène) adulterated partially—Olbia and Bosporus considerably—by admixture of a non-Hellenic element.

Of Sinopé, and its three dependent colonies Kotyóra, Kerasus, and Trapezus, I have already said something, in describing the retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks. Like Massalia with its dependencies Antipolis, Nikaea, and others—Sinopé enjoyed not merely practical independence, but considerable prosperity and local dignity, at the time when Xenophon and his companions marched through those regions. The citizens were on terms of equal alliance, mutually advantageous, with Korylas, prince of Paphlagonia, on the borders of whose territory they dwelt. It is probable that they figured on the tribute list of the Persian king as a portion of Paphlagonia, and paid an annual sum; but here ended their subjection. Their behaviour towards the Ten Thousand Greeks, pronounced enemies of the Persian king, was that of an independent city. Neither they, nor even the inland Paphlagonians, warlike and turbulent, were molested with Persian governors or military occupation. Alexander however numbered them among the subjects of Persia; and it is a remarkable fact, that envoys from Sinopé were found remaining with Darius almost to his last hour, after he had become a conquered fugitive, and had lost his armies, his capitals, and his treasures. These Sinopian envoys fell into the hands of Alexander; who set them at liberty with the remark, that since they were not members of the Hellenic confederacy, but subjects of Persia—their presence as envoys near Darius was very excusable.

The position of Sinopé placed her out of the direct range of the hostilities carried on by Alexander's successors against each other; and the ancient Kappadokian princes of the Mithridatic family (professedly descendants of the Persian Achaemenidae), who ultimately ripened into the king of Pontus, had not become sufficiently powerful to swallow up her independence until the reign of Pharnakès, in the second century before Christ. Sinopé then passed

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1 See Ch. LXXI.
2 See the remarkable life of the Karian Datamés, by Cornelius Nepos, which gives some idea of the situation of Paphlagonia about 360-350 B.C.
3 Polybius, v. 43.
4 Arrian, iii. 24, 8; Curtius, vi. 5, 6.
under his dominion; exchanging (like others) the condition of a free Grecian city for that of a subject of the barbaric kings of Pontus, with a citadel and mercenary garrison to keep her citizens in obedience. We know nothing, however, of the intermediate events.

Respecting the Pontic Herakleia, our ignorance is not so complete. That city—much nearer than Sinope to the mouth of the Thracian Bosporus, and distant by sea from Byzantium only one long day’s voyage of a rowboat—was established by Megarians and Boeotians on the coast of the Mariandyni. These natives were subdued, and reduced to a kind of serfdom, whereby they became slaves, yet with a proviso that they should never be sold out of the territory. Adjoining, on the westward, between Herakleia and Byzantium, were the Bithynian Thracians—villagers not merely independent, but warlike and fierce wreckers, who cruelly maltreated any Greeks stranded on their coast. We are told in general terms that the government of Herakleia was oligarchical; perhaps in the hands of the descendants of the principal original colonists, who partitioned among themselves the territory with its Mariandynian serfs, and who formed a small but rich minority among the total population: We hear of them as powerful at sea, and as being able to man, through their numerous serfs, a considerable fleet, with which they invaded the territory of Leukon prince of the Kimmerian Bosporus. They were also engaged in land-war with Mithridates, a prince of the ancient Persis family established as district rulers in Northern Kappadokia.

Towards 380-370 B.C. the Herakleots became disturbed by violent party-contentions within the city. As far as we can divine from a few obscure hints, these contentions began among the oligarchy themselves; some of whom opposed, and partially threw open, a close political monopoly—yet not without a struggle, in the course of political discord at Herakleia—bannishment of Krēarchus—partial democracy established.

1 Xenoph. Anab. vi. 6, 2.

2 Aristot. Polit. v. 5, 2; v. 5, 5.

Another passage in the same work, however (v. 4, 2), says, that in Herakleia, the democracy was subverted immediately after the foundation of the colony, through the popular leaders; who committed injustice against the rich. These rich men were banished, but collected strength enough to return and subvert the democracy by force. If this passage alludes to the same Herakleia (there were many towns of that name), the government must have been originally democratical. But the serfdom of the natives seems to imply an oligarchy.

3 Aristot. Polit. vii. 5, 7; Polyb. vi. 3, 3, 4; compare Pseudo-Aristotle, Economic. ii. 9.

The reign of Leukon lasted from about 392-330 B.C. The event alluded to by Polyb. must have occurred at some time during this interval.

4 Justin, xvi. 4.

5 Aristot. v. 5, 2; v. 5, 10.
which an energetic citizen named Klearchus was banished. Presently however the contest assumed larger dimensions; the plebs sought admission into the constitution, and are even said to have required abolition of debts with a redivision of the lands. A democratical constitution was established; but it was speedily menaced by conspiracies of the rich, to guard against which, the classification of the citizens was altered. Instead of three tribes, and four centuries, all were distributed anew into sixty-four centuries, the tribes being discontinued. It would appear that in the original four centuries, the rich men had been so enrolled as to form separate military divisions (probably their rustic serfs being armed along with them)—while the three tribes had contained all the rest of the people; so that the effect of thus multiplying the centuries was, to divest the rich of their separate military enrolment, and to disseminate them in many different regiments along with a greater number of poor.

Still however the demands of the people were not fully granted, and dissension continued. Not merely the poorer citizens, but also the population of serfs—homogeneous, speaking the same language, and sympathising with each other, like Helots or Penestae—when once agitated by the hope of liberty, were with difficulty appeased. The government, though greatly democratised, found itself unable to maintain tranquillity, and invoked assistance from without. Application was made first, to the Athenian Timotheus—next, to the Theban Epaminondas; but neither of them would interfere—nor was there, indeed, any motive to tempt them. At length application was made to the exiled citizen Klearchus.

This exile, now about forty years of age, intelligent, audacious and unprincipled, had passed four years at Athens partly in hearing the lessons of Plato and Isokrates—and had watched with envious curiosity the brilliant fortune of the despot Dionysius at Syracuse, in whom both these philosophers took interest. During his banishment, moreover, he had done what was common with Grecian

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1 Justin, xvi. 4.
2 Aeneas, Poliorket. c. 11. I have given what seems the most probable explanation of a very obscure passage. It is to be noted that the distribution of citizens into centuries (ικαστοτήτες) prevailed also at Byzantium; see Inscript. No. 3069 ap. Boeck. Corp. Inscr. Græc. p. 130. A citizen of Olbia, upon whom the citizenship of Byzantium is conferred, is allowed to enroll himself in any one of the ικαστοτήτες that he prefers.
3 Dio. x. 81. ἄλλον δὴ τοῦ Συρακούσιου διαγωγήν, Μεθ. Monn., Fragm. c. 1; Isokrates, Epist. vii. It is here that the fragments of Memnon, as abstracted by Photius (Cod. 724), q`e; Begins. Photius had seen only eight
exiles; he had taken service with the enemy of his native city, the neighbouring prince Mithridates, and probably enough against the city itself. As an officer, he distinguished himself much; acquiring renown with the prince and influence over the minds of soldiers. Hence his friends, and a party in Herakleia, became anxious to recall him, as moderator and protector under the grievous political discord prevailing. It was the oligarchical party who invited him to come back, at the head of a body of troops, as their auxiliary in keeping down the plebs. Klearchus accepted their invitation; but with the full purpose of making himself the Dionysius of Herakleia. Obtaining from Mithridates a powerful body of mercenaries, under secret promise to hold the city only as his prefect, he marched thither with the proclaimed purpose of maintaining order, and upholding the government. As his mercenary soldiers were soon found troublesome companions, he obtained permission to construct a separate stronghold in the city, under colour of keeping them apart in the stricter discipline of a barrack. Having thus secured a strong position, he invited Mithridates into the city, to receive the promised possession; but instead of performing this engagement, he detained the prince as prisoner, and only released him on payment of a considerable ransom. He next cheated, still more grossly, the oligarchy who had recalled him; denouncing their past misrule, declaring himself their mortal enemy, and espousing the pretensions as well as the antipathies of the plebs. The latter willingly seconded him in his measures— even extreme measures of cruelty and spoliation—against their political enemies. A large number of the rich were killed, impr}-

books of Memnon’s History of Herakleia (Books lx.-xvi. inclusive), neither the first eight books (see the end of his excerpts from Memnon), nor those after the sixteenth, had come under his view. This is greatly to be regretted, as we are thus shut out from the knowledge of Heraklean affairs anterior to Klearchus.

It happens, not unfrequently, with Photius, that he does not possess an entire work, but only portions of it; this is a disappointing fact, in reference to the libraries of the ninth century A.D.

The Fragments of Memnon are collected ‘out of Photius,’ together with those of Nymphius and other Herakleotic historians, and illustrated with useful notes and citations, in the edition of Orelli; as well as by K. Müller, in Didot’s Fragm. Hist. Græc. tom. iii. p. 262. Memnon carried his history down to the time of Julius Caesar, and appears to have lived shortly after the Christian era. Nymphius (whom he probably copied) was much older; having lived seemingly from about 300-330 B.C (see the few Fragmenta remaining from him, in the same work, in p. 12). The work of the Herakleotic author Herodorus seems to have been altogether upon legendary matter (see Fragm. in the same work, ii. p. 27). He was half a century earlier than Nymphius.

1 Suidas, s.v. Klaweuser.

2 Polygenes, ii. 30, 1; Justin, xvi, 4, "A quibus revocatus in patriam, per quas in arce collocatus fuerat," &c.

Æneas (Pollux, c. 12) cites this proceeding as an example of the mistake made by a political party, in calling in a greater number of mercenary auxiliaries than they could manage or keep in order.
soned, or impoverished and banished; their slaves or serfs, too, were not only manumitted by order of the new despot, but also married to the wives and daughters of the exiles. The most tragical scenes arose out of these forced marriages; many of the women even killed themselves, some after having first killed their new husbands. Among the exiles, a party, driven to despair, procured assistance from without, and tried to obtain by force readmittance into the city; but they were totally defeated by Klearchus, who, after this victory became more brutal and unrelenting than ever.  

He was now in irresistible power; despot of the whole city, plebs as well as oligarchy. Such he continued to be for twelve years; during which he displayed great warlike energy against exterior enemies, together with unabated cruelty towards the citizens. He farther indulged in the most overweening insolence of personal demeanour, adopting an Oriental costume and ornaments, and proclaiming himself the son of Zeus—as Alexander the Great did after him. Amidst all these enormities, however, his literary tastes did not forsake him; he collected a library, at that time a very rare possession. Many were the conspiracies attempted by suffering citizens against this tyrant; but his vigilance baffled and punished all. At length two young men, Chion and Leonidès (they too having been among the hearers of Plato), found an opportunity to stab him at a Dionysiac festival. They, with those who seconded them, were slain by his guards, after a gallant resistance; but Klearchus himself died of the wound, in torture and mental remorse.

His death unfortunately brought no relief to the Herakleots. The two sons whom he left, Timotheus and Dionysius, were both minors; but his brother Satyrus, administering in their name, grasped the sceptre and continued the despotic government, with cruelty not merely undiminished, but even aggravated and sharpened by the past assassination. Not inferior to his predecessor in energy and vigilance, Satyrus was in this respect different, that he was altogether rude and unlettered. Moreover he was rigidly scrupulous in preserving the crown for his brother's children, as soon as they should be of age. To ensure to them an undisturbed succession, he took every pre-

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1 Justin, xvi. 4, 5; Theopompus ap. Athenae. iii. p. 85. Fragnm. 200, ed. Didot. 
2 Memnon, c. 1. The seventh epistle of Isokratés, addressed to Timotheus, son of Klearchus, recognises generally this character of the latter; with whose memory Isokratés disclaims all sympathy. 
3 Memnon, c. 1; Justin, xvi. 5; Dio- dor. xvi. 36.
caution to avoid begetting children of his own by his wife. After a rule of seven years, Satyrus died of a lingering and painful distemper.

The government of Herakleia now devolved on Timotheus, who exhibited a contrast, alike marked and beneficent, with his father and uncle. Renouncing all their cruelty and constraint, he set at liberty every man whom he found in prison. He was strict in dispensing justice, but mild and even liberal in all his dealings towards the citizens. At the same time, he was a man of adventurous courage, carrying on successful war against foreign enemies, and making his power respected all around. With his younger brother Dionysius, he maintained perfect harmony, treating him as an equal and partner. Though thus using his power generously towards the Herakleots, he was, however, still a despot, and retained the characteristic marks of despotism—the strong citadel, fortified separately from the town, with a commanding mercenary force. After a reign of about nine years, he died, deeply mourned by every one.

Dionysius, who succeeded him, fell upon unsettled times, full both of hope and fear; opening chances of aggrandizement, yet with many new dangers and uncertainties. The sovereignty which he inherited doubtless included, not simply the city of Herakleia, but also foreign dependencies and possessions in its neighbourhood; for his three predecessors had been all enterprising chiefs, commanding a considerable aggressive force. At the commencement,
ment of his reign, indeed, the ascendency of Memnon and the Persian force in the north-western part of Asia Minor was at a higher pitch than ordinary; it appears that Klearchus— and probably his successors also— had always taken care to keep on the best terms with the Persian court. But presently came the invasion of Alexander (334 B.C.), with the battle of the Granicus, which totally extinguished the Persian power in Asia Minor, and was followed, after no long interval, by the entire conquest of the Persian empire. The Persian control being now removed from Asia Minor— while Alexander with the great Macedonian force merely passed through it to the east, leaving viceroy's behind him— new hopes of independence or aggrandisement began to arise among the native princes in Bithynia, Paphlagonia, and Kappadokia. The Bithynian prince even contended successfully in the field against Kalas, who had been appointed by Alexander as satrap in Phrygia. The Herakleot Dionysius, on the other hand, enemy by position of these Bithynians, courted the new Macedonian potentates, playing his political game with much skill in every way. He kept his forces well in hand, and his dominions carefully guarded; he ruled in a mild and popular manner, so as to preserve among the Herakleots the same feelings of attachment which had been inspired by his predecessor. While the citizens of the neighbouring Sinope (as has been already related) sent their envoys to Darius, Dionysius kept his eyes upon Alexander; taking care to establish a footing at Pella, and being peculiarly assiduous in attentions to Alexander's sister, the princess Kleopatra. He was the better qualified for this courtly service, as he was a man of elegant and ostentatious tastes, and had purchased from his namesake, the fallen Syracusan Dionysius, all the rich furniture of the Dionysian family, highly available for presents.

By the favour of Antipater and the reagency at Pella, the Herakleotic despot was enabled both to maintain and extend his dominions, until the return of Alexander to Susa and Babylon in 324 B.C. All other authority was now superseded by the personal will of the omnipotent conqueror; who, mistrusting all his delegates— Antipater, the princesses, and the satraps— listened readily to complainants from all quarters, and took particular pride in

Memnon, c. 1. 2 Memnon, c. 20. 3 Memnon, c. 3. See in this History, Memnon, c. 3. 4 Ch LXXXV.
exposing the pretensions of Grecian exiles. I have already re-
counted how, in June 324 B.C., Alexander promulgated at the
Olympic festival a sweeping edict, directing that in every Grecian
city the exiles should be restored—by force, if force was required.
Among the various Grecian exiles, those from Herakleia were not
backward in soliciting his support, to obtain their own restoration,
as well as the expulsion of the despot. As they were entitled,
along with others, to the benefit of the recent edict, the position of
Dionysius became one of extreme danger. He now reaped the
full benefit of his antecedent prudence, in having maintained both
his popularity with the Herakleots at home, and his influence with
Antipater, to whom the enforcement of the edict was entrusted.
He was thus enabled to ward off the danger for a time; and his
good fortune rescued him from it altogether, by the death of Alex-
ander in June 323 B.C. That event, coming as it did unexpectedly
upon every one, filled Dionysius with such extravagant joy, that he
fell into a swoon; and he commemorated it by erecting a statue
in honour of Euthymia, or the tranquillising Goddess. His position
however seemed again precarious, when the Herakleotic exiles re-
newed their solicitations to Perdikkas; who favoured the cause,
and might probably have restored them, if he had chosen to direct
his march towards the Hellespont against Antipater and Kraterus,
instead of undertaking the ill-advised expedition against Egypt,
wherein he perished.

The tide of fortune now turned more than ever in favour of
Dionysius. With Antipater and Kraterus, the prepon-
derant potentates in his neighbourhood, he was on the
best terms; and it happened at this juncture to suit the
political views of Kraterus to dismiss his Persian wife
Amastris (niece of the late Persian king Darius, and
conferred upon Kraterus by Alexander when he himself
married Statira), for the purpose of espousing Phila
dughter of Antipater. Amastris was given in marriage to Diony-
sius; for him, a splendid exaltation—attesting the personal in-
fluence which he had previously acquired. His new wife, herself
a woman of ability and energy, brought to him a large sum from
the royal treasure, as well as the means of greatly extending his
dominion round Herakleia. Noway corrupted by this good fortune,
he still persevered both in his conciliating rule at home, and his
prudent alliances abroad, making himself especially useful to Anti-
Dionysius, That great chief, preponderant throughout most parts of Asia Minor, was establishing his ascendancy in Bithynia and the neighbourhood of the Propontis, by founding the city of Antigonia in the rich plain adjoining the Askanian Lake. Dionysius lent effective maritime aid to Antigonus, in that war which ended by his conquest of Cyprus from the Egyptian Ptolemy (307 B.C.). To the other Ptolemy, nephew and general of Antigonus, Dionysius gave his daughter in marriage; and he even felt himself powerful enough to assume the title of king, after Antigonus, Lysimachus, and the Egyptian Ptolemy had done the like. He died, after reigning thirty years with consummate political skill and uninterrupted prosperity—except that during the last few years he lost his health from excessive corpulence.

Dionysius left three children under age—Klearchus, Oxathrés and a daughter—by his wife Amastris; whom he consti-
tuted regent, and who, partly through the cordial support of Antigonus, maintained the Herakleotic dominion un-
impared. Presently Lysimachus, king of Thrace and of the Thracian Chersonese (on the isthmus of which he had founded the city of Lysimachcia), coveted this as a valuable alliance, paid his court to Amastris, and married her. The Herakleotic queen thus enjoyed double pro-
tection, and was enabled to avoid taking part in the formidable conflict of Ipsus (300 B.C.); wherein the allies Lysimachus, Kassander, Ptolemy, and Seleukus were victorious over Antigonus. The latter being slain, and his Asiatic power crushed, Lysimachus got possession of Antigonia, the recent foundation of his rival in Bithynia, and changed its name to Nikæa. After a certain time, however, Lysimachus became desirous of marrying Arsinoë, daughter of the Egyptian Ptolemy; accordingly, Amastris divorced herself from him, and set up for herself separately as regent of Herakleia. Her two sons being now nearly of age, she founded and fortified, for her own residence, the neighbouring city of Amastris, about sixty miles eastward of Herakleia on the coast of the Euxine. These young men, Klearchus and Oxathrés, assumed the government of Herakleia, and

1 Strabo, xii. p. 565.
2 Memnon, c. 4: compare Diodor. xx. 53.
4 Strabo, xii. p. 565. So also Antioch, on the Orontes in Syria, the great

foundation of Seleukus Nikataet, was established on or near the site of another Antigonia, also previously founded by Antigonus Monophthalmus (Strabo, xv. p. 750).
5 Strabo, xii. p. 544.
entered upon various warlike enterprises; of which we know only, that Klearchus accompanied Lysimachus in his expedition against the Goths, sharing the fate of that prince, who was defeated and taken prisoner. Both afterwards obtained their release, and Klearchus returned to Herakleia; where he ruled in a cruel and oppressive manner, and even committed the enormity (in conjunction with his brother Oxathrés) of killing his mother Amastris. This crime was avenged by her former husband Lysimachus; who, coming to Herakleia under professions of friendship (B.C. 286), caused Klearchus and Oxathrés to be put to death, seized their treasure, and keeping separate possession of the citadel only, allowed the Herakleots to establish a popular government.

Lysimachus, however, was soon persuaded by his wife Arsinoē to make over Herakleia to her, as it had been formerly possessed by Amastris; and Arsinoē sent thither a Kyngeean officer named Herakleidēs, who carried with him force sufficient to re-establish the former despotism, with its oppressions and cruelties. For other purposes too, not less mischievous, the influence of Arsinoē was all-powerful. She prevailed upon Lysimachus to kill his eldest son (by a former marriage) Agathoklēs, a young prince of the most estimable and eminent qualities. Such an atrocity, exciting universal abhorrence among the subjects of Lysimachus, enabled his rival Seleukus to attack him with success. In a great battle fought between these two princes, Lysimachus was defeated and slain—by the hand and javelin of a citizen of Herakleia, named Malakon.

This victory transferred the dominions of the vanquished prince to Seleukus. At Herakleia too, its effect was so powerful, that the citizens were enabled to shake off their despotism. They at first tried to make terms with the governor Herakleidēs, offering him money as an inducement to withdraw. From him they obtained only an angry refusal; yet his subordinate officers of mercenaries, and commanders of detached posts in the Herakleotic territory, mistrusting their own power of holding out, accepted an amicable compromise with the citizens, who tendered to them full liquidation of arrears of pay, together with the citizenship. The Herakleots were thus enabled to discard Herakleidēs, and regain their popular government. They signalled their revolution by the impressive ceremony of demolishing their Bastile—the detached fort or stronghold within the city,
which had served for eighty-four years as the characteristic symbol, and indispensable engine, of the antecedent despotism. ¹ The city, now again a free commonwealth, was farther reinforced by the junction of Nymphias (the historian) and other Herakleotic citizens, who had hitherto been in exile. These men were restored, and welcomed by their fellow-citizens in full friendship and harmony; yet with express proviso, that no demand should be made for the restitution of their properties, long since confiscated.² To the victor Seleukus, however, and his officer Aphrodithus, the bold bearing of the newly-emancipated Herakleots proved offensive. They would probably have incurred great danger from him, had not his mind been first set upon the conquest of Macedonia, in the accomplishment of which he was murdered by Ptolemy Keraunus. The Herakleots thus became again a commonwealth of free citizens, without any detached citadel or mercenary garrison; yet they lost, seemingly through the growing force and aggressions of some inland dynasts, several of their outlying dependencies—Kiernus, Tium, and Amastris. The two former they recovered some time afterwards by purchase, and they wished also to purchase back Amastris; but Eumenès, who held it, hated them so much, that he repudiated their money, and handed over the place gratuitously to the Kappadokian chief Ariobarzanès. ¹ That their maritime power was at this time very great, we may see by the astonishing account given of their immense ships,—numerously manned, and furnished with many brave combatants on the deck—which fought with eminently distinction in the naval battle between Ptolemy Keraunus (murderer and successor of Seleukus) and Antigonus Gonataes.⁴

It is not my purpose to follow lower down the destinies of Herakleia. It maintained its internal autonomy, with considerable maritime power, a dignified and prudent administration, and a partial, though sadly circumscribed, liberty of foreign action—until the successful war of the Romans against Mithridates (B.C. 69). In Asia Minor, the Hellenic cities on the coast were partly enabled to postpone the epoch of their subjugation, by the great

¹ Memnon, c. 9; Strabo, xii. p. 542.
² Memnon, c. 11.
³ Memnon, c. 11. The inhabitants of Byzantium also purchased for a considerable sum the important position called the 'leper,' at the entrance of the Euxine on the Asiatic side (Polyb. iv. 50). These are rare examples, in ancient history, of cities acquiring territory or dependencies by purchase. Acquisitions were often made in this manner by the free Germans, Swiss, and Italians on modern Europe; but as to the Hellenic cities, I have not had occasion to record many such transactions in the course of this History.
⁴ Memnon, c. 13. ¹ compare Polyb. xviii. 34.
division of power which prevailed in the interior; for the potentates of Bithynia, Pergamus, Kappadokia, Pontus, Syria, were in almost perpetual discord—while all of them were menaced by the intrusion of the warlike and predatory Gauls, who extorted for themselves settlements in Galatia (B.C. 276). The kings, the enemies of civic freedom, were kept partially in check by these new and formidable neighbours, who were themselves however hardly less formidable to the Greek cities on the coast. Simpô, Ileraklia, Byzantium,—and even Rhodes, in spite of the advantage of an insular position,—isolated relics of what had once been an Hellenic aggregate, become from henceforward cribbed and confined by inland neighbours almost at their gates—dependent on the barbaric potentates, between whom they were compelled to trim, making themselves useful in turn to all. It was however frequent with these barbaric princes to derive their wives, mistresses, ministers, negotiators, officers, engineers, literati, artists, actors, and intermediate agents both for ornament and recreation—from some Greek city. Among them all, more or less of Hellenic influence became thus insinuated: along with the Greek language which spread its roots everywhere—even among the Gauls or Galatians, the rudest and latest of the foreign immigrants.

Of the Greek maritime towns in the Euxine south of the Danube—Apollonia, Mesembria, Odessus, Kallatis, Tomi, and Istrus—five (seemingly without Tomi) formed a confederate Pentapolis. About the year 319 B.C., we hear of them as under the power of Lysimachus king of Thrace. It is most probable that these cities invited Philip as their defender.

1 This is a remarkable observation made by Memnon, c. 19.
2 See the statement of Polybius, xxii. 24.
3 Contrast the independent and commanding position occupied by Byzantium in 399 B.C., acknowledging no superior except Sparta (Xenoph. Anab. vii. 1)—with its condition in the third century B.C.—harassed and pillaged almost to the gates of the town by the neighbouring Thracians and Gauls, and only purchasing immunity by continued money payments: see Polybius, iv. 45.
4 An inscription (2056) immediately preceding the above, also found at Odessa, contains a vote of thanks and honours to a certain citizen of Antioch, who resided with the Scythian king of the Scythians, and rendered great service to the Greeks by his influence.
Thrace, who kept a garrison in Kallatis—probably in the rest also. They made a struggle to shake off his yoke, obtaining assistance from some of the neighbouring Thracians and Scythians, as well as from Antigonus. But Lysimachus, after a contest which seems to have lasted three or four years, overpowered both their allies and them, reducing them again into subjection. 1 Kallatis sustained a long siege, dismissing some of its ineffective residents; who were received and sheltered by Eumelus prince of Bosporus. It was in pushing his conquests yet farther northward, in the steppe between the rivers Danube and Dniester, that Lysimachus came into conflict with the powerful prince of the Getæ—Dromichætés; by whom he was defeated and captured, but generously released. 2 I have already mentioned that the empire of Lysimachus ended with his last defeat and death by Seleukus—(281 B.C.). By his death, the cities of the Pontic Pentapolis regained a temporary independence. But their barbaric neighbours became more and more formidable, being reinforced seemingly by immigration of fresh hordes from Asia; thus the Sarmatians, who in Herodotus's time were on the east of the Tanais, appear, three centuries afterwards, even south of the Danube. By these tribes—Thracians, Getæ, Scythians, and Sarmatians—the Greek cities of this Pentapolis were successively pillaged. Though renewed indeed afterwards, from the necessity of some place of traffic, even for the pillagers themselves—they were but poorly renewed, with a large infusion of barbaric residents. 3 Such was the condition in which the exile Ovid found Tomi, near the beginning of the Christian era. The Tomitans were more than half barbaric; and their Greek not easily intelligible. The Sarmatian or Getic horse- bowmen, with their poisoned arrows, ever hovered near, galloped even up to the gates, and carried off the unwary cultivators into slavery. Even within a furlong of the town, there was no security either for person or property. The residents were clothed in skins or leather; while the women, ignorant both of spinning and weaving, were employed either in grinding corn or in carrying on their heads the pitchers of water. 4

1 Diodor, xix. 73; xx. 25.
2 Strabo, vii. p. 302-305; Pausanias, i. 9, 5.
3 Dion. Chrysost. Orat. xxxvi. (Borysthenitica) p. 75, Beick. ἐλοῦν δὲ καὶ πόλιν Ὀλίβα, Νέας, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς ἐν τοῖς δυτικοῖς του Πόντου πόλεις, μέχρι Ἀσπαλαμίας τοῖς θαλάσσιοι θέμι καὶ σφόδρα τακτικά τὰ ἡμέρας κατάστη τῶν τάκτων Ἑλλήνων τῶν μὲν οὐκέτι συνυκαθεῖσαν πόλεως, τῶν δὲ ψυκῆς, καὶ τῶν πλεῖστων βαρβάρων εἰς τίτας συβομένων.
4 The picture drawn by Ovid, of his situation as an exile at Tomi, can never fail to interest, from the mere beauty and felicity of his expression; but it is not less interesting, as a real description of Hellenism in its last phase, degraded and overcome, by adverse fates. The truth of Ovid's picture is fully
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Hypanis or Bug near its mouth) became robbed of that
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by Herodotus. In his day, the Olbians lived on good
terms with the Scythian tribes in their neighbourhood.
They paid a stipulated tribute, giving presents besides
to the prince and his immediate favourites; and on these
conditions, their persons and properties were respected. The
Scythian prince Skylès (son of an Hellenic mother from Istrus,
who had familiarised him with Greek speech and letters) had built
a fine house in the town, and spent in it a month, from attachment
to Greek manners and religion, while his Scythian army lay near
the gates without molesting any one. It is true that this pro-
ceeding cost Skylès his life; for the Scythians would not tolerate
their own prince in the practice of foreign religious rites, though
they did not quarrel with the same rites when observed by the
Greeks. To their own customs the Scythians adhered tenaciously,
and those customs were often sanguinary, ferocious, and brutish.
Still they were warriors, rather than robbers—they abstained from
habitual pillage, and maintained with the Greeks a reputation for
honesty and fair dealing, which became proverbial with the early
poets. Such were the Scythians as seen by Herodotus (probably
about 410 to 430 B.C.); and the picture drawn by Ephorus a cen-
tury afterwards (about 340 B.C.) appears to have been not ma-
terially different. But after that time it gradually altered. New

This is a specimen out of many others: compare Trist. ii. 10, 51; iv. 1, 67;
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Ovid dwells especially upon the fact
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Hellocne speech at Tomi—"Gratoque
quod Graio vix loquela sum est" (Trist. v. 2, 68). Woollen clothing, and
the practice of spinning and weaving by
the free women of the family, were
among the most familiar circumstances
of Grecian life; the absence of these
feminine arts, and the use of skins for
clothing, were notable de-
parations from Grecian habits (Ex Ponto,
ni. 8)—

"Vulcanis artes Ruma frondendis; et Polibus uti
Atque Ioanni non diderc munus
Paulina pro lacri Cereris nomen interstant,

Sphingateque aestas in vulis et portis agit.

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tribes seem to have come in—the Sarmatians out of the East—the Gauls out of the West; from Thrace northward to the Tanais and the Palus Mætis, the most different tribes became intermingled—Gauls, Thracians, Getæ, Scythians, Sarmatians, &c. Olbia was in an open plain, with no defence except its walls and the adjoining river Hypanis, frozen over in the winter. The hybrid Helleno-Scythian race, formed by intermarriages of Greeks with Scythians—and the various Scythian tribes who had become partially-sedentary cultivators of corn for exportation—had probably also acquired habits less warlike than the tribes of primitive barbaric type. At any rate, even if capable of defending themselves, they could not continue their production and commerce under repeated hostile incursions.

A valuable inscription remaining enables us to compare the Olbia (or Borysthenes) seen by Herodotus, with the same town in the second century B.C. At this latter period, the city was diminished in population, impoverished in finances, exposed to constantly increasing exactions and menace from the passing barbaric hordes, and scarcely able to defend against them the security of its walls. Sometimes there approached the barbaric chief Saitapharnæs with his personal suite, sometimes his whole tribe or horde in mass, called Saiii. Whenever they came, they required to be appeased by presents, greater than the treasury could supply, and borrowed only from the voluntary help of rich citizens; while even these presents did not always avert ill-treatment.

1 Strabo, vii. p. 296-304. 2 This inscription—No. 2058—in Boeckh's Inschr. Greec. part xi. p. 121 sq.—is among the most interesting in that noble collection. It records a vote of public gratitude and honour to a citizen of Olbia named Protogenes, and recites the valuable services which he had contributed to extricate the city from numerous situations of difficulty and danger from which he had contributed to extricate them. A vivid picture is presented to us of the distress of the city. The introduction prefixed by Boeckh (p. 86-98) is also very instructive.

Olbia is often spoken of by the name of Borysthenes, which name was given to it by foreigners, but not recognized by the citizens. Nor was it even situated on the Borysthenes river; but on the right or western bank of the Hypanis (Bug) river; not far from the modern Oczakoff.

The date of the above inscription is not specified, and has been differently determined by various critics. Niebuhr assigns it (Untersuchungen uber die Skythen, &c. in his Kleine Schriften, p. 387) to a time near the close of the second Punic war. Boeckh also believes that it is not much after that epoch. The terror inspired by it, even to other barbarians, appears to suit the second century B.C. better than it suits a later period.

The Inscription No. 2058 attests the great number of strangers resident at Olbia; strangers from eighteen different cities, of which the most remote is Miletus, the mother-city of Olbia.
ment or pillage. Already the citizens of Olbia had repelled various attacks, partly by taking into pay a semi-Hellenic population in their neighbourhood (Mix-Hellenes, like the Liby-Phenicians in Africa); but the inroads became more alarming, and their means of defence less, through the uncertain fidelity of these Mix-Hellenes, as well as of their own slaves—the latter probably barbaric natives purchased from the interior. In the midst of public poverty, it was necessary to enlarge and strengthen the fortifications; for they were threatened with the advent of the Gauls—who inspired such terror that the Scythians and other barbarians were likely to seek their own safety by extorting admission within the walls of Olbia. Moreover even corn was scarce, and extravagantly dear. There had been repeated failures in the produce of the lands around, famine was apprehended, and efforts were needed, greater than the treasury could sustain, to lay in a stock at the public expense. Among the many points of contrast with Herodotus, this is perhaps the most striking; for in his time, corn was the great produce and the principal export from Olbia; the growth had now been suspended, or was at least perpetually cut off, by increased devastation and insecurity.

After perpetual attacks, and even several captures, by barbaric neighbours—this unfortunate city, about fifty years before the Christian era, was at length so miserably sacked by the Getae, as to become for a time abandoned. Presently, however, the fugitives partially returned, to re-establish themselves on a reduced scale. For the very same barbarians who had persecuted and plundered them, still required an emporium with a certain amount of import and export, such as none but Greek settlers could provide; moreover it was from the coast near Olbia, and from the care of its inhabitants, that many of the neighbouring tribes derived their supply of salt. Hence arose a puny after-growth of Olbia—preserving the name, traditions, and part of the locality, of the deserted city—by the return of a portion of the colonists with an infusion of Scythian or Sarmatian residents; an infusion indeed so large, as seriously to dishellenise both the speech and the personal names in the town.

1. On our occasion, we know not when, the citizens of Olbia are said to have been attacked by one Zopyrion, and to have succeeded in resisting him only by emancipating their slaves, and granting the citizenship to foreigners (Macrobius, Saturnal. i. 11).

2. Dion Chrys. (Or. xxxvi. p. 75.)


4. See Boeckh's Commentary on the language and the personal names of the Olbian Inscriptions, part xi. p. 108-111.
To this second edition of Olbia, the rhetor Dion Chrysostom paid a summer visit (about a century after the Christian era) of which he has left a brief but interesting account. Within the wide area once filled by the original Olbia—the former circumference of which was marked by crumbling walls and towers—the second town occupied a narrow corner; with poor houses, low walls, and temples having no other ornament except the ancient statues mutilated by the plunderers. The citizens dwelt in perpetual insecurity, constantly under arms or on guard; for the barbaric horsemen, in spite of sentinels posted to announce their approach, often carried off prisoners, cattle, or property, from the immediate neighbourhood of the gates. The picture drawn of Olbia by Dion confirms in a remarkable way that given of Tomi by Ovid. And what imparts to it a touching interest is, that the Greeks whom Dion saw contending with the difficulties, privations, and dangers of this inhospitable outpost, still retained the activity, the elegance, and the intellectual aspirations of their Ionic breed; in this respect much superior to the Tomitans of Ovid. In particular, they were passionate admirers of Homer; a considerable proportion of the Greeks of Olbia could repeat the Iliad from memory. Achilès (localised under the surname of Pontarchès, on numerous islands and capes in the Euxine) was among the chief divine or heroic persons to whom they addressed their prayers. Amidst Grecian life, degraded and verging towards its extinction, and stripped even of the purity of living speech—the thread of imaginative and traditional sentiment thus continues without suspension or abatement.

Respecting Bosporus or Pantikapeum (for both names denote the same city, though the former name often comprehends the whole annexed dominion), founded by Milesian

settlers on the European side of the Kimmerian Bosporus (near Kertsch), we first hear, about the period when Xerxes was repulsed from Greece (480-479 B.C.). It was the centre of a dominion including Phanagoria, Kepi, Hermonassa, and other Greek cities on the Asiatic side of the strait; and is said to have been governed by what seems to have been an oligarchy—called the Archaeaktides, for forty-two years (480-438 B.C.):

After them we have a series of princes standing out individually by name, and succeeding each other in the same family. Spartokus I. was succeeded by Seleukus; next comes Spartokus II.; then Satyros I. (407-393 B.C.); Leukon (393-353 B.C.); Spartokus III. (353-348 B.C.); Parians I. (348-310 B.C.); Satyros II., Prytanis, Eunemus (310-304 B.C.); Spartokus IV. (304-284 B.C.); Parians I. During the reigns of these princes, a connexion of some intimacy subsisted between Athens and Bosporus; a connexion not political, since the Bosporanic princes had little interest in the contentions about Hellenic hegemony—but of private intercourse, commercial interchange, and reciprocal good offices. The eastern corner of the Tauric Chersonesus, between Pantikapaum and Theodosia, was well suited for the production of corn; while plenty of fish, as well as salt, was to be had in or near the Palus Mæotis. Corn, salted fish and meat, hides, and barbaric slaves in considerable numbers were in demand among all the Greeks round the Ægean, and not least at Athens, where Scythian slaves were numerous; while oil and wine, with other products of more southern regions, were acceptable in Bosporus and the other Pontic ports. This important traffic seems to have been mainly carried on in ships and by capital belonging to Athens and other Ægean maritime towns; and must have been greatly under the protection and regulation of the Athenians, so long as their maritime empire subsisted. Enter-

1 Strabo, vii. p. 310.
2 Diodor, xii. 31.
3 See Mr. Clinton’s Appendix on the Kings of Bosporus—Fast. Hellen. App. c. 15, p. 280, &c.; and Boeckh’s Commentary on the same subject, Inscrip. Graec. part xi, p. 94 seq.
4 Polybius (iv. 38) enumerates the principal articles of this Pontic trade; among the exports ῥομα αδιπωμένα καὶ ῥομα ῥεαμένα τὰς διώλεις ἐγωμένους σωμάτων ἀλέας, &c., where Schweighauser has altered ῥομα αδιπωμένα to ῥομα αδιπωμένα, seemingly on the authority of one MS. only. I doubt the propriety of this change, as well as the fact of any large exportation of live cattle from the Pontus; whereas the exportation of hides was considerable: see Strabo, xi. p. 493.
5 The Scythian public slaves or policemen of Athens are well known. Σκύθης is the name of a female slave (Aristoph. Lysistr. 184). Σκύθης, for the name of a slave, occurs as early as Theognis, v. 326.
6 Some of the salted preparations from the Pontus were extravagantly dear; Cato complained of a κρέατος οίνων ταρδεύως at a price of 300 drachms (Polyb. xxxi. 24).
prising citizens of Athens went to Bosporus (as to Thrace and the Thracian Chersonesus) to push their fortunes; merchants from other cities found it advantageous to settle as resident strangers or metics at Athens, where they were more in contact with the protecting authority, and obtained readier access to the judicial tribunals. It was probably during the period preceding the great disaster at Syracuse in 413 B.C., that Athens first acquired her position as a mercantile centre for the trade with the Euxine; which we afterwards find her retaining, even with reduced power, in the time of Demosthenes.

How strong was the position enjoyed by Athens in Bosporus, during her unimpaired empire, we may judge from the fact, that Nymphæum (south of Panticapæum, between that town and Theodosia) was among her tributary towns, and paid a talent annually. Not until the misfortunes of Athens in the closing years of the Peloponnesian war, did Nymphæum pass into the hands of the Bosporanic princes; betrayed (according to Aeschines) by the maternal grandfather of Demosthenes, the Athenian Gylon; who however probably did nothing more than obey a necessity rendered unavoidable by the fallen condition of Athens. We thus see that Nymphæum, in the midst of the Bosporanic dominion, was not only a member of the Athenian empire, but also contained influential Athenian citizens, engaged in the corn-trade. Gylon was rewarded by a large grant of land at Kepi—probably other Athenians of Nymphæum were rewarded also—by the Bosporanic prince; who did not grudge a good price for such an acquisition. We find also other instances,—both of Athenian citizens sent out to reside with the prince Satyrus,—and of Pontic Greeks who, already in correspondence and friendship with various individual Athenians, consign their sons to be initiated in the commerce, society, and refinements of Athens. Such facts attest the correspondence and intercourse of that city, during her imperial greatness, with Bosporus.

The Bosporanic prince Satyrus was in the best relations with

1 Aeschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 78, c. 57. See my preceding Ch. LXXVII.
2 Lyseus, pro Maiantheo, Or. xvi. s. 4; Isocrates (Traspedric.), Or. xvii. s. 8.
3 The young men, whose case Euthydikos sets forth, was sent to Athens by his father Sophus, a rich Pontic Greek (s. 59) much in the confidence of Satyrus. Sophus furnished his son with two ship-loads of corn, and with money besides—and then dispatched him to Athens. } 

 Athens ἑμα 'κατ᾽ ἔνδο τῆς ἐπαρχιας ἥλιον ἑκατοντάκτην. 
Athens, and even seems to have had authorised representatives there to enforce his requests, which met with very great attention. He treated the Athenian merchants at Bosporus with equity and even favour, granting to them a preference in the export of corn when there was not enough for all. His son Leukon not only continued the preference to Athenian exporting ships, but also granted to them remission of the export duty (of one-thirtieth part), which he exacted from all other traders. Such an exemption is reckoned as equivalent to an annual present of 13,000 medimni of corn (the medimnus being about 1.7 bushel); the total quantity of corn brought from Bosporus to Athens in a full year being 400,000 medimni. It is easy to see moreover that such a premium must have thrown nearly the whole exporting trade into the hands of Athenian merchants. The Athenians requited this favour by public votes of gratitude and honour, conferring upon Leukon the citizenship, together with immunity from all the regular burthens attaching to property at Athens. There was lying in that city money belonging to Leukon; who was therefore open (under the proposition of Leptinês) to that conditional summons for exchange of properties, technically termed Antidosis. In his time, moreover, the corn-trade of Bosporus appears to have been farther extended; for we learn that he established an export from Thegdosia as well as from Pantikapeum. His successor Parisadès I. continuing to Athenian exporters of corn the same privilege of immunity from export duty, obtained from Athens still higher honours than Leukon; for we learn that his statue, together with those of two relatives, was erected in the agora, on the motion of Demosthenês. The connexion of Bosporus with Athens was durable as well as intimate; its corn-trade being of high importance to the subsistence of the people. Every

1 Isokrátês, Trapezit. s. 5, 6. Sopóus, father of this pleader, had incurred the suspicions of Satyrus in the Pontus, and had been arrested; upon which Satyrus sends to Athens to seize the property of the son, to order him home,—and if he refused, then to require the Athenians to deliver him up—ἐστίταλεν δὲ τοῖς ἐνθάδε ἐπιδημοῦσιν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου τὰ χρήματα παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ κομίσασθαι, &c.

2 Isokratês, Trapezit. s. 71. Demosthenês also recognises favours from Satyrus—καὶ ἀντὶς (Leukon) καὶ ὡς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου τὰ περὶ χρήματα παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ κομίσασθαι, &c.

3 Demosth. adv. Leptin., p. 467.

4 Demosth. adv. Phormion., p. 917; Deinarchus adv. Demosth., p. 54. The name stands Berisades as printed in the oration; but it is plain that Parisades is the person designated. See Boeckh, Introd. ad Inscr. No. 2056, p. 92.

Deinarchus avers, that Demosthenês received an annual present of 1000 modii of corn from Bosporus.
Athenian exporter was bound by law to bring his cargo in the first instance to Athens. The freighting and navigating of ships for that purpose, together with the advance of money by rich capitalists (citizens and metics) upon interest and conditions enforced by the Athenian judicature, was a standing and profitable business. And we may appreciate the value of equitable treatment, not to say favour, from the kings of Bosporus—when we contrast it with the fraudulent and extortionate behaviour of Kleomenes, satrap of Egypt, in reference to the export of Egyptian corn.¹

The political condition of the Greeks at Bosporus was somewhat peculiar. The hereditary princes (above enumerated), who ruled them substantially as despots, assumed no other title (in respect to the Greeks) than that of Archon. They paid tribute to the powerful Scythian tribes who bounded them on the European side, and even thought it necessary to carry a ditch across the narrow istmus, from some point near Theodosia northward to the Palus Maeotis, as a protection against incursions.² Their dominion did not extend farther west than Theodosia; this ditch was their extreme western boundary; and even for the land within it, they paid tribute. But on the Asiatic side of the strait, they were lords paramount for a considerable distance, over the feeble and less warlike tribes who pass under the common name of Maeota or Maeotae—the Sindi, Toreti, Dundarii, Thates, &c. Inscriptions, yet remaining, of Parisades I., record him as King of these various barbaric tribes, but as Archon of Bosporus and Theodosia.³ His dominion on the Asiatic side of the Kimmerian Bosporus, sustained by Grecian and Thracian mercenaries, was of considerable (though to us unknown) extent, reaching to somewhere near the borders of Caucasus.⁴

¹ Demosthen. adv. Dionysodor. p. 1285.
² Strabo, vii. p. 310, 311.
³ See Inscription, Nos. 2117, 2118, 2119, in Bösehch's Collection, p. 158. In the Memorabilia of Xenophon (ii. 1, 10), Socrates cites the Scythians as an example of ruling people, and the Maeota as an example of subjects. Probably this refers to the position of the Bosporan Greeks, who paid tribute to the Scythians, but ruled over the Maeota. The name Maeota seems confined to tribes on the Asiatic side of the Palus Maeotis; while the Scythians were on the European side of that sea. Sokrates and the Athenians had good means of being informed about the situation of the Bosporani and their neighbours on both sides. See K. Neumann, Die Hellenen im Skythenlande, ii. p. 218.
⁴ This boundary is attested in another Inscription, No. 2104, of the same collection. Inscription No. 2103, seems to indicate Arcadian mercenaries in the service of Leukon; about the mercenaries, see Diodor. xx. 22. Parisades I. is said to have been worshipped as a God, after his death (Strabo, vii. p. 310).
Parasidès I. on his death left three sons—Satyrus, Prytanis, and Eumelus. Satyrus, as the eldest, succeeded; but Eumelus claimed the crown, sought aid without, and prevailed on various neighbours—among them a powerful Thracian king named Ariopharnès—to espouse his cause. At the head of an army said to consist of 20,000 horse and 22,000 foot, the two allies marched to attack the territories of Satyrus, who advanced to meet them, with 2000 Grecian mercenaries, and 2000 Thracians of his own, reinforced by a numerous body of Scythian allies—20,000 foot, and 10,000 horse, and carrying with him a plentiful supply of provisions in waggons. He gained a complete victory, compelling Eumelus and Ariopharnès to retreat and seek refuge in the regal residence of the latter, near the river Thapsis; a fortress built of timber, and surrounded with forest, river, marsh, and rock, so as to be very difficult of approach. Satyrus, having first plundered the country around, which supplied a rich booty of prisoners and cattle, proceeded to assail his enemies in their almost impracticable position. But though he, and Meniskus his general of mercenaries, made the most strenuous efforts, and even carried some of the outworks, they were repulsed from the fortress itself; and Satyrus, exposing himself forwardly to extricate Meniskus, received a wound of which he shortly died—after a reign of nine months. Meniskus, raising the siege, withdrew the army to Gargaza; from whence he conveyed back the regal corpse to Pantikapeum. Prytanis, the next brother, rejecting an offer of partition tendered by Eumelus, assumed the sceptre, and marched forth to continue the struggle. But the tide of fortune now turned in favour of

1 Diodor. xx. 24. The scene of these military operations (as far as we can pretend to make it out from the brief and superficial narrative of Diodorus) seems to have been on the European side of Bosporus; somewhere between the Borysthenes river and the Isthmus of Perekop, in the territory called by Herodotus ταυλα, This is Niebuhr's opinion, which I think more probable than that of Boeckh, who supposes the operations to have occurred on the Asiatic territory of Bosporus. So far I concur with Niebuhr; but his reasons for placing Dromichætus king of the (the victor over Lysimachus), east of the Borysthenes, are noway satisfactory.


The mention by Diodorus of a wooden fortress, surrounded by morass and forest, is curious, and may be illustrated by the description in Herodotus (iv. 108) of the city of the Budini. This habit, of building towns and fortifications of wood, prevailed among the Slavonic population in Russia and Poland until far down in the middle ages. See Paul Joseph Schafferik, Slavische Alterthümer, in the German translation of Wuttke, vol. i, ch. 10, p. 192; also K. Neumann, Die Hellenen im Skythenlande, p. 91.
Eumelus, who took Gargaza with several other places, worsted his brother in battle, and so blocked him up in the isthmus near the Falus Maotis, that he was forced to capitulate and resign his pretensions. Eumelus entered Pantikapeum as conqueror. Nevertheless, the defeated Prytanis, in spite of his recent covenant, made a renewed attempt upon the crown; wherein he was again baffled, forced to escape to Képi, and there slain. To assure himself of the throne, Eumelus put to death the wives and children of both his two brothers, Satyrus and Prytanis—together with all their principal friends. One youth alone—Parisades, son of Satyrus—escaped and found protection with the Scythian prince Agarus.

Eumelus had now put down all rivals; yet his recent cruelties had occasioned wrath and disgust among the Bosporanic citizens. He convoked them in assembly, to excuse his past conduct, and promised good government for the future; at the same time guaranteeing to them their full civic constitution, with such privileges and immunities as they had before enjoyed, and freedom from direct taxation. Such assurances, combined probably with an imposing mercenary force, appeased or at least silenced the prevailing disaffection. Eumelus kept his promises so far as to govern in a mild and popular spirit. While thus rendering himself acceptable at home, he maintained an energetic foreign policy, and made several conquests among the surrounding tribes. He constituted himself a sort of protector of the Euxine, repressing the piracies of the Heniochi and Achai (among the Caucasian mountains to the east) as well as of the Tauri in the Chersonesus (Crimea); much to the satisfaction of the Byzantines, Sinopians, and other Pontic Greeks. He received a portion of the fugitives from Kallatis, when besieged by Lysimachus, and provided for them a settlement in his dominions. Having thus acquired great reputation, Eumelus was in the full career of conquest and aggrandisement, when an accident terminated his life, after a reign of rather more than five years. In returning from Scythia to Pantikapeum, in a four-wheeled carriage (or waggon) and four with a tent upon it, his horses took fright and ran away. Perceiving that they were carrying him towards a precipice, he tried to jump out; but his sword becoming entangled in the wheel, he was killed on the spot. He was succeeded by his son Spartokus IV., who reigned twenty years (304-284 B.C.).
afterwards came the son of Spartokus, Parisadès II.; with whose name our information breaks off.  

This dynasty, the Spartokides, though they ruled the Greeks of Bosporus as despots by means of a foreign mercenary force—yet seem to have exercised power with equity and moderation.  

Had Eumelus lived, he might probably have established an extensive empire over the barbaric tribes on all sides of him. But empire over such subjects was seldom permanent; nor did his successors long maintain even as much as he left. We have no means of following their fortunes in detail; but we know that about a century B.C. the then reigning prince, Parisadès IV., found himself so pressed and squeezed by the Scythians, that he was forced (like Olbia and the Pentapolis) to forego his independence; and to call in, as auxiliary or master, the formidable Mithridatès Eupator of Pontus; from whom a new dynasty of Bosporanic kings began—subject however, after no long interval, to the dominion and interference of Rome. 

Monuments of the Spartokid princes of Bosporus—like the imposing groups of mighty sepulchral tumuli near Kertch (Pantikapeum)—deserve to be ranked among the conspicuous features of the living Hellenic world. They were not indeed purely Hellenic, but presented a considerable admixture of Scythian or Oriental manners; analogous to the mixture of the Hellenic and Libyan elements at Kyrenâ with its Battiad princes. Among the facts attesting the wealth and power of these Spartokid princes, and of the Bosporanic community, we may number the imposing groups of mighty sepulchral tumuli near Kertch (Pantikapeum); some of which have been recently examined, while the greater part still remain unopened. These spacious chambers of stone—enclosed in vast hillocks (Kurgans), cyclopian works piled up with prodigious labour and cost—have been found to contain not only a profusion of ornaments of the precious metals (gold, silver, and electrum, or a mixture of four parts of gold to one of silver), but also numerous vases, implements, and works of art, illustrating the life and ideas of the Bosporanic population. 

The contents of the tumuli...
already opened are so multifarious, that from the sepulchres of Pantikapeum alone, we might become acquainted with every thing which served the Greeks either for necessary use, or for the decoration of domestic life. 1 Statues, reliefs, and frescoes on the walls, have been found, on varied subjects both of war and peace, and often of very fine execution; besides these, numerous carvings in wood, and vessels of bronze or terra cotta; with necklaces, armlets, bracelets, rings, drinking cups, &c. of precious metal—several with coloured beads attached. 2 The costumes, equipment, and physiognomy represented, are indeed a mixture of Hellenic and barbaric; moreover, even the profusion of gold chains and other precious ornaments, indicates a tone of sentiment partially orientalized, in those for whom they were destined. But the design as well as the execution comes clearly out of the Hellenic workshop; and there is good ground for believing, that in the

1 Neumann, Die Hellenen im Skythenlande, p. 503.
2 An account of the recent discoveries near Kertch or Pantikapeum, will be found in Dubois de Montpéreux, Voyage dans le Caucase, vol. v. p. 115 seqq.; and in Neumann, Die Hellenen im Skythenlande, pp. 488-533. The last-mentioned work is peculiarly copious and instructive; relating what has been done since Dubois’s travels, and containing abundant information derived from the recent memoirs of the St. Petersburg Literary Societies.

The local and special type, which shows itself so much on these works of art, justifies the inference that they were not brought from other Grecian cities, but executed by Grecian artists resident at Pantikapeum (p. 507). Two marble statues, a man and a woman, both larger than life, exhume in 1850, are spoken of with peculiar admiration (p. 491). Coins of the third and fourth century B.C. have been found in several (p. 494–495). A great number of the so-called Etruscan vases have also been discovered, probably fabricated from a species of clay still existing in the neighbourhood: the figures on these vases are often excellent, with designs and scenes of every description, religious, festal, warlike, domestic (p. 522). Many of the sarcophagi are richly ornamented with carvings, in wood, ivory, &c.; some admirably executed (p. 521). Unfortunately, the belief prevails, and has long prevailed, among the neighbouring population, that these tumuli contain hidden treasures. One of the most striking among them—called the Kul-Obo—was opened in 1839 by the Russian authorities. After great pains and trouble, the means of entrance were discovered, and the interior chamber was reached. It was the richest that had ever been opened; being found to contain some splendid golden ornaments, as well as many other relics. The Russian officers placed a guard to prevent any one from entering it; but the eagerness of the population of Kertch was so inflamed by the report of the expected treasure being discovered, that they forced the guard, broke into the interior, and pillaged most of the contents (p. 509). The Russian authorities have been generally anxious for the preservation and gradual excavation of these monuments, but have had to contend against repugnance and even rapacity on the part of the people near.

Dubois de Montpéreux gives an interesting description of the opening of these tumuli near Kertch, especially of the Kul-Obo, the richest of all, which he conceives to have belonged to one of the Spartokid kings, and the decorations of which were the product of Hellenic art:—

"Si Mn a enterré (he observes) un roi entouré d’un luxe Scythe, on sont des Grecs et des artistes de cette nation qui ont travaillé à ses funérailles."

(Voyage autour du Caucase, pp. 195, 219, 227). Pantikapeum and Phanagoria (he says) "se préoccupent de lein à la foule de leurs tumuli" (p. 197).
fourth century B.C., Pantikapeum was the seat, not only of enter-
prising and wealthy citizens, but also of strenuous and well-directed
artistic genius. Such manifestations of the refinements of Hellen-
ism, in this remote and little-noticed city, form an important
addition to the picture of Hellas as a whole,—prior to its days of
subjection,—which it has been the purpose of this history to
present.

I have now brought down the history of Greece to the point of
time marked out in the Preface to my First Volume—the close of
the generation contemporary with Alexander—the epoch, from
whence dates not only the extinction of Grecian political freedom
and self-action, but also the decay of productive genius, and the
debasement of that consummate literary and rhetorical excellence
which the fourth century B.C. had seen exhibited in Plato and
Demosthenes. The contents of this last Volume indicate but too
early that Greece as a separate subject of history no longer
exists; for one full half of it is employed in depicting Alexander
and his conquests—ἅγιον αἰχμητόν, κρατερὸν μήστωρᾳ φόβοι2—
that Non-Hellenic conqueror into whose vast possessions the Greeks
are absorbed, with their intellectual brightness dimmed, their
spirit broken, and half their virtue taken away by Zeus—the
melancholy emasculation inflicted (according to Homer) upon
victims overtaken by the day of slavery.3

One branch of intellectual energy there was, and one alone,
which continued to flourish, comparatively little impaired, under
the preponderance of the Macedonian sword—the spirit of specula-
tion and philosophy. During the century which we have just gone
through, this spirit was embodied in several eminent persons, whose
names have been scarcely adverted to in this History. Among
these names, indeed, there are two, of peculiar grandeur, whom I
have brought partially before the reader, because both of them
belong to general history as well as to philosophy; Plato, as citizen

1 How marked that degradation was, may be seen attested by Dionysius of
Halikarnassus, De Antiquis Oratoribus, pp. 445, 446, Reiske—ἐν γὰρ δὴ τοῖς
τρὸ ἡμῶν χρόνοις ἡ μὲν ἀρχαία καὶ φιλο-
σοφος ῥητορικὴ προπηλακιζομένη καὶ
πάντως ἐβραίς ὑπομένουσα κατελύετο,
ἀρκετών μᾶν ἄντο τῆς ‘Αλεξάνδρου τοῦ
Μακεδόνα τελευτήτες ἐκπεναὶ καὶ μαραλ-
νευσμα καὶ ὃλγεν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς καθ’ ἡμᾶς
πλακᾶς μικροῦ δεήσασα εἰς τέλος ἡμα-
τρείαν. Compare Dionys. De Composit,
Verbor. p. 29, 30, Reisk.; and Wester-
mann, Geschichte der Griechischen Be-
redtsumkeit, 5. 75-77.

2 Hom. Iliad, vi. 97.

3 Hom. Odys., xvi. 322.
of Athens, companion of Sokratēs at his trial, and counsellor of Dionysius in his glory—Aristotle, as the teacher of Alexander. I had at one time hoped to include in my present work a record of them as philosophers also, and an estimate of their speculative characteristics; but I find the subject far too vast to be compressed into such a space as this volume would afford. The exposition of the tenets of distinguished thinkers is not now numbered by historians, either ancient or modern, among the duties incumbent upon them, nor yet among the natural expectations of their readers; but is reserved for the special historian of philosophy. Accordingly, I have brought my history of Greece to a close, without attempting to do justice either to Plato or to Aristotle. I hope to contribute something towards supplying this defect, the magnitude of which I fully appreciate, in a separate work, devoted specially to an account of Greek speculative philosophy in the fourth century B.C.

APPENDIX.

ON ISSUS

AND ITS NEIGHBOURHOOD AS CONNECTED WITH THE BATTLE.

The exact battle-field of Issus cannot be certainly assigned upon the evidence accessible to us. But it may be determined, within a few miles north or south; and what is even more important—the general features of the locality, as well as the preliminary movements of the contending armies, admit of being clearly conceived and represented. The annexed Plan, of the country round the Gulf of Issus, will enable the reader to follow easily what is certain, and to understand the debate about what is matter of hypothesis.

That the battle was fought, in some portion of the narrow space intervening between the eastern coast of the Gulf of Issus and the western flank of Mount Amanus—that Alexander's left and Darius's right, rested on the sea, and their right and left respectively on the mountain—that Darius came upon Alexander unexpectedly from the rear, thus causing him to return back a day's march from Myriandrus, and, to recoup a pass which he had already passed through and quitted—these points are clearly given, and appear to me not open to question. We know that the river Pinarus, on which the battle was fought, was at a certain distance south of Issus, the last town of Kilikia before entering Syria (Arrian. ii. 7, 2)—τὴν ὑστεραίαν προὐχώρει (Darius from Issus) ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμὸν τὸν Πίναρον—Ritter erroneously states that Issus was upon the river Pinarus, which he even calls the Issus river (Erdkunde, Theil iv. Abth. 2. p. 1787-1808). We know also that this river was at some distance north of the maritime pass called the Gates of Kilikia and Assyria, through which Alexander passed and repassed.
But when we proceed, beyond these data (the last of them only vague and relative), to fix the exact battle-field, we are reduced to conjecture. Dr. Thirlwall, in an appendix to the sixth volume of his History, has collected and discussed very ably the different opinions of various geographers;

To those whom he has cited, may be added—Mr. Ainsworth's Essay on the Cilician and Syrian Gates (in the Transactions of the Geographical Society for 1837)—Mütsel's Topographical Notes on the third book of Quintus Curtius—and the last volume of Ritter's Erdkunde, published only this year (1855), ch. xxvii. p. 177 sqq.

We know from Xenophon that Issus was a considerable town close to the sea—two days' march from the river Pyrgmus, and one day's march northward of the maritime pass called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria. That it was near the northeastern corner of the Gulf, may also be collected from Strabo, who reckons the shortest line across Asia Minor, as-stretching from Sinope or Amisos to Issus—and who also lays down the Egyptian sea as having its northern termination at Tane (Strabo, xiv. p. 647; xvi. p. 749). The probable site of Issus has been differently determined by different authors; Rennell (Illustrations of the Geography of the Anabasis, p. 42-48) places it near Oseler or Yusler; as far as I can judge, this seems too far distant from the head of the Gulf, towards the south.

In respect to the maritime pass, called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, there is much discrepancy between Xenophon and Arrian. It is evident that, in Xenophon's time, this pass and the road of march through it lay between the mountains and the sea—and that the obstructions (walls blocking up the passage), which he calls insurmountable by force, were mainly of artificial creation. But when Alexander passed no walls existed. The artificial obstructions had disappeared during the seventy years between Xenophon and Alexander; and we can assign a probable reason why. In Xenophon's time, Kilikia was occupied by the native prince Syennesis, who, though tributary, maintained a certain degree of independence even in regard to the Great King, and therefore kept a wall guarded by his own soldiers on his boundary towards Syria. But in Alexander's time, Kilikia was occupied, like Syria, by a Persian satrap. Artificial boundary walls, between two confederate satrapies under the same master, were unnecessary; and must even have been found inconvenient, during the great collective military operations of the Persian satrapies against the revolted Evagoras of Cyprus (principally carried on from Kilikia as a base, about 380 B.C., Diodor. xv. 2)—as well as in the subsequent operations against the Phœnician towns (Diodor. xvi. 42). Hence we may discern the reason why all artificial obstructions may have been swept away before the time of Alexander; leaving only the natural difficulties of the neighbouring ground, upon which Xenophon has not touched.

The spot still retained its old name—"The Gates of Kilikia and Syria"—even after walls and gates had been dispensed with. But that same, in Arrian's description, designates a difficult and narrow point of the road over hills and rocks; a point which Major Rennell (Illustrations, p. 34) supposes to have been about a mile south of the river and walls described by Xenophon. However this may be, the precise spot designated by Xenophon seems probably to be sought about seven miles north of Scanderoom, near the ruins now known as Jonas's Pillars (or Sakal Tutu), and the Castle of Merke, where a river called Merkeis, Maberya, or Kara-su, flows across from the mountain to the sea. That this river is the same with the Keres of Xenophon, is the opinion of Rennell, Ainsworth, and Mütsel; as well as of Colonel Callier, who surveyed the country when accompanying the army of Ibrahim Pacha as engineer (cited by Ritter, Erdk. p. 1782). At the spot here mentioned, the gulf indents eastward, while the western flank of Amanus approaches very close to it, and droops with unusual steepness towards it. Hence the road now followed does not pass between the mountain and the sea; but ascends over a portion of the mountains and descends again afterwards to the low
ground skirting the sea. Northward of Merkes, the space between the mountain and the sea gradually widens, towards Bayas. At some distance to the north of Bayas occurs the river now called Delle Tschai, which is considered, I think with probability, to be the Pinarus, where the battle between Alexander and Darius was fought. This opinion however is not unanimous; Kinneir identifies the Merkes with the Pinarus. Moreover, there are several different streams which cross the space between Mount Amanus and the sea. Des Moneaux notices six streams as having been crossed between the Castle of Merkes and Bayas; and five more streams between Bayas and Ayas (Miitzel ad Curtium, p. 105). Which among these is the Pinarus, cannot be settled without more or less of doubt.

Besides the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, noted by Xenophon and Arrian in the above passages, there are also other Gates called the Amanian Gates, which are spoken of in a perplexing manner. Dr. Thirlwall insists with propriety on the necessity of distinguishing the maritime passes, between Mount Amanus and the sea—from the inland passes, which crossed over the ridge of Mount Amanus itself. But this distinction seems not uniformly observed by ancient authors, when we compare Strabo, Arrian and Callisthenes. Strabo uses the phrase, Amanian Gates, twice (xiv. p. 676; xvi. p. 751); in both cases designating a maritime pass, and not a pass over the mountain—yet designating one maritime pass in the page first referred to, and another in the second. In xiv. p. 676—he means by ἀπὸ Αμανίνης πύλαι, the spot called by modern travellers Demir Kapu, between Ayas and Issus, or between Mopsuestia and Issus; while in xvi. 751—he means by the same words that which I have been explaining as the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, on the eastern side of the Gulf of Issus. In fact, Strabo seems to conceive as a whole, the strip of land between Mount Amanus and the Gulf, beginning at Demir Kapu, and ending at the Gates of Kilikia and Syria—and to ta" both the beginning and the end of it by the same name—the Amanian Gates. But he does not use this last phrase to designate the passage over or across Mount Amanus; neither does Arrian; who in describing the march of Darius from Sochi into Kilikia, says (ii. 7, 1)—ὑπερβαλὼν δὴ τὸ πόσον Δαρεῖος τὸ κατὰ τὰς πύλας τὰς Ἀμανικὰς καλουμένας, ὡς εἴη ἡ ἔσον προῆς, καὶ ἐγένετο κατὰ τὸν Ἀμανίνην ἀναμ. Here, let it be observed, we do not read υπερβαλὼν τὰς πύλας—no, can I think that the words mean, as the translator gives them—"transit Amanum, eundo por Pyros Amanicas." The words rather signify, that Darius "crossed over the mountain where it adjoined the Amanian Gates"—i.e. where it adjoined the strip of land skirting the Gulf, and lying between those two extreme points which Strabo denominates Amanian Gates. Arrian employs this last phrase more loosely than Strabo, yet still with reference to the maritime strip, and not to a col over the mountain ridge.

On the other hand, Callisthenes (if he is rightly represented by Polybius, who recites his statement, not his words, xii. 17) uses the words Amanian Gates to signify the passage by which Darius entered Kilikia—that is, the passage over the mountain. That which Xenophon and Arrian call the Gates of Kilikia and Syria—and which Strabo calls Amanian Gates—is described by Polybius as τὰ στενὰ καὶ τὰς λεγομένας ἐν ἧν Κιλικία πύλας.

I have marked on the Plan the pass by which Darius crossed Mount Amanus, as it stands on Kiepert's Map, and on Chesney's Map; in the line from Aintab to the head of the Gulf, near the 37th parallel. It seems pretty certain that this must have been Darius's line of march, because he came down immediately upon Issus, and then marched forward to the river Pinarus. Had he entered Kilikia by the pass of Beylan, he must have passed the Pinarus before he reached Issus. The positive grounds for admitting a practicable pass near the 37th parallel, are indeed called in question by Miützal (ad Curtium, p. 102, 103), and are not in themselves conclusive; still I hold them sufficient, when taken in conjunction with the probabilities of the case. This pass was, however, we may suppose, less frequented than the maritime line of road, through the Gates of Kilikia and Syria,
and the pass of Beylan; which, as the more usual, was preferred both by the Cyreians and by Alexander.

Respecting the march of Alexander, Dr. Thirlwall here starts a question, substantially to this effect: "Since Alexander intended to march through the pass of Beylan for the purpose of attacking the Persian camp at Sochi, what could have caused him to go to Myriandrus, which was more south than Beylan, and out of his road?" Dr. Thirlwall feels this difficulty so forcibly, that in order to eliminate it, he is inclined to accept the hypothesis of Mr. Williams, which places Myriandrus at Bayas, and the Kiliko-Syrian Gates at Demir-Kapu; an hypothesis which appears to me inadmissible on various grounds, and against which Mr. Ainsworth (in his Essay on the Cilician and Syrian Gates) has produced several very forcible objections.

I confess that I do not feel the difficulty on which Dr. Thirlwall insists. When we see that Cyrus and the Ten Thousand went to Myriandrus, in their way to the Pass of Beylan, we may reasonably infer that, whether that town was in the direct line or not, it was at least in the usual road of march—which does not always coincide with the direct line. But to waive this supposition, however—let us assume that there existed another shorter road leading to Beylan without passing by Myriandrus—there would still be reason enough to induce Alexander to go somewhat out of his way, in order to visit Myriandrus. For it was an important object with him to secure the sea-ports in his rear, in case of a possible reverse. Suppose him repulsed and forced to retreat,—it would be a material assistance to his retreat, to have assured himself beforehand of Myriandrus as well as the other sea-ports.

In the approaching months, we shall find him just as careful to make sure of the Phenician cities on the coast, before he marches into the interior to attack Darius at Arbela.

Farther, Alexander, marching to attack Darius, had nothing to gain by haste, and nothing to lose by coming up to Sochi three days later. He knew that the enormous Persian host would not try to escape; it would either await him at Sochi, or else advance into Kilikia to attack him there. The longer he tarried, the more likely they were to do the latter, which was what he desired. He had nothing to lose therefore in any way, and some chance of gain, by prolonging his march to Sochi for as long a time as was necessary to secure Myriandrus. There is no more difficulty, I think, in understanding why he went to Myriandrus than why he went westward from Tarsus (still more out of his line of advance) to Soli and Anchialus.

It seems probable (as Rennell (p. 56) and others think), that the site of Myriandrus is now some distance inland; that there has been an accretion of new land and morass on the coast.

The modern town of Scanderoon occupies the site of Ἀλεξανδρεία κατ' Ἰσσον, founded (probably by order of Alexander himself) in commemoration of the victory of Issus. According to Ritter (p. 1791), "Alexander had the great idea of establishing there an emporium for the traffic of the East with Europe, as at the other Alexandrias for the trade of the East with Egypt." The importance of the site of Scanderoon, in antiquity, is here greatly exaggerated. I know no proof that Alexander had the idea which Ritter ascribes to him; and it is certain that his successors had no such idea; because they founded the great cities of Antioch and Seleucia (in Phoös), both of them carrying the course of trade up the Orontes, and therefore diverting it away from Scanderoon. This latter town is only of importance as being the harbour of Aleppo; a city (Beroea) of little consequence in antiquity, while Antioch became the first city in the East, and Seleucia among the first: see Ritter, p. 1152.
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